MARTIN COUNTY COAL CORPORATION v. JAMES L. CHARLES; HON. RICHARD L. CAMPBELL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; SPECIAL FUND; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 12, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-003031-WC
MARTIN COUNTY COAL CORPORATION
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-98-00785
v.
JAMES L. CHARLES; HON. RICHARD L. CAMPBELL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; SPECIAL FUND;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, DYCHE AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Martin County Coal Corporation has filed a
petition for review of an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation
Board rendered on November 19, 1999, which affirmed an
Administrative Law Judge’s award of retraining incentive benefits
(RIB) to James L. Charles pursuant to KRS1 342.732(1)(a) as it
existed from April 4, 1994, through December 12, 1996.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Having
concluded that this Court’s decision in Whitaker Coal Co. v.
Melton,2 is dispositive of the issue on appeal, we affirm.
The Board’s opinion summarized Charles’ work history
and his exposure to coal dust as follows:
Charles was born on October 12, 1942[,]
and is a resident of Inez, Martin County,
Kentucky. He has an eighth grade education
and no specialized or vocational training.
Relevant work experience consists primarily
of mechanical repair and maintenance. He
entered the coal mining industry in 1970 with
Island Creek Coal Company. It was stipulated
between the parties that Charles was exposed
to respirable industrial coal and rock dust
for approximately 26 years in the mining
industry. As a coal miner, he worked
primarily as a mechanic in surface coal
mining operations. He worked for the
petitioner, Martin County[,] from September
1974 until October 1996. His last injurious
exposure occurred in October 1996 while in
Martin County’s employ, prior to the
enactment of the statutory changes to KRS
Chapter 342, which became effective December
12, 1996.
Charles filed his application for
resolution of an occupational disease claim
with the Department of Workers’ Claims on
April 21, 1998.
In the award entered on February 22, 1999, the ALJ
stated:
Although petitioner’s claim was filed
subsequent to December 12, 1996, the date of
his last injurious exposure to coal dust was
sometime in October [ ] 1996; therefore, this
claim, at least substantively, must be
governed by the version of KRS 342.732,
particularly subparagraph (1)(a) thereof, in
effect from April 4, 1994, through December
11, 1996. The argument to the contrary was
rejected by the Workers’ Compensation Board
through its November 6, 1998, opinion
rendered in Whitaker Coal Company v. George
2
Ky.App., 18 S.W.3d 361 (2000).
-2-
S. Melton et al., Claim Nos. 97-01456 and 97-00371[.]
In affirming the ALJ, the Board stated:
In Melton, supra, as in the instant
claim, the claimant filed his RIB claim after
the 1996 amendment was effective. However,
his last injurious exposure was prior to
December 12, 1996. We framed the issue as
“whether the 1996 amendment can be applied
retroactively to a claim that arose prior to
the effective date of the amendment, noting
that KRS 446.080(3) states, “No statute shall
be construed to be retroactive, unless
expressly so declared.”
We ultimately decided in Melton, supra:
In our opinion, the 1996
amendment to KRS 342.732(1)(a),
unlike the 1994 amendment, affects
vested rights of claimants and
cannot therefore be applied
retrospectively without a specific
expression by the Legislature of
its intent for the provisions to be
so applied.
Melton, as of the date of his
last exposure, had a vested right
to a RIB award of 208 weeks
duration if it were found that he
had a radiographic classification
of Category 1/0, 1/1, or 1/2
pneumoconiosis without evidence of
breathing impairment, so long as he
either left the mining industry or
undertook an approved training
program while still working in the
mining industry, either of which
would have fulfilled the purpose of
the RIB statute. Applying the 1996
version of the statute to his claim
would have resulted in no award in
that (1) he did not have evidence
of the requisite radiographic
classification nor degree of
breathing impairment and (2) he was
not actively enrolled in an
approved training program
notwithstanding the fact that he
had left the mining industry,
thereby fulfilling one of the
purposes of the RIB statute.
Therefore, in our opinion, the ALJ
-3-
did not err in declining to apply
the 1996 version of KRS
342.732(1)(a) to Melton’s claim in
that it would have impaired his
vested rights to the benefits to
which he was entitled on the date
of his last exposure.
We believe the 1996 amendments to KRS
342.732(1)(a) does more than limit the
payment of benefits to claimants only while
they are actively enrolled in and
participating in an approved training
program. It reduces the payment period of
benefits from 208 to 104 weeks and restricts
the award of such benefits to claimants
having radiographic classifications of
Category 1/1 or 1/2 and respiratory
impairment as evidenced by spirometric test
values of between 55 and 80 percent of
predicted normal values. In light of our
earlier decision in Melton, supra, and given
the fact that in our opinion, the 1996
amendments affect Charles’ vested rights to
the benefits to which he was entitled by law
on his last date of exposure, we find no
other alternative but to affirm Charles’
award and dismiss Martin County’s appeal.
This Court in Melton not only affirmed the Board, but
it adopted a significant part of the Board’s opinion.
In its
petition for review, Martin County Coal concedes that Melton is
dispositive of its issue on appeal.
Accordingly, pursuant to our
holding in Melton that “the 1996 amendment to KRS 342.732(1)(a),
unlike the 1994 amendment, affects vested rights of claimants and
cannot therefore be applied retrospectively without a specific
expression by the Legislature of its intent for the provisions to
be so applied”,3 the opinion of the Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
3
Id. at 364.
-4-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, JAMES
CHARLES:
Natalie D. Brown
Lexington, Kentucky
Leonard Stayton
Inez, Kentucky
-5-
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