ROBERT E. THOMAS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 14, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001822-MR
ROBERT E. THOMAS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00031
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, GUIDUGLI AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Appellant was convicted in the Muhlenberg
Circuit Court of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
KRS 527.040.
We affirm.
On December 13, 1999, appellant pled guilty in the
Daviess Circuit Court to possession of a controlled substance in
the first degree.
KRS 218A.1415.
After the entry of his plea at
that proceeding, appellant asked the court to allow him to enter
the Drug Court Diversion Program.
Before the Daviess Court could
rule on that request, appellant was arrested on December 24,
1999, in Muhlenberg County.
He was charged with possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon pursuant to KRS 527.040, based on
his previous drug charge in Daviess County.
Subsequently, on
January 28, 2000, the Daviess Court approved appellant’s request
to participate in the Drug Court Program.
On February 22, 2000,
a Muhlenberg County grand jury indicted appellant on the firearm
possession charge.
Appellant moved to have the firearm charge dismissed at
trial.
He claimed he was not a convicted felon based on his
previous drug charge because at the time of his arrest he was
under consideration for enrollment in the Drug Court Diversion
Program.
The Muhlenberg Court denied the motion, and appellant
was later convicted on the charge.
This appeal followed.
Appellant presents two claims on appeal.
First, he
alleges the Muhlenberg Court erred in holding that he was a
convicted felon based on the Daviess County drug charge.
Next,
he alleges the court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary
hearing and issue findings of fact in regards to his motion to
suppress evidence at trial.
We shall address each issue as
presented by appellant.
Appellant claimed at trial that he was wrongly held to
be a convicted felon.
In denying appellant’s motion, the trial
court relied on a case from this Court, Grace v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 915 S.W.2d 754 (1996), to conclude that appellant was a
convicted felon by virtue of the Daviess drug charge.
In Grace,
we compared KRS 527.040 to the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968
and its definition of a “convicted” felon, specifically examining
18 U.S.C. §922(h)(1) which outlaws possession of firearms by
felons.
Regarding the federal law, this Court held, “if guilt is
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established via a guilty plea or a verdict, and nothing remains
except for imposing a sentence, the particular defendant is
deemed ‘convicted’ for purposes of 18 U.S.C. §922.”
supra, at 756.
Grace,
In Grace, the defendant pled guilty to a felony
offense but had not yet been sentenced when charged with
possession of a handgun by a convicted felon in violation of KRS
427.040.
This case is controlled by the holding in Grace which
stated, “We conclude that once the appellant’s plea of guilty was
accepted by the court, and he was found by the court to be
guilty; he became a “convicted felon” for purposes of KRS
527.040.”
Id. at 756.
Though his status as a “convicted felon”
may change at sometime in the future depending on other
circumstances or actions, on the date of the underlying offense
he was a convicted felon.
The Drug Court diversion order entered by the Daviess
Circuit Court re-enforces this conclusion.
Numerical paragraph
five specifically states that “The Defendant [Thomas] has freely,
knowingly, and intelligently entered a plea for the offense of
Possession of a Controlled Substance in the First Degree.”
Paragraph number eight informed appellant of the consequences of
not completing the program as follows, “In the event (Thomas)
fails to successfully complete the terms and conditions of the
Daviess County, Kentucky, Drug Court Diversion Program and the
Court voids this Agreement, (Thomas) understands that a sentence
of three (3) year(s) in the penitentiary may be imposed upon
him.”
Upon completion of the Drug Diversion Program, appellant’s
conviction would not be automatically vacated or dismissed.
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Appellant acknowledged this in his motion to dismiss the
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon filed on May 18,
2000.
In that motion, appellant argued that “[Thomas] at the
time the guilty plea was entered, requested the Court to allow
him to enter into the Drug Court Program wherein the sentence
imposed upon a plea of guilty would be deferred until the
completion of drug court.”
(Emphasis added).
As to appellant’s second contention that the trial
court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to
suppress, we believe it lacking in merit.
Appellant (at page 5
of his brief) argues that the trial court did not conduct a
“full” evidentiary hearing.
otherwise.
We believe the record indicates
The record indicates that the trial court conducted
an evidentiary hearing in its chambers and heard evidence from
witnesses, and considered all the evidence offered by the
parties.
After reviewing the evidence, the court properly denied
appellant’s suppression motion.
After reviewing the record, we
believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this
matter.
See Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219 (1996).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment entered by the
Muhlenberg Circuit Court is affirmed.
EMBERTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
McANULTY, JUDGE DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bruce A. Brightwell
Louisville, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Anitria M. Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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