COURTNEY LANGLEY v. ROBERT S. DAVIS, M.D.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: June 1, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2000-CA-000521-MR (DIRECT APPEAL)
AND
NO. 2000-CA-000628-MR (CROSS APPEAL)
COURTNEY LANGLEY
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-04261
v.
ROBERT S. DAVIS, M.D.
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING AS TO THE APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL
** ** ** ** **
COMBS and KNOPF, Judges; and MARY COREY, Special Judge.1
BEFORE:
COMBS, JUDGE: Courtney Langley appeals from the November 5, 1999,
judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court following a jury verdict
that awarded him no damages on his claim against Dr. Robert S.
Davis for the alleged intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
He also appeals from the judgment entered on May 27,
1999, pursuant to a jury verdict, awarding him nothing on his
claim against Dr. Davis for alleged medical negligence.
1
We
Senior Status Judge Mary Corey sitting as Special Judge by
assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution.
affirm.
On cross-appeal, Dr. Davis challenges the trial court’s
denial of his motions for summary judgment as well as many of the
rulings made during the two trials — including the failure to
grant his motion for a directed verdict on the claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Because of our
resolution of the issues raised in the direct appeal, these
issues have been rendered moot.
On December 9, 1997, Langley filed a complaint in the
Fayette Circuit Court alleging that while he was under the care
of Dr. Davis from 1972 until 1995, the doctor was “grossly
negligent” in his care and treatment of him by prescribing
“excessive amounts” of Demerol, resulting in his drug addiction.
He charged that due to the doctor’s negligent and intentional
acts, he “developed a mental illness resulting in severe and
permanent injury,” causing “great humiliation, extreme emotional
distress, financial hardship, severe loss of reputation and
respect.”
Additionally, Langley contended that Dr. Davis had
breached his duty to treat him in accordance with reasonable
medical standards and that in breaching that duty, he “exhibited
an outrageous and reckless disregard” for Langley’s physical and
mental health.
A twenty-five-year relationship between Langley and Dr.
Davis began in the early 1970's.
Dr. Davis, a family
practitioner in Harlan, Kentucky, and a good friend of Langley’s
father, began treating Langley professionally when he returned to
Harlan after graduating from college.
Langley appeared to have a
promising future working in his father’s coal mining business; he
-2-
eventually became vice-president of a construction company owned
by his father.
It is undisputed that Langley frequently
presented himself to Dr. Davis with complaints of migraine
headaches and back pain attributable to work-related injuries and
scoliosis.
From the mid-70's until 1983, Dr. Davis treated his
pain with Demerol, a narcotic pain-killer in the form of pills
and injections.
Langley testified that Dr. Davis also gave him
prescriptions for other drugs that he requested — including
Vicodin and Percocet.
By 1983, Langley was addicted to Demerol.
Because he
could no longer tolerate taking Demerol by injections, Dr. Davis
began administering the drug intravenously.
Langley alleged that
Dr. Davis also began demanding sexual favors in exchange for the
drug.
Dr. Davis admitted (and his records show) that he provided
Langley with narcotic medications, including large doses of
Demerol; however, the doctor insisted that he did so to keep
Langley “off the streets” and out of trouble with the law.
denied having any sexual involvement with Langley.
He
After the
Board of Medical Licensure conducted an investigation of the
records pertaining to his medical treatment of Langley, it
permanently suspended Dr. Davis’s license to practice medicine in
1996.
During the years at issue, Langley also had significant
problems with alcohol addiction as evidenced by his six
convictions for driving under the influence.
Langley had other
medical problems as well, including depression and panic
disorder; he obtained prescriptions from other doctors for Prozac
-3-
and Xanax, another highly addictive drug similar to Valium.
Langley entered a drug treatment program in 1986 and was clean
and sober for a few months; but upon his return to Harlan, he
again sought out Dr. Davis for drugs.
Even after Langley moved
to Lexington in the early 1990's, he continued to obtain
prescriptions from Dr. Davis.
In 1992, Langley served time in prison after being
convicted of his fourth DUI.
In 1994, he was convicted of
obtaining a controlled substance by fraud.
In November 1996, he
became depressed after attending a University of Kentucky
football game with family members.
Police officers responded to
an anonymous telephone call reporting that Langley had a gun and
was threatening to shoot himself.
When an officer arrived at the
scene, Langley brandished a handgun and waved it around while
shouting that he wanted the officer to kill him.
After being
persuaded to put the gun down, Langley was taken into custody and
was subsequently charged with the crimes of wanton endangerment
and possession of a handgun by a felon.
He entered an insanity
plea.
At trial in October 1997, Dr. Davis testified about his
treatment of Langley with various drugs — including Demerol.
The
jury was unable to reach a verdict, and Langley ultimately pled
guilty.
The five-year sentence imposed was probated; however,
after yet another conviction for driving under the influence,
Langley was sent to prison.
He was still incarcerated at the
time of the trial on his claims against Dr. Davis.
At trial,
Langley testified that the last twenty-five years of his life had
-4-
been a “waste.”
For all his numerous problems and failures --
his depressed state, run-ins with the law, an unsatisfactory
social life, his inability to enjoy sexual relationships with
either men or women, and numerous financial problems -- he placed
the blame squarely and solely upon Dr. Davis.
One of several defenses asserted by Dr. Davis was that
the complaint was barred by the one-year statute of limitations
contained in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 413.140(e).
Because
the action was filed more than two years after Dr. Davis last
provided Langley with any drugs, Dr. Davis moved the trial court
to dismiss the medical negligence claim as time-barred.
19, 1998, the trial court granted the motion.
On June
In a motion to
reconsider, Langley argued that it was not until his trial on the
criminal charge of wanton endangerment conducted in October 1997
that he “discovered”
Dr. Davis’s negligence in treating him with
Demerol to treat his back pain.
In response to the motion to reconsider, Dr. Davis
pointed to Langley’s contradictory deposition testimony in which
Langley acknowledged that as early as 1975, he was aware that Dr.
Davis was prescribing drugs for him for his recreational use
only.
Dr. Davis also argued that Langley, who was admitted to a
drug treatment facility in 1987, and who remained drug-free while
incarcerated for a DUI in 1992, had to have been aware of his
Demerol addiction and the source of the drug sustaining that
addiction long before the criminal trial in 1997.
Nevertheless,
the trial court agreed that there might be a genuine issue of
material fact bearing upon when Langley became aware both of his
-5-
injury and of the fact that Dr. Davis was the cause of that
injury.
Thus, on February 8, 1999, the trial court reinstated
the medical negligence claim.
Dr. Davis also moved for summary judgment on the
outrage claim and argued that under the standards for that tort
as discussed in Rigazio v. Archdiocese of Louisville, Ky.App.,
853 S.W.2d 295 (1993), Langley was not permitted simultaneously
to pursue a claim for medical negligence and for outrage.
Langley responded that his claims did not overlap but that they
were related to two discrete time periods -- the claim for
medical negligence encompassing the years beginning in the early
1970's and ending in 1983 with the claim for outrage running from
1983 to 1995, a period during which even Dr. Davis acknowledged
that there had been no medical justification for prescribing or
administering the drugs.
The trial court accepted Langley’s
argument that Dr. Davis’s conduct comprised two successive torts
rather than one, and both claims were tried in May 1999.
At the conclusion of the first trial, the jury received
several instructions — which became confusingly commingled as
portions seemed to overlap one another.
The jury was first
instructed on the medical negligence claim; it was told that Dr.
Davis had a duty "to exercise the degree of care and skill
expected of a reasonably competent family practitioner."
Dr.
Davis conceded to the jury that he had breached that duty in
providing the considerable quantities of drugs to Langley.
Without resolving attendant issues such as the degree of
comparative negligence attributable to Langley, the jury
-6-
unanimously agreed that the medical negligence claim was indeed
time-barred and that Langley should have realized Dr. Davis’s
breach of duty prior to October of 1997.
Thus, it awarded no
compensatory damages.
The jury was next instructed on the claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress (or the "outrage
claim," covering the time period from 1983 to 1995).
It awarded
no damages.
Finally, the last set of instructions concerned the
issue of punitive damages and whether the evidence had
established that Dr. Davis "was grossly negligent in the medical
treatment rendered to Courtney Langley...."
Nine of the jurors
voted to award punitive damages in the amount of $1,000,000.
From the sequence in which the jurors had responded to
the instructions, it became apparent to the trial judge that they
had wanted to award "something" to Langley but that they had in
effect awarded punitive damages on a claim that they themselves
had found to be time-barred.
After further discussion between
the trial judge and the jurors, it seemed that the jurors wanted
to deliberate a bit more on the outrage claim.
This time, the
jury returned a verdict for Langley on the issue of intentional
infliction of emotional distress — but awarded $0 in damages.
On May 27, 1999, judgment was entered dismissing the
claim against Dr. Davis for negligence and awarding Langley “zero
dollars” for his claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
In dismissing the claim for punitive damages, the
trial court reasoned that under Kentucky law:
-7-
compensatory damages must be awarded to
support an award of punitive damages. Fowler
v. Mantooth, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 250, 252-253
(1984); Lawrence v. Risen, Ky.App., 598
S.W.2d 474, 475-76 (1980). As a result, an
award of punitive damages is not supported
and judgment is entered on behalf of the
Defendant, Robert S. Davis. . .
Following a series of post-trial motions by both sides,
the trial court agreed that the jury may have been confused by
its instructions on the issue of punitive damages.
It set aside
the judgment with respect to the award of zero dollars for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress and ordered a new
trial be conducted solely on the issue of damages.
The new trial was conducted in October 1999.
The jury
heard much of the same evidence presented at the first trial.
The jury was instructed that it could award Langley compensatory
damages not to exceed $1,000,000 and punitive damages not to
exceed $5,000,000.
The jury awarded $0 under both the
compensatory and punitive damages categories.
A judgment was
entered reflecting that verdict on November 5, 1999.
Langley
filed a motion for a new trial based on the insufficiency of the
award, which was denied.
This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
Langley does not allege any error with respect to the
second trial.
Instead, he first argues that he is entitled to a
new trial on the issue of medical negligence due to an allegedly
erroneous ruling during the first trial on his motion in limine
to exclude the testimony of Nick Cole.
Cole, a high school
friend, testified in his deposition that he and Langley had
smoked marijuana in school, that Langley sold drugs, and that he
attempted to enlist Cole to sell drugs as well.
-8-
Ruling that
there was no probative value in the evidence that Langley may
have sold drugs, the trial court prohibited any reference to that
activity at trial.
However, it reasoned that Langley’s prior use
of illegal drugs was relevant to the issue of his possible
proclivity to use drugs as well as to his claim that Dr. Davis
was the cause of his long-standing depression and addiction to
drugs.
Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 404(b) creates a
general rule against the admission of evidence of other wrongs or
acts “to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith.”
Such evidence may, however, be
admitted if offered “for some other purpose.”
KRE 404(b)(1).
The proper application of this rule is entrusted to the sound
discretion of the trial court.
See Green River Electric
Corporation v. Nantz, Ky.App., 894 S.W.2d 643 (1995).
Absent an
abuse of that discretion, a trial court’s decision on
admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal.
Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 222 (1996).
We agree that Langley’s drug use prior to the doctor/patient
relationship was directly relevant to several issues before the
jury.
Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
ruling to allow Cole to testify about Langley’s use of drugs in
high school.
Langley next contends that the trial court erred in its
judgment of May 27, 1999 (following the first trial), when it
ruled that an award of punitive damages could not survive absent
an award for compensatory damages.
-9-
Langley is correct:
an award
of punitive damages need not necessarily be accompanied by an
award for compensatory damages as long as there has been an
allegation of grounds justifying compensatory damages.
Without a factual allegation of actual
compensatory damages, punitive recoveries
cannot be sustained. [Emphasis added.] It
has long been held that "[t]he correct rule .
. is that if a right of action exists—-that
is, if the plaintiff has suffered an injury
for which compensatory damages might be
awarded, although nominal in amount--he may
in a proper case recover punitive damages.
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Ritchel, 148 Ky.
701, 147 S.W. 411, 414 (1912). Lawrence v.
Risen, Ky.App., 598 S.W.2d 474, 476 (1980).
The Kentucky Supreme Court has most recently examined this
issue in Commonwealth Department of Agriculture v. Vinson, Ky.,
30S.W.3d 162, 166 (2000), in which it unequivocally announced
that a punitive damages award may stand alone without a grant of
any compensatory damages.
Although Vinson involved a previous
award of equitable relief, it relied upon Ritchel, supra, and
Nappe v. Anschelewitz, 97 N.J. 37, 447 A.2d 1224 (1984), both
cases in which the punitive damages award was not premised upon
or preceded by equitable relief.
We read Vinson as authorizing
entry of a punitive damages award without the necessity of other
relief having been granted:
Ritchel, supra, states in part that a
verdict for punitive damages only will not be
set aside because the jury failed to return a
verdict for compensatory damages.
* * *
We are also persuaded by the reasoning
of Nappe v. Anschelewitz, 97 N.J. 37, 477
A.2d 1224 (1984), that compensatory damages
are not an essential element of an
intentional tort committed willfully and
-10-
without justification. The mere fact that no
compensatory damages were awarded to Vinson
or Anderson does not mean that they did not
have compensable injuries. The fact that
there is not a quantifiable monetary damage
awarded for lost pay does not mean that
injury did not occur.
* * *
Here there is a factual basis for a
possible award of actual compensatory damages
although not given in this case. The common
law of Kentucky does not provide a basis for
defeating the judgment in question. The
Whistleblower Statute is sufficiently
explicit in regard to punitive damages.
Thus, although Langley is correct in arguing that a
compensatory damages award need not be granted as a condition
precedent for a punitive damages award, he forgets one critical
point: that the court had also disallowed the punitive damages
because they were tied to the medical negligence claim, which was
legally unsustainable since it had been filed beyond the period
of the statute of limitations.
Langley essentially argues that
although the trial court had failed to give a punitive damages
instruction on the claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, the $1,000,000 awarded by the jury for medical
negligence should now be revived or resurrected to compensate him
for that claim.
It was precisely because of the confusion surrounding
the instructions that the trial court granted Langley a new trial
on the issue of damages with respect to his claim for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Any error inherent
in the first trial was cured when the instruction was given upon
re-trial.
There is no legal basis for reinstating from the first
-11-
trial the award of punitive damages for the time-barred
negligence claim in order to compensate Langley for the separate
and distinct claim for outrage in the second trial.
Such a re-
arrangement of awards from one claim to another and from one
trial to another is not legally cognizable.
In his cross-appeal, Dr. Davis argues that the trial
court rendered several erroneous rulings before and during the
trial.
Specifically, Dr. Davis argues that the negligence claim
was barred by the statute of limitations as a matter of law and
that the claim should have been summarily dismissed prior to
trial.
He contends that the tort of outrage is meant to be a
“gap-filler” and should not allowed to co-exist or coincide with
a claim asserting a more traditional tort.
He also argues that
he was entitled to a directed verdict on the outrage claim.
We
need not address the merits of these arguments since our decision
in the direct appeal has rendered them moot.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
COREY, SPECIAL JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Larry S. Roberts
Lexington, KY
Robert F. Duncan
Jay E. Ingle
Lexington, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT:
Robert F. Duncan
Lexington, KY
-12-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.