ROBERT CALDWELL v. KENTUCKY NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
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RENDERED: JUNE 8, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000723-MR
ROBERT CALDWELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-01266
KENTUCKY NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, JOHNSON AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Robert Caldwell has appealed from a declaratory
judgment entered by the Hardin Circuit Court on February 25,
2000, in favor of Kentucky National Insurance Company (KNIC).
Having concluded that there are genuine issues of material fact
for the trier of fact to decide which preclude the granting of
the declaratory judgment by summary judgment, we reverse and
remand.
On March 21, 1996, Caldwell applied for homeowner’s
insurance coverage for his home in Hardin County, Kentucky, from
KNIC through one of its agents, Bluegrass Insurance.
While there
are many questions concerning the completion of the insurance
application, it is agreed that Caldwell signed the application
and that it was accepted by KNIC.
Shortly after Caldwell’s home
was destroyed by a fire on August 16, 1997, he filed a claim for
his loss with KNIC.
On December 8, 1997, KNIC rejected
Caldwell’s claim pursuant to KRS1 304.14-1102 based on the
grounds that his application for coverage contained “several
material inaccuracies.”
KNIC refunded all premiums Caldwell had
paid.3
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
KRS 304.14-110 is entitled “Representations in
applications” and states:
All statements and descriptions in any application for an
insurance policy or annuity contract, by or on behalf of the
insured or annuitant, shall be deemed to be representations and
not warranties. Misrepresentations, omissions, and incorrect
statements shall not prevent a recovery under the policy or
contract unless either:
(1)
Fraudulent; or
(2)
Material either to the acceptance of the risk, or to the
hazard assumed by the insurer; or
(3)
The insurer in good faith would either not have issued the
policy or contract, or would not have issued it at the same
premium rate, or would not have issued a policy or contract
in as large an amount, or would not have provided coverage
with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss, if the
true facts had been made known to the insurer as required
either by the application for the policy or contract or
otherwise. This subsection shall not apply to applications
taken for workers’ compensation insurance coverage.
3
The refund was for $688.74.
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On August 13, 1998, Caldwell filed a verified complaint
in the Hardin Circuit Court against KNIC.
He alleged that when
his home was destroyed by fire, the premises were covered by a
policy issued by KNIC.
He claimed that he had “done all and
sundry the [sic] acts and things required of him to have been
done under the policy to be done as conditions precedent to
[KNIC] making payment to him of his claim for loss due to the
fire, and all such conditions precedent have been performed or
have occurred, yet [KNIC] has failed and refused to pay [his]
claim[.]”
Caldwell asked for “a trial by jury on all issues so
triable[.]”4
On August 31, 1998, KNIC filed an answer and a “Counter
Petition for Declaration of Rights” pursuant to KRS Chapter 418.
KNIC alleged that
Caldwell induced issuance of the subject
Policy by means of an application of
Insurance which contained misrepresentations,
omissions and incorrect and fraudulent
statements on which [KNIC] relied. Said
misrepresentations were material, they were
false, they were known by Plaintiff [ ]
Caldwell to be false or he made said
misrepresentations recklessly, he made said
representations with the intent that it be
acted upon by [KNIC], that [KNIC] acting in
reliance thereon issued the subject Policy.
Accordingly, Plaintiff [ ] Caldwell is
4
Approximately five pages of Caldwell’s nine-page complaint
is devoted to alleging that KNIC committed an unfair claims
settlement practice pursuant to KRS 304.12-230. Caldwell sought
damages which included his attorney’s fees and punitive damages.
Caldwell tendered an amended complaint on July 27, 1999, which
was ordered filed on July 30, 1999. The amended complaint
withdrew the unfair settlement practice claim and the claim for
punitive damages.
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estopped from stating any claim under the
subject Policy.
KNIC also claimed that it was entitled to payment of its
attorney’s fees pursuant to CR5 11.
For the next ten months, the
parties took some discovery; and Caldwell, pursuant to CR 12.05,
sought a more definite statement of KNIC’s counterclaim.
Caldwell’s CR 12.05 request was denied by an order entered on
June 14, 1999.
On June 29, 1999, Caldwell filed a “Reply to
Counterclaim,” wherein he once again demanded “a trial by jury on
all issues so triable[.]”
On September 7, 1999, KNIC filed a motion “pursuant to
KRS 418.050” for the trial court “to enter tendered Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment Declaring Rights.”
In its
supporting brief, KNIC argued that Caldwell had made numerous
misrepresentations in his application for homeowner’s insurance;
and that if KNIC had known the true facts, it would not have
issued a policy to Caldwell.
KNIC’s motion was supported by the
affidavit of Jeffrey Wilkinson, the Division Underwriting Manager
for KNIC, which stated, in part, as follows:
4. That the misrepresentations, omissions,
or incorrect statements set out in the
application were material to the acceptance
of this risk and were material to the hazard
assumed by the insurer. KENTUCKY NATIONAL
would not have accepted this risk under any
program if it had been aware of the nature of
the construction of the subject residence
[emphasis original].
5. That the annual premium for coverage as
set out in the subject application, totaled
5
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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$200.97. The annual premium for the actual
residence would be unknown as this risk is
not eligible for any of our Insurance
programs.
There is a substantial material
difference between the construction quality
of a 1993 double wide modular home and a
bolted together dwelling which consists of
two mobile homes. Of primary concern, is the
wiring and the potential for overloading the
circuits. Also, the modular home would be
subject to building and safety codes. A home
made [sic] structure would not be subject to
the same inspections and standards.
For these reasons, factory constructed
houses are eligible for our programs. Bolted
together mobile homes do not meet our
requirements.
On October 6, 1999, the trial court entered an order6
giving Caldwell until November 1, 1999, to file a brief in
response to KNIC’s motion.
pleading.7
Caldwell did not file a responsive
On February 25, 2000, the trial court entered its
“FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & FINAL JUDGMENT DECLARING
RIGHTS” wherein it “considered, ordered, adjudged and determined
that the subject KENTUCKY NATIONAL Policy of Insurance was void
ab initio and Plaintiff, ROBERT A. CALDWELL, does and shall have
no cause or have any rights or claims under or as to said Policy
of Insurance” [emphases original].8
6
The order had also been tendered by KNIC, but the deadline
for Caldwell’s response had been left blank.
7
Trial counsel was not the same as appellate counsel.
8
The declaratory judgment entered by the trial court was the
one tendered by KNIC on September 7, 1999. The word “TENDERED”
was apparently covered with white correction fluid.
-5-
The declaratory judgment, as tendered by KNIC and
adopted in toto by the trial court, contained some interesting
language that provides some insight into why the erroneous
judgment may have been entered.
The declaratory judgment
specifically states that the trial court has “determined as fact”
various matters.
While some of these “facts” were not in
dispute, some material facts were disputed.
The declaratory
judgment also stated that the trial court had “considered all
pleadings including the Briefs and Exhibits of counsel [and] oral
arguments.”
However, there were no “oral arguments,” and many of
the “Exhibits of counsel” were not verified, and thus, they were
not appropriate for consideration in a summary judgment.
The trial court’s declaratory judgment contained the
following findings of fact:
The Court determines as fact that MR.
CALDWELL has admitted that the subject
application contained various
misrepresentations and incorrect statements,
viz:
The application was for a
Homeowners Policy, not for a Mobile
Homeowners Policy.
The subject residence was
represented as being of frame
construction.
The application asked whether the
dwelling was currently insured and
Mr. Caldwell answered “just
purchased.”
The application asked how many
years he lived at this residence
and he answered “New”.
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The application asked what year the
dwelling was built and he answered
“1993."
The application asked whether any
business was conducted on the
premises and his answer was “No.”
The application asked when he
purchased the property and his
answer was “1996."
The application asked the “purchase
price” and he stated $50,000.00.
The application asked for the
“replacement costs” and the “market
value” to which he answered each
question “$50,000.00.”
In the remarks section of the
application, the residence was
stated to be “. . . a double wide
modular home” which is “. . . . set
on a continuous concrete
foundation”, the “. . . . front
porch of which was built on after
the house was set on the property.”
The Court further determines as fact and
MR. CALDWELL has admitted that in fact, this
residence consisted of two mobile homes
joined together and then covered with siding
and a wrap around front porch; the mobile
homes were given to MR. CALDWELL, they were
not purchased. MR. CALDWELL has resided at
this property since January, 1992 and he
operated his drywall business from the
property. The Hardin County Property
Evaluation Administrator valued the subject
two joined mobile homes with a wrap around
porch at $8,000.00 [emphases original].
This Court further determines as fact
that Defendant/Petitioner, KENTUCKY NATIONAL
INSURANCE CO., does not have any Insurance
Plan available by which it could have
provided Insurance coverage for MR.
CALDWELL’S actual residence [emphasis
original].
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Following the above factual findings, the trial court
stated these conclusions of law:
This Court determines as a matter of
law, that pursuant to the Kentucky Building
Code, a modular home does not include mobile
homes. Further, pursuant to KRS 304.14-110,
the aforesaid misrepresentations and
incorrect statements are:
Material to both the acceptance of
the risk and to the hazard assumed
by Kentucky National, and
Kentucky National, in good faith,
would not have issued the Policy
and would not have provided
coverage with respect to the hazard
resulting in the loss if the true
facts had been made known to
Kentucky National as required by
the application for the Policy and
the subject contract of Insurance.
From the record on appeal, it is clear that there are
genuine issues of material fact to be decided by the trier of
fact and the trial court erred by granting KNIC a declaratory
judgment.9
In a declaratory judgment action, it has generally
been recognized that a party has a “right to jury trial on those
issues in regard to which either party could have claimed a jury
in any action for which the declaratory judgment action may be
9
It would appear in this case that KNIC’s demand for relief
via a counterclaim for declaratory judgment may have been
superfluous, since Caldwell’s complaint and KNIC’s answer raised
the same issues as the counterclaim raised. However, there is
precedent for proceeding in this manner. See Greenwell v. Nova,
314 Ky. 813, 236 S.W.2d 883 (1951) cited in 22A Am.Jur.2d
Declaratory Judgments §220 (1988). See also Jefferson County ex
rel. Coleman v. Chilton, 236 Ky. 614, 620, 33 S.W.2d 601 (1930).
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regarded as a substitute.”10
“The general rule that a motion for
summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and admissions show
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law has been applied
in actions for declaratory judgment.”
“But a summary judgment
will be denied where genuine issues of fact are raised.”11
Under the law of Kentucky, summary judgment is only
proper “where the movant shows that the adverse party could not
prevail under any circumstances.”12
The moving party has the
initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of a material
fact exists, then the other party must refute the contentions of
the moving party.
If the moving party does not sustain his
burden, . . then the summary judgment should not be granted.”13
The circuit court must view the record “in a light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all
doubts are to be resolved in his favor.”14
“The trial judge must
examine the evidence, not to decide any issue of fact, but to
10
22A Am.Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments §228 (1988).
11
22A Am.Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments §225 (1988).
12
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky.,
807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991)(reaff’g Paintsville Hospital Co. v.
Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985)).
13
Roberts v. Davis, Ky., 422 S.W.2d 890, 894 (1967)(citing
Robert Simmons Construction Co. v. Powers Regulator Co., Ky., 390
S.W.2d 901 (1965); Conley v. Hall, Ky., 395 S.W.2d 575 (1965);
and Spencer, et al. v. Leone, et al., Ky., 420 S.W.2d 685
(1967)). See also Hartford Insurance Group v. Citizens Fidelity
Bank & Trust Co., Ky.App., 579 S.W.2d 628, 630-31 (1979).
14
Steelvest, supra (citing Dossett v. New York Mining &
Manufacturing Co., Ky., 451 S.W.2d 843 (1970)).
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discover if a real issue exists.”15
The standard of review on
appeal of a summary judgment is “whether the trial court
correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any
material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law” [citations omitted].16
“There is no
requirement that the appellate court defer to the trial court
since factual findings are not at issue.”17
Pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
56.03, summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
To prevail on its motion for summary judgment, KNIC was required
to meet its “initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of
material fact exists,”18 and to demonstrate that “it would be
impossible for [Caldwell] to produce evidence at trial warranting
a judgment in [his] favor.”19
However, the evidence submitted by KNIC in support of
its motion for summary judgment did not even address the factual
dispute that is the central question in this case: Did Caldwell
15
Id. at 480.
16
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky.App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
17
Id.
18
Roberts, supra at 894.
19
Steelvest, supra; CR 56.03.
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truthfully provide KNIC’s agent with the correct material
information concerning his home, and did the agent incorrectly
complete the application; or did Caldwell misrepresent material
facts concerning his home to the agent, and did the agent
complete the application based on the information provided by
Caldwell?
While Caldwell has admitted that many of the questions
in the application concerning his home were answered incorrectly,
he claims he truthfully disclosed the correct information to
KNIC’s agent.
It is conceded that most of the facts about the
home itself are not in dispute; however, it is also obvious that
there are disputed issues of fact concerning what Caldwell told
the agent and what Caldwell did or did not understand concerning
the application that he signed and the representations made
therein.
When summary judgment is sought, the party opposing the
summary judgment is not required to produce any evidence until
the moving party first establishes a prima facie case.20
“We
think it clear that appellant had no duty to make any showing
whatever to defeat the motion for summary judgment because the
movant failed entirely to establish a prima facie case.
CR 56.03
provides that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment may
20
State Street Bank v. Heck’s, Inc., Ky., 963 S.W.2d 626,
630-31 (1998)(citing D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Hirsh Bros. & Co., Ky.,
459 S.W.2d 598, 600 (1970)).
-11-
file opposing affidavits, but does not require him to do so”
[emphasis original].21
This Court in Continental Casualty Co. v. Smith,22
affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the insured, after the
insurance company had denied coverage based upon its contention
that Smith’s application was “substantially untrue.”23
This
Court stated that “the determination of whether an insurance
applicant was, through ignorance and good faith, misled by a
company’s agent into believing the answers were truthful is for a
jury to decide.”24
Obviously, the jury may choose not to believe
Caldwell if he testifies that he truthfully disclosed all the
material facts concerning his home to KNIC’s agent and that he
did not realize that the application he signed contained false
and misleading information that was material to KNIC’s decision
to grant him insurance coverage.
However, if the jury finds the
facts in Caldwell’s favor, case law supports his claim for
insurance coverage.
In Smith, supra, this Court noted that the former Court
of Appeals in Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co. v. McReynolds,25
21
Davis v. Dever, Ky.App., 617 S.W.2d 56, 57 (1981).
22
Ky.App., 617 S.W.2d 48 (1980).
23
Id. at 49.
24
Id. at 50 (citing Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Trunick’s Adm’r, 246 Ky. 240, 54 S.W.2d 917 (1932)).
25
Ky., 440 S.W.2d 275 (1969).
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reiterates and affirms the law of Sovereign
Camp, W.O.W. v. Alcock, 273 Ky. 734, 117
S.W.2d 938 (1938), to the effect:
In the case of insurance contracts
it is the fixed rule that the
insurer will be estopped to deny
liability on a policy if its agent
inserts false statements in the
written application, or by
misleading statements induces the
insured to make false answers, if
the insured is acting in good
faith. . . .26
We now turn to KNIC’s argument that Caldwell failed to
preserve any issue for appeal.
We have chosen to address this
argument last so we could incorporate into our discussion of this
issue our previous discussion concerning summary judgment.
In
its brief, KNIC states “that allegations contained in a
Complaint, Amended Complaint and answers to discovery pleadings
are not sufficient to reserve issues for Appeal.
Otherwise, all
cases would be appealable and the Rule requiring preservation of
issues would have no meaning.”
KNIC cites no case law to support
this statement, and we are not aware of any which does.
To the
contrary, we believe it is evident from our previous discussion
concerning the movant for summary judgment being required to make
a prima facie case before the opposing party is required to
refute the contentions of the moving party, that Caldwell has
properly joined the issues before the trial court.
We hold that
he preserved the issue of whether summary judgment was properly
26
See generally B.H. Glenn, Annotation, Insured’s
Responsibility for False Answers Inserted by Insurer’s Agent in
Application Following Correct Answers by Insured, or Incorrect
Answers Suggested by Agent, 26 A.L.R.3d 6 (1969).
-13-
entered for appellate review by filing his answer to the
counterclaim and by raising in his pleadings and in his answers
to discovery requests genuine issues of material fact which
preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Accordingly, the declaratory judgment of the Hardin
Circuit Court is reversed and this matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Walter L. Porter
Louisville, KY
Lori Henninger
Louisville, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Jason Bell
Elizabethtown, KY
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