GREGORY KENT MASON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 18, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002541-MR
GREGORY KENT MASON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00334
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
AND
NO.
1999-CA-002637-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00334
GREGORY KENT MASON
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN APPEAL NO. 1999-CA-002541-MR
DISMISSING IN CROSS-APPEAL NO. 1999-CA-002637-MR
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
By judgment entered September 28, 1999, the
Fayette Circuit Court convicted Gregory Kent Mason of firstdegree possession of a controlled substance1 and sentenced him to
one year in prison.
The judgment confirmed a jury verdict
finding Mason guilty of having had in his possession several
rocks of “crack” cocaine folded inside a ten-dollar bill.
In
appeal number 1999-CA-002541-MR, Mason concedes that he possessed
the cocaine, but contends that it should not have been allowed
into evidence at his trial because the security guards who seized
it did so illegally.
Persuaded that the trial court did not err
by refusing to suppress the cocaine evidence, we affirm its
judgment.
The Commonwealth has also appealed from the judgment
convicting Mason.
In appeal number 1999-CA-002637-MR, it
challenges the trial court’s disallowance, during jury selection,
of one of its peremptory strikes of a potential juror.
Because
our affirmance of Mason’s conviction renders the Commonwealth’s
appeal moot, we dismiss that appeal.
It is not seriously disputed that between 1:30 and 2:00
o’clock on the morning of January 16, 1999, Mason and a companion
drove to the Villa Green Apartments on Hollow Creek Road in
Lexington.
They went there to purchase cocaine.
While his
companion waited in the car, Mason entered one of the apartments.
A very few minutes later, as he was making his way back to his
car, two off-duty Lexington-Fayette County detention facility
1
KRS 218A.1415.
-2-
officers working as security guards for the apartment complex
pulled up in their car, got out, and asked what he was doing.
From this point, the parties’ accounts of the incident
differ.
At the hearing on Mason’s motion to suppress the cocaine
evidence, both officers testified that Mason had appeared
unsteady on his feet and nervous.
They had identified
themselves, they claimed, and had shown Mason their badges, but
he had ignored their demand that he stop and their requests for
his name and for the name of the resident he had visited.
Instead, he continued moving toward his companion, who had gotten
out of their car and was standing next to it.
to intercept him.
The officers moved
As they got closer, they saw that he seemed to
be clutching something in his right hand and was glancing about
as though in search of a place to leave or throw it.
The
officers reached Mason’s companion at just about the same time
Mason did.
They saw Mason hand her whatever it was he carried,
and one of them immediately took it from her.
It proved to be a
ten-dollar bill and a one-dollar bill, the ten-dollar bill folded
into a sort of packet.
Mason’s companion had also seemed
unsteady on her feet, and when the officers had come within
touching distance of her and Mason, they could smell alcohol
emanating from them both.
By this time, Mason had told the officers his name and
had placed his wallet on the car, but he and his companion both
refused to say why they were there.
Thereupon, the officers had
arrested them for third-degree trespassing and alcohol
intoxication.
At about the same time, the officer who had
-3-
confiscated the ten-dollar bill had unfolded it and had
discovered what seemed and later proved to be several pieces of
“crack” cocaine.
Mason did not testify at the suppression hearing, but
he argued that the warrantless seizure of the cocaine had been
unlawful because the officers lacked sufficient justification
either to stop or to search him and his companion.
It should
have been apparent to the officers, he maintained, that he and
his companion were not trespassing.
He had just emerged from one
of the apartments and thus had clearly been visiting one of the
residents.
The arrests, moreover, had followed the seizure of
the ten-dollar bill and so could not provide an after-the-fact
justification for it.
In response, the Commonwealth argued that Mason had, in
effect, abandoned the packet of cocaine when he had handed it to
his companion and that he lacked standing to complain of any
alleged violation of his companion’s rights.
There had been no
violation, moreover, because the officers had had probable cause
to arrest both suspects, and the search that produced the cocaine
was a lawful incident of those arrests.
By way of reply, Mason
defended his standing by insisting that the officers had taken
the cocaine from him, either in fact by intercepting it before it
reached his companion, or constructively by, in essence, having
her hand it to them from him.
Denying the motion to suppress,
the trial court agreed with both of the Commonwealth’s arguments.
It found that Mason had passed the cocaine to his companion and
lacked standing to complain of its being taken from her.
-4-
And, in
any event, as long as the search and seizure were genuinely
incident to a lawful arrest, as here they were, they were
reasonable and therefore lawful regardless of whether they
occurred just before the arrest or just after.
It is from this
ruling that Mason has appealed.
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution, a
police officer’s warrantless detention and search of an
individual is presumptively unlawful.
Owing to the exigencies
and dangers of police work, however, courts have recognized
exceptions to this rule and have deemed certain searches and
seizures reasonable and therefore constitutional even in the
absence of a warrant.2
One such exception to the warrant
requirement is the rule that a police officer may arrest one who
commits a misdemeanor in his presence and may, incident to that
arrest, search the individual’s person to remove potential
weapons and to preserve evidence of crime.3
In determining
whether a particular arrest and search come within this rule,
reviewing courts are to consider the totality of the
circumstances presented to the officer, including the officer’s
training and experience, and are to ask whether, given those
circumstances and reasonable inferences from them, a prudent,
reasonable, cautious officer would have believed it more likely
than not that the arrestee had committed a misdemeanor in the
2
Cook v. Commonwealth, Ky., 826 S.W.2d 329 (1992).
3
Mash v. Commonwealth, Ky., 769 S.W.2d 42; Commonwealth v. Wood, Ky. App., 14
S.W.3d 557 (1999).
-5-
officer’s presence.4
Although this Court defers to the trial
court’s properly supported factual findings on this question, and
gives due weight to the trial court’s reasonable inferences based
on those findings, nevertheless, “‘[a]s a general matter
determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should
be reviewed de novo on appeal.’”5
Did the trial court correctly determine that the
officers had probable cause to believe that Mason and his
companion committed a misdemeanor in their presence?
that it did.
We believe
Before addressing this question, however, we shall
note that the other ground urged in support of the trial court’s
decision is less clear.
It is true, as the Commonwealth
observes, that “[a] warrantless search or seizure of property
that has been ‘abandoned’ does not violate the fourth
amendment.”6
Abandonment in this context refers not so much to
property-law notions as to the relinquishment of one’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in the place or the object.7
Some courts
have held, however, that, where an illegal stop or detention both
precedes and induces the “abandonment,” the constitutional right
4
Mash v. Commonwealth, supra, United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
5
Richardson v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 975 S.W.2d 932, 934 (1998) (quoting from
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996)).
6
United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
7
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980); United
States v. Thomas, supra.
-6-
is implicated.8
Because it is arguable, at least, that the
officers stopped Mason prior to the abandonment and that the stop
induced him to abandon the money-wrapped cocaine, we are
reluctant to say that he lacks standing to challenge the legality
of that stop.
We need not resolve these issues, however, for
even if the trial court erred in its ruling on standing, we agree
with it that the officers lawfully arrested Mason and lawfully
discovered and seized the cocaine incident to the arrest.
As noted above, according to the officers, Mason and
his companion refused to tell them why they were on the
apartment’s premises at about 2:00 in the morning or whom they
were visiting.
The officers, both of whom had worked at the
complex for several years, recognized neither Mason nor his
companion.
They testified that burglary and drug dealing were
rife in the complex and that the apartment’s management had
posted “no trespassing” signs at all the entrances.
It was
reasonable under these circumstances, we believe, for the
officers to stop Mason and ask him to explain why he was on the
apartment’s grounds.
His refusal to comply gave them probable
cause to believe that he was trespassing in their presence.
This
conclusion is not altered by the fact that Mason had just emerged
from an apartment, inasmuch as it was entirely possible for Mason
to have been in the apartment without the occupant’s knowledge or
approval.
8
Hollinger v. State of Florida, 620 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1993); State of Connecticut v.
Oquendo, 613 A. 2d 1300 (Conn. 1992).
-7-
The officers also had probable cause to believe that
Mason was, in their presence, intoxicated in a public place
contrary to KRS 222.202.9
They both testified that his unsteady
walking and his demeanor had plainly told them that he was
intoxicated even before they got close enough to him to smell the
strong scent of alcohol.
One of the officers testified that he
would not have considered allowing either Mason or his companion
to drive.
On either of these grounds, therefore, the officers
were authorized to arrest Mason as he was handing off the
cocaine.
The fact that the officer seized the cocaine moments
before the arrest does not change the result.
Where probable
cause for the arrest existed prior to the search and the search
followed quickly on the heels of the arrest, it is not
“particularly important that the search preceded the arrest
rather than vice versa.”10
In sum, we agree with the trial court that the
discovery and seizure of the cocaine in Mason’s possession were
incidents of a lawful arrest and thus did not violate the
constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches.
The
trial court did not err, therefore, by refusing to suppress the
evidence of that possession.
Accordingly, in appeal number 1999-
CA-002541-MR, we affirm the trial court’s September 28, 1999,
9
KRS 222.020 condemns, in pertinent part, manifest public alcohol intoxication that
renders one a danger either to oneself, to others, or to property.
10
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. at 111, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 646, 100 S. Ct. at 2564;
Richardson v. Commonwealth, supra.
-8-
judgment, and in appeal number 1999-CA-002637-MR, we dismiss the
appeal as moot.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
H. Wayne Roberts
Lexington, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Joseph T. Bouvier
Special Assistant Attorney
General
Lexington, Kentucky
-9-
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