CHRIS MONTAZE CATLETT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 14, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001339-MR
CHRIS MONTAZE CATLETT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDWIN M. WHITE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00293
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: Chris Montaze Catlett appeals from an order of
the Christian Circuit Court denying his RCr1 11.42 motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence.
We conclude the
trial court correctly denied the motion and thus affirm.
On June 30, 1998, Catlett was arrested and charged with
first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance as a result of
selling two rocks of crack cocaine to a police informant on
May 12, 1998.
While in jail on the charge, Catlett was indicted
on three counts of first-degree trafficking in a controlled
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
substance.
One count was as a result of the May 12, 1998
incident, and the other two counts were as a result of incidents
allegedly occurring on April 23 and April 24, 1998.
On September 16, 1998, Catlett entered into a plea
agreement and pled guilty to the charges in each of the three
counts of the indictment.
On October 14, 1998, Catlett was
sentenced pursuant to the plea agreement to five years in prison
on each count.
The court ordered Counts 1 and 2 to run
consecutively and Count 3 to run concurrently for a total
sentence of ten years in prison.
Approximately four months
later, Catlett’s attorney filed a motion for shock probation,
which the trial court denied.
In April 2000, Catlett filed his RCr 11.42 motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence.
By order entered on
May 8, 2000, the trial court denied the motion without an
evidentiary hearing.
In its order denying the motion, the court
held that “the record shows that Movant’s guilty plea was
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.
Furthermore,
there is no evidence in the record to indicate that his counsel
was ineffective.”
This appeal by Catlett followed.
The essence of Catlett’s RCr 11.42 motion is that he
received the ineffective assistance of counsel.
He argues that
his counsel did not fully explain to him the nature of the
charges against him, did not inform him of the constitutional
rights he would be forfeiting by pleading guilty, failed to
explain the concept of double jeopardy to him, did not
investigate his case and his background, and coerced him into
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pleading guilty with the unfulfilled promise that she would file
a motion for shock probation.
In connection with these
arguments, Catlett argues that the two counts of the indictment
relating to alleged offenses committed on April 23 and April 24,
1998, were “trumped up” by law enforcement officers and had
absolutely no factual basis supporting them.
First, to the extent that Catlett is attempting to
challenge the factual basis of the two April 1998 counts in the
indictment, his guilty plea to the offenses precludes such a
challenge at this late date.
“Entry of a voluntary, intelligent
plea of guilty has long been held by Kentucky Courts to preclude
a post-judgment challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.”
Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 724 S.W.2d 223, 225 (1986).
The court in Taylor further reasoned as follows:
A defendant who elects to unconditionally
plead guilty admits the factual accuracy of
the various elements of the offenses with
which he is charged. By such an admission, a
convicted appellant forfeits the right to
protest at some later date that the state
could not have proven that he committed the
crimes to which he pled guilty. To permit a
convicted defendant to do so would result in
a double benefit in that defendants who elect
to plead guilty would receive the benefit of
the plea bargain which ordinarily precedes
such a plea along with the advantage of later
challenging the sentence resulting from the
plea on grounds normally arising in the very
trial which defendant elected to forego.
Id.
In connection with his argument that he received the
ineffective assistance of counsel, Catlett first contends that
his attorney did not fully explain the nature of the charges
against him or the constitutional rights he would be forfeiting
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by pleading guilty.
However, in reviewing the record, we note
that the colloquy between the trial court and Catlett indicates
Catlett understood the charges against him as well as his
constitutional rights.
Furthermore, in response to a question
from the trial judge at the guilty plea proceeding, Catlett’s
counsel indicated she believed Catlett understood his rights and
the nature of the proceeding.
In addition, Catlett signed a
written motion to enter a guilty plea which explained to him the
constitutional rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty.
In
short, the record supports the trial court’s findings and refutes
Catlett’s allegations that his guilty plea was not entered
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
Catlett next asserts that his counsel failed to explain
the concept of double jeopardy to him.
It appears he believes
that the convictions for the two April 1998 incidents violate
double jeopardy principles based on his allegation that the
offenses never occurred but were merely “trumped up” and were
nothing more than a restatement of the same charge concerning the
May 12, 1998, incident.
To get to the point, there is no double
jeopardy issue in this case.
The indictment set forth three
separate offenses occurring on three separate dates.
As stated
earlier herein, Catlett may not attack at this late date the
factual basis or sufficiency of the evidence concerning his
convictions.
Catlett next argues that his counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to investigate the law and
facts surrounding the case.
The record indicates the
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Commonwealth provided all discoverable material and information
to Catlett’s counsel.
After possessing the evidence for some
period of time, Catlett moved to enter a guilty plea to the
charges.
Further, he now fails to specifically express what
counsel failed to investigate and how that failure to discover
prejudiced his case.
See Centers v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 799
S.W.2d 51, 56 (1990).
His argument in this regard is likewise
without merit.
Catlett also asserts that he was coerced to plead
guilty due to an unfulfilled promise by his counsel that she
would file a motion for shock probation.
promise was made, it was fulfilled.
In fact, if such a
Counsel filed a motion for
shock probation on Catlett’s behalf on February 11, 1999, but it
was denied by the trial court.
Since the trial court denied Catlett’s motion without
an evidentiary hearing, our review concerns “whether the [RCr
11.42] motion on its face states grounds that are not
conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would
invalidate the conviction.”
Baze v. Commonwealth, Ky., 23 S.W.3d
619, 622 (2000), quoting Lewis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 411 S.W.2d
321, 322 (1967).
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the
record conclusively refutes the grounds stated by Catlett in
support of his motion.
Thus, the order of the Christian Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Chris Montaze Catlett, Pro Se
Central City, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Janine Coy Bowden
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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