DAVEN AARON CRABTREE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: June 22, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002400-MR
DAVEN AARON CRABTREE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCLEAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00019
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Daven Aaron Crabtree brings this appeal from a
September 13, 2000, judgment of the McLean Circuit Court entered
upon a conditional plea of guilty under Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr)
8.09.
We reverse.
The sole issue presented for our consideration is
whether the circuit court erred in failing to suppress evidence
seized incident to Crabtree's arrest.
Our review of the circuit
court's factual determination is under the substantial evidence
rule.
(1984).
RCr 9.78, see Diehl v. Commonwealth, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 711
Our review of the applicable law is, of course, de novo.
On March 20, 2000, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Crabtree
was driving his Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck from Owensboro,
Daviess County, Kentucky, along Highway 81 toward his home in
McLean County, Kentucky.
Detective Jim Saddler of the Owensboro
Police Department (OPD) was off duty and going home after a
“workout” at the department gym.
He was driving an unmarked
detective vehicle, wearing gym shorts and a tee-shirt.
Detective
Saddler observed Crabtree driving erratically in Daviess County.
Suspecting Crabtree was driving under the influence (DUI),
Detective Saddler called the OPD dispatcher on his cell phone.1
He asked the dispatcher to contact the Daviess County Sheriff.
Realizing he was entering McLean County, he also requested the
dispatch unit to notify McLean County law enforcement and
Kentucky State Police (KSP).
For whatever reason, no contact was
made with McLean County law enforcement.
Subsequently, Detective
Saddler established contact with the KSP by cell phone.
Detective Saddler testified that the KSP instructed him to
maintain surveillance of Crabtree.
The record does not reveal
the dispatcher's identity or the extent of his authority.
In McLean County, Crabtree turned off the public
highway into a private drive, and Detective Saddler gave up his
surveillance.
He so advised the KSP.
It is unclear whether
Detective Saddler terminated his cell phone communication at this
time.
Nevertheless, Detective Saddler turned his car around with
the intention of returning to Daviess County.
1
At this time,
Detective Saddler testified he did not have his police
radio with him at the time.
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Crabtree began following him.
private drive.
Detective Saddler pulled into a
He advised the KSP he was back on the case since
Crabtree was back on the public highway.
Crabtree drove past the
drive where Detective Saddler had stopped, then exited onto a
McLean County gravel road.
He turned his vehicle around and
parked facing the highway.
Detective Saddler re-entered the
highway and then pulled onto the gravel road where Crabtree had
stopped, directly facing Crabtree's truck.
headlights to headlights.
The vehicles were
Detective Saddler exited his vehicle.
He possessed no indicia of a law enforcement officer.
He did,
however, possess a pistol which was tucked in the back waistband
of his gym shorts.
He immediately identified himself as an
Owensboro police officer and asked Crabtree if he was carrying
any weapons.
Crabtree told him that he was carrying a loaded gun
in his belt.
Detective Saddler then sat Crabtree on the ground
and proceeded to take the loaded gun from him.
then noticed Crabtree “fidgeting.”
Detective Saddler
Upon inspection, Detective
Saddler discovered a black container between Crabtree's legs as
Crabtree sat cross-legged on the ground.
Detective Saddler
opened the container and found baggies of what later proved to be
methamphetamine and half of a marijuana cigarette.
The record is
unclear, but at some point in the foregoing proceedings,
Detective Saddler put Crabtree in handcuffs and informed him that
he was being detained until the KSP arrived.
Kentucky State
Trooper J. M. Woo arrived some twenty minutes later.2
2
Trooper
Trooper Woo's Uniform Offense Report indicated that he was
dispatched at approximately 6:25 p.m. He arrived at the scene at
(continued...)
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Woo and Detective Saddler both searched Crabtree's vehicle.
The
search yielded rounds of ammunition and the drug pseudoephedrine,
a raw material used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
On May 16, 2000, Crabtree was indicted by the McLean
County Grand Jury on four counts, first-degree possession of a
controlled substance while in the possession of a firearm
(Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 218A.1415 and KRS 218A.992),
possession of marijuana while in possession of a firearm (KRS
218A.1422 and KRS 218A.992), carrying a concealed weapon (KRS
527.020), and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of a
controlled substance, first offense (KRS 189A.010).
On August
10, 2000, Crabtree, through counsel, filed a motion to suppress
evidence seized incident to his arrest.
the circuit court denied the motion.
After a full hearing,
Crabtree thereupon entered
into a conditional plea to amended charges.
This appeal follows.
We are presented with the single issue of whether the
circuit court erred in failing to suppress the evidence.
In its
opinion, the circuit court reasoned as follows:
The general principle among law enforcement
agencies is to pursue and apprehend criminals
who have fled from the vicinity in which the
crime was committed. Holland v.
Commonwealth, 294 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. 1956). This
general principle makes sense in that the
public would expect any peace officer to
2
(...continued)
approximately 6:50 p.m. Detective Saddler testified that
Crabtree was “detained” for approximately twenty-five minutes
before Trooper Woo arrived. Additionally, Trooper Woo's report
of the incident was titled “Carrying Concealed Deadly Weapon.”
We note that Crabtree's detention and Trooper Woo's response time
were nearly identical. Considering these facts, we must conclude
that Trooper Woo was not officially dispatched until after
Detective Saddler detained Crabtree and seized the gun.
-4-
pursue suspected criminal activity rather
than turning away from such conduct. KRS
431.007 authorizes a full-time police officer
of any city, county or urban-county
government to assist in any matter when
within the jurisdiction of the requesting
agency. In the case sub judice, Officer
Saddler was pursuing suspected criminal
activity and was assisting the Kentucky State
Police by keeping the Defendant under
surveillance. Officer Saddler was in effect
detaining the Defendant until the Kentucky
State Police could arrive. Certainly, the
detention was necessary for the protection of
the public due to the erratic driving
behavior and because of the exigent
circumstance. Officer Saddler had the right
to pat down the Defendant for his own
personal safety which resulted in the seizure
of the pistol. Even though Officer Saddler
may not have had the right to seize the black
film canister which the Defendant was trying
to conceal, this item would have been
inevitably discovered at the time Trooper Woo
arrived and placed the Defendant under
arrest.
Crabtree specifically argues that (1) his detention by
Detective Saddler was, in fact, an arrest; and (2) Detective
Saddler is an Owensboro police officer and thus was without
jurisdiction to effect his arrest in McLean County.
We shall
address these arguments seriatim.
An arrest occurs whenever an individual is
significantly deprived of his freedom of action.
See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)
(distinguishing between arrest and mere detention).
Detective
Saddler seated Crabtree on the ground in front of his cruiser,
handcuffed him, and held him over twenty minutes until Trooper
Woo arrived.
Detective Saddler testified Crabtree was not free
to leave at that point.
As such, we hold Crabtree was clearly
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under arrest.
We now turn to Crabtree's next argument of whether
Detective Saddler had jurisdiction to arrest in McLean County.
It is well-established that a law enforcement officer
may cross jurisdictional boundaries if in actual pursuit of a
fleeing suspect.
KRS 431.045; See Holland v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
294 S.W.2d 83 (1956).
Here, the evidence is uncontroverted that
Detective Saddler was not in “actual pursuit” of Crabtree.
Crabtree was not in the process of fleeing a crime and, in fact,
did not know he was being followed by law enforcement as proved
by his willingness to follow Detective Saddler.
Further,
Detective Saddler testified he was merely maintaining
surveillance.
Hence, we are of the opinion that Detective
Saddler was not in “actual pursuit” of Crabtree pursuant to KRS
431.045.
To determine Detective Saddler's extrajurisdictional
power of arrest, we must also analyze KRS 431.007(1) which reads:
431.007. Arrest powers of peace officers
assisting in another county -- Exception.
(1)
A policeman directly employed as a
full-time police officer by a Kentucky
city, county, or urban-county
government and whose department meets
the requirements of KRS 15.440 and a
sheriff or full-time deputy sheriff who
is officially requested by a law
enforcement agency in another county in
Kentucky to assist in any matter within
the jurisdiction of the requesting
agency shall possess, while responding
to and for the duration of the matter
for which the request was made, the
same powers of arrest in the requesting
county as he possesses in the county in
which he is a police officer.
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We believe the intent of KRS 431.007(1) is to augment
county law enforcement in Kentucky's myriad counties by allowing
one county to officially request the assistance of another county
when the situation dictates.
We think the statute is restricted
to county-to-county involvement and does not extend to include
requests for assistance made by the KSP.
As no contact was ever
made with McLean County law enforcement, we are of the opinion
that KRS 431.007(1) is inapplicable to the case at hand.
Even if the KSP could be viewed as a law enforcement
agency under KRS 431.007(1), we cannot say that Detective Saddler
received an “official request” as mandated thereunder.
To
trigger the statute, it is clear that an official request must be
tendered before assistance may be rendered.
While the term
official request is not defined, we think that its meaning may be
gleaned from the statute itself and from the term's ordinary
usage.
KRS 431.007(1) bestows upon an assisting law
enforcement officer “the same powers of arrest . . . as he
possesses in the county in which he is a police officer.”
We are
mindful that under the statute the full complement of police
powers are unleashed upon an official request.
Hence, in our
interpretation, we must be cognizant of such monumental facet.
We are likewise cognizant that under our system the jurisdiction
of all officials is predetermined and specifically prescribed;
otherwise, it would open the door to impermissible use of
arbitrary power.
Ky. Const. §2.
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We turn to an examination of the term “officially
requested” as found in KRS 431.007(1).
“Officially” is obviously
derived from the root word official, which generally means:
Pertaining to an office; invested with the
character of an officer; proceeding from,
sanctioned by, or done by, an officer.
Authorized act.
Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1084 (6th ed. 1990).
To constitute an
“official request,” we think it axiomatic that the individual
making the request must be an official acting in his official
capacity by virtue of the office.
In the case at hand, the
record is devoid of the identity of the individual at KSP who
allegedly asked Detective Saddler to survey Crabtree.
We view
the identification of the person making the request as critical
in triggering KRS 431.007(1).
Without such, it cannot be
concluded that an official at KSP, with authority to do so,
requested Detective Saddler to assist in surveying Crabtree.
Our
inquiry, however, cannot end with the conclusion that KRS
431.007(1) is inapplicable.
Initially, Detective Saddler began surveying Crabtree
in Daviess County.3
By virtue of KRS 95.019(1), Detective
Saddler, as an Owensboro police officer, had jurisdiction to
arrest in Daviess County.
Detective Saddler, however, continued
to survey Crabtree into McLean County.
At this time, Detective
Saddler was acting outside of his jurisdiction, yet he identified
himself as a law enforcement officer upon exiting his vehicle to
3
Detective Saddler testified he did not stop Crabtree within
Daviess County as his vehicle was equipped only with a flashing
blue light and Owensboro Police Department policy requires both
the light and a siren in order to make a stop.
-8-
arrest Crabtree.
Upon these undisputed facts, we conclude that
Detective Saddler was acting under “color of his office.”
That
is, Detective Saddler utilized the force and effect of his
official position to arrest Crabtree.
We think it inherently
unconstitutional for an officer to effect an improper
extrajurisdictional arrest and seizure by using the force and
effect of his official position.
Const. §10.
U.S. Const. amend. IV, and Ky.
Indeed, as recognized in Collins v. State, 143 So.
2d 700, 703 (Fl. 1962):
Any other rule would undermine “the right of
the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effect,” and would
obliterate one of the most fundamental
distinctions between our form of government,
where officers are under the law, and the
police-state where they are the law.
(Emphasis added.)
In sum, we are of the opinion the circuit court
committed reversible error by failing to grant Crabtree's motion
to suppress.
Under the precepts of Johantgen v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 571 S.W.2d 110 (1978), we reverse as a conviction is
impossible absent the unconstitutionally seized evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the McLean
Circuit Court is reversed.
BARBER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stewart B. Elliott
Owensboro, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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