THE ESTATE OF TODD CHARLES COX, a minor, Deceased, by the Personal Representative DWIGHT COX and JERRY F. SAFFORD, Ancillary Administrator of the ESTATE OF TODD CHARLES COX v. RANDALL DAVIDSON, M.D.; JOSEPH D. POTZICK, M.D.; and GILBERT, BARBEE, MOORE & MCILVOY, P.S.C., d/b/a GRAVES-GILBERT CLINIC
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RENDERED:
November 2, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002117-MR
THE ESTATE OF TODD CHARLES COX, a minor,
Deceased, by the Personal Representative
DWIGHT COX and JERRY F. SAFFORD, Ancillary
Administrator of the ESTATE OF TODD CHARLES COX
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS R. LEWIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00238
RANDALL DAVIDSON, M.D.; JOSEPH D. POTZICK,
M.D.; and GILBERT, BARBEE, MOORE & MCILVOY,
P.S.C., d/b/a GRAVES-GILBERT CLINIC
and
NO. 2000-CA-002193-MR
JOSEPH D. POTZICK, M.D. and GILBERT, BARBEE,
MOORE & MCILVOY, P.S.C., d/b/a GRAVESGILBERT CLINIC
vs.
APPELLEES
CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS R. LEWIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00238
THE ESTATE OF TODD CHARLES COX, a minor,
Deceased, by the Personal Representative
DWIGHT EDWARD COX; DWIGHT EDWARD COX,
individually; SHIRLEY FAYE COX, individually;
DWIGHT EDWARD COX, as Next Friend of DANE LOUVIERE;
KAITLYND COX; NICOLETTE COX; CORDELL COX, a minor;
TIMOTHY COX, a minor; JERRY R. SAFFORD, Ancillary
Administrator of ESTATE OF TODD CHARLES COX; and
SHIRLEY FAY COX, as Next Friend of DANE LOUVIERE CROSS-APPELLEES
and
NO. 2000-CA-002224-MR
RANDALL DAVIDSON, M.D.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS R. LEWIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00238
vs.
THE ESTATE OF TODD CHARLES COX, a minor,
Deceased, by the Personal Representative
DWIGHT EDWARD COX and JERRY F. SAFFORD,
Ancillary Administrator of the ESTATE
OF TODD CHARLES COX
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING AS TO THE APPEAL
AND THE CROSS-APPEALS
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
Judge.1
COMBS and MILLER, Judges; and MARY COREY, Special
COMBS, JUDGE:
The Estate of Todd Charles Cox and others appeal
from a judgment of the Warren Circuit Court entered April 18,
2000, following a jury verdict in favor of the defendants in a
medical negligence action.
In their cross-appeal, the appellees
(defendants below) challenge the trial court's denial of their
motion for a directed verdict.
We affirm as to both the appeal
and the cross-appeals.
Just after midnight on March 1, 1998, Todd Charles Cox,
a minor, was seen at Greenview Hospital Emergency Department in
Bowling Green Kentucky.
Cox, an Alabama resident, had been
visiting family in Louisville when he began suffering severe
stomach pain and episodic vomiting.
En route to Huntsville,
Cox's father decided that his son needed prompt medical
attention.
Dr. Randall Davidson, the emergency room physician,
1
Senior Status Judge Mary Corey sitting as Special Judge by
assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution.
-2-
assessed Cox and determined that he was dehydrated and suffering
with acidosis.
were conducted.
Fluid treatment was ordered and laboratory tests
The test results led Dr. Davidson to believe
that Cox might have a diabetic condition.
Dr. Davidson then
consulted by telephone with Dr. Joseph Potzick, a pediatrician.
Dr. Potzick believed that Cox's elevated blood-sugar
level stemmed from gastritis and dehydration rather than from a
diabetic condition.
Potzick suggested that fluid treatment be
continued and that Cox be carefully observed.
He discouraged
Cox's admission to the hospital unless his condition worsened.2
Acting on his own clinical judgment, Dr. Davidson
discharged Cox at 3:45 a.m.
After an uneventful, three-hour
drive home and a shower, Cox suddenly collapsed and died.
On February 19, 1999, Dwight Cox was appointed personal
representative of his son's estate in Alabama.3
Days later, this
wrongful death action was filed in Kentucky's Warren Circuit
Court by Cox both in his individual capacity and as personal
representative of the Estate.4
Because there was no indication
in the complaint that an ancillary administrator had been
appointed in the Commonwealth to represent the interests of the
2
Dr. Davidson's encounter record indicates that after Cox's
father was informed of the possible need for admission, he
indicated that he "really did not want to admit the child here
and would rather take him home to see a doctor there."
3
Letters of Administration appended to the complaint named
Dwight Edward Cox the personal representative of the estate and
indicated that he was granted authority to act in transactions
specifically identified in the Alabama Code.
4
Attorneys representing the plaintiffs were permitted to
appear pro hac vice.
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Estate of Todd Charles Cox, Dr. Potzick and Graves-Gilbert Clinic
contended in their answer that the complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.5
Following voir dire, a jury was empanelled and the
plaintiffs presented their evidence.
The defendants then filed a
joint motion for directed verdict in which they contended that
the action could not proceed to judgment against them since the
Estate lacked proper ancillary administration and thus a proper
plaintiff to prosecute the action.
The trial court considered
the motion but refrained from ruling until the close of proof.
The defendants presented their respective cases and
then renewed their motion for directed verdict.
They argued
again that the plaintiffs had failed to qualify a Kentucky
ancillary administrator and that since the statute of limitations
had run, their failure could not be remedied by re-filing the
action or by amending the original pleadings.
The trial court
denied the motion and permitted the plaintiffs to amend their
pleadings to add Jerry F. Safford (their Kentucky attorney) as a
party-plaintiff to serve as the ancillary administrator of the
Estate.6
The jury was instructed, and the parties delivered
their closing arguments.
Following deliberation, the jury
5
Kentucky violates no federal constitutional guarantee by
requiring a foreign fiduciary to apply and become appointed
personal representative of a decedent's estate in the courts of
this state. See Vassill's Administrator v. Scarsella, 292 Ky.,
153, 166 S.W.2d 64 (1942).
6
Todd Cox died on March 1, 1998. The amended complaint of
the ancillary administrator was not filed until April 14, 2000.
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returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.
The trial court
denied the plaintiffs' motion for new trial as well as the
defendants’ motion for JNOV.
On appeal, the appellants contend that the trial court
erred by failing to instruct the jury properly and by failing to
order a new trial based upon juror misconduct.
We consider each
issue in turn.
By way of a supplementary motion for new trial, the
appellants contended that the proceedings had been tainted by
juror misconduct.7
They argued that juror Stephanie Talley had
knowingly failed to disclose the fact that she had grown up with
Larea Steele, an employee of the Graves-Gilbert Clinic.
The
trial court rejected the contention.
On appeal, the appellants contend that the court should
have granted a new trial because they had established that the
juror had failed to give a proper response during voir dire.
We
disagree.
A party seeking a new trial on the ground of juror
misconduct has the burden of proving the facts on which he relies
to warrant such action by the court as well as showing that the
facts as proven operated to his prejudice.
Ky., 83 S.W.2d 870 (1935);
Norris v. Payton,
see also, Ligon Specialized Hauler,
Inc. v. Smith, Ky. App., 691 S.W.2d 902 (1985).
Having reviewed
relevant portions of the voir dire proceedings, we are not
persuaded that Ms. Talley failed to provide an accurate response
7
Despite grave reservation, we accept that the appellants’
argument has been properly preserved for our review.
-5-
to questions posed to her.
Moreover, even if the facts alleged
were true, the appellants have failed to demonstrate how they
were prejudiced in any respect.
The issue of whether a new trial should be granted is a
matter of judicial discretion which will not be disturbed on
appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown.
Louisville
Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Department of Highways,
Ky., 586 S.W.2d 716 (1979).
Talley testified that she had not
failed to disclose requested information; that she had not talked
with Steele during the pendency of the trial; and that her
decision in the case had not been improperly affected.
We
conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's denial of the appellants' motion for a new trial.
Next, the appellants contend that the court should have
granted a new trial because it failed to instruct the jury
properly.
CR 59.01 permits a new trial to be granted for errors
of law occurring at trial and properly objected to by the party
seeking relief.
The appellants argue that the trial court erred in
submitting Instruction #2 to the jury.
It provided as follows:
Do you believe from the evidence, that Todd
Charles Cox died from a condition that could
not be diagnosed or treated and without the
fault of anyone?
The appellants contend that the instruction precluded the jury
from considering the doctors' negligence and amounted to a
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prejudicial comment on the weight of the evidence as to Cox's
cause of death.8
The appellants have failed to comply with CR
76.12(4)(c)(iv), which requires an appellant to supply a
statement with reference to the record showing whether an issue
was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.
The appellees' citation to the record indicates that the
appellants expressed broad disapproval of the challenged
instruction:
"I don't like Instruction 2."
a generalized objection:
"I object."
They also registered
With respect to a
separately discussed instruction, they made an objection to the
giving of any instruction "other than what we tendered."
Such
vague objections given without articulating specific grounds are
insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.
See Burgess v.
Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806 (2001).
An argument with respect to jury instructions will not
be considered where the trial court's attention was not timely
called to the point.
Pipelines, Inc. v. Muhlenberg County Water
District, Ky., 465 S.W.2d 927 (1971).
The Appellants first
asserted these specific errors in their motion for a new trial.
Consequently, the dilatory objection cannot be cured and
considered timely for the issue to be properly preserved for
review.
Nevertheless, considering the instructions as a whole,
we conclude that the law as stated was essentially correct and
8
Defense pathologists indicated that Cox suffered from a
blockage of the av node artery, which was the condition that was
the ultimate cause of death. This condition could not have been
diagnosed, treated, or prevented by the physicians.
-7-
resulted in no prejudice.
In combination with Instruction #2,
the court instructed the jury: (1) that it was the duty of Dwight
Cox to exercise ordinary care for the life and safety of his son;
(2) that it was the duty of each doctor to exercise the degree of
care and skill expected of a reasonably competent physician; and
finally, (3) that any fault be apportioned to each party.
The
court allowed counsel to make these points to the jury during
closing argument.
We conclude that the instructions were
sufficient. Collins v. Galbraith, Ky., 494 S.W.2d 527 (1973).
The judgment is affirmed on appeal.
On cross-appeal, the appellees contend that the
plaintiffs failed to file a viable complaint before the running
of the statute of limitations and that the trial court erred by
permitting relation back of their amended complaint.
They argue
that the court erred in refusing to grant their motion for a
directed verdict based on this issue.
In ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the trial
court must consider the evidence in the strongest possible light
in favor of the party opposing the motion.
A directed verdict
should not be entered unless there is "a complete absence of
proof on a material issue in the action, or if no disputed issue
of fact exists upon which reasonable men could differ."
Taylor
v. Kennedy, Ky. App., 700 S.W.2d 415 (1985).
It is undisputed that a foreign administrator is not
authorized to bring a tort action in Kentucky.
The personal
representative who may bring such an action is one appointed by
or who qualifies in the proper court of the Commonwealth.
-8-
See
Vassil's Administrator v. Scarsella, 292 Ky. 153, 166 S.W.2d 64
(1942).
It is also undisputed that the amended complaint
properly naming a domestic personal representative as plaintiff
in this case was filed outside the period of the pertinent
statute of limitations.
The threshold question to be considered
is whether the plaintiffs' amended complaint, tendered pursuant
to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 15.03, may be deemed to
relate back to the filing of the original complaint that had
asserted the claim within the required statutory time-frame.
In Richardson v. Dodson, Ky., 832 S.W.2d 888 (1992),
the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed a fact situation similar to
the case before us.
In Richardson, the decedent's son, acting in
his individual capacity, timely filed a pro se complaint alleging
the wrongful death of his mother.
Id. at 889.
He was later
appointed administrator of the decedent's estate.
Prior to the
filing of any motion or responsive pleading, he filed an amended
complaint properly alleging his status as administrator of his
mother's estate.
However, the applicable statute of limitations
had run by this time.
The trial court held that the amended
complaint could not relate back to the fatally flawed original
complaint and dismissed the action.
decision.
This court affirmed that
We held that an action brought by one who has no
authority to bring it is a nullity and that substitution of the
proper party is of no avail if the period of limitation has run.
Upon discretionary review, the Kentucky Supreme Court
reversed the order of dismissal entered by the trial court and
remanded the case.
Id. at 890.
Referring to the provisions of
-9-
CR 15.03(2), the Supreme Court held that the amended complaint
related back to the date of the original pleading because the
claim arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence "set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading. . .
."
In doing so, the Court concluded that the initial complaint,
although flawed, was sufficient to permit subsequent amendment
naming the personal representative of the decedent's estate as
plaintiff to relate back pursuant to CR 15.03.
Id. at 889.
In its opinion, the Richardson Court emphasized that
the appellant, the decedent's son, was a person entitled by
statute to act as administrator of the estate.
The Court also
noted that relation back of the amended complaint under CR 15.03
was not prejudicial to the defendants since the amendment sought
only to designate the correct capacity in which the son was
suing.
Finally, the Court noted that the purpose of statutes of
limitations is served when notice of litigation is given within
the period allowed.
See Nolph v. Scott, Ky., 725 S.W.2d 860
(1987).
On the other hand, there are noteworthy differences
distinguishing Richardson from this case.
Most importantly, the
original plaintiff in Richardson was a person statutorily
entitled to act as administrator of the decedent's estate and,
indeed, was so appointed.
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 395.040
provides as follows:
(1) The court shall grant administration to
the relations of the deceased who apply for
administration, preferring the surviving
husband or wife, or if the surviving husband
or wife does not nominate a suitable
administrator, then such others as are next
-10-
entitled to distribution, or one (1) or more
of them whom the court judges will best
manage the estate.
(2) If no person mentioned in subsection (1)
applies for administration within sixty (60)
days from the death of an intestate, the
court may grant administration to a creditor,
or to any other person, in its discretion.
(Emphasis added.)
Dwight Cox admittedly failed to become
qualified in Kentucky to serve as an administrator of his son’s
estate in order to have proper standing to bring the wrongful
death action.
Even more disturbing, he failed to take immediate
remedial action to have an administrator so appointed.
The
administrator finally chosen was not a relative but one who was
appointed pursuant to the court’s discretion.
The main question for our consideration is whether such
an administrator not statutorily designated can qualify for
purposes of CR 15.03.
Richardson stopped short of such a
determination:
Our view as to the application of CR 15.03 to
the facts presented here is strengthened by
recognition that appellant was a person
entitled to be appointed administrator of the
decedent’s estate and, indeed, was so
appointed. See KRS 395.040. We need not
determine whether one outside the eligible
class of appointees could toll the running of
the statute by filing such a complaint.
(Emphasis added.)
Id. at 889-890.
We are persuaded that the Richardson rule
allowing relation back should be extended to apply in this case.
The main purpose of CR 15.03 is to provide timely notice of the
onus and specter of litigation to an unwary defendant.
The
defendants in this case were certainly not taken by surprise by
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the lawsuit; it had long been timely filed before the deficiency
as to the naming of the administrator finally became an issue.
The Richardson court observed in discussing a related case:
Thus, we discern no significance in the
abortive attempt, if there was one, to obtain
an appointment prior to the expiration of the
statutory period. The event which tolled the
statute was the filing of the complaint.
Despite the dilatory appointment of Mr. Safford as administrator,
we believe that the policy of CR 15.03 was not compromised and
that the Richardson reasoning is broad enough to encompass this
factual situation.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in
holding that the doctrine of relation back saved this cause of
action.
It correctly denied the motion for directed verdict, and
we affirm on the two cross-appeals in this matter.
In summary, we affirm the trial court both on appeal
and on the cross-appeals.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANTS JOSEPH D. POTZICK,
M.D. AND GILBERT, BARBEE,
MOORE & MCILVOY, P.S.C. d/b/a
GRAVES-GILBERT CLINIC:
Jerry F. Safford
Bowling Green, KY
John David Cole
Matthew P. Cook
Bowling Green, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT RANDALL DAVIDSON,
M.D.:
John W. Phillips
William P. Swain
Louisville, KY
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