RODNEY WALKER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 25, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000973-MR
RODNEY WALKER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00259
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, COMBS, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment pursuant to a
guilty plea convicting appellant of rape in the first degree and
sodomy in the first degree.
Appellant argues that he was
improperly sentenced to an additional three-year conditional
discharge under KRS 532.043 because said statute was an ex post
facto law as applied to him.
The Commonwealth concedes this
issue and we agree that KRS 532.043 was improperly applied to
appellant pursuant to the holding in Purvis v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
14 S.W.3d 21 (2000).
As for appellant’s remaining argument that
his guilty plea was not entered knowingly or voluntarily because
he did not understand an element of the offenses and because he
was highly emotional at the time of the plea, we believe this
argument is without merit.
Accordingly, we affirm the
convictions, but reverse that portion of the sentence applying
KRS 532.043.
In August of 1998, appellant, Rodney Walker, was
indicted on one count of rape in the first degree and one count
of sodomy in the first degree.
Both offenses stemmed from an
incident which occurred on July 5, 1998.
entered a plea of not guilty.
Walker initially
Thereafter, Walker accepted a plea
agreement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to both offenses in
exchange for the Commonwealth’s recommendation that he be
sentenced to two 15-year sentences to be served concurrently.
The plea agreement also provided that an additional three-year
term of conditional discharge would be imposed on Walker upon his
release from prison pursuant to KRS 532.043.
On January 18, 2000, Walker appeared with his appointed
counsel and entered an emotional guilty plea to one count of
first-degree rape and one count of first-degree sodomy.
When
Walker later appeared for sentencing on March 1, 2000, Walker
informed the court that he could not plead guilty to the
offenses.
For reasons other than Walker’s contention, the
sentencing hearing was rescheduled for April 3, 2000.
On that
date, Walker moved the court to allow him to withdraw his guilty
plea because he was highly emotional during the plea and did not
understand that forcible compulsion was an element of the
offenses due to his ineffective counsel.
After taking the motion
under submission and reviewing the videotape of the guilty plea,
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the court denied Walker’s motion and thereafter sentenced him to
two 15-year terms of imprisonment to be served concurrently.
No
mention was made in the judgment of the three-year conditional
discharge term.
This appeal by Walker followed.
Walker first argues that the imposition of the threeyear conditional discharge term pursuant to KRS 532.043 was an
unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to him.
Although
the final judgment and sentence on the plea of guilty did not
mention the additional three-year conditional discharge, we shall
assume that it was nonetheless imposed on Walker since it was
listed in his plea agreement with the Commonwealth.
Further, we
shall review this argument as palpable error under RCr 10.26 even
though it was not raised below.
KRS 532.043 provides that the
defendant must complete any sex offender treatment program
required by the Department of Corrections, and if the defendant
fails to so complete the program, the conditional discharge may
be revoked and the defendant required to serve any of the
remaining three-year sentence.
KRS 532.043 was effective on
July 15, 1998, and Walker committed the offenses in this case on
July 5, 1998.
In Purvis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 14 S.W.3d 21
(2000), the defendant committed the sex offenses prior to the
effective date of KRS 532.043, and the court imposed the
additional three years’ conditional discharge per that statute.
The Court held that the application of KRS 532.043 as to that
defendant constituted an ex post facto law because it enhanced
the legal consequences of offenses committed before the effective
date of the law.
It follows that in the present case, the
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application of KRS 532.043 was likewise improper.
Accordingly,
we reverse that portion of the sentence which imposed the three
years’ conditional discharge.
Walker next argues that his guilty plea was not entered
knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently because he was not
informed by his attorney that an element of both offenses was
forcible compulsion and because he was highly emotional during
the plea.
During the course of the plea, Walker at times cried
and his voice cracked.
could clearly be heard.
However, his statements and responses
The following colloquy occurred between
the court, Walker, and Walker’s counsel during the plea:
Court: Mr. Walker, do you understand the
facts which you are charged in the
indictment?
Walker:
Yes sir.
Court: Did you in fact on July 5, 1998, here
in Daviess County, Kentucky engage in sexual
intercourse with Heather Carter-Reynolds by
forcible compulsion?
Walker:
Yes sir.
Court: How do you plead to count one in the
indictment, rape in the first degree?
Walker:
Guilty.
Court: Did you in fact on July 5, 1998, here
in Daviess County, Kentucky engage in deviate
sexual intercourse with Heather CarterReynolds by forcible compulsion?
Walker:
Yes.
Court: Alright, how do you plead to count
two of the indictment, sodomy in the first
degree?
Walker:
Guilty.
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Court: What did you do to commit those
offenses?
Walker:
please?
Could you explain your question sir,
Court: Tell me what you did, exactly what
you did.
Walker: Well, to my understanding, the lady
wanted to have sex with me. She made
advances at me, so I obliged. I tried to
have sex with her as I thought she was
wanting to have sex with me. That’s what I
did.
Court: Well, are you now acknowledging for
the record that she did not consent to you
having sex with her and that you had sex with
her forcibly?
Walker:
I don’t understand.
Defense counsel: Are you admitting today
that, uh, saying today you forced her to have
sex and oral sex with her?
Walker: Yes sir. I am admitting today that
I forced her to have oral sex with me.
Court:
Walker:
Court:
Walker:
Is that oral sex also?
Yes sir.
So, she did not consent to any of it?
No sir.
A guilty plea is valid if it represents a voluntary and
intelligent choice by a competent and counseled defendant to
waive the several trial-related constitutional rights, and the
record affirmatively establishes this knowing waiver.
Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969);
Centers v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 799 S.W.2d 51 (1990).
a plea is voluntary is determined from the surrounding
circumstances as well as from the transcript of the plea
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Whether
proceeding.
Kotas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 445 (1978).
A guilty plea may be involuntary either because the accused does
not understand the nature of his waived rights or because he has
such an incomplete understanding of the charge that the plea is
not a reliable admission of guilt.
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S.
637, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1976).
The trial court is
in the best position to determine if there was any reluctance,
involuntariness, or incompetence to plead guilty.
Kotas, 565
S.W.2d at 447.
In the instant case, Walker signed the Commonwealth’s
offer on a plea of guilty, which specifically lists “forcible
compulsion” as an element of the crime.
Further, the motion to
enter guilty plea, which Walker also signed, states that he was
voluntarily, freely, knowingly, and intelligently pleading
guilty, that he was represented by competent counsel, and that he
understood the nature of the charges against him and any possible
defenses thereto.
At the guilty plea proceeding, Walker
confirmed that he had all the time necessary to confer with his
attorney and that he was fully satisfied with her services.
The
court explained all the rights Walker was waiving by pleading
guilty, and Walker acknowledged that he was freely waiving those
rights.
The court read the charges against Walker, which
specifically included the element of forcible compulsion, and
Walker unequivocally admitted he was guilty of both charges.
Although Walker at first did not admit that he forced the victim
to have sex when asked by the court what he did to commit the
offenses, he subsequently confirmed that he forcibly committed
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the acts without the consent of the victim when the question was
clarified by his counsel.
As to Walker’s claim that he was emotionally
overwrought during the guilty plea, after viewing the videotape
of the guilty plea proceeding, we do not believe that Walker was
so emotional that his judgment was impaired or that he was not
aware of what was he was doing.
In fact, during the plea, Walker
conceded that he had no mental disease or defect and that his
judgment was not impaired in any way.
Although he was emotional,
he appeared to be competent, and his responses and statements
were coherent and intelligent.
Simply because a defendant is
emotional does not render him incompetent or his plea
involuntary.
On the contrary, a defendant facing imprisonment on
charges such as these has good reason to be emotional, and his
emotion can be a sign that he is competent and well aware of the
proceedings and the attendant consequences.
Accordingly, we
reject Walker’s assertion that his guilty plea was not entered
voluntarily.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the
Daviess Circuit Court is affirmed in part and reversed only as to
that portion of the sentence which imposed the three-year
conditional discharge under KRS 532.043.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joanne Lynch
Louisville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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