TERI O. EADS, GUARDIAN AND NEXT FRIEND OF JERI O. EADS, MINOR v. SOUTHERN HERITAGE INSURANCE COMPANY
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RENDERED: JULY 6, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000851-MR
TERI O. EADS, GUARDIAN AND NEXT
FRIEND OF JERI O. EADS, MINOR
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00451
v.
SOUTHERN HERITAGE INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
The appellant, Jeri O. Eads, as Guardian and Next
Friend of her minor daughter, Teri O. Eads, brought a declaratory
judgment action against her motor vehicle insurance carrier,
Southern Heritage Insurance Company (Southern), to determine
their entitlement to coverage under the uninsured motorist (UM)
provision of the policy.
The Eadses contend that the trial court
erred in setting aside the default judgment which was initially
entered against Southern and in subsequently granting Southern’s
motion for summary judgment on the issue of its liability to pay
UM benefits.
We find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in setting aside the default judgment.
We further
find that the vehicle in which Teri Eads was injured was not
uninsured for purposes of UM coverage.
On June 9, 1998,
Hence, we affirm.
Jeri Eads, who was then age eleven,
was a passenger in a car that was being driven by an uninsured,
unlicenced ten-year-old named David Pilkington.
Sylvester
Willard, the vehicle’s owner, had not given David permission to
use the vehicle.
However, two of Willard’s children, Brandon
McQueen, age eleven, and Randy Willard, age twelve, were also in
the vehicle along with Jeri and David.
Sylvester had insured the
vehicle under a policy with Kentucky Farm Bureau with policy
limits of $25,000.00 per person and $50,000.00 per accident.
While David was driving, the vehicle was involved in a
single-car accident.
Jeri sustained numerous injuries and had to
be transported by air to a hospital for treatment.
Jeri's
mother, Teri Eads, filed a claim against Sylvester Willard for
negligently entrusting the vehicle to his children.
Kentucky
Farm Bureau paid the liability limits of Willard’s policy, and
the Eadses received $25,000.00.
Teri Eads was insured under a policy provided by
Southern.
In addition to the liability coverage, the policy
provided underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage in the amount of
$100,000.00 per person and $300,000.00 per accident and UM
coverage in the same amounts.
After Kentucky Farm Bureau paid
the limits of Willard’s policy, Teri Eads filed a claim with
Southern to recover under her own UIM coverage.
Eads $100,000.00 in UIM benefits.
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Southern paid
Thereafter, the Eadses brought a negligence claim
against David and his parents for David’s negligent acts.
Their
insurance carrier, OMNI Insurance Company, denied coverage
because David had not received the permission of the owner of the
vehicle to drive it.
The Eadses then sought an additional
recovery from Southern for UM coverage.
The Eadses argued that
they were entitled to both UIM benefits (with respect to Willard)
and UM benefits (with respect to David).
Southern denied their
claim for UM benefits.
The Eadses filed a declaratory judgment action against
Southern on April 19, 1999.
On that same day the Eadses served
notice on Southern through the Kentucky Secretary of State's
Office.1
The Secretary of State's office forwarded notice to
Southern by certified mail on April 30, 1999.
In addition, on
April 19, 1999, the Eadses sent a courtesy copy of the complaint
to Southern's counsel.
Southern, notwithstanding the service of
process and the informal notice, filed no answer within the time
allowed under CR 12.01.
The Eadses moved for default judgment,
which the trial court granted on May 25, 1999.
Nine days later, on June 3, 1999, Southern moved to
have the judgment set aside.
Southern’s counsel explained that
the recent departure from their office of two associates, the
inexperience of two part-time law-student clerks, and counsel’s
vacation and out-of-town duties had apparently combined to allow
the Eadses complaint to escape prompt notice.
Although
acknowledging that these circumstances would not excuse an
1
KRS 304.3-230(5).
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extreme or a general failure to abide by the civil rules, counsel
noted that, with this lone exception, he and his office had been
diligent in meeting all deadlines and that he had responded
promptly as soon as this mistake had come to his attention.
On July 12, the trial court set aside the default
judgment.
Citing Thompson v. American
Home Assurance Company,2
the trial court concluded that Southern had shown good cause to
have the judgment set aside.
After the trial court set aside the
default judgment, Southern filed a motion for summary judgment.
Southern claimed that Jeri was injured in an insured vehicle
since the owner of the vehicle had insurance.
Southern further
stated that the vehicle owner's insurance carrier had already
paid its policy limits.
Since the vehicle was insured, Southern
denied that it had any liability under the Eadses UM coverage.
Southern concluded that no additional amounts were owing.
The trial court granted Southern’s motion for summary
judgment.
Relying upon Commonwealth Fire and Casualty Insurance
Co. v. Manis,3 and Windham v. Cunningham,4 the court concluded
that the vehicle in which Jeri was injured was insured.
Since
Jeri had been paid the limits of the owner’s liability policy and
she had received UIM benefits from Southern, she could no longer
ask for any benefits under UM coverage.
The Eadses now appeal from the trial court’s judgment.
They first maintain that the trial court relied inappropriately
2
95 F.3d 429 (6th Cir., 1996).
3
Ky. App., 549 S.W.2d 303 (1977).
4
Ky., 902 S.W.2d 838 (1995).
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on Thompson and that as a result the court abused its discretion
by concluding that Southern had shown good cause to set aside the
default judgment.
The Eadses argue that Southern was not
entitled to relief from the default judgment because it failed to
provide a valid excuse for default.
In response, Southern urges this court to adopt as the
applicable law the federal rule stated in Thompson.
The Thompson
court employed a three-part test to determine whether "good
cause" had been shown: (1) whether the entry of default was the
result of willful or culpable conduct on the part of the
defendant; (2) whether setting aside the default judgment would
prejudice the plaintiff; and (3) whether the defenses raised
following the entry of default are meritorious.5
Based on this
test, Southern argues that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in setting aside the default judgment.
We agree with the Eadses that the trial court erred in
applying the test set out in Thompson.
The Thompson test does
not apply because there are established rules in Kentucky that
cover this subject.
CR 55.02 provides as follows: "For good
cause shown the Court may set aside a judgment by default in
accordance with CR 60.02."
Among other grounds, CR 60.02
permits a trial court to relieve a party from a judgment which
was entered due to “excusable neglect.”
Good cause may be shown
by proving: (1) a valid excuse for default; (2) a meritorious
defense to the claim; and (3) absence of prejudice to the non-
5
Thompson, 95 F.3d at 432.
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defaulting party.6
Thompson sets out an alternative to the
valid-excuse requirement- the absence of willful or culpable
conduct- which has not been recognized under Kentucky’s rules of
procedure.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with the Eadses that the
trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the default
judgment.
While CR 55.02 and 60.02 are the applicable rules of
procedure with regard to setting aside a default judgment, CR
59.05 also support the trial court’s decision.
In this case, the
trial court entered the default judgment on May 25, 1999.
Southern filed to set aside default judgment on June 3--nine days
later.
Southern clearly filed their motion within the 10-day
reconsideration period allowed by CR 59.05.
Under this rule, the
trial court retained jurisdiction to set aside its judgment for
ten days after the entry of the order.7
Furthermore, CR 59.05 is
not inconsistent with the default judgment rule of CR 55.02.8
Because the trial court had the authority to set aside
the default judgment under CR 59.05 as well as CR 55.02, the
question becomes whether the trial court abused its discretion
under the former rule in setting aside the judgment.
believe that it did.
We do not
Trial courts "possess and exercise a very
large discretion for the purpose of permitting defense to be made
6
Perry v. Central Bank & Trust Co., Ky. App., 812 S.W.2d 166, 170 (1991).
7
Mingey v. Cline Leasing Service, Inc., Ky. App., 707 S.W.2d 794, 796 (1986).
8
Granville & Nutter Show v. Florsheim Shoe, Ky. App., 569 S.W.2d 721, 723 (1978).
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on the merits."9
Appellate courts will not interfere with that
broad discretion except when abuse is shown.10
The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial
judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.11 Here, the trial court
gave both parties ample opportunity to argue the merits of
Southern’s motion.
Although the Thompson test for finding good
cause was not binding, the trial court did conclude that Southern
had not acted in bad faith and that the Eadses would not be
unfairly prejudiced if the default judgment were set aside.
Moreover, the trial court also concluded that Southern had
presented a potentially meritorious defense to the Eadses claims.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment.
The Eadses next argue that the trial court erred in
granting Southern’s motion for summary judgment.
Because summary
judgments involve no fact finding, this Court reviews them de
novo, in the sense that we owe no deference to the conclusions of
the trial court.
As did the trial court, we ask whether material
facts are in dispute and whether the party moving for judgment is
clearly entitled thereto as a matter of law.12
9
Kidd v. B. Perini & Sons, Ky. App., 233 S.W.2d 255, 257 (1950).
10
Id.
11
Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1999).
12
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky. App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996); See also Steelvest, Inc. v.
Scansteel Service Center, Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
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The issue on appeal is whether the Eadses are allowed
to "stack" their UM coverage with their UIM coverage.
The Eadses
claim that the relevant factor to determine whether UM coverage
should be paid is not the status of the vehicle, but rather the
status of the individual.
In Estate of Swartz v. Metropolitan
Property & Casualty Co.,13 this Court noted that UM coverage is
personal to the insured, while liability insurance follows the
vehicle.14
However, in Swartz, this Court was considering the
validity of a policy provision which prohibited an insured from
stacking UIM coverage under a policy which, while ostensibly
charging a single premium for the protection, in fact based the
premium on the number of vehicles insured.
In this case, the
question presented is whether an insured is entitled to both UIM
and UM coverage for the same vehicle.
Likewise, we are not persuaded that the doctrine of
reasonable expectations applies to this case.
That doctrine can
only apply when the policy provisions are ambiguous.15
The
Eadses do not contend that the policy provisions are ambiguous
regarding the extent of their coverage.
Rather, KRS 304.20-020(1) and (2) set out standards to
determine when a motor vehicle will be considered “uninsured” for
purposes of UM coverage.
Section (1) of that statute requires
that every automobile insurance policy contains provisions for
13
14
Ky. App., 949 S.W.2d 72 (1997).
Id. at 74; citing Hamilton v. Allstate Insurance Co., Ky., 789 S.W.2d 751, 753-54
(1990).
15
Meyers v. Kentucky Medical Ins. Co., Ky. App., 982 S.W.2d 203 (1997); citing Simon
v. Continental Ins. Co., Ky., 724 S.W.2d 210 (1987).
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uninsured motorist coverage unless the insured waives such
coverage.
Section (2) sets out the circumstances under which a
vehicle may be deemed uninsured even when a policy of insurance
is in effect for the vehicle:
For the purposes of this coverage the term
"uninsured motor vehicle" shall, subject to
the terms and conditions of such coverage, be
deemed to include an "insured motor vehicle"
where the liability insurer thereof is unable
to make payment with respect to the legal
liability of its insured within the limits
specified therein because of insolvency; an
"insured motor vehicle" with respect to the
amounts provided, under the bodily injury
liability bond or insurance policy applicable
at the time of the accident with respect to
any person or organization legally
responsible for the use of such "motor
vehicle", are less than the limits described
in KRS 304.39-110; and an "insured motor
vehicle" to the extent that the amounts
provided in liability coverage applicable at
the time of the accident is denied by insured
writing the same.
In each of the three instances set out in the statute,
the factor used to determine whether a vehicle is uninsured
focuses on the vehicle’s coverage and not on the driver’s
coverage.
Furthermore, this Court has held that if the vehicle
was insured, the fact the driver was uninsured is irrelevant.16
Consequently, an insured is not entitled to recover under the UM
and UIM coverages of the same policy.17
In the case before us, the owner of the vehicle,
Sylvester Willard, insured the vehicle through Kentucky Farm
Bureau.
In fact, Kentucky Farm Bureau paid the Eadses the limits
16
Windham v. Cunningham, 902 S.W.2d at 840.
17
Id.; See also Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glass, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 437, 448-50 (1997).
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of that policy for this accident.
Therefore, the fact that David
Pilkington was an unlicenced, uninsured driver has no relevance
here since the vehicle was insured by its owner.
Furthermore, the "purpose of uninsured motor vehicle
coverage is to make available to injured parties from their own
insurer a stated minimum amount of insurance coverage when no
other valid or collectible insurance exists with respect to the
vehicle causing the damage."18
Jeri and Teri Eads have received
liability coverage under Willard’s policy and UIM benefits under
their own policy with Southern.
They are not entitled to also
recover UM benefits under their policy with Southern.
Therefore,
the trial court properly found that Southern was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael L. Hawkins
Cleveland & Hawkins, LLP
Frankfort, Kentucky
David A. Nunery
David A. Nunery, PSC
Campbellsville, Kentucky
18
Commonwealth Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Manis, Ky. App., 549 S.W.2d 303, 305
(1977).
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