TROY TOOLEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
October 19, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002457-MR
TROY TOOLEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McLEAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00001
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, JOHNSON AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Troy Tooley has appealed from a judgment and
final sentencing of the McLean Circuit Court entered on October
4, 1999, following the entry of a conditional guilty plea by
Tooley to the offenses of manufacturing methamphetamine1,
trafficking in methamphetamine2, possession of drug paraphernalia
1
Kentucky Revised Statute 218A.1432.
2
KRS 218A.1435.
while in the possession of a firearm,3 possession of
methamphetamine while in the possession of a firearm4 and
possession of a police receiver5.
Tooley preserved for appeal
the issue of whether the trial court erred by refusing to find
that his co-defendant Alan W. Humphrey’s6 residence had been
subjected to an unconstitutional search pursuant to an invalid
search warrant.
Tooley was arrested during the search of
Humphrey’s residence and the McLean County Sheriff’s Department
later searched his residence and seized several items that he
argues should also be suppressed.
Having concluded that the
trial court’s findings of fact were supported by substantial
evidence and that the trial court did not erroneously apply the
law, we affirm.
On March 8, 1999, at approximately 6:30 p.m., McLean
County Deputy Sheriff Terry Wetzel, at the request of McLean
County Deputy Sheriff Kenny Thomasson,7 was providing extra
patrol for the area surrounding Humphrey’s residence due to
complaints from unnamed persons that unusual odors had been
coming from Humphrey’s premises and that an abnormal amount of
traffic had been seen coming in and out of the area of Humphrey’s
3
KRS 218A.500 and KRS 218A.992.
4
KRS 218A.1415 and KRS 218A.992.
5
KRS 432.570.
6
Humphrey’s conviction was affirmed in a separate opinion in
case no. 1999-CA-002410-MR rendered this date.
7
Deputy Thomasson was serving as acting Sheriff at that
time.
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residence.
As Deputy Wetzel patrolled the area, he noticed a
strong smell of either starting fluid or ether coming from
Humphrey’s house or garage.
Deputy Wetzel reported this
observation to Deputy Thomasson and the two of them agreed to
meet and patrol the area together.
The two deputies went back to
Humphrey’s residence and slowly drove past, once again noticing a
strong smell of ether.
Through their narcotics training, they
had learned that ether was often used in the manufacturing of
methamphetamine.
The police officers also observed several
vehicles in and about Humphrey’s property and they noticed that
light was coming out from beneath the garage door.
Based upon this information, the police officers
contacted McLean County Attorney William Quisenberry for the
purpose of obtaining a search warrant for Humphrey’s house and
garage.
The police officers met with Attorney Quisenberry at
approximately 8:20 p.m. on March 8, and Deputy Wetzel signed an
affidavit in support of the search warrant.
Thereafter, Trial
Commissioner John Hicks arrived at the courthouse and signed a
search warrant for Humphrey’s property.
Deputy Wetzel and Deputy
Thomasson then left to execute the search, but while they were en
route to Humphrey’s property they were contacted by cellular
phone by Attorney Quisenberry and asked to return to the
courthouse so Deputy Wetzel could sign a supplemental affidavit
in support of a new search warrant.
After the new search warrant
was issued, Deputy Wetzel and Deputy Thomasson left again to
execute the search.
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Several police officers arrived at the scene to search
Humphrey’s house and garage.
that searched the garage.
Deputy Thomasson went with the team
The police officers seized both
methamphetamine and items used to make the drug.
The police
officers also arrested Tooley and took him to the McLean County
jail.
While in the jail, Tooley was overheard having a
conversation with his wife by jail personnel which led them to
believe that drug-related evidence could be found at his
residence.
The information was passed on to the police.
The
police went to the Tooley residence and Tooley’s wife consented
to a warrantless search of their residence.
Methamphetamine and
drug-related supplies were found at Tooley’s home.
Tooley was indicted and on August 23, 1999, he entered
a conditional plea of guilty in the McLean Circuit Court to the
offenses of manufacturing methamphetamine, trafficking in
methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia while in the
possession of a firearm, possession of methamphetamine while in
the possession of a firearm and possession of a police receiver.8
This appeal followed.
Tooley’s arguments as set out in his brief are somewhat
convoluted.
We believe the proper sequential analysis of the
issues on appeal is to first determine whether the affidavits in
support of the search warrant for Humphrey’s residence were
8
On October 4, 1999, the trial court sentenced Tooley to
prison for terms of 12 years, ten years, five years, five years
and 12 months, respectively, for each of the above convictions.
The sentences all ran concurrently with each other.
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facially deficient; and then to determine whether critical
allegations in the affidavits were false.
If the affidavits were
facially deficient, reversal would be required; and it would not
matter if the critical allegations were false.9
If the
affidavits were facially sufficient, then the truthfulness of the
critical allegations would have to be considered.10
If the
critical allegations were false, then reversal would be required;
and it would be impossible for the search to be deemed otherwise
valid under the “good faith” exception of Crayton, supra.11
Finally, since we have held the search of Humphrey’s residence to
be constitutional, Tooley’s argument that the evidence seized as
his residence was the result of the invalid search at Humphrey’s
residence and is therefore barred by the “fruit of the poisonous
tree” doctrine, is without merit.
We will first address the question of whether the
affidavits were facially deficient.
“[T]he object of an
affidavit for a search warrant is not to charge all of the
elements or prerequisites of a given offense.
It is intended
merely to supply written evidence of facts which are such that a
reasonably discreet and prudent person would have probable cause
for believing that an offense has been committed and evidence
9
Crayton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 846 S.W.2d 684, 688 (1992).
10
Commonwealth v. Smith, Ky.App., 898 S.W.2d 496, 503
(1995).
11
Crayton at 687-88. (“If the affidavit contains false or
misleading information, the officer’s reliance cannot be
reasonable.”)
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material to a prosecution of the offense might be obtained under
the search.”12
Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution provides in
part that “no warrant shall issue to search any place, or seize
any person or thing, without describing them as nearly as may be,
nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.”
This Court held in Coker v. Commonwealth,13 that “[t]his section
has long been held to require that the affidavit for a search
warrant reasonably describe the property or premises to be
searched and state sufficient facts to establish probable cause
for the search of the property or premises.”14
The “plain smell” or “plain odor” doctrine as a
reasonable means to establish probable cause has long been
recognized in Kentucky.15
In Cooper v. Commonwealth,16 where
probable cause was established when an officer stopped a suspect
on the highway and smelled marijuana emanating from the suspect’s
car, this Court stated:
It is a fundamental principle that a
policeman may “observe” with any of his five
senses for purposes of a misdemeanor arrest.
As long ago as 1925, this state’s highest
court held that a warrantless search could be
based upon smelling illegal liquor. The
federal courts have also recognized a “plain
12
Commonwealth v. Melvin, Ky., 256 S.W.2d 513, 514 (1953).
13
Ky.App., 811 S.W.2d 8 (1991).
14
Id. at 9.
15
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 206 Ky. 701, 268 S.W. 345 (1925).
16
Ky.App., 577 S.W.2d 34 (1979).
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smell” analogue to the “plain view” doctrine.
Therefore, when Trooper Arnold approached the
car and smelled marijuana smoke, he had
probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor
was being committed in his presence by
Cooper, and the arrest without a warrant was
proper [citations omitted].17
While there is no Kentucky case which directly
addresses the “plain smell” doctrine with regards to the
manufacturing of methamphetamine, we believe this situation is
analogous to the establishment of probable cause based upon the
smell of marijuana.18
Certainly, the processing of both drugs
emanates a unique odor that is easily detectible by police
officers who have been properly trained.
We believe that based
upon the strong smell of ether, the police officers’ observations
of an unusual amount of traffic and their training related to the
manufacturing of methamphetamine, the trial commissioner had
probable cause to issue the search warrant for Humphrey’s house
and garage.
Thus, on the face of the affidavits there was
probable cause to issue the search warrant.
Tooley’s only remaining means of attacking the validity
of the search of Humphrey’s residence is to establish that
crucial allegations in the affidavits were false.
If the
affidavits would have been insufficient to establish probable
17
Id. at 36.
18
Although Kentucky has not directly addressed this issue
other courts have held that the odor of chemicals associated with
creating methamphetamine is sufficient to establish probable
cause. People v. James, 62 Cal.App.4th 244, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 7
(1998); United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir.
1986).
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cause that evidence of a crime would be found at Humphrey’s
residence without relying upon crucial statements provided in the
affidavits that were false, then the trial court would have erred
by refusing to suppress the evidence that was seized during the
search.19
In Smith, supra, this Court stated:
To attack a facially sufficient affidavit, it
must be shown that (1) the affidavit contains
intentionally or recklessly false statements,
and (2) the affidavit, purged of its
falsities, would not be sufficient to support
a finding of probable cause. The same basic
standard also applies when affidavits omit
material facts. An affidavit will be
vitiated only if the defendant can show that
the police omitted facts with the intent to
make, or in reckless disregard of whether the
omission made, the affidavit misleading and
that the affidavit, as supplemented by the
omitted information, would not have been
sufficient to support a finding of probable
cause.20
Tooley argues that the search warrant for Humphrey’s
residence was invalid because the police officers provided false
statements in the supporting affidavits which were relied upon by
the trial commissioner for his finding probable cause that
evidence of a crime would be found at the residence.
The
affidavits show that the primary basis for Deputy Wetzel’s and
19
Humphrey needlessly argues that if the police officers
made false, misleading and inaccurate statements to obtain the
search warrant, the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary
rule could not save the otherwise improper search. The “good
faith” exception will allow evidence to be used following an
improperly issued search warrant if “it appears that the
affidavit was made in good faith but the warrant erroneously
issued by virtue of judicial error[.]” Crayton, supra at 688.
20
Smith, supra at 503 (citing United States v. Sherrell, 979
F.2d 1315, 1318 (8th Cir. 1992); and State v. Garrison, 118
Wash.2d 870, 872-873, 827 P.2d 1388, 1390 (1992)).
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Deputy Thomasson’s belief that illegal drug activity either had
recently occurred or was occurring at Humphrey’s residence was
the apparent smell of ether that was detected by both police
officers; the fact that they had recently been provided with
information that there had been an unusual amount of traffic
entering and exiting Humphrey’s residence; and their narcotics
training concerning ether constituting evidence of the
manufacturing of methamphetamine.
Before the trial court, Tooley identified three
specific statements by the police officers in the affidavits that
he believed to be false.
The trial court summarized these
allegations as follows:
(1) Affiant claimed that the nearest neighbor
house or building was over 100 yards away,
yet testimony at the suppression hearing
revealed that there was a neighbor’s house on
the opposite side of the road in front of the
Humphrey’s property within 100 feet of the
Humphrey’s residence.
(2) Affiant claimed the wind was blowing from
the house to the road but that the evidence
at the suppression hearing was contradictory
to that claim.
(3) Affiant claimed that officer Darrell
Stewart had personally observed a suspected
drug dealer at the Humphrey residence on
several occasions, but the testimony from
officer Stewart at the suppression hearing
was that he never saw a suspected drug dealer
at the residence.
In its opinion denying Tooley’s motion to suppress, the
trial court rejected each of these allegations.
It found that
the statements in the affidavits were neither false or
misleading:
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First, the neighbor’s house which was
approximately 100 feet from the Humphrey
residence was across the highway and in the
opposite direction from the way the wind was
blowing on March 8, 1999. In other words, as
the officer observed the smell of ether, and
given the direction that the wind was
blowing, there was no way the odor could be
coming from the opposite side of the highway.
There was no neighbor house within 100 yards
of the Humphrey residence and in the
direction that the wind was blowing. Taken
in context, the officer’s statement in the
affidavit was accurate.
8. Second, all of the pertinent evidence at
the suppression hearing as to the direction
in which the wind was blowing supports the
statement in the affidavit. Defense witness,
Edward Goode, stated that the general
direction the wind was blowing on March 8,
1999, at the hour in question, was exactly as
testified to by Deputies Wetzel and
Thomasson.
9. Third, the statement in the affidavit of
Deputy Wetzel that officer Stewart had
advised Deputy Thomasson that Stewart had
personally observed a suspected drug dealer
at the Humphrey residence on several
occasions is supported by the evidence.
Officer Stewart testified that he advised
Deputy Thomasson that he had seen a known
dealer on at least two occasions either
stopped in front of the Humphrey residence or
had either just backed out of the driveway or
was going to turn into the driveway. Officer
Stewart went on to testify that this person
may not be a dealer but actually was
suspected to be “involved in methamphetamine
in some way”. While technically there may be
a difference between a “dealer” and someone
“involved in methamphetamine in some way”,
this is a difference without a distinction in
terms of providing accurate information to
obtain a search warrant. While President
Clinton might appreciate the parsing of these
words by the Defendants in their argument,
this Court must conclude that all in all, the
testimony from all the officers on this point
was very consistent and supportive of the
statements in the affidavit.
-10-
For Tooley to prevail on his claim that crucial
statements in the affidavits were false, we would have to
conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact were not
supported by substantial evidence.
RCr21 9.78 provides in regard
to a suppression hearing that “[i]f supported by substantial
evidence the factual findings of the trial court shall be
conclusive.”22
Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient
probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable
persons.23
We have reviewed the transcript of the suppression
hearing and the testimony provided therein certainly constitutes
substantial evidence to support each of the trial court’s
findings of fact.
The trial court did not err in denying the
motion to suppress.
Tooley’s final claim, that the items seized at his
residence should be suppressed based upon the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine, is without merit since we have held that
the search of Humphrey’s residence was valid.
Because the search
of Humphrey’s residence was valid, and subsequent arrest of
Tooley was valid, the poisonous tree doctrine is not applicable
to the case sub judice.24
21
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
22
See Diehl v. Commonwealth, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 711, 712
(1984).
23
Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, Ky., 481
S.W.2d 298, 308 (1972).
24
The evidence at the suppression hearing was that while in
jail, Tooley was overheard by jail personnel telling his wife to
(continued...)
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For these reasons, the judgment of the McLean Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dan Jackson
Hartford, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
24
(...continued)
hide a safe. This information that led police to believe there
was evidence of drug activity at the Tooley residence. Police
officers then went to the Tooley residence and were given
permission by Mrs. Tooley to search the residence. Tooley has
not argued that the officers lacked probable cause to search his
residence based upon this conversation. Likewise, he has not
argued that his wife lacked authority to consent to the search.
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