DARRELL MONYHAN v. JAMES A. YOUNGBLOOD
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RENDERED: MAY 18, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-003013-MR
DARRELL MONYHAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-005548
JAMES A. YOUNGBLOOD
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, GUIDUGLI, and MILLER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE: Darrell Monyhan appeals from the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court entered September 17, 1999, based on a
jury verdict, dismissing his complaint against James Youngblood.
Monyhan sought to recover for personal injuries which he
sustained as a result of an automobile accident with Youngblood.
The jury found no liability as to Youngblood.
On appeal, Monyhan
maintains that the trial court committed reversible error by
denying his motion for a directed verdict on the issue of
liability and by refusing a tendered instruction pertaining to
Youngblood’s duties.
Finding no error, we affirm.
At trial, the jury heard two opposing theories of the
accident.
Monyhan told the jury that immediately prior to his
impact with Youngblood’s vehicle, he was travelling south in the
right-hand lane of South Third Street in Louisville (a four-lane
roadway) below the speed limit.
As he approached the
intersection of South Third and Florence streets, Monyhan noticed
two cars in the left lane.
The first car was stopped, preparing
to turn left; the second vehicle, operated by Youngblood, was
stopped (or nearly stopped), waiting for the car in front to
turn.
According to Monyhan, Youngblood abruptly turned his car
to the right and entered into Monyhan’s lane without signaling.
Although Monyhan stomped on his brakes and veered sharply to the
left, he could not avoid hitting Youngblood’s vehicle.
Monyhan’s
automobile sustained about $3,000 in damage, and he incurred
nearly $20,000 in medical bills for the treatment of his
resulting back injury.
Youngblood agreed with Monyhan that he and the car in
front of him were travelling south in the left lane of South
Third Street at about 35 miles an hour.
However, he denied that
he was stopped or even nearly stopped just before the accident.
He told the jury that when the driver in front gave a left-turn
signal, he decided to pass the driver on the right.
He looked in
his side view mirror and did not see any vehicle in the right
lane to his rear to impede his passing.
He activated his right
turn signal and moved into the right lane.
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After he completed
the lane change, disengaged his turn signal, and started to
regain speed, he heard brakes squealing and thought to himself
that someone was about to be hit.
the Honda driven by Monyhan.
He was then hit from behind by
The only damage to Youngblood’s car
consisted of two tires that were blown after the car was forced
over a curb.
He sustained no personal injuries.
The trial court gave the following instruction to the
jury with respect to Youngblood’s duties:
It was the duty of the Defendant, James
Youngblood, in driving his automobile, to
exercise ordinary care for the safety of
other persons using the roadway. This
general duty included the following, specific
duties:
a. To keep a lookout for other persons
or vehicles in front of or to the rear of or
so near his intended line of travel as to be
in danger of collision;
b. To have his motor vehicle under
reasonable control;
c. To drive at a speed no greater than
was reasonable and prudent having regard for
the traffic and for the condition and use of
the roadway; and
d. To exercise ordinary care generally
to avoid collision with other persons or
vehicles using the roadway.
If you believe from the evidence that
the Defendant, James Youngblood, failed to
comply with one or more of these duties, and
that such failure was a substantial factor in
causing the motor vehicle collision, you
shall find for the Plaintiff, and proceed to
Instruction No. 3. Otherwise, you shall find
for the Defendant, and shall enter your
verdict on Verdict Form A, then return to
Court.
The jury was unanimous in exonerating Youngblood, and
judgment was entered accordingly.
Monyhan’s motions for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial were
denied on November 15, 1999.
This appeal followed.
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In regard to the denial of his motion for a directed
verdict, Monyhan cites Roberts v. Rogers, Ky., 265 S.W.2d 448
(1954), which held that “the law not only requires a person to
look when he should, but also to see what he should see.”
He
argues that there was no issue of fact for the jury to consider
and that Youngblood was negligent as a matter of law by failing
to see his vehicle approaching at a close distance in the right
lane before cutting into that lane.
The standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a
motion for directed verdict in a civil jury action was set forth
in Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface Mining Co., Ky., 798 S.W.2d 459, 461
(1990):
All evidence which favors the prevailing
party must be taken as true and the reviewing
court is not at liberty to determine
credibility or the weight which should be
given to the evidence, these being functions
reserved to the trier of fact. The
prevailing party is entitled to all
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from
the evidence. Upon completion of such an
evidentiary review, the appellate court must
determine whether the verdict rendered is
“‘palpably or flagrantly’ against the
evidence so as ‘to indicate that it was
reached as a result of passion or
prejudice.’”
(Citations omitted).
See also, USAA Casualty Insurance Company
v. Kramer, Ky., 987 S.W.2d 779 (1999).
We have reviewed the evidence presented at trial and
have studied the inferences which that evidence supported.
We
cannot agree that the jury’s verdict on the issue of liability
was unjustified.
The jury was entitled to believe: (1) that
Youngblood looked in his side view mirror prior to changing lanes
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and (2) that he saw no vehicle in that lane.
Based on
Youngblood’s testimony, the jury could have inferred that Monyhan
had a reasonable opportunity to avoid the collision and that
Youngblood had complied with all of his duties, leaving Monyhan
solely at fault for the rear-end collision.
Thus, we find no
error in the trial court’s refusal to direct a verdict in favor
of Monyhan and in permitting the question of Youngblood’s
negligence to proceed to the jury.
Next, Monyhan contends that the trial court erred in
refusing to instruct the jury as he requested with regard to
Youngblood’s duty of care.
Specifically, he argues that the
trial court should have instructed the jury that Youngblood had a
duty:
not to turn his automobile from a direct
course upon the highway unless and until such
movement could be made with reasonable safety
and if Plaintiff [sic], Monyhan’s, automobile
was near enough to be affected by such
movement, not to change lanes without first
giving an intention to do so for not less
than the last one hundred feet traveled by
him before turning, by mechanical right turn
signal visible to the rear or by the
extension of his hand and arm upward from the
left side of his automobile.
This tendered instruction was based upon on Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 189.380, which provides:
(1) A person shall not turn a vehicle or move
right or left upon a roadway until the
movement can be made with reasonable safety
nor without giving an appropriate signal in
the manner hereinafter provided.
(2) A signal indicating the intention to turn
right or left shall be given continuously for
not less than the last 100 feet traveled by
the motor vehicle before the turn.
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Although subsection (1) of the statute does require a motorist to
signal when moving to the right or left on a roadway, it does not
require a continuous signal for 100 feet except when preparing to
turn.
Since Youngblood was merely changing lanes rather than
turning, the tendered instruction did not accurately reflect
Youngblood’s statutory duties.
Thus, the trial court did not err
in refusing to instruct the jury as Monyhan requested.
We find
that Youngblood’s duties were fairly presented to the jury.
See
Yellow Cab Company of Louisville v. Crume, Ky., 552 S.W.2d 662
(1977).
Monyhan concedes that his tendered instruction may have
been faulty with respect to the length of time during which the
signal was required to be used.
Nonetheless, he contends that
the omission in the instructions of any reference to a duty to
use a turn signal constituted reversible error.
However, Monyhan
did not tender an alternate instruction; nor did he object to the
instructions ultimately given to the jury.
not preserved for appellate review.
Thus, the issue is
Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure 51(3).
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert M. Lindsay
Louisville, KY
Renee G. Hoskins
Louisville, KY
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