MARCEL AND PAMELA PITTON v. J.J. CARTER AND SONS MOVING AND STORAGE, INC.; ALLIED VAN LINES, INC.; AND EHMKE/KENTUCKY MOVERS, INC.
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RENDERED: JUNE 8, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002080-MR
MARCEL AND PAMELA PITTON
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ERNEST A. JASMIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-003700
v.
J.J. CARTER AND SONS MOVING
AND STORAGE, INC.; ALLIED VAN
LINES, INC.; AND EHMKE/KENTUCKY
MOVERS, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, JOHNSON AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Pamela and Marcel Pitton have appealed from an
order entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court on August 6, 1999,
granting summary judgment in favor of Allied Van Lines, Inc.;
Ehmke/Kentucky Movers, Inc.; and J. J. Carter & Son Moving and
Storage, Inc.
Having concluded that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the defendants were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, we affirm.
On April 21, 1998, Pamela Pitton contacted J. J. Carter
to inquire about services to assist her family in its move from
Louisville, Kentucky to Dallas, Texas.1
A few days later, Wes
Caudill, a representative of J. J. Carter, came to the Pittons’
residence to do an analysis of their house and to provide an
estimate for the cost of services.
The Pittons informed Caudill
that they intended to move on May 22, 1998, and would need J. J.
Carter to store their property until they found a home in Dallas.
On April 23, 1998, Mrs. Pitton signed a document provided by J.
J. Carter entitled “Estimated Cost of Services”.2
According to
Mrs. Pitton, she believed this document was the contract which
controlled her property being stored in Louisville.
On May 22, 1998, representatives of J. J. Carter
arrived at the Pitton home and loaded their property onto a
trailer.
Mrs. Pitton claims that at the end of the day she was
asked to sign numerous documents.
One of the documents that Mrs.
Pitton signed was entitled “Kentucky Household Goods, Bill of
1
J. J. Carter & Son was a local representative of the
national moving corporation, Allied Van Lines.
2
The total estimated cost of services was $1,320.00. The
estimate listed the following charges: “Pickup or delivery for
storage in transit 11000 lbs. @ 7.50 $825.00”; “Storage in
transit at 11000 lbs. @ 2.50 $275.00”; “Warehouse handling in
storage 11000 lbs. @ 2.00 $220.00”; “[T]ake out of storage
$220.00”. Obviously, this estimate did not include the delivery
to Dallas, Texas.
-2-
Lading and Freight Bill.”3
Mrs. Pitton testified in her
deposition that she signed the Bill of Lading without reading it.
On the left side of the first page of the Bill of
Lading is a section that has a highlighted, enlarged title that
reads, “THIS IS A TARIFF LEVEL OF CARRIER LIABILITY: IT IS NOT
INSURANCE”.
This section provides:
Unless the shipper expressly releases
the shipment to a value of 60 cents per pound
per article, the carrier’s maximum liability
for loss and damage shall be either the lumpsum value declared by the shipper or an
amount equal to $1.25 for each pound of
weight in the shipment, whichever is greater.
The shipment will move subject to the rules
and conditions of the carrier’s tariff.
not exceeding $[/s]45,000
(To be completed by the person signing below)
The shipper signing this contract must insert
in the space above in his own handwriting,
either his declaration of the actual value of
the shipment, or the words “60 cents per
pound per article”, otherwise the shipment
will be deemed released to a maximum value
equal to $1.25 times the actual or
constructive weight of the shipment in
pounds.
OR
The shipper may declare this shipment
released with Full Value Protection (with at
least $3.50 per pound minimum value indicated
above) by initialing the following:
TARIFF FULL VALUE PROTECTION______________
NOTE: If Full Value Protection is initialed
but no value is stated above, then the
3
The bottom of the front page of the Bill of Lading
indicates that it is “Form #KY 110695 Revised 11/95.” This is in
apparent reference to a Transportation Cabinet form.
-3-
shipment will be released with a minimum
value of $3.50 per pound.
Signed [/s] Pam Pitton
Shipper
Mrs. Pitton filled in the blank on the form with
“45,000" in her own handwriting, and signed the document directly
underneath this section.
Additionally, the first paragraph of
this section has the word “VALUATION” running conspicuously down
the left side in large, highlighted letters.
Mrs. Pitton claims
that she asked one of the movers what this section covered and he
responded, “it’s getting late. Well, most people put down
$45,000.”
Mrs. Pitton claims that she knew that this was not the
correct value of her property, but that she went ahead and put it
down with the intention of calling J. J. Carter’s office on the
next working day to make further inquires about having her
property fully insured.
On May 26, 1998, the Tuesday following Memorial Day,
Mrs. Pitton contacted J. J. Carter and spoke with its Customer
Service Manager, Pamela Tkac.
Mrs. Pitton claims that upon
asking Tkac about insurance coverage for her property while it
was in storage, she was told, “You don’t need insurance when it’s
in storage, because the only thing that can happen would be
either a fire or a tornado, and J. J. Carter is fully covered for
that.”4
Pitton claims that because of this conversation, she did
not pursue
insurance coverage any further.
4
Tkac does not recall making such a statement. But, of
course, for the purposes of summary judgment, we must accept Mrs.
Pitton’s version as fact.
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Mrs. Pitton claims that she gave Caudill instructions
to store her property in J. J. Carter’s warehouse vault.
J. J.
Carter has admitted that the Pittons’ property was never unloaded
from the trailer and instead was stored in the trailer.
On June
1, 1998, J. J. Carter transferred all of its contractual rights
and obligations to Ehkme.5
On June 7, 1998, the Pittons’
property was stolen, and 80% of their property was either damaged
or never recovered.
On July 6, 1998, the Pittons filed a complaint against
Allied, Ehmke, and J. J. Carter alleging breach of contract,
negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, bailment, and violation
of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act.
On August 6, 1999, the
Jefferson Circuit Court entered an order granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, limiting their liability to
the $45,000 valuation that Mrs. Pitton had entered on the Bill of
Lading.
This appeal followed.
Under the law of Kentucky, summary judgment is only
proper “where the movant shows that the adverse party could not
5
Shortly after the incident, Ehmke attempted to resolve the
situation by offering to pay the Pittons the $45,000 that Mrs.
Pitton had inserted on the Bill of Lading. J. J. Carter has
likewise admitted that it breached a duty owed to the Pittons by
failing to adequately store their property, but it has maintained
that its breach resulted in no harm to the Pittons since the
property was not stolen until after its assets had been
transferred to Ehmke. Furthermore, it argues that any claim
against it has been discharged by Ehmke’s offer to pay the
Pittons $45,000. For the purposes of this appeal, it is not
necessary to resolve J. J. Carter’s and Ehmke’s respective
liability. But, suffice it to say, we are of the belief that any
allocation of liability between these two defendants would have
best been addressed by cross-claims.
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prevail under any circumstances.”6
“The moving party has the
initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of a material
fact exists, then the other party must refute the contentions of
the moving party.
If the moving party does not sustain his
burden, or if the opposing party is successful in rebutting, then
the summary judgment should not be granted.”7
The circuit court
must view the record “in a light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be
resolved in his favor.”8
“The trial judge must examine the
evidence, not to decide any issue of fact, but to discover if a
real issue exists.”9
The standard of review on appeal of a
summary judgment is “whether the trial court correctly found that
there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law”
[citations omitted].10
In order to defeat a properly supported summary
judgment motion, the party opposing the motion must present some
6
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991)(reaff’g Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose,
Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985).
7
Roberts v. Davis, Ky., 422 S.W.2d 890, 894 (1967)(citing
Robert Simmons Construction Co. v. Powers Regulator Co., Ky., 390
S.W.2d 901 (1965); Conley v. Hall, Ky., 395 S.W.2d 575 (1965);
and Spencer, et al. v. Leone, et al., Ky., 420 S.W.2d 685 (1967).
See also Hartford Insurance Group v. Citizens Fidelity Bank &
Trust Co., Ky.App., 579 S.W.2d 628, 630-31 (1979).
8
Steelvest, supra (citing Dossett v. New York Mining &
Manufacturing Co., Ky., 451 S.W.2d 843 (1970)).
9
Id. at 480.
10
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky.App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
-6-
affirmative evidence that a genuine issue of material fact exists
for trial.11
While summary judgment is not to be used to deny
litigants their right to trial if they have issues to try, it is
appropriate “to terminate litigation when, as a matter of law, it
appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce
evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor.”12
While there are various factual disputes surrounding
this transaction, a factual dispute does not preclude entry of
summary judgment, unless it relates to a material fact.
From our
analysis of the undisputed facts in this case and the questions
of law presented, we conclude that there are two questions of law
to be decided that will determine whether the trial court’s
granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendants was
correct.
First, was the trial court correct in ruling that the
Bill of Lading was the controlling document as to the defendants’
liability for transit storage?
Second, if the Bill of Lading was
the controlling document, may Mrs. Pitton as an intrastate
shipper avoid the legal consequences of a limitation of liability
provision contained in the Bill of Lading issued by the carrier
and signed by her on the ground that she did not read the
document and therefore did not agree to its provisions?
11
Steelvest, supra at 482; and Continental Casualty Company,
Inc. v. Belknap Hardware and Manufacturing Company, Ky., 281
S.W.2d 914 (1955).
12
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480; see Paintsville Hospital Co.
v. Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985).
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In its opinion, the trial court first addressed
Allied’s possible liability to the Pittons.
The trial court
ruled:
Both EHMKE [sic] and Carter are local
representatives of Allied. Allied only
collects fees from such representatives upon
interstate transfers of goods. Thus, no
agency relationship exists as to intrastate
matters and Allied can have no liability for
the acts of Ehmke or Carter. Further, as
argued by Allied, had there actually been an
interstate transfer, the liability for loss
would have been governed by the Carmack
Amendment. While the Plaintiffs contend that
the Defendants have not met their burden
thereunder, the evidence proves that they
have in that Ms. Pitton was shown the Bill of
Lading and given a choice as to whether or
not to accept the tariff rates or to enter
her own valuation of her property. She chose
the latter option and was issued the Bill.
The appellees have argued throughout this case that
their liability was properly limited pursuant to the terms of the
Bill of Lading, which was in compliance with KRS13 355.7-309(2),
which provides:
(2) Damages may be limited by a
provision that the carrier’s liability shall
not exceed a value stated in the document if
the carrier’s rates are dependent upon value
and the consignor by the carrier’s tariff is
afforded an opportunity to declare a higher
value or a value as lawfully provided in the
tariff, or where no tariff is filed he is
otherwise advised of such opportunity; but no
such limitation is effective with respect to
the carrier’s liability for conversion to its
own use.
13
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-8-
The trial court accepted the appellees’ argument and
ruled that they had met their burden under KRS 355.7-309(2):14
EHMKE’s [sic] obligation was to perform
the contracts of Carter according to their
terms. By failing to store and protect the
Plaintiff’s goods properly, it clearly
breached the Carter contract with the
Plaintiffs. However, by offering the
$45,000.00 stated value, it complied with the
contractual provisions governing in the event
of breach. Therefore, it’s liability is
properly limited as permitted by K.R.S.
355.7-309.
The Pittons are correct that before a carrier can rely
upon KRS 355.7-309 to limit its liability, it must first meet
several requirements.
From the undisputed material facts of
record, we hold that all of these requirements were met.
The
statute requires that the shipper be given an opportunity declare
the value of the goods; and Mrs. Pitton was given this
opportunity.
When Mrs. Pitton was asked in her deposition about
the limitation of liability, the following colloquy occurred:
[F. Larkin Fore Attorney for Allied & Ehmke]:
Q.
This document indicates that you’re
declaring that the value of the entire
shipment is $45,000. That number
14
The Carmack Amendment is not applicable to this case. In
1906, Congress enacted the Carmack Amendment so as to create a
national policy regarding an interstate carrier’s liability for
property loss. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. v.
Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 131, 97 L.Ed. 1500, 73 S.Ct. 986 (1953).
The Sixth Circuit, along with seven other circuits, have held
that the Carmack Amendment preempts state and common law claims
and remedies for cargo damaged in interstate transport. W.D.
Lawson & Co. v. Penn Central Co., 456 F.2d 419, 421 (6th Cir.
1972). Thus, since the Pittons’ property was damaged in
intrastate transport, the Carmack Amendment is not applicable to
this case. However, KRS 355.7-309 is significantly similar to
the Carmack Amendment.
-9-
written in there, is that your
handwriting?
[Pamela Pitton]
A.
It is.
Q.
And is that your signature that appears
below that?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you know whose signature that is at
the bottom of the page?
A.
It’s Maurice, who was the head driver.
Q.
Tell me how you arrived at the number of
$45,000.
A.
When they were done moving us that day,
and I was signing all the paperwork,
Maurice said to me: Do you want
insurance? And I said to him: You mean
what’s in storage? And he said, yes.
And I said: Wes Caudill did not discuss
insurance with me at all in any of the
conversations that we had with him. And
I said: I don’t know anything about
insurance for storage. I don’t know
what it costs. I don’t know what it
covers. He said: Well — he looks at his
watch — it’s getting late. He said:
Well, most people put down $45,000.
Q.
Mr. Sydnor said this to you?
A.
Yes, he did. And I stopped — I knew
that was not the value of our goods, but
because it was late and I didn’t have
anymore information, I went ahead and I
put $45,000 down, and I said to him:
I’ll call the office on Tuesday — since
Monday was a holiday — and I’ll find out
what I need to do to have the right
amount of insurance.
Q.
And did you do that?
A.
Yes, I did.
Q.
And to whom did you speak?
I called Tuesday morning.
-10-
A.
Q.
Pam?
A.
She’s the move coordinator.
Q.
Do you know what her last name is?
A.
I read it in one of the other
depositions, but I don’t know what it
is. Something like Tack.15
Q.
Oh, okay. And tell me the sum and
substance of the conversations with Pam
Tack.
A.
I told Pam about when we were getting
ready to leave that night — I said, I
didn’t know anything about insurance. I
had no previous knowledge of any
information about insurance because Wes
did not talk about it. I told her that
upon Maurice’s recommendation I put down
$45,000, but I would call and find out
what I needed to do to have the right
amount of insurance. She said: You
don’t need insurance when it’s in
storage, because the only thing that can
happen would be either a fire or a
tornado, and J. J. Carter is fully
covered for that. So I said: So I don’t
need insurance when it’s in storage?
She said: Oh, no. Only for your longhaul when you move from Louisville to
Dallas.
Q.
So at the time of that conversation,
what did you conclude from that?
A.
15
I asked for Wes. Wes was out of the
office, so I talked to Pam, who I had
had many conversations with prior to
this.
That my goods were in storage, and I
didn’t need insurance, because nothing
would happen to my goods except a fire
or a tornado, and J. J. Carter would be
fully covered.
The correct spelling is “Tkac.”
-11-
Q.
And Pam Tack is the one who told you
this?
A.
Yes.16
In their brief the Pittons argue:
In this case, the sworn deposition
testimony makes it clear that the Pittons
were never given, by any of the Appellees, a
choice of liability coverage; nor were they
given a reasonable opportunity to choose from
available options of liability insurance
coverage for their property while in storage.
Thus, there was never an agreement made by
the Pittons as to their choice of liability
coverage on their stored property.
In light of the language in the contract, we cannot
accept this argument. The contract provided Mrs. Pitton with five
options for coverage: “60 cents per pound per article”; “$1.25
times the actual or constructive weight of the shipment in
pounds”; “the lump-sum value declared by the shipper”; “Full
Value Protection”;17 “value stated”; or “Full Value Protection”
and “no value is stated.”
Mrs. Pitton chose “the lump-sum value
declared by the shipper” by inserting the amount of $45,000 and
signing at the bottom of the page.
The back of the Bill of Lading contains a section that
has been blocked off with large block letters running vertically
16
Mrs. Pitton has not alleged that anyone coerced her into
writing in the amount of $45,000.00.
17
The cost for “Full Value Protection” is not clear from the
record. However, the Bill of Lading states that the cost is to
be “at least a $3.50 per pound minimum value.” The form also
states, “If Full Value Protection is initialed but no value is
stated above, then the shipment will be released with a minimum
value of $3.50 per pound.”
-12-
down the left side.
The heading states: “THIS IS TRANSIT
PROTECTION NOT INSURANCE” and provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
Section 1: The Carrier shall be liable for
physical loss of or damage to any articles
from external cause while being carried or
held in storage-in-transit . . . [emphasis
added].
The carrier’s maximum liability shall be
either:
(1)
The amount of the actual loss or damage
not exceeding $1.25 times the actual or
constructive weight (in pounds) of the
shipment, or the lump sum declared
value, whichever is greater; or
Replacement Value if shipment is
released at $3.50 times the actual or
constructive weight in pounds of the
shipment or;
(2)
The actual loss or damage not exceeding
sixty (60) cents per pound of the weight
of any lost or damaged article when the
shipper has released the shipment to
carrier, in writing with liability
limited to sixty (60) cents per pound
per article.
The Pittons claim that Mrs. Pitton did not understand
the significance of the document she was signing because she did
not read it.
In general, a person who has the opportunity to
read a contract, but does not do so and signs the agreement
anyway, is bound by the contract terms unless there was some
fraud in the process of obtaining her signature.18
18
Cline v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 690 S.W.2d 764, 766
(Ky.App. 1985) citing Prewitt v. Estate Building and Loan
Association, 288 Ky. 331, 156 S.W.2d 173 (1941).
-13-
Also, it has been held in this state that a person who
has the capacity and opportunity to read the contract and is not
misled as to its contents, cannot avoid the contract on the
ground of mistake.19
Mrs. Pitton is a college graduate with a
master’s degree in psychology and a graduate G.P.A. of 3.9 out of
4.0, who, obviously, can competently read and write.
She has not
argued that she would have unable to have understood the Bill of
Lading, if she had read it.
While Mrs. Pitton has consistently tried to justify her
failure to read the Bill of Lading by arguing that it was late in
the day and that she had to sign multiple documents, we agree
with the trial court that these circumstances are of no legal
significance. The Pittons have not argued that J. J. Carter
coerced Mrs. Pitton into signing the documents, that its
employees were purposefully dilatory in their duties in an
attempt to give her less time to review the documents, or
its employees acted fraudulently.
that
Accordingly, there is no legal
basis for Mrs. Pitton to deny the fact that she made a conscience
decision to set the carrier’s liability limit at $45,000.00.
In their brief, the Pittons argue that summary judgment
should not have been granted because this case involves
contractual intent.
They are correct in their argument that an
issue of contractual intent is usually inappropriate for summary
19
Amlung v. First National Lincoln Bank of Louisville, 411
S.W.2d 465, 468 (Ky. 1967) citing Clark v. Brewer, Ky., 329
S.W.2d 384 (1959).
-14-
judgment.20
However, Mrs. Pitton’s failure to contemplate the
legal significance of inserting $45,000 on the Bill of Lading is
a direct result of her failure to read the document that she was
signing, not some misunderstanding between the parties as to
contractual intent.
As previously discussed, her failure to read
the document does not excuse her from its provisions.
Finally, the Pittons have failed to establish that the
document entitled “Estimated Cost of Services” was the
controlling document while their goods were in storage.
Our
research has not revealed any cases where such a document was the
controlling contract between the parties.
In all the cases that
we have reviewed, including the ones cited by the parties, the
controlling contract was always a bill of lading.
Furthermore,
the “Estimated Cost of Services” document also used the phrase
“storage-in-transit.”
This was the same phrase that was used in
the Bill of Lading that Mrs. Pitton signed.
In reviewing the
“Estimated Cost of Services” document, it is clear that this
document was intended to be an estimate for the cost of various
services and not the controlling contract between the parties as
to liability.
One clear indication of the purposes of the two
documents is that the Bill of Lading had the necessary language
to conform with KRS 355.7-309, whereas the estimate did not.
Also, the estimate did not contain Mrs. Pitton’s self-valuation
of her property.
20
White v. Winchester Land Development Corp., Ky.App., 584
S.W.2d 56, 63-64 (1979); and River City Development Corp. v.
Slemmer, Ky.App. 781 S.W.2d 525, 526 (1989).
-15-
Thus, we hold that as a matter of law the Bill of
Lading was the applicable contract in this case as to the
appellees’ liability; and that Mrs. Pitton’s valuation of her
property at $45,000 limited the appellees’ liability to $45,000.
For these reasons, the summary judgment of the Jefferson Circuit
Court is affirmed.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, J. J. CARTER & SONS:
William C. Boone
Louisville, KY
Robert E. Stopher
Louisville, KY
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
ALLIED VAN LINES & EHMKE:
F. Larkin Fore
Louisville, KY
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