FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND MELECIO JACOBO-RAMIREZ v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 28, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002527-MR
FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-541
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
AND
NO.
2000-CA-002556-MR
MELECIO JACOBO-RAMIREZ
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00541
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, JOHNSON, and SCHRODER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
The appellants, Francisco Rodriguez and Melecio
Jacobo-Ramirez, were convicted of multiple crimes following a
jury trial in the Fayette Circuit Court.
Both were convicted on
two counts of second-degree criminal possession of a forged
instrument (KRS1 516.060); Jacobo-Ramirez was also convicted of
first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance (KRS
218A.1412) and of possession of drug paraphernalia (KRS
218A.500).
Rodriguez and Jacobo-Ramirez (Melecio) appeal from
the judgments of the Fayette Circuit Court entered on October 10,
2000, as to their respective convictions.
Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
On March 21, 2000, pursuant to a warrant, the Lexington
police searched the apartment where the appellants resided along
with Melecio’s brother, Felipe.
Rodriguez and Felipe were at
home when police arrived, and they cooperated with the officers
conducting the search.
Melecio was located at a local bar; he
was searched and was taken back to the apartment.
All three
occupants of the apartment were of Hispanic descent and did not
speak English.
Therefore, a police translator, Officer Rick
Schad, was present during the search to assist the investigating
officers.
As a result of the search, the appellants and Felipe
were arrested and were charged with trafficking, possession of
drug paraphernalia, and second-degree criminal possession of a
forged instrument.
They were tried together in August 2000.
At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the
three men sharing the two-bedroom apartment had been the subject
of the police search; that Rodriguez had his own bedroom; and
that the Jacobo-Ramirez brothers shared the other bedroom.
Officer Schad testified that when he asked Rodriguez for
identification, he directed the officer to look under the
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-2-
mattress in his bedroom.
Officer Schad did so and found a wallet
containing a Social Security card with the name “Jose Islas,” a
resident alien card with Rodriguez’s name and picture, and about
$216 in cash.
No drugs or drug paraphernalia were found on
Rodriguez or in his room.
In the bedroom shared by the Jacobo-Ramirez brothers,
police officers found a set of digital scales, three separate
bags of cocaine, $1550 in cash in a shirt pocket, and several
documents — later determined to be counterfeit, which included
Social Security cards and resident alien cards in the names of
Felipe and Melecio Jacobo-Ramirez and a resident alien card in
the name of Jose Islas, matching the name on the social security
card found in Rodriguez’s wallet.
The Jacobo-Ramirez brothers
each had about $600 in cash on their persons.
Melecio also had a
cell phone, and Felipe was carrying a suspected “debt sheet” -- a
list of names juxtaposed with varying amounts of cocaine.
Melecio and Felipe Jacobo-Ramirez were convicted on all
crimes charged in the indictments; Rodriguez was acquitted of the
drug-related charges but was found guilty on the charges that he
possessed two forged instruments.
Melecio was sentenced to serve
six years in prison for the trafficking offense, one year on each
of the two counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument
(these three sentences to run consecutively with each other), and
12 months on the paraphernalia misdemeanor (to run concurrently
with the felony convictions) — for a total of eight years.
Rodriguez was sentenced to one year on each count of criminal
possession of a forged instrument (the sentences to run
-3-
consecutively) for a total of two years to serve.
The appeals
of Jacobo-Ramirez and Rodriguez have been designated to be heard
together.2
NO.
2000-CA-002556
As his sole allegation of error, Melecio argues that
the trial court erred by failing to grant either of two motions
for a mistrial.
These motions were made after police officers
testified to statements allegedly made by brother/co-defendant,
Felipe.
Melecio contends that the statements were incriminating
to him and that they violated his constitutional right of
confrontation.
The first motion for a mistrial was made after
Detective Doug Caldwell testified that Felipe told him that he
and his brother lived in the apartment together.
The second
motion was based on Officer Schad’s testimony that Felipe told
the officers searching the apartment that he had no knowledge
that drugs were in the apartment and that they belonged to
Melecio.
Melecio argues that the trial court’s denial of his
requests for a mistrial warrants a reversal of his drug-related
convictions and a remand for a new trial.
We disagree.
Statements of non-testifying co-defendants which tend
to incriminate the other defendant violate the constitutional
right of confrontation.
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123,
88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); Lowe v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
2
Although he was tried with the appellants, Felipe JacoboRamirez filed a belated appeal, the merits of which were not
ready for submission to this panel.
-4-
487 S.W.2d 935 (1972).
However, such a violation is subject to
harmless error analysis.
[W]here a violation of the Bruton rule occurs
it need not constitute reversible error if
the evidence introduced through the
confession or statement of the non-testifying
co-defendant is cumulative and other evidence
of the guilt of the accused is overwhelming.
In such a case only harmless error occurs and
the conviction may be upheld.
Butler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 516 S.W.2d 326, 328 (1974).
See
also, Gill v. Commonwealth, Ky., 7 S.W.3d 365, 368 (1999), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 830, 121 S.Ct. 83, 148 L.Ed.2d 45 (2000).
Prior to Detective Caldwell’s allegedly objectionable
testimony, other evidence had been admitted concerning the layout of the apartment, which defendants occupied the bedrooms, et
cetera.
There had also been testimony concerning the contents
discovered during the search of the bedrooms indicating which
rooms were used by each of the defendants.
We have reviewed the
video tape containing Detective Caldwell’s testimony as to
Felipe’s statement about the living arrangements in the
apartment.
evidence.
We conclude that it qualifies as
“cumulative”
The trial court’s denial of the motion for mistrial in
this instance amounted at the very most to harmless error -- if
indeed any error at all.
Felipe’s second statement as related by Officer Schad
involved more serious implications for Melecio.
testified about the search from memory.
Officer Schad
Since he was present at
the scene of the search in his capacity as an interpreter,
Officer Schad did not keep any notes nor did he generate a
report.
In addition to constituting a Bruton violation, his
-5-
testimony was inaccurate.
During the bench conference on
Melecio’s renewed motion for a mistrial, the prosecutor
acknowledged that Felipe had admitted that the drugs were his -contrary to Officer Schad’s testimony.
The prosecutor suggested
that the court allow her to lead Officer Schad in order to elicit
the actual responses made by Felipe.
The trial court reasoned
that if the Commonwealth were allowed to impeach its own witness,
the defendants were likely to benefit.
Thus, it denied the
motion for a mistrial as unnecessary unless Officer Schad
continued to misquote Felipe.
When the testimony resumed,
Officer Schad corrected himself and testified that Felipe had
admitted to purchasing the drugs.
On this point as well, we conclude that any error in
failing to grant a mistrial amounts to the harmless error due to
the overwhelming evidence of Melecio’s guilt.
Melecio had worked
at a horse farm and earned slightly more than minimum wage.
When
he was searched, he was found to possess more than $600 in cash
and a cell phone; more than 71 grams of cocaine in various
containers; digital scales; and even more cash in his bedroom.
We agree with the Commonwealth that the evidence of Melecio’s
trafficking in cocaine was so overwhelming that no possible
prejudice occurred warranting either the reversal of his
conviction or a new trial.
NO.
2000-CA-002527
Rodriguez, who was acquitted of the more serious drug
charges, argues that he should have received a directed verdict
-6-
since the evidence was insufficient to convict him of possessing
a forged Social Security card and a forged resident alien card.
The standard for determining the appropriateness of a directed
verdict in a criminal case was set forth by the Kentucky Supreme
Court in Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991),
citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, Ky., 660 S.W.2d 3 (1983):
On motion for directed verdict, the
trial court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given. For the purpose of ruling on the
motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
reserving to the jury questions as to the
credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a
directed verdict is, if under the evidence as
a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for
a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant
is entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal.
Sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to
support the guilty verdict on the first count of criminal
possession of a forged instrument.
That evidence indicated that
the wallet under Rodriguez’s mattress contained a Social Security
card -- later determined to be counterfeit.
Even though found in
another room in the apartment, the forged resident alien card
matching the name on the Social Security card in his wallet
constituted sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that
Rodriguez was connected to the green card and thus to support the
second conviction for possessing a forged instrument.
criteria required for a directed verdict were not met.
-7-
The
Rodriguez also argues that he was denied a fair trial
by the presentation of “false testimony.”
Officer Schad
testified that Rodriguez’s wallet contained a resident alien card
bearing the name and photograph of Rodriguez.
Unlike the forged
documents bearing the name “Jose Islas,” a green card in
Rodriguez’s name was not introduced at trial.
It is unclear from
the record whether Officer Schad--the only interpreter for the
three defendants and the many officers involved in the search-confused Rodriguez with one of the other defendants or whether
such a document may have existed and was lost.
However, Rodriguez did not object to any of the
testimony that he now claims was misleading and prejudicial.
A
defendant must make an objection to evidence admitted at trial in
order to preserve any alleged error for review.
RCr3 9.22.
Without a “proper objection” to preserve the error for appellate
review, this Court may not consider the merits of the issue.
Sherley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 889 S.W.2d 794, 796 (1994); West v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 780 S.W.2d 600, 602 (1989).
The trial court
must first be given the opportunity to rule on the issue.
Id.
Although Rodriguez suggests that he is entitled to relief under
RCr 10.26, he has not demonstrated the existence of a “manifest
injustice” resulting from Officer Schad’s testimony, see Brock v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 24, 28 (1997).
We believe that
even without the testimony of Officer Schad, there was sufficient
evidence to support Rodriguez’s conviction for possessing
counterfeit documents.
3
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure.
-8-
Finally, Rodriguez contends that the trial court erred
in ordering that his two sentences be served consecutively
instead of concurrently (as recommended by the jury).
He
acknowledges that the trial court has broad discretion in
determining how multiple sentences are to be served with respect
to each other.
Swain v. Commonwealth, Ky., 887 S.W.2d 346
(1994); Dotson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 740 S.W.2d 930 (1987).
Nevertheless, he argues that abuse of discretion is apparent in
this case as the trial court justified its decision on facts not
in evidence.
Specifically, the trial court stated that it felt
“very strongly” that if a person came into the country illegally
and committed a crime, he should “do the time.”
Rodriguez
contends that there is no evidence that he came into the country
illegally and that the trial court was wrong to use that “fact”
in imposing his sentence.
The formal sentencing hearing in this case was
conducted after the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation
report -- a document which is not contained in the record for our
review.
While there was no evidence that Rodriguez came into the
country illegally, there was no evidence that he had entered the
country legally.
However, at the hearing, Rodriguez asked the
trial court to order that he be conditionally released until he
was picked up by the immigration authorities.
Thus, there was a
basis for the court to infer that even if his initial border
crossing had been legal, Rodriguez might have remained in this
country illegally.
Regardless of whether a defendant’s alien
status constitutes an appropriate consideration for the trial
-9-
court in these circumstances, the trial court articulated other
reasons for the manner in which it ordered the sentences to run.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to
order consecutive running of the sentences.
The judgments of the Fayette Circuit Court are
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT MELECIO
JACOBO-RAMIREZ:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kim Brooks
Covington, KY
Janine Coy Bowden
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT FRANCISCO
RODRIGUEZ:
Matthew W. Boyd
Lexington, KY
-10-
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