JESSE RAY NANCE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY BRENDA YOUNG v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: July 13, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001619-MR
JESSE RAY NANCE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B. VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00199
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND
NO.
APPELLEE
2000-CA-001649-MR
BRENDA YOUNG
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B. VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00199
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF, SCHRODER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Jesse Ray Nance and Brenda Young appeal their
convictions of facilitation of trafficking in a controlled
substance.
Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we
affirm both convictions.
On December 9, 1999, officers of the Narcotics Division
of the Fayette County Police Department, assisted by ten or
twelve members of the Emergency Response Unit (ERU), executed a
search warrant at a house located at 521 North Limestone in
Lexington, Kentucky.
The house was leased to Jesse Ray Nance and
Brenda Young, who resided there along with their young daughter.
At trial, Detective Douglas Caldwell, the lead officer, testified
that, as the ERU drove past the house, he observed about a dozen
people in front of the house, the majority of whom took off
running before the ERU vehicle could stop.
Three people of the
outside group were detained as the police made their entry into
the house, but nine or more of the group escaped.
Caldwell entered the house within a minute or so of the
ERU’s entry, and initially saw Nance running from the living room
through a "middle room", where he was caught, and saw Young
sitting on the couch holding a baby.
He observed two other
individuals running through the house, both of whom were
subsequently captured.
Young.
Caldwell took statements from Nance and
Caldwell testified that Nance told him that "he (Nance)
was allowing people to use his residence to sell and use drugs
out of in return for help on the rent."
Brenda Young denied any
knowledge of drug activity, and Caldwell stated that no drugs,
paraphernalia, or money were found on her.
Officer Andrea Carter testified that she searched Young
and around her person.
Under the cushion where Young was sitting
on a sofa, Officer Carter found rolling papers, a crack pipe, and
a bag containing crack cocaine.
Carter acknowledged that she did
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not know how long Young had been seated on the sofa and did not
know who had told her to sit there.1
Carter testified that Young
had $47 in her back pocket.
The search of the house resulted in the recovery of
assorted items of drug paraphernalia, and the baggie of crack
cocaine found under the cushion.
Katrina Featherston of the
Kentucky State Crime Lab testified that the baggie contained 587
milligrams of crack cocaine.
Officer Carter testified the street
value of a half-gram of crack cocaine would be about fifty
dollars.
On February 21, 2000, Nance and Young were both
indicted on:
Count 1, first-degree trafficking in a controlled
substance, and Count 2, possession of drug paraphernalia.
and Young were tried together on May 17, 2000.
Nance
Nance and Young
did not testify, and the defense presented no witnesses.
On
Count 1, the jury received instructions on first-degree
trafficking in a controlled substance, first-degree possession of
a controlled substance, and criminal facilitation of trafficking
in a controlled substance.2
The jury found both Nance and Young
guilty of criminal facilitation of trafficking in a controlled
substance, and not guilty on Count 2 - possession of drug
paraphernalia.
On June 21, 2000 and June 22, 2000, respectively,
1
The videotape of the entry and search shows Young being
placed on the couch by a police officer.
2
It appears that facilitation was being considered as a
lesser included offense of trafficking. In Houston v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 925 (1998), the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that criminal facilitation is not a lesser included
offense of trafficking in a controlled substance. However, this
issue was not raised by Nance or Young on appeal.
-3-
the trial court entered final judgment against Nance and Young sentencing Nance to 12 months in the Fayette County Detention
Center, and sentencing Young to 12 months probated for two years.
From these judgments, Nance and Young appeal.
APPEAL OF JESSE NANCE
On appeal, Nance argues that a mistrial should have
been granted based upon statements made by Detective Caldwell at
trial regarding the informant process and a reference to a
confidential informant.
After voir dire, the court granted
defense counsel’s motion to preclude the police officers from
testifying as to the basis for the search warrant.
At trial,
when asked by the Commonwealth about the types of jobs narcotics
officers are asked to perform, Caldwell responded that they
conduct "buy-busts" in which informants are used to buy drugs
from street level traffickers, and that in some cases they get a
complaint about a residence where drugs are being sold and try to
confirm the information.
At this point, defense counsel moved
for a mistrial, which the court denied.
A short time later, in
response to the Commonwealth's question regarding Caldwell's role
in this case, Caldwell responded that he "handled the
confidential informant".
Defense counsel made a renewed motion
for mistrial based on this statement.
The court denied the
motion, and admonished the jury regarding the statement.
Nance first contends that Detective Caldwell's
testimony regarding buy-busts and informants created the clear
inference that a buy had occurred earlier and that a confidential
informant had participated.
Nance contends that the jury was
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thus made aware of the situation giving way to the assault on the
house, and that this information unduly prejudiced the jury.
A
mistrial should only be granted by the trial court if there is a
manifest, urgent, or real necessity for such action.
Skaggs v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 672 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1130, 106 S. Ct. 1998, 90 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1986).
The Kentucky
Supreme Court has stated:
It is universally agreed that a mistrial is
an extreme remedy and should be resorted to
only when there is a fundamental defect in
the proceedings which will result in a
manifest injustice. The occurrence
complained of must be of such character and
magnitude that a litigant will be denied a
fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial
effect can be removed in no other way.
Gould v. Charlton Co., Ky., 929 S.W.2d 734, 738 (1996). Absent an
abuse of discretion, a trial court’s decision whether or not to
grant a mistrial will not be disturbed.
Id. at 741.
Caldwell's
statements constituted a general explanation of the duties of
narcotics officers, and we adjudge no prejudice resulting to
Nance therefrom.
Hence, we cannot say the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Nance's first motion for a mistrial.
Nance next contends that the trial court erred in
denying his second motion for a mistrial based on Detective
Caldwell's statement that he "handled the confidential
informant".
The trial court denied the motion, but admonished
the jury as follows:
The officer in his testimony made reference
to a confidential informant and also a
question has been raised concerning the use
of the emergency response unit. These are
matters that go to the validity of the search
-5-
warrant and also police practices. These are
not issues that are for you to decide.
We do not believe that Caldwell’s mention of the confidential
informant created an urgent, manifest, or real necessity for a
mistrial.
Skaggs, 694 S.W.2d 672.
“It is ordinarily presumed
that an admonition controls the jury and removes the prejudice
which brought about the admonition.”
App., 867 S.W.2d 200, 204 (1993).
Clay v. Commonwealth, Ky.
The jury was aware that the
police were searching Nance’s residence pursuant to a search
warrant.
The trial court clearly explained to the jury that the
issue of a confidential informant went to the validity of the
search warrant, which was not an issue for the jury to decide.
We believe that the admonition was sufficient to cure any
resulting prejudice to Nance, and hence the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Nance’s second motion for a
mistrial.
Nance finally argues that the videotape of the crime
scene, which showed the forced entry of the ERU, search of the
house, and his arrest, should not have been shown at trial as its
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
undue prejudice per KRE 403.
Nance admits the issue was not
preserved, but argues that we should nevertheless consider the
issue under RCr 10.26.
Having reviewed the videotape, we do not
deem its showing to be palpable error as would merit review per
RCr 10.26.
APPEAL OF BRENDA YOUNG
Brenda Young contends on appeal that the trial court
erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict.
-6-
“On
appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the
evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury
to find guilt, only then is the defendant entitled to a directed
verdict of acquittal.”
186, 187 (1991).
Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d
We believe that sufficient evidence was
presented from which a jury could reasonably infer that Young was
engaged in trafficking.
Detective Caldwell testified that Nance
admitted that he allowed people to use his residence for drug
activity to help with the rent.
Young lived in the house with
Nance and her name was on the lease.
In addition to the crack
cocaine, drug paraphernalia was found scattered throughout the
house where Young and Nance lived.
The concept of constructive
possession is applicable to offenses arising under KRS 218A.
Houston v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 925, 928 (1998).
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
denying Young’s motion for a directed verdict.
For the aforementioned reasons, the Fayette Circuit
Court's judgments of conviction for both Nance and Young are
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, JESSE RAY
NANCE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Bobby Amburgey
Lexington, Kentucky
Gilbert L. Busby, III
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney Generals
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, BRENDA
YOUNG:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
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