MICHAEL WATSON; CRYSTAL L. WATSON; AND SANDRA KAY BAILEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF WAYNE D. PURCELL AND RANDALL WAYNE PURCELL v. KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY MICHAEL WATSON AND CRYSTAL WATSON v. WAYNE D. PURCELL
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RENDERED: JULY 27, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000373-MR
MICHAEL WATSON;
CRYSTAL L. WATSON; AND
SANDRA KAY BAILEY,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF WAYNE D. PURCELL AND
RANDALL WAYNE PURCELL
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FLEMING CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT I. GALLENSTEIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00003
KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU
INSURANCE COMPANY
AND:
APPELLEE
NO. 2000-CA-000937-MR
MICHAEL WATSON AND
CRYSTAL WATSON
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FLEMING CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT I. GALLENSTEIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00073
WAYNE D. PURCELL
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING CONSOLIDATED APPEALS
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, GUIDUGLI AND HUDDLESTON, JUDGES.
APPELLEE
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
In these consolidated appeals, Michael and
Crystal Watson (the Watsons) appeal from several orders of the
Fleming Circuit Court which granted summary judgment in favor of
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau) and
dismissed their complaint against Wayne D. Purcell (Purcell).
We
hereby order that these appeals be dismissed.
Crystal Watson (Crystal), Sandra Bailey (Sandra) and
Randal Wayne Purcell (Randal) are the children of Wayne Purcell.
On May 10, 1996, Crystal was visiting Purcell at his home when
she slipped and fell on the front porch, injuring her leg.
Purcell maintained a policy of homeowner’s insurance with Farm
Bureau which was in full force and effect at the time of the
accident.
The Watsons filed suit against Purcell on May 9, 1997,
seeking to recover damages for Crystal’s injuries, and the case
was assigned Case No. 97-CI-00073.
Purcell died on July 16, 1997, and Sandra was appointed
Executrix of his estate on August 7, 1997.
The Watsons filed a
proof of claim against Purcell’s estate referencing their action
against Purcell on December 16, 1997.
or disallowed by Sandra.
The claim was never denied
Purcell’s estate was closed and Sandra
was discharged by order of the Fleming District Court dated
October 22, 1998.
On November 24, 1998, counsel for Purcell filed a
motion seeking dismissal of the Watsons’ complaint on the ground
that they had failed to revive the action against the personal
representative of the state within one year from the date of
Purcell’s death as required by KRS 395.278.
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In response to the
motion, the Watsons argued that they properly preserved their
claim by filing the proof of claim in Purcell’s estate.
The
Watsons further claimed that dismissal was improper because the
heirs and the Executrix of Purcell’s estate had agreed to waive
the statute of limitations defense pursuant to KRS 396.065.
In
support of this argument, the Watsons attached an un-notarized,
undated affidavit signed by Crystal, Randal, and Sandra
“individually and as administrator” which stated:
1. That they are successors in interest to
the Estate of Wayne D. Purcell and that
Sandra Bailey is the administrator of said
estate.
2.
That the estate is solvent.
3. That the undersigned waive all defenses of
limitations that the Estate of Wayne Purcell
may have in the abovestyled action.
In light of the filing of the affidavit attempting to
waive the limitations defense, Farm Bureau filed a petition for
declaratory judgment against the Watsons, Sandra (both
individually and in her capacity as Executrix of Purcell’s
estate), Randal, and the Estate on January 11, 1999.
In its
petition, Farm Bureau alleged:
that it has complied with all requirements
and duties set forth in its homeowner’s
policy issued to its insured, Wayne D.
Purcell, and has established that its insured
is not legally liable for any damages because
of the failure of [the Watsons] to revive
their cause of action against its insured.
It is the position of the plaintiff that the
waiver relied on by the [Watsons] cannot
provide a basis to impose personal liability
coverage after a complete defense has been
established.
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Farm Bureau requested a judgment declaring 1) that it was not
liable under the homeowners’s policy because the Estate had a
complete defense to the Watsons’ claim; and 2) that it did not
owe the Estate a duty to defend against the Watsons’ claim.
Farm Bureau filed a motion seeking summary judgment on
its petition, arguing that the Watsons failed to timely review
their claim against the Estate and that the alleged waiver of
defenses made pursuant to KRS 395.78 was invalid.
In their
response to the motion for summary judgment, Randal and Sandra
admitted that “there has not been a valid waiver of KRS 395.278
that would allow the waiver of the assertion of that limitation
period,” but continued to deny that summary judgment was proper.
An examination of the record shows that the Watsons did not
respond to Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment.
Randal and Sandra filed a motion to dismiss which was
denied by order of the trial court entered December 13, 1999.
the same day, the trial court entered a separate
Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment.
On
order granting
In response to a
motion by the Watsons, Sandra, and Randal requesting “that the
Court make specific and adequate findings of fact pursuant to the
judgment entered by the Court on the 13th day of December, 1999,”
the trial court entered a second order and judgment on January
18, 2000, which stated:
1. There is no dispute that the cause of
action asserted by the [Watsons] against
Wayne Purcell as set forth in Fleming Circuit
Court Civil Action Filed No. 97-CI-00073, was
not revived within the one year time period
required by KRS 395.278. The law clearly
recognizes that this limitation is mandatory
and not discretionary. (Mitchell v. Money,
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Ky. App., 606 S.W.2d 687 (1980). The
defendants initially attempted to waive the
statue of limitations and permit [the
Watsons] to proceed with their claim against
the Estate of Wayne D. Purcell. The Waiver
tendered by the defendants though is not a
valid waiver as KRS 396.065 requires the
personal representative of the Estate to
waive the limitations. In this matter, the
personal representative was discharged on
October 22, 1998, by Order of the Fleming
District Court, and thus the waiver is not
valid. The defendants in this action have
now admitted that the waiver was not valid.
It is the opinion of this Court that even
with a waiver executed by a personal
representative and all successors of the
decedent as required by the statute (KRS
396.065), that such a waiver still would not
apply in this situation. The statute clearly
refers to the waiver of limitations that
would be applicable at the time of the
decedent’s death. Such is not the case here,
as the limitations are relevant to reviving
all actions subsequent to the death of Wayne
D. Purcell. The [Watsons] having failed to
revive their action within the mandatory time
period, it is the opinion of this Court that
the action against Wayne D. Purcell in the
Fleming Circuit Court, Civil Action File No.
97-CI-00073 must be dismissed.
2. It is also the opinion of this Court that
the facts in this case, even assuming a valid
waiver of limitations defense, would still
not allow [the Watsons] to recover insurance
benefits under the Plaintiff’s [sic]
homeowner’s policy that was in effect at the
time of the Plaintiff’s [sic] injuries. The
policy provisions as raised by the Plaintiff
in its Memorandum of Law are well taken. The
liability coverage set forth in the
homeowner’s policy clearly requires that the
insured must be legally liable. Under the
facts in this matter, the Estate of Wayne D.
Purcell cannot be legally compelled to pay,
as a complete defense is available. Under
these facts, the liability coverage would not
be available, and clearly the Estate could
not agree or assume liability, as such
actions would preclude coverage under the
policy.
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WHEREFORE, the Court ORDERS that the claim of
[the Watsons] in Civil Action 97-CI-00073,
will be dismissed and an appropriate Order
will be issued in that action consistent with
this opinion. It is further ORDERED that the
homeowner’s policy issued by [Farm Bureau]
which was in effect and insured Wayne D.
Purcell at the time of the incident referred
to in 97-CI-00073 will not provide liability
coverage, nor is [Farm Bureau] required to
provide a defense as there is a complete
defense based on the statute of limitations
as set forth in KRS 395.278.
Following entry of the January 2000 order in 99-CI00003, counsel for the Estate filed a motion in 97-CI-00073
seeking “an Order of Dismissal consistent with the Declaratory
Judgment action[.]”
The trial court granted the motion by order
entered March 10, 2000.
These consolidated appeals followed.
Before addressing the merits of the Watsons’ appeal,
there are several deficiencies in the Watsons’ appellate brief
which must be addressed.
The Watsons filed an appellate brief
with this Court on September 11, 2000.
The brief does not
contain a statement of points and authorities as required by
CR 76.12(c)(ii).
As grounds for this omission, the brief recites
that the statement of points and authorities was “[o]mitted
pursuant to CR 76.12(4)(f).
Additionally throughout the body of
the brief, the Watsons cite to several cases by name only and do
not provide a citation to the cases as required by
CR 76.12(4)(g).
There is no explanation as to why citations to
the cases were not provided.
Under CR 76.12(c)(ii), an appellant is required to
include a statement of points and authorities in the appellate
brief which sets forth “the appellant’s contentions with respect
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to each issue of law on which he relies for a reversal, listing
under each the authorities cited on that point and the respective
pages of the brief on which the argument appears and on which the
authorities are cited.”
The only exception to this requirement
is CR 76.12(4)(f), which provides that “[t]he requirements of
this Rule with respect to a “STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES”
shall not apply to any brief of five pages or less.” [Emphasis in
original.]
This provision does not excuse the Watsons’ failure
to comply with CR 76.12(c)(ii) as the statement of facts and
argument portion of the Watsons’ brief is twelve pages long.
CR 76.12(4)(g) provides the citation format which is to be used
to cite cases in an appellate brief.
Without proper citation,
the Court would be required to waste valuable time tracking down
the cases cited by parties to an appeal, and this we will not do.
Pursuant to CR 76.12(8)(a), an appellate brief “may be
stricken for failure to comply with any substantial requirement
of this Rule 76.12.”
Given the Watsons’ misrepresentation as to
the length of their appellate brief and noncompliance with CR
76.12(8)(a), we find that dismissal of the Watsons’ appeal is
warranted.
Even if we were to address the merit of the Watsons’
appeal, we would be inclined to affirm the orders of the trial
court.
Under the mandatory language of KRS 395.278, “an
application to revive a cause of action against the
representative or successor of a defendant, shall be made within
one (1) year after the death of a deceased party.”
It is
abundantly clear from the record that this was not done.
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Furthermore, Randal and Sandra admitted in 99-CI-00003 that the
attempted waiver of the statute of limitations was invalid.
We also disagree with the Watsons’ argument that the
doctrine of estoppel requires a different result.
We agree with
Farm Bureau that Gailor v. Alsabi, Ky., 990 S.W.2d 597 (1999), on
which the Watsons rely, actually supports Farm Bureau’s position.
As Farm Bureau states in its brief on appeal:
While the [Watsons] make repeated reference
to estoppel, they fail to establish a
legitimate basis for any such claim as to
Farm Bureau. In support of their argument
they rely on the decision of [Gailor]. A
review of that case shows that not only does
the Gailor decision fail to support the
[Watsons’] argument, but it actually supports
Farm Bureau’s position in regard to a claim
of estoppel. First, it should be noted that
in Gailor the party seeking estoppel based
its argument on communications between the
insurance carrier and counsel in which the
insurance company representative failed to
inform counsel of the death of the insured.
The representative continued to inquire
regarding settlement of the claim after the
death of its insured and still did not inform
counsel that its insured had passed away.
Thus, the claimant and claimant’s counsel
were unaware of the death of the insured.
In this case obviously the plaintiff in the
underlying action, the appellant, Crystal
Watson, was aware that the defendant had died
since the defendant was her father and the
executor [sic] of the estate was her sister.
Thus, the plaintiff and counsel were fully
aware of this fact and thus the argument
relied on in Gailor is simply not available
to the appellants in this case. It should
also be noted that even under those facts,
the Gailor decision rejected a claim of
estoppel.
. . . .
In this case the plaintiff in her tort claim,
and her attorney, were well aware of all of
the relevant facts. As in the Gailor case,
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there is nothing in the record that would
support a claim of estoppel against Farm
Bureau.
We are also unpersuaded by the Watsons’ argument that
Purcell’s Estate is estopped from asserting the Watsons’ failure
to timely revive the action as a defense.
According to the
Watsons, the Estate’s failure to either admit or disallow the
proof of claim filed in the Estate somehow estops it from
asserting the revival defense or from denying the validity of the
claim.
Having examined the relative statutes, we believe that
the Estate’s failure to admit or disallow the claim has no effect
on the Watsons’ civil suit.
At best, it only allows for a
proceeding against one or more of the several distributees under
KRS 396.195.
The Watsons’ argument that the Estate’s failure to
admit or disallow the claim somehow makes Farm Bureau liable is
without merit as Farm Bureau obviously did not have a hand in
selecting the attorney who handled the probate of Purcell’s
estate.
ALL CONCUR.
___________________________
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
ENTERED: /s/ Daniel T. Guidugli
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, KENTUCKY
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE:
Michelle Jackson-Rigg
Maysville, KY
John J. Ellis
Morehead, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, WAYNE
PURCELL:
Michelle R. Williams
Mt. Sterling, KY
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