JEFFREY PALMER v. LISA DRIGGERS; MARK LEE; OWENSBORO MESSENGER-INQUIRER, INC.; AND THE CITY OF OWENSBORO, KENTUCKY OWENSBORO MESSENGER-INQUIRER, INC.
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RENDERED:
November 16, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002231-MR
JEFFREY PALMER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HENRY M. GRIFFIN, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00743
LISA DRIGGERS; MARK LEE;
OWENSBORO MESSENGER-INQUIRER, INC.; AND
THE CITY OF OWENSBORO, KENTUCKY
AND
NO. 2000-CA-002308-MR
OWENSBORO MESSENGER-INQUIRER, INC.
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HENRY M. GRIFFIN, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00743
JEFFREY PALMER; LISA DRIGGERS; MARK LEE;
AND THE CITY OF OWENSBORO, KENTUCKY
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART;
REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
APPELLEES
GUIDUGLI, HUDDLESTON AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
CROSS-APPELLEES
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Jeffrey Palmer, a former police officer for the
City of Owensboro, Kentucky, has appealed from a partial summary
judgment entered by the Daviess Circuit Court on August 22, 2000,
which pursuant to Kentucky’s Open Records Act allowed OwensboroMessenger Inquirer, Inc., to obtain copies of certain police
department records pertaining to a disciplinary action taken
against him.
Owensboro Messenger-Inquirer, Inc., has cross-
appealed from the same partial summary judgment claiming that the
trial court erred by redacting certain information from the
released documents.
Having concluded that the records are not
exempt from disclosure as claimed by Palmer and that the
redacting of certain information was in error, we affirm in part,
reverse in part and remand.
On April 19, 2000, Matthew Francis, a reporter for the
Messenger-Inquirer, an Owensboro newspaper, made an Open Records
request to the City of Owensboro.
Francis requested that the
City allow him to inspect various documents pertaining to
possible investigations and disciplinary actions related to
employees of the Owensboro Police Department.
The City of
Owensboro provided copies of certain documents and declined to
disclose other documents which had been requested.
On June 7, 2000, police officers Lisa Driggers, Mark
Lee, and Palmer filed in the Daviess Circuit Court a petition for
nondisclosure and exemption from the Open Records Act.
In
response, the newspaper asked the circuit court judge to review
-2-
the records in camera pursuant to KRS1 61.882(3).
After
reviewing the records and considering the parties’ written and
oral arguments, the trial court entered its partial summary
judgment where it found that a formal disciplinary complaint had
been filed against Palmer; that as a result of the complaint the
Owensboro City Commission began a formal hearing that was closed
at Palmer’s request; on the second day of the hearing, Palmer
indicated that he would submit his resignation, and the
disciplinary proceeding immediately ended; on April 18, 2000,
Palmer submitted his letter of resignation;2 neither Palmer’s
letter of resignation nor the written charges against him
incorporated any of the investigative documents in the City’s
files; an exhibit which was attached to the written charges
contained communications of a private nature involving third
parties and was evidentiary in nature and not an essential part
of the complaint; and all other information received by the
court, except for the complaint and letter of resignation,
related to matters which were not final at the time of the Open
Records request.
The trial court ordered that a redacted copy of
the complaint against Palmer be released to the newspaper.3
These appeals followed.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
The letter of resignation merely stated: “This letter is to
confirm that I am voluntarily resigning my position as Police
Officer, effective March 14, 2000.” Palmer does not object to
its disclosure.
3
The redacted complaint has not been released pending this
appeal.
-3-
Palmer claims: (1) that the documents requested were
exempt from disclosure under the preliminary action exemption to
the Open Records Act; (2) that the documents requested were
exempt pursuant to the personal privacy exemption contained in
the Open Records Act; and (3) that the documents requested were
exempt from disclosure by KRS 61.810(1)(f), the Open Meetings
Act.
Palmer argues that the documents requested by the
newspaper, including the complaint filed with the Owensboro City
Commission, relate to “preliminary matters” which are not subject
to disclosure pursuant to KRS 61.878(1)(i) and (j), which state:
(i)
Preliminary drafts, notes,
correspondence with private
individuals, other than
correspondence which is intended to
give notice of final action of a
public agency;
(j)
Preliminary recommendations, and
preliminary memoranda in which
opinions are expressed or policies
formulated or recommended[.]
In City of Louisville v. Courier-Journal & Louisville
Times Co.,4 this Court held that “Internal Affairs” are exempt
from public inspection.
The Court stated:
We do not find that the complaints per se are
exempt from inspection once final action is
taken. Inasmuch as whatever final actions
are taken necessarily stem from them, they
must be deemed incorporated as a part of
those final determinations. We acknowledge
that it is possible that these complaints
could be afforded continuing exemption under
subsection (g) relating to preliminary
4
Ky.App., 637 S.W.2d 658, 659-60 (1982).
-4-
correspondence with private individuals;
however, that determination would be made
upon consideration of the facts on a case-bycase basis and would be dealt with under KRS
61.878(3): “If any public record contains
material which is not excepted under this
section, the public agency shall separate the
excepted and make the nonexcepted material
available for examination” [emphasis added].
In Kentucky State Board of Medical Licensure v.
Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co.,5 this Court clarified its
position by holding that the exemption would not extend to the
complaints which initially spawned the investigation.
The Court
stated:
It is beyond contention that complaints which
“initially spawned” any investigations of
Kentucky physicians may not be excluded
because the public “has a right to know what
complaints have been made.” It is clear then
that the trial court was correct in ruling
that once final action is taken by the Board,
the initial complaints must be subject to
public scrutiny. The Board’s attempt to
categorize complaints as formal public
complaints and private individual complaints
has no bearing on whether such complaints
must be released. Inasmuch as final actions
stem from the complaints, they must be
incorporated as part of the final
determination and are therefore not exempt
under KRS 61.878(1)(g) or (h) [now (i) and
(j)] [citations omitted].
Palmer does not argue that the complaint filed against
him could not be disclosed under KRS 61.878(1)(i) and (j) and
Kentucky State Board of Medical Licensure, but instead argues
that no “final action” was ever taken by the Owensboro City
Commission.
5
In his brief, Palmer states:
Ky.App., 663 S.W.2d 953, 956 (1983).
-5-
In this case, the final decision maker,
the Owensboro City Commission, made no final
decision and took no final action regarding
the discipline of Officer Palmer. Officer
Palmer resigned from the Owensboro Police
Department on the second day of his hearing
before the Owensboro City Commission. The
commission took no action with respect to the
resignation and never ruled on the merits of
the charge. The city commission certainly
never incorporated any documents into any
final action that the commission took in this
case. Nor can it be said that the letter of
resignation incorporated any documents
produced to or by the City of Owensboro.
Palmer correctly states that whether his resignation
constitutes “final action” is an issue of first impression in
Kentucky.
However, we believe that to accept his argument that
since his resignation came before the Commission had an
opportunity to make a ruling, the resignation somehow negated any
“final action” from occurring in the case defies common sense.
Black’s Law Dictionary6 defines “final” as :
Last; conclusive; decisive; definitive;
terminated; completed. As used in reference
to legal actions, this word is generally
contrasted with ‘interlocutory.’ For res
judicata purposes, a judgment is ‘final’ if
no further action by court rendering judgment
is required to determine matter litigated.
Although Kentucky’s courts have not addressed the issue
of whether a resignation constitutes “final action,” there have
been several Opinions of the Attorney General that have dealt
with this issue.
6
Although this Court does not have to follow
629 (6th ed. 1990).
-6-
Opinions of the Attorney General, they have been considered
“highly persuasive.”7
In Ky OAG 85-147, the Attorney General was faced with a
situation where several complaints were filed against a
psychologist and the Board was preparing to proceed against the
psychologist when he resigned and his case was dismissed.
A
newspaper asked to inspect copies and/or have access to all
documents regarding the psychologist.
The Attorney General
ruled:
In the situation here, however, while
the Board has received several complaints
concerning the activities of a former
licenced psychologist and while the Board
itself prepared complaints against that
person and scheduled a hearing relative to
those matters, no final action has been taken
on those complaints. The former psychologist
submitted a resignation from the practice of
his profession and tendered his license to
practice his profession before any hearing
relative to the complaints was ever conducted
and before any action was taken by the Board
pertaining to those complaints. While those
documents were accepted with conditions
attached nothing associated with their
acceptance involved a final decision or final
action concerning the complaints [emphasis
original].
However, in a more recent Open Records Decision, the
Attorney General ruled in an unpublished opinion that resignation
constituted the final action of the agency.
In 00-ORD-107, the
Attorney General stated:
In his response to the letter of appeal,
Mr. McMillan indicated that the Strike
Force’s investigation did not determine the
7
York v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 815 S.W.2d 415 (1991).
-7-
allegations to be true, but that it did
accept the resignation of the Executive
Director. Apparently, as a result of the
resignation, no final action was taken on the
investigation, such as the issuance of a
final report. The fact that the agency
decided to take no further action on the
complaint or that the investigation was
preempted by the resignation, in our view,
indicates that the ‘final action’ of the
agency was to take ‘no action’ on the
complaint.
We believe that it is only logical to conclude that a
resignation from a position by an employee before the Commission
has reached a decision concerning possible termination is a
“final action.”
The effect of Palmer’s resignation was to end
the City’s disciplinary proceedings against him.
The subsequent
decision of the Commission to end the hearings against Palmer
constituted its “final action.”
Obviously, if the City had
proceeded with the disciplinary proceedings after Palmer’s
resignation when nothing further could be gained, since he had
already terminated his own employment, the Commission would have
been wasting government resources.
We must assume that all the
parties proceeded logically and recognized that Palmer’s
resignation was the final action to be taken.
Next, Palmer argues that the documents requested by the
newspaper were exempt from disclosure under the personal privacy
exemption contained in KRS 61.878(1)(a).
This section exempts
from disclosure:
Public records containing information of a
personal nature where the public disclosure
thereof would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[.]
-8-
Palmer argues that the complaint contains information
of personal, private matters which, if disclosed, would
constitute an invasion of his privacy.
He claims that there is
no purpose in disclosing the information other than to quench the
public’s curiosity.
To support his argument, Palmer cites this
Court to Kentucky Board of Examiners of Psychologists & Division
of Occupations & Professions, Dept. for Administration v.
Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co.8
In that case, the
newspaper brought an action under the Act seeking disclosure of
complaints by clients to the Board about an alleged act of sexual
misconduct.
Rejecting disclosure, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
stated:
A plain reading of subsection (1)(a)
reveals an unequivocal legislative intention
that certain records, albeit they are
“public,” are not subject to inspection,
because disclosure would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
[footnote omitted].9
However, the Court went on to state that judicial
review of a disclosure decision must be approached on a case-bycase basis:
The language of subsection (1)(a)
implies a number of other conclusions as
well. First, it reflects a public interest
in privacy, acknowledging that personal
privacy is of legitimate concern and worthy
of protection from invasion by unwarranted
public scrutiny. We are therefore spared
debate (or deprived of it) on privacy as a
matter of natural right or constitutional
8
Ky., 826 S.W.2d 324 (1992).
9
Id. at 327.
-9-
law. Second, the statute exhibits a general
bias favoring disclosure. An agency which
would withhold records bears the burden of
proving their exempt status. KRS 61.882(3).
The Act’s “basic policy” is to afford free
and open examination of public records, and
all exceptions must be strictly construed.
KRS 61.882(4), supra. Third, given the
privacy interest on the one hand and, on the
other, the general rule of inspection and its
underlying policy of openness for the public
good, there is but one available mode of
decision, and that is by comparative weighing
of the antagonist interests. Necessarily,
the circumstances of a particular case will
affect the balance. The statute contemplates
a case-specific approach by providing for de
novo judicial review of agency actions, and
by requiring that the agency sustain its
action by proof. Moreover, the question of
whether an invasion of privacy is “clearly
unwarranted” is intrinsically situational,
and can only be determined within a specific
context [emphasis added].
The public’s “right to know” under the
Open Records Act is premised upon the
public’s right to expect its agencies
properly to execute their statutory
functions. In general, inspection of records
may reveal whether the public servants are
indeed serving the public, and the policy of
disclosure provides impetus for an agency
steadfastly to pursue the public good.10
The first step in our analysis under KRS 61.878(1)(a)
must begin with a determination as to whether the information in
question is of a “personal nature.”
If we find that it is, then
we must determine whether public disclosure “would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
10
Id. at 327-28.
-10-
This latter
determination entails the comparative balancing of interests as
discussed in Kentucky Board of Examiners of Psychologists.11
In Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v.
Lexington Herald-Leader Co.,12 the Supreme Court analyzed the
decisions examining KRS 61.878(1)(a) and stated:
The foregoing decisions establish
certain points which are noteworthy in this
case. Of primary concern is the nature of
the information which is the subject of the
requested disclosure; whether it is the type
of information about which the public would
have little or no legitimate interest but
which would likely cause serious personal
embarrassment or humiliation. The Court had
no difficulty concluding in Board of
Examiners of Psychologists that information
which would have revealed the identities of
persons who had been sexually victimized
should not be produced. In Zink the
information sought did not implicate any
significant public interest but did
transgress, albeit not greatly, upon the
privacy of the subject individuals. Beckham
held that privacy rights may extend to
citizens who are not parties to the Open
Records request but who would be
substantially affected by the disclosure.13
In the case sub judice, we hold that the public has a
legitimate interest in the information sought by the newspaper.
Unlike Zink and Kentucky Board of Examiners of Psychologists, the
information sought by the newspaper in the present case does not
contain information concerning an innocent, private citizen.
In
fact, the only parties that would have standing to argue that the
11
Zink v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of Workers’
Claims, Labor Cabinet, Ky.App., 902 S.W.2d 825 (1994).
12
Ky., 941 S.W.2d 469 (1997).
13
Id. at 472.
-11-
information contained in the complaint is embarrassing or
humiliating to them would be Palmer and Driggers.
We believe the complaint against Palmer presents a
matter of unique public interest.
At the time of the complaint,
Palmer was an Owensboro police officer, who was sworn to protect
the public.
The complaint charged specific acts of misconduct by
Palmer while he was on duty.
Since the question of the
disclosure of the details of this alleged misconduct is the
reason for this appeal, we will generally describe the alleged
misconduct as Palmer neglecting his duty to the public by having
an inappropriate relationship with another police officer while
on duty.
We believe the public has a legitimate interest in
knowing the underlying basis for a disciplinary charge against a
police officer who has been charged with misconduct under KRS
95.450.
While the allegations of misconduct by Palmer are of a
personal nature, we hold that the public disclosure of the
complaint would not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
Palmer’s personal privacy.
Palmer’s final claim of error is that the information
sought by the newspaper was exempted from disclosure by KRS
61.810(1)(f), the Open Meetings Act, which provides:
(1)
All meetings of a quorum of the
members of any public agency at
which any public business is
discussed or at which any action is
taken by the agency, shall be
public meetings, open to the public
at all times, except for the
following:
. . .
-12-
(f)
Discussions or hearings which might
lead to the appointment,
discipline, or dismissal of an
individual employee, member, or
student without restricting that
employee’s, member’s, or student’s
right to a public hearing if
requested. This exception shall
not be interpreted to permit
discussion of general personnel
matters in secret.
Palmer argues that the exemption under KRS 61.810(1)(f)
must be applied to his case through KRS 61.878(1)(l), which
exempts from disclosure under the Open Records Act:
Public records or information the disclosure
of which is prohibited or restricted or
otherwise made confidential by enactment of
the General Assembly.
Palmer correctly points out that this is an issue of
first impression in this jurisdiction.
He argues that if the
documents in his case are not exempted from disclosure under the
Open Records Act, the purpose of having a closed meeting under
the Open Meetings Act would be defeated.
For support of his
argument, Palmer relies upon an Opinion of the Attorney General,
Ky OAG 78-11, where the Courier-Journal was denied access to
documents that included: (1) a copy of a transcript from a
disciplinary hearing conducted by Internal Affairs of a
Louisville police officer; (2) a statement by a witness in the
investigation; and (3) two letters which were deleted from the
file of the investigation that the police department claimed were
included in the file by mistake.
-13-
In denying the newspaper access to the information, the
Attorney General stated:
The enactment of the General Assembly
which we consider makes these documents
confidential is that provision in the Open
Meetings Statute which provides that closed
meetings shall be held for discussions or
hearings which might lead to the appointment,
discipline or dismissal of an individual
employee. KRS 61.810(6).14 From the
information we have at hand we believe that
the Internal Affairs investigation was such a
hearing and as such was to be held in a
closed meeting unless the person under
investigation demanded a public hearing. The
purpose of holding such a hearing in closed
session would be defeated if the agency were
required to make public a transcript of the
hearing.
The statute states that the purpose of
having a closed session on a disciplinary
matter is to protect the reputation of
individual persons. In the instant case, the
opening of the requested documents to the
public could possibly affect not only the
reputation of the person being investigated
but also the reputation of one or more of the
witnesses in the investigation.
We believe that the present case differs significantly
from Ky OAG 78-11 since in the present case the information
sought is the complaint that led to the disciplinary hearing.
In
Ky OAG 78-11 the information sought was a transcript of the
hearing, and statements made by witnesses in the investigation.15
The Attorney General made it clear that his reasoning in denying
14
Now KRS 61.810(1)(f).
15
However, in that case, as to a portion of the evidence
which included a statement by a police officer, the Attorney
General went on to state, “[w]e do not believe that a police
officer has any right to privacy as to any of his actions while
on duty.”
-14-
the request was based on the fact that the information sought
would needlessly subject the reputation of witnesses to public
scrutiny.
That is not the case here.
We have reviewed the
complaint against Palmer, and the only people who could have
their reputations harmed are the police officers who were accused
of neglecting their duties.
We believe KRS 61.810(1)(f) can be reconciled with KRS
61.878(1)(l).
It is clear that once there has been a “final
action” to a disciplinary proceeding taken by an agency, the
complaint that initially spawned that proceeding is subject to
public scrutiny.16
In its cross-appeal, the newspaper argues that the
entire complaint filed against Palmer should be subject to public
scrutiny without redaction of names and addresses.
Since we have
already decided that the complaint itself is not exempt from
public scrutiny, we must now decide if the trial court erred by
redacting names and addresses from the complaint.
Since the
trial court’s interpretation of the Open Record’s Act and its
subsequent decision to redact part of the complaint was an
interpretation of law, this Court’s review of its legal
conclusions is de novo.17
After reviewing the complaint, we hold
that no private citizen would be subject to embarrassment or
humiliation by its release.
16
In fact, the only names that are
Board of Medical Licensure, supra at 956.
17
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth, ex
rel. Kentucky Railroad Commission, Ky., 314 S.W.2d 940, 943
(1958).
-15-
redacted are those of police officers who were either allegedly
involved in inappropriate conduct with Palmer or involved in the
investigation itself as witnesses.
Accordingly, the newspaper
should have access to a complete copy of the complaint against
Palmer.
For these reasons, the partial summary judgment of the
Daviess Circuit Court is affirmed in part, reversed in part and
this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT, OWENSBORO
MESSENGER-INQUIRER, INC.:
Michael T. Lee
Owensboro, Kentucky
Ralph W. Wible
Owensboro, Kentucky
-16-
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