VINCENT B. DOBBINS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 15, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002123-MR
VINCENT B. DOBBINS
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 99-CR-00715 AND 99-CR-00810
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; BARBER and KNOPF, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered
by the Fayette Circuit Court, which sentenced appellant to ten
years’ imprisonment after a jury found him guilty of flagrant
nonsupport and of being a second-degree persistent felony
offender (PFO II).
We affirm.
Appellant and Lisa Dawson signed an agreed judgment in
1981, pursuant to which appellant was to pay $15 per week for the
support of their infant child.
Dawson filed a criminal complaint
in April 1999, charging appellant with flagrant nonsupport for
having failed to pay child support since August 1989, resulting
in a total arrearage of approximately $12,400.
Appellant
thereafter was indicted on one felony count of flagrant
nonsupport, as well as one count of being a PFO II.
530.050 and KRS 532.080.
See KRS
The Commonwealth then filed a pretrial
notice stating an intent to introduce evidence of other crimes or
wrongs during its case-in-chief.
More specifically, it intended
to introduce evidence that on three prior occasions appellant was
convicted by the Fayette District Court and served time in jail
for misdemeanor nonsupport.
The Commonwealth alleged that this
information showed appellant’s knowledge and absence of mistake
with respect to his child support obligation, as well as his
motive, intent, and plan to not honor that obligation.
404(b)(1).
KRE
Over appellant’s objection, the court permitted the
Commonwealth to introduce such evidence.
The Commonwealth adduced evidence to show that
appellant was convicted and served time in jail for nonsupport in
1989, 1991, and 1992, and that he failed to make any child
support payments between 1994 and 1999.1
Although appellant was
incarcerated in the county jail and the state penitentiary at
various times between 1994 and 1999, he was not incarcerated for
some 608 days during that five-year period.
Further, a parole
officer testified that appellant was employed at a restaurant for
approximately three months in 1996, and an unemployment services
officer testified that state records indicated appellant earned
$582 through employment at a seafood store that year.
Another
parole officer stated that appellant indicated in 1988 that he
was employed through a temporary work placement agency.
1
The 1994-1999 period was chosen because appellant had
already been convicted and served time for the prior time period.
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After the court denied appellant’s motion for a
directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth’s case,
appellant testified that he was denied employment several times
because of his felony convictions, that asthma and a hernia
limited his ability to work, and that he supported himself
through criminal activities which resulted in repeated periods of
incarceration.
Appellant admitted that he had knowledge of his
child support obligation, that he had made no payments through
the Domestic Relations Office, and that he had been incarcerated
three times for not paying child support.
However, appellant
denied that he had ever been employed or told his parole officer
that he was employed through a temporary job placement agency,
and he claimed that he had insufficient funds to make support
payments, especially while incarcerated.
Appellant did not seek
a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence.
The jury found appellant guilty of flagrant nonsupport
and of being a PFO II, and recommended that he be sentenced to
five years’ imprisonment for flagrant nonsupport, enhanced to ten
years based on the PFO II conviction.
The trial court sentenced
appellant to ten years’ imprisonment consistent with the jury’s
recommendation.
This appeal followed.
First, appellant contends that the trial court erred by
denying his motion for a directed verdict.
However, we note that
although defense counsel orally moved for a directed verdict at
the close of the Commonwealth’s case, the issue was not preserved
for review since he did not renew the motion at the close of all
the evidence.
As was recently reaffirmed by the supreme court in
Baker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 54, 55 (1998), a
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defendant’s motion for a directed verdict must be renewed at the
close of all the evidence, “thus allowing the trial court the
opportunity to pass on the issue in light of all the evidence.”
Moreover, in any event it is clear that the trial court
properly denied the motion for a directed verdict.
As stated in
Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991), on a
criminal defendant’s motion for a directed verdict
the trial court must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence
is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty, a directed verdict
should not be given. For the purpose of
ruling on the motion, the trial court must
assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth
is true, but reserving to the jury questions
as to the credibility and weight to be given
to such testimony.
See also Estep v. Commonwealth, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 191, 193 (1997);
Commonwealth v. Sawhill, Ky., 660 S.W.2d 3 (1983).
A court must
be mindful of the rule that the “[c]redibility and weight of the
evidence are matters within the exclusive province of the jury.”
Commonwealth v. Smith, Ky., 5 S.W.3d 126, 129 (1999)(citations
omitted).
The standard on appellate review of a trial court’s
denial of a motion for a directed verdict is that a defendant is
not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal if, under the
evidence as a whole, it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury
to find the defendant guilty.
Fugate v. Commonwealth, Ky., 993
S.W.2d 931, 940 (1999); Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187.
Relying on his extended periods of incarceration, his
inability to secure employment, and his medical problems,
appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to establish that
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he was “reasonably” able to provide the required child support.
See KRS 530.050.
However, the evidence shows that appellant was
not incarcerated during a ten-month period in 1997-1998, that he
obtained employment for short periods of time, and that his
repeated incarcerations resulted from criminal activity which,
albeit illegally, did provide him with some access to funds.
An incarcerated person’s limited access to income or
assets does not exempt that person from his or her obligation to
pay some child support.
See Commonwealth ex rel. Marshall v.
Marshall, Ky. App., 15 S.W.3d 396 (2000).
Appellant admitted
below that he neither paid any child support between 1994 and
1999, nor sought a modification of his obligation based on his
alleged inability to pay.
Whether appellant exercised sufficient
efforts to obtain employment or was physically capable of
generating some income was essentially a question for the jury.
Viewing the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, there was clearly sufficient evidence “to
induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt”
that appellant was guilty of flagrant nonsupport.
S.W.2d at 187.
Benham, 816
Hence, he was not entitled to a directed verdict.
Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by
admitting evidence of his three prior misdemeanor convictions for
nonsupport.
He argues that this evidence was not admissible
under KRE 404(b) to show intent, and that its prejudicial effect
outweighed its probative value.
In reviewing a challenge to the admission of evidence,
the appellate standard of review generally is whether the trial
court abused its discretion.
See, e.g., Estep v. Commonwealth,
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Ky., 957 S.W.2d 191, 194 (1997); Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918
S.W.2d 219, 222 (1996); Skimmerhorn v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
998 S.W.2d 771, 775 (1998).
Typically, evidence of crimes other
than those charged is not admissible to show that a defendant has
a criminal predisposition.
KRE 404(b);
Ky., 905 S.W.2d 76, 78 (1995).
Daniel v. Commonwealth,
Exceptions to this general rule
exist as to evidence of other crimes or wrongs offered to prove
“motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”
KRE 404(b)(1).
“To be admissible under any of these exceptions, the acts must be
relevant for some purpose other than to prove criminal
predisposition; sufficiently probative to warrant introduction;
and the probative value must outweigh the potential for undue
prejudice to the accused.”
S.W.2d 488, 494 (1995).
Chumbler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 905
Moreover, “[t]he test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1999).
Here, the Commonwealth asserts that evidence of
appellant’s prior convictions was admissible under KRE 404(b)(1)
to show knowledge and intent.
Not only did all three of those
convictions concern the same child involved herein, but they also
showed appellant’s common plan or scheme to pay no child support.
Appellant’s employment status was similar throughout the period
covered by the convictions, and evidence of his behavior leading
to those convictions was consistent with, and relevant to show,
his intent to continue to not pay child support despite his
obvious knowledge of his obligation to do so.
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As we believe the
prejudicial effect of admitting evidence of the prior convictions
did not outweigh its probative value, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence in question.
The court’s judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Michael G. Wilson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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