SCOTT YOUNG v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 12, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000492-MR
SCOTT YOUNG
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES W. BOTELER, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00201
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, JOHNSON AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Scott Young has appealed an order of the Hopkins
Circuit Court entered on February 8, 2000, which denied his
motion for additional jail time credit.
Having concluded that
the record before the trial court was inadequate to allow for a
proper review of Young’s motion, we vacate the trial court’s
order and remand for further proceedings.
A review of the record reveals that Young, who is
currently incarcerated in the Kentucky State Penitentiary, has
been in and out of custody frequently within the last 10 years on
an assortment of charges.
Currently, he is serving a two-year
sentence imposed for a conviction for promoting contraband in the
first degree.
In his motion for additional jail time credit,
Young asserted that the trial court erred when it granted him
only three days of jail time credit toward his current sentence.
He contends that he is actually entitled to 99 days of jail time
credit.
While Young styled his motion as a “motion pursuant to
KRS 532.120(3) requesting court to enter an order granting movant
additional jail time credit” and failed to file his motion
pursuant to any particular court rule, we agree with the
Commonwealth that Young’s motion was the functional equivalent of
a motion pursuant to CR1 60.02(a).2
The applicable standard of
review for motions pursuant to CR 60.02 limits this Court to a
review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion in ruling on
the motion to set aside the original judgment.3
Young was indicted for promoting contraband in the
first degree on September 30, 1998.
On January 5, 1999, he
entered a plea of guilty to the charge; and on January 19, 1999,
he was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, probated for five
years.
1
The record reveals that after Young was indicted on
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
See Duncan v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 614 S.W.2d 701 (1981)
(construing a motion for additional jail time credits as a CR
60.02 motion).
3
Bethlehem Minerals Co. v. Church & Mullins Corp., Ky., 887
S.W.2d 327, 329 (1994).
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September 30, 1998, he was arrested and incarcerated in the
Hopkins County Jail from October 12, 1998, to January 19, 1999.4
While this period of incarceration might be a result of the
indictment of September 30, 1998, it appears, from the record,
that there were two other convictions for which Young could have
been incarcerated.5
In any event, Young violated the terms of his probation
in the case sub judice by using alcohol and his probation was
revoked.
In an order, entered on March 31, 1999, Young’s two-
year sentence was reinstated and he was given three days of jail
time credit.
On January 31, 2000, Young filed a pro se motion
for jail time credit, which claimed he was entitled to 92
additional days in jail time credit.6
The Hopkins Circuit Court
denied Young’s motion on February 8, 2000.
This appeal followed.
In its brief, the Commonwealth argues that Young is
precluded from pursuing his claim for additional jail time credit
4
Apparently, this time period constitutes the 99-day total
Young arrived at in his motion for additional jail time credit.
5
Apparently, on June 18, 1998, Young was sentenced by the
Hopkins Circuit Court (98-F-00225) to 360 days of incarceration
for his conviction for unlawful transaction with a minor in the
third degree; 270 days of the sentence were conditionally
discharged. Apparently, on July 16, 1998, Young was sentenced by
the Hopkins Circuit Court (98-F-00268) to 90 days of
incarceration for promoting contraband in the second degree; 60
days of the sentence were conditionally discharged and the
remaining 30 days were ordered to be served concurrently with the
sentence of June 18. In both instances, Young was granted a work
release so long as he was employed.
6
Young claimed a total of 99 days of credit in his motion
and he claimed he had been allowed seven days credit. However,
the order had allowed him three days, so the difference would
appear to be 96 days.
-3-
since he did not file his motion within one-year of the date of
the judgment as required by CR 60.02
7
and Duncan, supra.
While
it is true that Young filed his motion over one year from the
entry of final judgment in his case, Young’s CR 60.02 motion did
not relate to the final judgment.
The final judgment of January
27, 1999, fixed Young’s sentence at two years and probated the
sentence for a period of five years.
issue of jail time credit.
It did not address the
Rather, it was the order of March 31,
1999, which revoked Young’s probation that also gave him three
days of jail time credit.
Young’s CR 60.02 motion, which alleges
a mistake in the determination of jail time credit, clearly
relates to the March 1999, order and not the January 1999, order.
Since Young’s motion was filed on January 31, 2000, it was timely
filed.
The calculation of terms of imprisonment is governed by
KRS8 532.120(3), which provides, in relevant part, that “[t]ime
spent in custody prior to the commencement of a sentence as a
result of the charge that culminated in the sentence shall be
credited by the court imposing sentence toward service of the
maximum term of imprisonment.”
Conversely, credit is not given
for time spent in custody as a result of an unrelated charge.9
7
CR 60.02 states that “[t]he motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and on grounds (a), (b) and (c) not more than
one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken.”
8
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
9
KRS 532.120(3); Prewitt v. Wilkinson, Ky.App., 843 S.W.2d
(continued...)
-4-
The Commonwealth has generally asserted that Young “had
other problems with the law at the time of his indictment,” and
that Young “clearly could have been serving time for other
charges while he was being held to answer for this indictment as
well.”
However, a careful review of the record does not reveal
whether Young was serving time in custody for the charge to which
this appeal relates or whether he was serving time in custody for
one of the unrelated charges pending against him at the time.10
Additionally, the order of March 31, 1999, does not state a
factual or legal basis for its award of three days of jail time
credit.
Without a determination by the trial court of whether
Young’s time spent in custody from October 12, 1998, to January
19, 1999, related to his current sentence or to another sentence,
we are unable to conduct a proper review of the trial court’s
order.
Accordingly, the order of the Hopkins Circuit Court
must be vacated and this matter must be remanded for a hearing
and factual findings.
Specifically, upon remand, the Hopkins
Circuit Court must determine whether the time that Young spent in
custody during the time period from October 12, 1998, to January
19, 1999, related to the current conviction or some prior,
9
(...continued)
335, 336 (1992); Lemon v. Corrections Cabinet, Ky.App., 712
S.W.2d 370, 371 (1986); Handley v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 653
S.W.2d 165, 166 (1983).
10
See n.5, supra, (discussing the other charges concerning
Young at the time of his September 30, 1999, indictment for
promoting contraband in the first degree).
-5-
unrelated charge or conviction.
If the time spent in custody
during that time related to his current, two-year sentence for
promoting contraband in the first degree, Young’s motion should
be granted.
If the trial court finds that this time in custody
related to some other charge or conviction, then Young would not
be entitled to any additional jail time credit.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Scott Young, Pro Se
Eddyville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-6-
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