SULTAN SALAT APPEALS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 10, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2000-CA-001205-MR
AND NO. 2000-CA-002419-MR
SULTAN SALAT
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-002615
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN CASE NO. 2000-CA-001205-MR
AND VACATING AND REMANDING IN CASE NO. 2000-CA-002419-MR
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, MILLER, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Sultan Salat appeals from his conviction of
theft by deception over $300 and theft by failure to make
required disposition of property over $300.
In a separate
appeal, Salat appeals from an order of the Jefferson Circuit
Court revoking his probation.
Having reviewed the record and
applicable law, we affirm the conviction and vacate and remand
the order revoking probation.
Glynn Jones (Jones), the victim, was employed as an
assistant football coach at the University of Louisville from
1995-1997, but lost his job when the head coach, Ron Cooper, was
let go in 1997.
Jones had worked as a football coach for
approximately 15 years, and, after being let go from U of L,
decided to change careers in order to be able to spend more time
with his family.
In 1998, after submitting numerous job
applications and experiencing financial difficulties, Jones
started his own businesses - a lawn care service and a janitorial
business.
On August 17, 1998, Sultan Salat called Jones and
urgently wanted to meet with him.
Jones was acquainted with
Salat, having met him on two or three previous occasions.
Salat
came over to Jones's house and said he had an investment
opportunity.
Jones explained his financial situation to Salat
and told Salat that he was not in a position to get involved in
anything that would cause financial harm to his family.
Salat
assured Jones that the deal he had was 100% guaranteed and that
he was not going to do anything that would hurt Jones's family.
Salat then pulled out official looking documents and explained
that he was involved in a construction deal in Nigeria, but
needed $7,000 to complete the transaction.
Salat indicated to
Jones that he had relatives in Nigeria and was friends with the
Nigerian official in charge of the deal.
Salat told Jones that
he (Jones) would make $20,000 off of the investment.
Salat
explained to Jones that the transaction would be completed within
72 hours at the most, at which time Jones would have his initial
investment back, plus the $20,000.
Believing he was participating in a legitimate business
deal, Jones gave Salat two cashier's checks on August 17, 1998,
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one for $5,000 and one for $2,830.
Three days later, Salat gave
Jones a personal check for $20,000, but the check was not dated.
Salat told Jones that there was no money in his account at the
time, but that the money would be in the account after three days
and then Jones could take the check to Salat's bank and cash it.
Salat assured Jones that he (Salat) had enough money in his
retirement account to cover the check if anything went wrong.
On September 2, 1998, Salat called Jones and said that
there was a glitch in getting the money, and that he needed to
"tip" a Nigerian official to get the money released.
Salat came
to Jones's house and showed him more official looking documents
and asked if Jones knew anyone else who wanted to get in on the
investment.
Jones called a friend with whom he had invested
before, who agreed to lend Jones the $25,000 Salat said he
needed.
Salat assured Jones that he would get the money back in
three days.
The friend subsequently wired the money to Jones,
who then gave a cashier's check for $25,000 to Salat.
After receiving the $25,000 check, Salat stopped
contacting Jones.
After about five days, a worried Jones began
contacting Salat, who assured him that everything was okay.
Jones asked Salat to show him documentation that he had actually
wired the money to Nigeria, or show him bank statements, but
Salat refused.
Finally, realizing that he was the victim of a
scam, on November 1, 1998, Jones contacted the Attorney General's
office, met with Robert Winlock, an investigator in the consumer
protection division, and filed a complaint.
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Salat did not
respond to the complaint, and after an investigation, a warrant
was issued for Salat's arrest.
On October 25, 1999, Salat was indicted by the
Jefferson County Grand Jury on one count of theft by deception
over $300 and one count of theft by failure to make required
disposition of property over $300.
March 16, 2000.
A jury trial was held on
Jones testified to the facts as stated above.
Salat did not testify and presented no evidence.
Salat guilty as charged.
The jury found
On April 25, 2000, the court entered
its judgment of conviction and sentence, sentencing Salat to four
years' imprisonment on each charge, with the sentences to run
consecutively for a total of eight years' imprisonment.
court then probated the sentence for five years.
The
As a condition
of probation, Salat was required to pay $33,600 in restitution in
the amount of $300 per month for 110 months.
On May 12, 2000,
Salat filed a notice of appeal from the April 25, 2000 judgment,
case number 2000-CA-001205.
Salat subsequently failed to pay
restitution, and, following a revocation hearing on September 8,
2000, on September 11, 2000, the court entered an order revoking
Salat's probation.
On October 11, 2000, Salat filed a separate
notice of appeal from the September 11, 2000 order, case number
2000-CA-002419.
In 2000-CA-001205, Salat first contends that the trial
court erred by allowing improper hearsay, character, and opinion
evidence at trial through the testimony of Robert Winlock.
Salat
concedes that these errors were not preserved, but requests this
court review them per RCr 10.26.
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At trial, Winlock, the
investigator from the Attorney General's office, testified as to
the procedure used by the Attorney General's office in
investigating a consumer complaint.
He then explained what Jones
had told him in the interview about the deal with Salat.
Salat
argues that this was improper hearsay to allow the investigator
to testify as to Jones's allegations.
"Background information
supplied to a police officer may be admissible under the 'verbal
act' doctrine in circumstances where it has a 'proper nonhearsay
use' to explain 'the action subsequently taken by the police
officer.'"
Carter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 782 S.W.2d 597, 600
(1989), overruled in part on other grounds, Norton v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 37 S.W.3d 750 (2001) (quoting Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534, 541 (1988)).
Further, Jones,
who made the statements to Winlock, testified at trial and was
available for cross-examination.
794 S.W.2d 165 (1990).
Barnes v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
Hence, we conclude Winlock's testimony
was not improper.
Salat next contends an improper introduction of
character evidence occurred when, in discussing the process of
investigating a complaint, Winlock stated, "We always check on
the offender and we found out that Mr. Salat's background was not
too clean."
While we believe that this allusion to prior bad
acts was improper per KRE 404(b), in light of the totality of
evidence we cannot say that Salat's substantial rights were
prejudiced by the statement.
Salat further argues that Winlock offered improper
opinion evidence when he "assure[d] the jury that Salat was in
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fact guilty" when "Winlock outlined the elements of the two
crimes charged and said that he felt that Salat had committed the
crimes for which he was being tried."
Winlock, explaining the
procedures the Attorney General's office goes through to obtain a
warrant, testified that he put in the affidavit that "Salat had
created a false impression and taken money.
Jones had given him
money and he had not properly disposed of it as he was supposed
to have - no proof of that."
We believe Winlock's testimony as
to the statements included in the affidavit was improper.
The
fact that an arrest warrant was obtained, which requires only
probable cause, is not relevant to a determination of guilt,
which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Further, the use
of the statements constituted hearsay as they were used to prove
guilt.
See Barnes, 794 S.W.2d at 168.
However, in light of the
testimony of Jones, we conclude that Salat's substantial rights
were not affected by Winlock's statements.
RCr 10.26.
Salat next contends that the trial court erred in
failing to appoint an attorney for him without holding a hearing
and without obtaining a waiver.
At Salat's arraignment on
November 1, 1999, the trial court asked him if he had an
attorney.
Salat answered that he did not, and the court informed
him that he had a right to have an attorney.
The court noted
that Salat's case had started in district court, and asked Salat
if he had been given a public defender in district court, to
which Salat replied that he had not.
The judge inquired as to
who owned the house Salat lived in, to which Salat replied that
he did.
The court then explained that by law, the court cannot
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appoint an attorney for him if he owns real estate.
The judge
then encouraged Salat to find an attorney to help him.
At the
December 12, 1999 hearing, the judge asked Salat if he was still
proceeding without an attorney.
Salat replied that he had asked
the court to appoint an attorney for him, but had been told he
could not get one because he owned real estate.
Salat
acknowledged that he still owned his house, and the court told
him he was welcome to hire an attorney.
At the January 18, 2000
hearing, the court again inquired if Salat was still choosing to
proceed without an attorney.
Salat again requested an appointed
attorney, but conceded that he still owned his house, although he
had filed for bankruptcy.
The court again explained to Salat
that it could not appoint a public defender if he owned real
estate.
KRS 31.110 provides for the appointment of an attorney
for a needy person.
KRS 31.120 states:
(3) It shall be prima facie evidence that a
person is not indigent or needy within the
meaning of this chapter if he . . .
(a) Owns real property in the Commonwealth
or without the Commonwealth;
The record shows that the court determined at each step of the
proceedings whether Salat was a needy person, as required by KRS
31.120(1).
We believe Salat had sufficient opportunity to
present evidence of indigency but did not.
In each instance
Salat conceded that he owned his own house, and he presented no
evidence other than his own assertions that he was indigent to
rebut this prima facie evidence.
Even in bankruptcy, there is a
housing exemption that could be released to help hire an
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attorney.
See KRS 427.160; KRS 427.060.
Further, Salat did not
file an affidavit of indigency as required by KRS 31.120(6).
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in failing
to appoint an attorney for Salat.
In 2000-CA-002419, Salat argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by revoking his probation without regard to
his financial inability to make the monthly restitution payments
of $300, and that his revocation hearing did not afford him the
required due process.
As a condition of his probation, Salat was
required to pay restitution of $300 per month.
On August 3,
2000, the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke Salat's probation
for failure to pay restitution.
The Commonwealth submitted a
report from the Division of Probation and Parole which stated
that Salat had paid $300 in May and $77 in June, and which
further stated that a letter was sent to Salat on June 26, 2000
informing him that if the fees were not made current by July 7,
2000, a report would be submitted to the court.
Salat failed to
comply, and a probation revocation hearing was held on
September 8, 2000, at which Salat was represented by appointed
counsel.
On September 11, 2000, the trial court entered an order
revoking Salat’s probation.
In Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-673, 103 S.
Ct. 2064, 2073, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1983), the United States
Supreme Court held that:
[I]n revocation proceedings for failure to
pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court
must inquire into the reasons for the failure
to pay. If the probationer willfully refused
to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide
efforts legally to acquire the resources to
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pay, the court may revoke probation and
sentence the defendant to imprisonment within
the authorized range of its sentencing
authority. If the probationer could not pay
despite sufficient bona fide efforts to
acquire the resources to do so, the court
must consider alternative measures of
punishment other than imprisonment. Only if
alternative measures are not adequate to meet
the State’s interests in punishment and
deterrence may the court imprison a
probationer who has made sufficient bona fide
efforts to pay. To do otherwise would
deprive the probationer of his conditional
freedom simply because, through no fault of
his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a
deprivation would be contrary to the
fundamental fairness required by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
At the revocation hearing, Salat stipulated to the fact
that restitution had not been paid as ordered, but contended that
he had attempted to pay restitution as best he could.1
Salat
contended that he could not pay because he was disabled and could
not work and received a total monthly income of $868 in social
security benefits.
The Commonwealth presented photographs taken
by a probation officer which showed Salat's house, which he still
owned, and furnishings, which included computers, artwork, and
TV's, along with three cars.
Salat explained that the
furnishings in his house were old, only one of the cars ran, that
he had filed for bankruptcy in November of 1999, and that he owed
in excess of the value of his house.
Salat did not present any
evidence at the hearing to support his contentions.
The trial
court may revoke probation upon a showing of a violation of
1
Salat stipulated to the violation report which stated that
he paid $300 in May and $77 in June. At the hearing, Salat
produced a receipt showing he had paid $50 in September, and
stated that he had also paid $50 in August, and "something" in
July.
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probation by a preponderance of evidence.
Rasdon v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 701 S.W.2d 716, 719 (1986).
The trial
court has broad discretion to revoke the conditional grant of
probation, and the appellate court cannot overturn the trial
court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion.
Tiryung v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 717 S.W.2d 503 (1986); Hardin v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 327 S.W.2d 93 (1959).
We believe the evidence
of Salat’s home and possessions set forth above was sufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that Salat had failed to make a
bona fide effort to pay restitution.
Hence, we cannot say that
the trial court abused its discretion in revoking Salat’s
probation.
Salat finally argues that the trial court denied him a
fair and impartial probation revocation hearing and failed to
state in writing the evidence relied on and the reasons for the
revocation, depriving him of his right to due process.
In parole
and probation revocation hearings certain due process rights must
be provided to the defendant which include:
(a) Written notice of the claimed violations
of parole;
(b) Disclosure to the parolee of evidence
against him;
(c) Opportunity to be heard in person and to
present witnesses and documentary evidence;
(d) The right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not
allowing confrontation);
(e) A ‘neutral and detached’ hearing
body . . .; and
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(f) A written statement by the factfinders as
to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking parole.
Marshall v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 638 S.W.2d 288, 289 (1982),
quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S. Ct. 2593,
2604, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972).
Salat first contends that the trial court was not
“neutral and detached” as evidenced by the judge’s comments at
the revocation hearing that Salat had tried “to con this jury”,
that Salat had “conned the court on at least two occasions, where
he told me about what he would do in the future”, and stated that
“I don’t think there’s any hope for you, Mr. Salat.”
Salat
contends that these comments demonstrated that the judge resented
and held a personal grudge against him.
Salat's allegations.
We find no merit in
The comments apparently refer to the
truthfulness of representations Salat made to the court at trial,
and at the sentencing hearing, which Salat has not made a part of
the record.
Further, the judge whom Salat contends resented him
initially granted him the privilege of probation.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 564 S.W.2d 21 (1977).
Brown v.
Additionally, upon
hearing the comments, Salat made no effort to challenge the
judge's continued presence at the hearing per KRS 26A.015.
Accordingly, we adjudge Salat's argument that the judge was not
"neutral and detached" to be without merit.
Salat finally contends that the written order revoking
his probation failed to state the evidence relied on and the
reasons for revocation.
The order states, in pertinent part:
Having considered the record, having
conducted a hearing, arguments and the
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stipulation of the parties having been
considered; the Court having dictated the
findings into the record, and being otherwise
sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion of the
Commonwealth to revoke is SUSTAINED.
The written statement required by Morrissey should “provide[] an
adequate basis for review to determine if the decision rests on
permissible grounds supported by the evidence.”
Black v. Romano,
471 U.S. 606, 613-614, 105 S. Ct. 2254, 2259, 85 L. Ed. 2d 636
(1985).
The trial court did not dictate the findings into the
record nor give a written statement as to the evidence relied on
for revoking parole.
Upon our review of the tape, the judge
simply revoked and sentenced.
Hence, we believe that the
probation revocation order must be vacated and the matter
remanded to the trial court to include a written statement as to
the evidence relied upon and reason for revocation.
See
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
For the aforementioned reasons, the Jefferson Circuit
Court's judgment of conviction is affirmed and the order revoking
probation is vacated and remanded.
MILLER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Elizabeth Shaw
Richmond, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Elizabeth B. McMahon
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville, Kentucky
John E. Zak
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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