RICHARD E. GRIDER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 21, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002554-MR
RICHARD E. GRIDER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANN O'MALLEY SHAKE, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 98-CR-003090
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, DYCHE, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
Richard Grider was arrested in Jefferson County on
September 18, 1998, and charged with reckless driving and driving
under the influence, third offense.
A breathalyzer test revealed
a blood alcohol concentration level of 0.23.
KRS 189A.010(4)(c),
the pertinent provision of the driving under the influence
statute, was amended in 1998.
The version in effect at the time
of Grider’s arrest stated that “for a third offense within a five
(5) year period, . . . [i]f the alcohol concentration is 0.18 or
above,” the offense was a class “D” felony.
Grider entered a
conditional guilty plea to the charges on September 24, 1999,
reserving the right to challenge the constitutionality of the
statute and to challenge the trial court’s denial of his
suppression motion.
The Kentucky Supreme Court recently ruled
that the 1998 amendments to KRS 189A.010 were constitutional.
Cornelison v. Commonwealth, Ky., 52 S.W.3d 570 (2001).
Prior to the rendition of Cornelison, the Legislature
again amended KRS 189A.010.
Third-time offenders are no longer
subject to felony sanctions, even if their blood alcohol
concentration is greater than 0.18.
Instead, a third-time
offender whose blood alcohol concentration is greater than 0.18
is subject to enhanced misdemeanor penalties.
& (11).
KRS 189A.010(5)(c)
The amended statute became effective on October 1, 2000.
Following his May 30, 2000, arrest for probation
violation, Grider filed a CR 60.02 motion with the Jefferson
Circuit Court, seeking to have the judgment of conviction and
sentence set aside as inequitable in light of the 2000 amendments
to the statute, and requesting that the court allow him to enter
his plea of guilty under the amended statute.
denied, and this appeal followed.
The motion was
Grider cites no Kentucky
authority in support of his request for retroactive application
of the 2000 amendments, and plainly ignores the weight of
authority against him.
KRS 446.080(3) states that “[n]o statute
shall be construed to be retroactive, unless expressly so
declared,” and KRS 446.080(2) states that “[t]here shall be no
difference in the construction of civil, penal, and criminal
statutes.”
Kentucky courts have consistently followed these
rules of construction.
See University of Louisville v. O’Bannon,
Ky., 770 S.W.2d 215, 216 (1989); White v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
-2-
32 S.W.3d 83, 86 (2000).
KRS 189A.010, as amended in 2000, is
silent on the question of retroactive application.
We therefore
conclude that the Legislature intended the statute to have only
prospective application.
60.02 motion.
The trial court properly denied his CR
See Land v. Commonwealth, Ky., 986 S.W.2d 440
(1999).
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John T. Fowler, III
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Elizabeth A. Heilman
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-3-
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