MERISEL AMERICAS, INC. v. JOSEPH \"PAT\" KIRTLEY d/b/a PRO-COM
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RENDERED:
October 5, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000346-MR
MERISEL AMERICAS, INC.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LARRY D. RAIKES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00025
v.
JOSEPH "PAT" KIRTLEY d/b/a PRO-COM
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, COMBS, and TACKETT, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Merisel Americas, Inc. (Merisel) appeals the
summary judgment granted by the Nelson Circuit Court to appellee
Joseph “Pat” Kirtley (Kirtley) in Merisel’s action to recover a
debt allegedly owed to it by Kirtley.
We affirm.
Dating from the early 1990's, Kirtley owned and
operated a business under the name of Pro-Com, which serviced
computers and provided software and computer accessories.
1996, Kirtley sold Pro-Com to Frank Wilson (Wilson).
In
In January
1999, Merisel filed suit in Nelson Circuit Court against Kirtley
for liability on a debt allegedly incurred by Pro-Com to Merisel
after June 1, 1996.
Kirtley joined Wilson in the suit as a
third-party defendant, contending that he had sold Pro-Com to
Wilson as of June 1, 1996, and that any debt incurred by Pro-Com
after that date was the liability of Wilson rather than Kirtley.
Attached to the motion to join Wilson was a copy of the sales
contract between Kirtley and Wilson, stipulating that Wilson —
not Kirtley — was to be responsible for all debts incurred by
Pro-Com after May 31, 1996.
Wilson was duly served with process.
He did not respond, and Kirtley was granted a default judgment
against Wilson.
In response to Kirtley’s discovery requests for
documents regarding the alleged debt, Merisel produced
documentation for sales that occurred after the sale of Pro-Com
to Wilson.
Every invoice, with the exception of one invoice
lacking the purchaser’s name, indicated that the sales were made
to Wilson.
The Nelson Circuit Court found that Kirtley had sold
Pro-Com, that he had notified Merisel of the sale, and that
Merisel was unable to present any evidence showing a genuine
issue of material fact for trial.
Accordingly, the court granted
Kirtley’s motion for summary judgment.
Our review of a summary judgment requires us to
determine whether the trial court correctly found that there were
no genuine issues of material fact and whether the moving party
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
916 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. App. 1996).
Scifres v. Kraft,
A party moving for summary
judgment bears the initial burden of convincing the court through
evidence of record that no genuine issue of fact is in dispute.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d
476, 482 (1991).
After the movant has satisfied this initial burden, the
party opposing the motion bears the burden of presenting “at
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least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine
issue of material fact for trial.”
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 482.
The party opposing the motion cannot simply rely on its pleadings
in the face of adverse evidence.
Smith v. Food Concepts, Inc.,
758 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. App. 1988).
Kirtley satisfied its initial burden by offering
credible evidence that Pro-Com had already been sold to Wilson.
Merisel made only a bare allegation without any substantiation
that Kirtley was liable for debts incurred by Pro-Com after June
1, 1996.
Merisel did not dispute the fact that the debts were
incurred after June 1, 1996; nor did Merisel dispute that Pro-Com
had been sold to Wilson on that date.
Merisel offered no basis
for liability on Kirtley’s part except through Pro-Com, from
which he had severed all ties. Accordingly, Kirtley’s summary
judgment motion, supported by evidence of the sale of Pro-Com,
shifted the burden to Merisel to show that there was a genuine
issue of material fact in dispute.
Merisel offered no evidence to rebut Kirtley’s evidence
that the debt at issue was incurred solely by Wilson through ProCom.
Merisel’s discovery evidence indicated that Wilson — not
Kirtley — had made the purchases in dispute.
Merisel takes issue with the finding of the court that
Kirtley notified Merisel of the sale of Pro-Com, contending that
this material fact renders summary judgment inappropriate.
However, Merisel has failed to demonstrate that this issue was
indeed genuinely disputed after Kirtley’s evidence to the
contrary.
Indeed, the trial court made a specific finding that
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Kirtley had given notice of the sale to Merisel.
(Summary
Judgment, p.2)
Merisel argues that Steelvest, supra, and Paintsville
Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985) hold that summary
judgment is improper unless it is “impossible for the respondent
to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor
and against the movant.” (Emphasis added.)
at 483.
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d
However, the Kentucky Supreme Court has directed that
“‘impossible’ is used in a practical sense, not in an absolute
sense.”
Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652 (1992).
The
Kentucky Supreme Court recently re-visited this standard in Welch
v. American Publishing Co. of Kentucky, 3 S.W.3d 724 (1999).
Welch holds that Steelvest did not apply a standard so stringent
as to repeal CR 56; it reiterated forcefully that trial judges
are to refrain from weighing evidence at the summary judgment
stage and that they are to review the record after discovery has
been completed to determine whether the trier of fact could find
a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Welch, 3 S.W.2d at 729.
Our review of the record indicates that the standard
was properly applied in the court below.
Summary judgment was
properly granted, and we find no error.
The judgment of the Nelson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James H. Abell
Bardstown, KY
Michael C. Coen
Bardstown, KY
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