DONNA OLSON v. HARDIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; HON. W. BRUCE COWDEN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; HON. ROBERT L. WHITTAKER, DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: MAY 4, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002065-WC
DONNA OLSON
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-98-00536
v.
HARDIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION;
HON. W. BRUCE COWDEN, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
HON. ROBERT L. WHITTAKER,
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, JOHNSON AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Donna Olson had filed a petition for review of an
opinion rendered by the Workers’ Compensation Board on July 23,
1999.
Having concluded that the Board has not overlooked or
misconstrued the law or committed an error in assessing the
evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice, we affirm.1
1
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685,
687-88 (1992).
Olson, who was born on March 6, 1956, was injured on
May 22, 1996, while working as a classroom assistant for the
Hardin County Board of Education.
Olson’s duties included
helping children with special needs, e.g., disabled children and
children with behavioral problems.
She was injured when a child,
weighing approximately 80 pounds, hugged her and pulled on her
neck as she was helping him into a wheelchair.
Olson heard her
neck pop and afterwards felt as though she “had a crick” in her
neck.
Within a few weeks, she experienced pain and stiffness in
her shoulders and a tingling in her arms and hands.
Approximately four months later, she began to experience low back
pain.
Olson’s injury caused her to miss approximately two
weeks of work near the time of the injury.
However, after she
returned to work, she worked at her normal job duties until
January 18, 1998, at which time she voluntarily resigned.
has not sought employment since her resignation.
She
In her brief,
Olson stated that “[s]he does not believe that there are any jobs
with the Board of Education which she can do.
performs only light housework.”
She currently
She described her pain and
physical limitations as follows:
Olson testified that she sleeps two or
three hours at a time. She has headaches and
stinging sensations down her arm with
stabbing pain in the fingers and her fingers
draw up. She complains of dropping things.
The pain has started down into her back, hip
and into her right leg.
. . .
Olson testified that she can stand or
sit for 10 to 15 minutes at a time but not
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longer. She cannot perform any overheard
work nor can she perform any work involving
bending.”
. . .
At the hearing Olson testified that the
pain is in the back of her neck at the base
of her head going down into the shoulders and
now into the back. It is in the lower back
by the shoulder blades, primarily on the
right side. The pain goes down into the arm
all the way to the fingers. Olson indicates
the ache in her arms is always there, and she
can even be sitting and her fingers will go
to sleep. Pain into the neck and shoulder
blade is a “come and go” pain, the ache is a
constant ache. Olson describes the pain as
stinging and does not have full use of her
right arm. Olson indicates she can carry a
gallon of milk (8 pounds) from the
refrigerator to the cabinet but not further.
Olson does not sleep through the night and is
currently on anti-inflammatories and pain
killers.
Olson was first treated by a chiropractor, and then, in
July 1996, came under the care of Dr. Raymond Shea, a Louisville
orthopedic surgeon.
Dr. Shea performed an MRI, which revealed
evidence of an osteophytic spur and a small herniated disk at C45 centrally located without intervertebral foraminal compromise.
He prescribed conservative treatment, consisting of medication
and physical therapy.
Olson was referred to Dr. John
Guarnaschelli, a Louisville neurosurgeon, in January 1997 for a
second opinion regarding the need for surgery.
Surgery has not
been recommended.
Olson introduced at her hearing before Administrative
Law Judge W. Bruce Cowden, Jr., a medical report from Dr. Shea,
which assessed a 25 percent impairment due to her “lumbrosacral
spine,” but it did not indicate that Olson was under any medical
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restrictions or medically unable to work.
Dr. Shea made no
reference to the AMA Guides.
Olson also submitted a medical report from Dr.
Guarnaschelli, which indicated that the MRI showed evidence of a
C4-5 disk herniation.
He opined that Olson exhibited multiple
level cervical spondylosis with predominance at C4-5.
Dr. Charles M. Hargadon, an orthopedic surgeon from
Louisville, examined Olson on May 13, 1998, at the request of the
employer.
He reviewed the cervical spine x-ray dated December
23, 1996, and agreed with the interpretation that it revealed
central disk herniation at C4-5 without significant compression
of the underlying cord and osteophytic spur and protruding disk
at C5-6.
He diagnosed Olson with degenerative disk disease of
the cervical spine with superimposed strain and believed her
prognosis was fairly good.
He assessed Olson with a DRE
cervical-thoracic Category II, which is a 5% whole body
impairment.
The ALJ noted that Olson “argues that she is 100%
disabled based on her limited prior work experience, her
disability rating and her subjective complaints[, or][i]n the
alternative, [she] argues that her occupational loss is in the
range of 60-65%.”
The employer “argues that [Olson] is
employable and that . . . [she] continued working from May of
1996 until January of 1998 at which point she resigned for
personal reasons.”
2
The employer “advocates that KRS2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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342.730(1)(b), as amended by the 1994 legislature caps benefits
at two times the functional impairment rating.”
The ALJ accepted the employer’s argument and stated:
After considering all the arguments of
counsel, the ALJ must conclude that KRS
342.730(1)(b) applies so as to cap the
petitioner’s occupational disability at 10%
and the ALJ so finds that her occupational
disability is 10% or two times the functional
impairment rating assessed by Dr. Hargadon.
Th ALJ notes that the petitioner continued to
work until January of 1998 until she
resigned. There has been no medical evidence
introduced to suggest that the petitioner can
not return to her work at the Board of
Education. It must be pointed out that
although Dr. Shea has assessed a 25%
impairment rating, there is no evidence in
the record that this impairment rating was
pursuant to the 4th edition of the AMA
Guidelines nor was there a finding in the
medical report which connect the 25%
impairment to the work event. For this
reason, the ALJ finds that the plaintiff has
failed in her burden to show that the lumbar
complaints are work related.
In Olson’s appeal to the Board, it framed the issue as
whether “the ALJ erred in capping petitioner’s benefits at two
times her impairment rating and [whether] the ALJ should have
relied on the occupational standard of Osborne v. Johnson.”3
The
Board noted that “Olson contends that in order for an ALJ to
apply the ‘two times functional impairment formula,’ a workers’
compensation claimant must be earning actual wages equal to or
greater than wages paid as of the date of injury.
Being
‘employable’ at wages greater than or equal to the date of injury
is not the standard according to Olson.”
3
Ky., 432 S.W.2d 800 (1968).
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KRS 342.730(1)(b), as amended in 1994, and prior to
December 12, 1996, stated, in relevant part, as follows:
For permanent, partial disability, where
an employee returns to work at a wage equal
to or greater than the employee’s preinjury
wage, sixty-six and two-thirds percent (662/3%) of the employee’s average weekly wage
but not more than seventy-five percent (75%)
of the state average weekly wage as
determined by KRS 342.740, multiplied by his
percentage of impairment caused by the injury
or occupational disease as determined by
“Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment,” American Medical Association,
latest edition available, unless the employee
establishes a greater percentage of
disability as determined under KRS
342.0011(11), in which event the benefits
shall not exceed two (2) times the functional
impairment rate, for a maximum period, from
the date the disability arises, of four
hundred twenty-five (425) weeks subject to
the provisions of subsection (1)(d) of this
section.
The Board addressed KRS 342.730(1)(b), and stated as
follows:
Based upon the above language, when a
claimant returns to work at the same or
greater wages as before the injury, the
claimant’s percentage of occupational
disability for injuries occurring between
April 4, 1994 and December 11, 1996 is
determined by either their impairment
established by the AMA Guides or two times
the functional impairment rating, if so
proven. With the advent of the above
statutory section, the Legislature limited an
employee’s ability to receive disability
benefits when he or she has not suffered a
reduction in her income after the injury.
Under KRS 342.730(1)(c) as it existed at the
time of Olson’s injury, where an employee
does not return to the same job at the same
wage, then disability may be established
under KRS 342.0011(11) and the principles
outlined in Osborne v. Johnson, Ky., 432
S.W.2d 800 (1968).
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We agree with Olson’s argument to the
extent that we believe that doing any work at
all at a wage equal to or greater than the
pre-injury wage does not necessarily qualify
as a “return to work” as contemplated by KRS
342.730(1)(b). Conversely, simply because
the same employee fails or refuses to return
to work does not invoke the provisions under
§730(1)(c) to the exclusion of §(1)(b). This
Board has routinely held in the past that if
the ALJ finds that the claimant could have
continued in such employment indefinitely, he
or she is subject to the limitations of KRS
342.730(1)(b). To hold otherwise would
merely discourage claimant’s from making any
attempts to return to work following an
injury. This would clearly be contrary to
one of the primary purposes of KRS Chapter
342. See, KRS 342.710(1).
Whether a claimant retains the ability
to return to work at a wage equal to or
greater than her pre-injury wage is a
question of fact for the ALJ. A claimant in
a workers’ compensation action has the burden
of proving his or her entitlement to benefits
under Chapter 342. Snawder v. Stice,
Ky.App., 576 S.W.2d 276 (1979). Where the
party who bears the burden of proof is
unsuccessful before the ALJ, the question on
appeal is whether the evidence compels a
different result. Wolf Creek Collieries v.
Crum, Ky.App., 673 S.W.2d 735 (1984).
Compelling evidence is defined as evidence
that is so overwhelming no reasonable person
could reach the same conclusion as the ALJ.
REO Mechanical v. Barnes, Ky.App., 691 S.W.2d
224 (1985). It is not enough for Olson to
show there is merely some evidence that would
support a contrary conclusion. McCloud v.
Beth-Elkhorn Corp., Ky., 514 S.W.2d 46
(1974). So long as the ALJ’s decision is
supported by any evidence of substance, it
cannot be said the evidence compels a
different result. Special Fund v. Francis,
Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641 (1986). The ALJ, as fact
finder, has the sole authority to determine
the weight, credibility, substance, and
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, Ky., 695
S.W.2d 418 (1985).
The evidence before the ALJ indicated
that although Olson was injured on May 22,
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1996, she continued to work in her normal and
customary job position until she voluntarily
resigned in January 1998. Dr. Shea assessed
no impairment attributable to Olson’s neck,
shoulder, arms, and hands. Furthermore, he
made no reference that any impairment rating
assessed to her low back condition was in
accordance with the AMA Guides. Dr.
Guarnaschelli likewise expressed no opinions
with regard to work restrictions. Only Dr.
Hargadon assessed an AMA impairment rating.
However, he, too, prescribed no restrictions
with regard to Olson’s ability to perform her
occupational duties.
Since the ALJ is entitled to draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence, we
conclude that it was within his discretion to
conclude that Olson retains the capacity,
even after her injury, to return to work at
an equal or greater wage than her pre-injury
wage. Jackson v. General Refractories
Company, Ky., 581 S.W.2d 10 (1979). We also
hold that the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Shea’s
impairment rating and conclusion that Olson’s
alleged lumbar complaints are not work
related is reasonable and supported by the
evidence.
Where the evidence is conflicting, the
ALJ may choose whom and what to believe.
Pruitt v. Bugg Brothers, Ky., 547 S.W.2d 123
(1977). The ALJ may choose to believe parts
of the evidence and disbelieve other parts,
even when it comes from the same witness or
the same party’s total proof. Caudill v.
Maloney’s Discount Stores, Ky., 560 S.W.2d 15
(1977). Furthermore, this Board may not
substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ
in matter involving the weight to be afforded
the evidence in questions of fact. See KRS
342.285(2).
We agree with the Board’s discussion quoted above and
adopt it as our own.
We also believe the Board’s reasoning is
supported by recent case law.4
This Court in Ashland Exploration
4
See also Whittaker v. Johnson, Ky., 987 S.W.2d 320 (1999);
and Whittaker v. Robinson, Ky., 981 S.W.2d 118 (1998).
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Inc. v. Tackett,5 observed that “[a]s with other 1994 amendments
to the Act, KRS 342.730(1)(b) was aimed at curbing economic
abuses of the workers’ compensation system.
Thus, the
Legislature intended to limit the amount of workers’ compensation
benefits an able-bodied claimant may receive if he, at least,
returns to work at his pre-injury wages and is physically capable
of remaining in the job he returns to permanently or
indefinitely.”
In Tackett, the claimant initially returned to
work after his injury at the same wage, but “he ultimately had to
retire because he could no longer physically handle the job.”
Unlike Mr. Tackett, the ALJ in the case sub judice did not find
that Ms. Olson had to retire because she could no longer
physically handle the job; and the evidence does not compel such
a finding.
Accordingly, the opinion of the Workers’ Compensation
Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, HARDIN
COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION:
Edward A. Mayer
Louisville, KY
R. Scott Borders
Covington, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, SPECIAL
FUND:
John Burrell
Frankfort, KY
5
Ky.App., 971 S.W.2d 832, 834 (1998).
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