KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION v. KENNETH R. MCDOUGAL AND FEDERAL CARTRIDGE, D/B/A HOFFMAN ENGINEERING1 HOFFMAN ENGINEERING, INC. v. KENNETH R. MCDOUGAL AND KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 24, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001591-MR
KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00234
v.
KENNETH R. MCDOUGAL AND
FEDERAL CARTRIDGE, D/B/A HOFFMAN ENGINEERING1
AND:
NO.
2000-CA-001677-MR
HOFFMAN ENGINEERING, INC.
v.
APPELLEES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00234
KENNETH R. MCDOUGAL AND
KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
1
HUDDLESTON, KNOPF AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
In Hoffman Engineering, Inc.’s Notice of Appeal, it notes
that “Federal Cartridge, d/b/a Hoffman Engineering” is an
incorrect designation.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission
(Commission) and Hoffman Engineering, Inc. (Hoffman), appeal from
an order of the Montgomery Circuit Court reversing the
Commission’s decision to deny Kenneth R. McDougal unemployment
benefits.
We reverse.
In March of 1997 McDougal was hired by Hoffman as a
production associate assigned to weld grind.
McDougal was a full
time employee and earned $11.38 per hour at the time of his
discharge.
On June 8, 1999, McDougal was fired by Hoffman and
according to his termination letter it was because McDougal
approached Curt Getchell, Team Leader in
Assembly, in an aggressive, threatening and
hostile manner; point[ed] [his] finger in
[Getchell’s] face, speaking to him within
inches of his face accompanied by a raised
voice. At no time did Mr. Getchell treat
[McDougal] in a similar manner. This type of
behavior is absolutely unacceptable and
viewed as mis-conduct. We expect associates
to adopt a business-like problem solving
manner in all instances especially in
disagreements. (T.E. at Page 5; Termination
letter dated June 8, 1999, marked as Agency
Exhibit 1).
Thereafter, McDougal made his initial claim for
unemployment insurance benefits.
A determination dated July 20,
1999, held that McDougal had been discharged for misconduct
connected with his work, and that he was disqualified for
benefits.
McDougal appealed that determination and requested a
hearing before a referee which was held August 26, 1999, by
teleconference.
The referee set aside the prior determination,
stating that McDougal was discharged for reasons other than
misconduct connected with his work, and holding that he was
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entitled to unemployment insurance benefits.
Hoffman appealed
the referee’s decision to the Commission.
The Commission reversed the decision of the referee and
held that McDougal was discharged for reasons of misconduct
connected with his work and was disqualified from receiving
unemployment benefits.
McDougal then filed a complaint in the
Montgomery Circuit Court seeking review of the Commission’s
decision.
The Montgomery Circuit Court reversed the Commission
and now both the Commission and Hoffman Engineering separately
appeal that decision.2
The appellants each contend that the circuit court
erroneously reversed the Commission’s determination that McDougal
was properly discharged for misconduct.
To illuminate the issues
in the case, we begin our review of the circuit court’s decision
by reproducing relevant portions of the referee’s decision, the
Commission’s order, and the circuit court’s order.
The referee’s decision, in relevant part, is as
follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT: Claimant, production
worker, worked for the captioned employer for
two years and three months. He worked fulltime earning $11.38 per hour. Claimant was
issued an informal counseling on September 4,
1998, for arguing with a team leader
concerning working overtime. The incident
was an apparent misunderstanding that led to
a verbal argument. Claimant had no other
counseling or warnings concerning his work.
On June 4, 1999, claimant and his team leader
got into another verbal argument concerning
claimant’s wife who also works for the
2
Because the issues in the two cases are identical, we have
addressed both cases in this opinion.
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appellee. The team leader accused claimant
of threatening him. Claimant denied the
allegations and accused the team leader of
instigating the situation. The employer
representative at the hearing had no first
hand knowledge of the incident. Claimant was
discharged on June 8, 1999, for threatening
the team leader in the work place. Claimant
again denied the allegations.
DECISION: The determination is set aside.
The employer discharged claimant for reasons
other than misconduct connected with the work
and claimant is not disqualified. The
employer’s reserve account is chargeable with
benefits paid under this claim. (September
21, 1999, Referee’s Decision, at Page 1).
REASONS:
. . . .
The burden of proof to establish misconduct
rests with the employer. That burden can be
satisfied only with competent evidence of
probative value. The evidence relied on by
the employer at the hearing was hearsay. It
was not competent evidence in the face of
claimant’s sworn testimony that he in no way
threatened his team leader or instigated the
situation. Claimant’s discharge was
therefore not proven misconduct connected
with the work. (September 21, 1999, Referees
Decision, at Page 2).
The December 3, 1999, order of the Commission, in relevant part,
is as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Claimant was employed by the captioned
employer for two years and three months as a
full-time production worker on the second
shift for an hourly wage, at the time of
discharge, of $11.38.
Early in the year, 1998, claimant was spoken
to informally by Becky Shelton, human
resource manager, for arguing with a security
guard....
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In September 1998, claimant agreed to work
overtime on first shift; however, claimant
was instructed by Tim Murphy, team leader, to
go home after working an hour. Apparently,
Mr. Murphy wanted to discuss something with
the claimant before claimant went home;
however, claimant refused to speak with Mr.
Murphy because he did not like what he
perceived to be Mr. Murphy’s demeanor of
always thinking he was right. Claimant was
spoken to informally by Ms. Shelton about his
refusal to speak with Mr. Murphy. Claimant
was aware that Ms. Shelton did not consider
his behavior to be acceptable and that he
could be discharged for similar behavior in
the future.
When claimant reported for work on June 4,
1999, he found his wife, who works for the
captioned employer on first shift, in tears
and distraught because someone had cut the
lock off the tool box claimant had made for
her. Claimant’s wife used the tool box to
secure a diary she was keeping at work of
events which she and the claimant hoped would
help in their efforts to get a union at the
plant.
Claimant approached Curtis Getchell, team
leader, and asked if he had cut the lock off
his wife’s tool box. Mr. Getchell said yes
and that he had the authority to do so.
Claimant, in a raised voice, told Mr.
Getchell that he had violated his wife’s
privacy and that he was going to report the
incident to the police. Just before claimant
turned to walk away, he pointed his finger at
Mr. Getchell and told Mr. Getchell “You guys
better quit messing with my wife....”
Claimant was discharged on June 8, 1999, for
approaching Mr. Getchell in an aggressive,
threatening, and hostile manner; pointing his
finger in Mr. Getchell’s face; and for
speaking to Mr. Getchell in a raised voice
within inches of his face. (December 3,
1999, KUIC Decision, at Pages 1 and 2).
. . . .
REASONS
Based on claimant’s account of the incident
which occurred in early 1998, claimant was
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being treated differently than other workers
when the security guard would ask him to
produce his company identification card
before being allowed on company property.
Therefore, claimant can not be held at fault
for voicing his objection. The record does
not support that the manner in which claimant
voiced his displeasure was so offensive as to
constitute misconduct.
Based on claimant’s account of the September
1998, incident, claimant was guilty of
refusing an instruction of a team leader to
speak with him before going home. Claimant
has neither shown that the team leader’s
instruction was unreasonable; nor that he had
reasonable justification for refusing the
team leader’s instruction. Therefore,
Claimant was guilty of statutory misconduct
as defined [in KRS 341.370].
The question to be answered is whether
claimant’s behavior on June 4, 1999, based on
his own testimony, was sufficiently offensive
to constitute misconduct, when considering
that claimant was on notice that his job was
in jeopardy because of his earlier
misconduct.
It is understandable that claimant wanted to
come to his wife’s defense; however, the
claimant owed the captioned employer the duty
of redressing his wife’s grievance in a civil
manner; preferably after first determining
whether the captioned employer had the right
to cut the lock off his wife’s tool box.
Nevertheless, on June 4, 1999, before
determining whether the captioned employer
had the right to cut the lock off his wife’s
tool box, claimant raised his voice in anger
at Mr. Getchell, and pointed his finger at
Mr. Getchell while issuing what reasonably
could be viewed as either a veiled threat; or
at the very least an attempt to intimidate
management. Claimant clearly violated a
standard of behavior which the captioned
employer had a right to expect of him.
Therefore, the Commission is constrained to
hold that claimant was guilty of misconduct
on June 4, 1999, both when he failed in the
duty he owed the captioned employer of
redressing his wife’s grievance in a civil
manner; and when he blatantly violated a
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standard of behavior which he owed the
captioned employer. Claimant’s behavior on
June 4, 1999, was especially egregious when
considering that claimant was on notice that
his job was in jeopardy because of his
insubordination in September 1998. . . .
(December 3, 1999, KUIC Decision, at Page 3).
DECISION
WHEREFORE, the Commission, having reviewed
the record and being advised, sets aside the
referee decision. It is now held that the
claimant was discharged from the employment
for reasons of misconduct connected with the
work and is disqualified from receiving
benefits... (Id.).
Finally, the trial court’s order reversing
the Commission’s order, in relevant part, is as
follows:
At the referee hearing, the only witnesses
were McDougal and Becky Shelton, the human
resources manager of the employer, Hoffman
Engineering. Shelton apparently had little
if any direct knowledge of any of the facts
of the case. However, Shelton did submit
three statements purportedly signed by
management personnel who did have direct
knowledge. None of the three statements were
notarized or sworn to.
At the referee hearing, McDougal disputed
much of what was contained in the statements.
However, since the witnesses were not
available to testify, he had no opportunity
to cross examine their statements or to
challenge them other than through his own
testimony and denials. The referee found for
McDougal.
The Commission, in reversing the referee’s
decision, relied upon the three written,
unsworn statements.
The appropriate standard in reviewing a
decision of the Commission is that their
decision must be supported by substantial
evidence of probative value. Although
referee hearings do not necessarily need to
strictly comply with the rules of evidence,
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due process requires that they be fair. The
statements which the Commission based its
decision [on] were clearly hearsay, and put
the Plaintiff in a serious disadvantage since
he could not cross examine any of the
witnesses or confront them in any manner.
All he could do was deny and give his own
version of the facts. The statements are not
substantial evidence and violated Plaintiff’s
right to due process. (Emphasis added.)
(June 7, 2000, Montgomery Circuit Court
Order, at Pages 1 and 2).
Unlike some administrative appellate bodies, the
Commission conducts a de novo review of unemployment compensation
applications and may affirm, modify, or set aside any decision of
a referee on the basis of the evidence previously submitted in
such case, may direct the taking of additional evidence, or may
permit any of the parties to such decision to initiate further
appeals before it.
Thus, while the Commission generally does not
hear evidence directly from witnesses, it has the authority to
enter independent findings of fact.
787 KAR 1:110(2)(4)(a).
Necessarily, such authority allows the Commission to judge the
weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses and to
disagree with the conclusion reached by the referee.
Burch v.
Taylor Drug Store, Inc., Ky. App., 965 S.W.2d 830, 834 (1998).
“To put it simply, ‘the trier of facts in an administrative
agency may consider all of the evidence and choose the evidence
that he believes.’"
Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet v. Cornell, Ky.
App., 796 S.W.2d 591, 594 (1990); Bowling v. Natural Resources
and Enviomental Protection Cabinet, Ky. App., 891 S.W.2d 406,
409-410 (1994).
When the findings of fact of the Commission are
supported by substantial evidence of probative value, the
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findings are binding upon a reviewing court.
H & S Hardware v.
Cecil, Ky. App., 655 S.W.2d 38, 40 (1983); Brown Hotel Company v.
Edwards, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 299, 302 (1962).
Evidence is
substantial if when taken alone or in the light of all the
evidence, it has sufficient probative value to induce conviction
in the minds of reasonable persons. Kentucky State Racing
Commission v. Fuller, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (1972).
The
reviewing court must then determine whether the Commission
applied the correct rule of law to its factual findings. H & S
Hardware, at 40.
Where the question is one of law rather than
fact, "courts are not bound to accept the legal conclusions of
[the] administrative body." Revenue Cabinet v. Joy Technologies,
Inc., Ky. App., 838 S.W.2d 406, 408 (1992).
If, however, the
reviewing court finds the correct rule of law was applied to
facts supported by substantial evidence, the final order of the
agency must be affirmed.
Brown Hotel Company at 302.
The
position of the circuit court in administrative matters is one of
review, not of reinterpretation.
Kentucky Unemployment Insurance
Commission v. King, Ky. App., 657 S.W.2d 250 (1983).
The circuit
court's review is limited to the record made before the
Commission.
Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v.
Murphy, Ky., 539 S.W.2d 293, 294 (1976); Department of Education
v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission, Ky. App., 798
S.W.2d 464 (1990).
As an appellate court, we step into the shoes
of the circuit court.
See American Beauty Homes Corp. v.
Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Comm'n, Ky.,
379 S.W.2d 450 (1964).
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The appellants contend that McDougal was discharged for
misconduct, and argue that the circuit court’s determination to
the contrary was erroneous.
KRS 341.370(6) defines "discharge
for misconduct" as follows:
"[d]ischarge for misconduct" as used in this
section shall include, but not be limited to,
separation initiated by an employer for
falsification of an employment application to
obtain employment through subterfuge; knowing
violation of a reasonable and uniformly
enforced rule of an employer; unsatisfactory
attendance if the worker cannot show good
cause for absences or tardiness; damaging the
employer's property through gross negligence;
refusing to obey reasonable instructions;
reporting to work under the influence of
alcohol or drugs or consuming alcohol or
drugs on employer's premises during working
hours; conduct endangering safety of self or
co-workers; and incarceration in jail
following conviction of a misdemeanor or
felony by a court of competent jurisdiction,
which results in missing at least five (5)
days work. [Emphasis added.]
An employer bears the burden of proving employee
misconduct.
Shamrock Coal Company, Inc. v. Taylor, Ky. App., 697
S.W.2d 952 (1985).
In cases involving the issue of misconduct,
the facts of each case must be examined in light of the
reasonable employment relationship.
Douthitt v. Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Commission, Ky. App., 676 S.W.2d 472
(1984).
Based upon their respective written decisions, the
primary dispute between the Commission and the circuit court
appears to be whether McDougal’s testimony alone supports a
finding that McDougal engaged in on-the-job misconduct which
would justify his discharge.
With regard to the September 8,
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1998, incident concerning McDougal’s refusal to talk to a team
leader, McDougal testified as follows:
I just walked away from him. I didn’t say
nothing to him. I walked away from him and
the next day they called me in the office and
they gave me an informal verbal counseling
that they said I should have sit there and
talked to him. (Transcript of August 26,
1999, Referee Hearing, at Page 19)
Based upon the foregoing, we agree with the
Commission’s conclusion that, by his own testimony, McDougal
admitted to statutory misconduct with reference to the September
1998 incident.
Further, with respect to the above incident,
McDougal signed a document captioned “Associate Corrective
Action.”
The form included “Manager/Team Leader Comments”
stating “I/we expect no further incident in the future of this
type behavior.
It cannot lead to success here at Hoffman.”
(Appellant Hoffman’s Brief, at 25).
Based upon McDougal’s
executing the Corrective Action Form, the Commission’s conclusion
that he was aware that his future conduct could jeopardize his
job is supported by substantial evidence.
With regard to the June 4, 1999, confrontation with
leader Curtis Getchell, McDougal testified as follows:
You know, I figured all we had was words.
You know, I raised my voice a little bit. I
never cussed at him. I was never aggressive
toward him. I never threatened him or
anything. They are blowing it all out of
proportion. The only reason they’re blowing
it out of proportion is because of the union.
Me wearing the union shirt and my wife
wearing the union shirt. (T.E., at Page 25).
. . . .
I raised my voice a little bit. I voiced my
opinion and I thought it was - - he was
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invading my wife’s privacy for getting into
that toolbox. (T.E., at Pages 25 and 26).
. . . .
We were standing an arm’s length away. We
talked a little bit more and when I left I
raised my arm a little bit and pointed at him
and I told him, I said, you guys better quit
messing with my wife, and I turned around and
walked away from him. (Emphasis added.)
(T.E., at Page 26).
We conclude that the emphasized portions of McDougal’s
testimony are substantial evidence which support the Commission’s
conclusion that McDougal raised his voice in anger at Getchell,
pointed his finger at Getchell and issued what could be viewed as
either a veiled threat, or at least an attempt to intimidate
management.
The circuit court determined that the Commission relied
upon the witnesses’ statements presented by Hoffman at the
hearing.
The Commission’s order, however, did not refer to these
witnesses’ statements, but rather implied that the Commission
relied solely upon the testimony of McDougal.
With regard to the
witnesses’ statements, even if the Commission had relied in part
upon these statements, it would not have been improper per se for
it to have done so.
Hearsay evidence is admissible in an
administrative hearing if it is the type of evidence that
reasonable and prudent persons would rely on in their daily
affairs.
KRS 13B.090(1).
This is true even though the hearsay
evidence alone is not sufficient in itself to support an agency's
findings of fact unless it would be admissible over objections in
civil actions.
Mollette v. Kentucky Personnel Bd., Ky. App., 997
S.W.2d 492, 495 (1999).
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Becky Shelton, Human Resources Manger, testified that
it was a uniformly enforced policy at Hoffman that if an employee
acted in the manner that McDougal did on June 4, 1999, the
employee would be discharged.
The Commission’s conclusion that
McDougal was terminated for work-related misconduct was clearly
based on substantial evidence.
In contrast, the circuit court’s
conclusion that the Commission’s determination was based entirely
upon hearsay witnesses’ statements is not supported by the
record.
As a result, we conclude that the Commission acted
properly when it disqualified McDougal from receiving
unemployment insurance benefits pursuant to KRS 341.370(1)(b).
For the foregoing reasons the decision of the
Montgomery Circuit Court is reversed and this case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT
HOFFMAN ENGINEERING, INC.:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
KENNETH R. MCDOUGAL:
Donald P. Wagner
Lexington, Kentucky
Kaye L. Leighton
Mount Sterling, Kentucky
KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE COMMISSION:
Randall K. Justice
Frankfort, Kentucky
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