KENTUCKY LOTTERY CORPORATION v. KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION; RHONDA K. RICHARDSON; NORMAN MITCHELL; WILLIAM A. FRITTS; EDWARD J. GILMORE; AND KEITH HUNTER
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RENDERED: JULY 20, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002517-MR
KENTUCKY LOTTERY CORPORATION
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00655
v.
KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
COMMISSION; RHONDA K. RICHARDSON;
NORMAN MITCHELL; WILLIAM A. FRITTS;
EDWARD J. GILMORE; AND KEITH HUNTER
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, EMBERTON, AND HUDDLESTON, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
Kentucky Lottery Corporation ("the Lottery")
appeals from an order of the Franklin Circuit Court dismissing
the Lottery's petition for a writ of mandamus and requiring the
Lottery to pay attorney fees to Edward Gilmore and Keith Hunter.
Gilmore was discharged from employment by the Lottery
in November, 1998, and his initial application for unemployment
benefits was denied. He filed an appeal before the Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Commission and was represented before the
Commission by Hunter, who from 1989 until 1993 was General
Counsel for the Lottery.
The Lottery filed a motion with the
Commission seeking an order that Hunter be disqualified from
representing Gilmore in the action, claiming that such
representation violated Rule 1.9 (Conflict of interest:
client) of the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct.
former
The
Commission determined that it lacked jurisdiction into complaints
of attorney misconduct; the Lottery then filed a petition for
writ of mandamus in the Franklin Circuit Court, seeking an order
compelling the Commission to disqualify Hunter, and a separate
motion seeking a stay of the administrative proceedings while the
conflict of interest issue was pending.
The court denied the
motion for the stay, and by subsequent order established a
briefing schedule on the merits of the disqualification issue.
The Lottery's brief in support of its petition was
filed on July 26, 1999; Hunter's memorandum in opposition to the
petition was filed on August 26, 1999; the Commission's brief in
opposition was filed on September 3, 1999; and the Lottery's
reply brief was filed on September 10, 1999.
During the briefing
period, and while the motion for disqualification was pending
resolution on the merits in the circuit court, the unemployment
proceedings terminated with an award in Gilmore's favor.
On
September 10, 1999, the Lottery also filed a motion for voluntary
dismissal pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR)
41.01(2), noting that because proceedings before the Commission
had concluded, any ruling by the court on the issue of Hunter's
disqualification would be moot.
On December 22, 1999, the court
issued an order granting the motion for voluntary dismissal on
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the condition that the Lottery pay Gilmore's attorney fees.
The
Lottery was given twenty days to accept the court's terms or to
file a notice of rejection and prosecute the case on the merits.
The Lottery filed a rejection of the terms on January 11, 2000,
and requested that the court rule on the merits.
Hunter then filed a motion to supplement the record,
which was denied on February 22, 2000.
On March 2, 2000, the
court issued what purported to be a final order in the case,
again denying the motions for voluntary dismissal and to
supplement the record, and ordering the case dismissed on the
merits with prejudice, and requiring the Lottery to pay Gilmore's
costs and attorney fees.
On March 13, 2000, the Lottery moved
the court to alter, amend, or vacate the order, noting that the
court had not entered findings of fact or conclusions of law.
On
September 26, 2000, the court entered an order containing
findings of fact and conclusions of law, stating that the Lottery
had refused to prosecute its case against Gilmore in an attempt
to avoid an adverse decision, and that the Lottery had acted in
bad faith in its effort to disqualify Hunter in his
representation of Gilmore.
The court thus reaffirmed its
previous order, incorporating the findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
The Lottery now appeals.
In Louisville Label, Inc. v. Hildesheim, Ky., 843
S.W.2d 321, 325 (1992), the Supreme Court stated that a trial
court had three options when faced with a motion for voluntary
dismissal:
deny the motion; impose terms as conditions for the
voluntary dismissal; or sustain the motion unconditionally.
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"But
the court [can] not turn a motion for voluntary dismissal under
CR 41.01(2) into an involuntary dismissal under CR 41.02."
Id.
CR 41.02(1) provides for involuntary dismissal as
follows:
"For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply
with these rules or any order of the court, a defendant may move
for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him."
(Emphasis added.)
The trial court in this case cited the
Lottery's failure to prosecute as its primary cause for
dismissing the action with prejudice and awarding costs and
attorney fees.
We have searched the record in vain for a motion
made by Gilmore or Hunter for such a dismissal.
As in Louisville
Label, the appellees here "had the right to move for an
involuntary dismissal, with prejudice, for any reason provided
for by the civil rules.
But [they have] not done so.
[Their]
right to an involuntary dismissal has never been established in
this record."
843 S.W.2d at 325.
If, on remand, the trial court finds itself faced with
such a motion and deems it inappropriate, the court should
include in its findings of fact a determination of the merits of
the Lottery's initial claim, i.e., whether Hunter's actions
violated Rule 1.9.
Finally, we briefly address the issue of the award of
attorney fees.
CR 41.01(2), dealing with voluntary dismissal,
provides that a matter may be dismissed on the plaintiff's motion
"upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as
the court deems proper."
(Emphasis added.)
CR 41.02 contains no
similar provision for an involuntary dismissal.
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In Northern
Kentucky Port Auth. v. Cornett, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 392, 394 (1985),
the Supreme Court stated that "costs and attorney fees may be
awarded in a voluntary dismissal . . . upon a finding of bad
faith or unreasonable delay . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
The Court
in Louisville Label stated that it remanded the case in Northern
Kentucky Port Auth. for the trial court to determine the issue of
bad faith, "thus justifying an award of attorney's fees and
litigation expenses as a condition of dismissal."
Label, 843 S.W.2d at 324 (emphasis added).
Louisville
Thus, while attorney
fees and costs are clearly allowed as a condition of dismissal
under CR 41.01(2), the absence of similar authority for the trial
court to impose "terms and conditions" on an involuntary
dismissal precludes an award of attorney fees if the award is
based solely on CR 41.02.
The decision of the Franklin Circuit Court is vacated,
and this case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES KENTUCKY
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
COMMISSION, RHONDA K.
RICHARDSON, NORMAN MITCHELL
AND WILLIAM A. FRITTS:
James D. Allen
Lizbeth Ann Tully
Lexington, Kentucky
Randall K. Justice
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES EDWARD J.
GILMORE AND KEITH HUNTER:
Keith B. Hunter
Louisville, Kentucky
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