WILLIAM FREDERICK HICKS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 27, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000535-MR
WILLIAM FREDERICK HICKS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00788
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; EMBERTON, and McANULTY, Judges.
McANULTY, JUDGE: Appellant’s probation was revoked by the Fayette
Circuit Court.
He now seeks dismissal of that revocation based
on KRS 533.040(3).
We affirm.
In August 1998, Appellant pleaded guilty to one felony
and two misdemeanor counts of theft by failure to make a required
disposition of property under KRS 514.070 and was sentenced to
five years probation.
Then, in March 1999, Appellant was
arrested on charges of criminal possession of a forged
instrument, which were pending prior to his earlier sentencing.
On May 19, 1999, Appellant’s probation and parole
officer filed an affidavit with the trial court requesting that
Appellant’s probation be revoked.
He cited Appellant’s failure
to pay probation fees, failure to pay restitution and failure to
complete a required substance abuse program as Appellant’s
probation violations.
That same day, the court issued a warrant
for Appellant’s arrest.
On January 20, 2000, the Department of Corrections
(Corrections) filed an acknowledgment with the trial court.
This
acknowledgment showed that Appellant was already being housed at
the Franklin County Detention Center and that Corrections would
forward a “hold” on the Appellant to the Center.
A bench warrant was filed on February 1, 2000, and a
date was set for Appellant’s probation revocation hearing.
At
the revocation hearing on February 18, 2000, Appellant asked the
court to dismiss the motion to revoke his probation pursuant to
KRS 533.040(3) because it had been filed on May 19, 1999, more
than ninety (90) days before his hearing date.
The court denied
Appellant’s motion, and this appeal followed.
Appellant alleges that the revocation of his probation
should be dismissed because the revocation hearing was not held
in a timely manner as required by KRS 533.040(3), which reads:
A sentence of probation or conditional
discharge shall run concurrently with any
federal or state jail, prison, or parole term
for another offense to which the defendant is
or becomes subject during the period, unless
the sentence of probation or conditional
discharge is revoked. The revocation shall
take place prior to parole under or
expiration of the sentence of imprisonment or
within ninety (90) days after the grounds for
revocation come to the attention of the
Department of Corrections, whichever occurs
first.
-2-
KRS 533.040(3).
The question created by this statute, then, is at what
point in these proceedings did the grounds for revocation of
Appellant’s probation come to the attention of Corrections?
This court thoroughly discussed this matter in Myers v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 836 S.W.2d 431 (1992), overruled on other
grounds in Sutherland v. Commonwealth, Ky., 910 S.W.2d 235
(1995).
In that case, we asked what actions were sufficient
enough to draw the attention of Corrections; would the ninety
days begin to toll once the first allegation of wrongdoing was
made or would it take the actual conviction of the alleged
wrongdoer?
period.
In Myers, it was a conviction that began the time
But we also said:
While a conviction for a new offense would be
grounds for revocation, an arrest for the
same offense may or may not be. An arrest
and/or indictment are only allegations and
the defendant remains innocent of the
charge(s) until proven guilty. The
Corrections Cabinet may treat the arrest as
grounds for revocation, and if a detainer is
placed on the defendant by Probation and
Parole at anytime prior to the revocation
hearing, it is our opinion that this would be
notice to Corrections and this prosecutorial
decision (notice that they are treating the
allegations as having substance) would
commence the ninety-day period for
revocation.
Myers v. Commonwealth at 433.
In the case at bar, we believe the “hold” placed on
Appellant while he served time in the Franklin County Detention
Center is analogous to the detainer mentioned in Myers.
This
acknowledgment showed that Corrections had taken official notice
of the grounds for revocation of his probation.
-3-
The hold on Appellant was filed January 20, 2000, and
Appellant’s revocation hearing took place less than a month
later.
Because the hearing occurred well within the statutory
ninety day time period, we affirm the decision of the trial court
to revoke Appellant’s probation.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Alicia A. Sneed
Lexington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General for Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Michael G. Wilson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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