ROBBIE WATERMAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
November 16, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED:
November 30, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001941-MR
ROBBIE WATERMAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS G. PAISLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-00106
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KNOPF and SCHRODER; and MARY COREY, SPECIAL JUDGE,
JUDGES.1
KNOPF, JUDGE:
On January 4, 1995, the Fayette County Grand Jury
indicted Waterman on two counts of sodomy in the first degree2
and one count of burglary in the first degree.3
At trial, the
victim, A.C., testified that Waterman broke into her home during
the early morning hours of January 3, 1995.
1
According to A.C,
Senior Status Judge Mary Corey sitting as Special Judge by
assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution.
2
KRS 510.070.
3
KRS 511.020.
Watterman hit her with her telephone handset as she tried to call
the police, tore her bra during a struggle, and then threatened
her with a pair of meat scissors.
Watterman then performed an
act of sodomy on A.C., and he forced her to perform an act of
sodomy on him.
A.C. called the police after Waterman left.
During the investigation, the police recovered Waterman’s pager
from the patio behind A.C.’s house, and A.C. identified Waterman
in a photo line-up.
Waterman took the stand in his own defense.
He
admitted that he broke into A.C.’s residence, but he emphatically
denied having committed the sodomy offenses.
On direct
examination, he admitted that he had previously been involved in
a number of other burglaries, and robberies, but he claimed that
none had involved violence.
However, on cross-examination, the
Commonwealth elicited additional information about the prior
offenses, including the fact that he had been involved in an
armed robbery.
Watterman also called several people to testify
that he had a reputation as being a non-violent and peaceful
person.
Following the close of the evidence, the jury convicted
Waterman on all three offenses and fixed consecutive sentences of
fifteen years on each of the two first-degree sodomy counts and
twenty years on the first-degree burglary count.
On July 8,
1996, the circuit court sentenced Waterman to serve a total of
fifty years in prison.
On May 21, 1998, the Kentucky Supreme
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Court affirmed the conviction and declined to review Waterman’s
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.4
On May 25, 1999, Waterman filed an RCr 11.42 motion to
vacate the judgment based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
He alleged that counsel erred by allowing him to testify, which
made it possible for the Commonwealth to use information on his
prior criminal history to his prejudice.
the motion without an evidentiary hearing.
The trial court denied
It held that defense
counsel’s action was not ineffective assistance because it was a
matter of trial strategy.
This appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, the dissent asserts that this
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
We agree with
the dissent that Section 110 (2) of the Kentucky vests exclusive
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over direct appeals from a
judgment of the circuit court imposing a sentence of death, life
imprisonment, or imprisonment for twenty years or more.
However, Williams v. Venters,5 makes it clear that a “judgment or
order denying a postconviction motion, ... , is not a judgment
‘imposing a sentence.’ Hence, an appeal from it is addressable to
the Court of Appeals”.6
Furthermore, since Williams v. Venters
was decided, our Supreme Court has taken discretionary review of
decisions by this Court involving the denial of RCr 11.42 motions
in capital cases and other cases involving sentences of more than
4
Waterman v. Commonwealth, 96-SC-622-MR (unpublished
opinion).
5
Ky., 550 S.W.2d 547 (1977).
6
Id. at 548. See also Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky.
593 S.W.2d 869 (1979).
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App.,
twenty years.7
There has been no suggestion that the Court of
Appeals improperly exercised jurisdiction in these cases.
Consequently, we conclude that this Court has jurisdiction to
review a circuit court’s order denying a post-conviction motion
which challenges a sentence of twenty years or more imprisonment.
Waterman argues on appeal that defense counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his
constitutional rights under the 6th and 14th amendments of the
U.S. Constitution and Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution.
He contends that defense counsel pursued a trial strategy which
permitted the introduction of his criminal history.
He argues
that the evidence of his other crimes was so detrimental to his
defense that counsel’s decision was constitutionally unsound and
prejudicial.
Waterman suggests that counsel could have admitted
to the burglary without introducing specific evidence of his
criminal history.
Finally, he maintains that an evidentiary
hearing was needed to settle material factual issues about
defense counsel’s trial strategy.
There is a two-prong test for ineffective assistance of
counsel.
A defendant must show both that: (1) counsel’s
performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficiency caused
actual prejudice resulting in a proceeding that was fundamentally
unfair.8
The burden is on the defendant to overcome a strong
7
See e.g. Myers v. Commonwealth, Ky., 42 S.W.3d 594 (2001);
Commonwealth v. Davis, Ky., 14 S.W.3d 9 (2000); Stanford v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 852 S.W.2d 742 (1993).
8
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80
L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); accord Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702
(continued...)
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presumption that counsel’s assistance was constitutionally
sufficient or that under the circumstances counsel’s action might
be considered “trial strategy.”9
A court must be highly
deferential in reviewing defense counsel’s performance and should
avoid second-guessing counsel’s actions based on hindsight.10
In
assessing counsel’s performance, the standard is whether the
alleged acts or omissions were outside the wide range of
prevailing professional norms based on an objective standard of
reasonableness.11
In order to establish actual prejudice, a
defendant must show a reasonable probability that absent
counsel’s errors the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.12
A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
proceeding considering the totality of the evidence before the
8
(...continued)
S.W.2d 37 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 3311,
92 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1986); Foley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d
878, 884 (2000), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S. Ct. 663, 148
L. Ed. 2d 565 (2000).
9
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. At 2065; Moore V.
Commonwealth, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1998), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 842, 120 S. Ct. 110, 145 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1999); Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905, 912 (1998), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1025, 119 S. Ct. 1266, 143 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1999).
10
Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311, 315 (1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1056, 119 S. Ct. 1367, 143 L. Ed. 2d 537
(1999); Russell v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 992 S.W.2d 871, 875
(1999).
11
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S. Ct. At 2064-65;
Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 836 S.W.2d 872, 878 (1992), cert.
denied, 507 U.S. 1034, 113 S. Ct. 1857, 123 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1993);
Harper v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d at 315.
12
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, at 694, 104 S. Ct. At 2068;
Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 981 S.W.2d 545, 551 (1998), cert.
denied, 527 U.S. 1026, 119 S. Ct. 2375, 144 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1999).
-5-
jury.13
In an RCr 11.42 proceeding, the defendant “‘must do more
than raise a doubt about the regularity of the proceedings under
which he was convicted.
He must establish convincingly that he
has been deprived of some substantial right which would justify
the extraordinary relief afforded by this post-conviction
proceeding.’”14
In the current case, defense counsel called Waterman as
a witness and placed into evidence specific information on his
prior burglary offenses.
Waterman asserts that the trial
strategy opened the door to allow the Commonwealth to introduce
information on the full range of his criminal history that
otherwise would not have been admissible.
This included
information about two armed robberies, his progression from
residential to commercial burglaries, the fact that he was
awaiting sentencing on a burglary conviction when the incident at
A.C.’s residence occurred, and the fact that he had committed
numerous burglaries since the age of 15.
He asserts that defense
counsel’s strategy allowed the prosecution to emphasize his
criminal history and diminish the value of the character
witnesses who were all unaware that Waterman had engaged in armed
robberies.
After carefully reviewing the trial proceedings, we
cannot agree that defense counsel rendered deficient performance.
13
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. At 2068-69.
See also Moore, 983 S.W.2d at 484, 488; Foley, 17 S.W.2d at 884.
14
Commonwealth v. Pelphrey, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 460, 462 (1999)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 614, 616
(1967)); Foley, 17 S.W.3d at 884.
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There was overwhelming evidence that Waterman committed a
burglary by breaking into A.C.’s residence, but no conclusive
evidence of the sodomies.
Defense counsel attempted to attack
A.C.’s credibility and buttress Waterman’s credibility.
Counsel
stated during closing argument that she intentionally called
Waterman to testify to give his side of the story because jurors
tend to sympathize with the crime victim.
She also stated that
she presented specific evidence on Waterman’s criminal history to
show that his method of operation was consistent with his version
of the incident.
Counsel emphasized that Waterman’s history was
primarily that of a burglar who attempted to avoid confrontation
with the residents, and not that of a violent criminal. The
character witnesses supported this point.
Undoubtedly, defense counsel’s strategy contained
certain risks.
Calling the defendant as a witness, especially
one with Waterman’s extensive criminal background, necessarily
exposes the defense to various attacks by the prosecution.
Defense counsel attempted to use Waterman’s willingness to
testify and his criminal history to his advantage by arguing to
the jury that Waterman wanted to be forthcoming and that he had
acted in conformity with his past behavior.
On the other hand,
the prosecution not unexpectedly emphasized the robbery offenses
and the increasing seriousness of his criminal acts.
In adopting the policy of a strong presumption that a
defense counsel acted properly, the court in Strickland v.
Washington stated, “There are countless ways to provide effective
assistance in any given case.
Even the best criminal defense
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attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same
way.”15
The Court indicated that counsel must there for be given
wide latitude in making tactical decisions.16
Waterman suggests that defense counsel could have
pursued a strategy whereby Waterman admitted the burglary without
opening the door to evidence of his other crimes.
explain how this would have been accomplished.
He fails to
In order to lend
credibility to his denial of the allegations of sodomy and to
counter A.C.’s detailed description of the incident, it was
necessary for Waterman to testify.
Despite the obvious risks
inherent in this strategy, we cannot say that defense counsel’s
balancing of its advantages and disadvantages was objectively
unreasonable or outside the wide range of competent performance
under the circumstances.
Because Waterman failed to demonstrate
deficient performance we need not determine whether he satisfied
the second prong of the Strickland test involving actual
prejudice.17
Against this result, Waterman cites several out-ofstate cases in which counsel’s failure to exclude evidence of the
15
466 U.S. at 689, 104. S. Ct. at 2065; See also Baze v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 23 S.W.3d 619,625 (2000) (“Depending on the
circumstances, there are many ways a case may be tried. The test
for effective assistance of counsel is not what the best attorney
would have done, but whether a reasonable attorney would have
acted under the circumstances as defense counsel did at trial.”)
16
Id. at 689-90, 104 S. Ct. at 2065-66.
17
See e.g. Strickland 466 U.S. at 697 104 S. Ct. at 2069;
Brewster v. Commonwealth, Ky. Ap., 723 S.W.2d 863, 864-65 (1986).
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defendant’s prior crimes was deemed a prejudicial mistake.18
These cases are distinguishable on their facts.
They involve
situations where the defendants’ prior crimes were totally
irrelevant to the crimes being prosecuted.
Moreover, in all of
these cases, the courts found that counsel's action or inaction
were not grounded on any reasonable basis designed to advance the
defendants’ interests.
In the current case, we have found that
defense counsel had legitimate (albeit debatable) reasons for
introducing evidence on Waterman’s criminal history.
Waterman also complains about the trial court’s denial
of his motion without a hearing.
A movant is not automatically
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on an RCr 11.42 motion.19
An
evidentiary hearing is not required on an RCr 11.42 motion when
the issues raised in the motion are refuted on the record, or
where the allegations, even if true, would not be sufficient to
invalidate the conviction.20
RCr 11.42 does not require a
hearing to serve the function of discovery.21
Waterman asserts
there are material issues concerning defense counsel’s strategy
18
See Stone v. State, 17 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi, 2000); Anaya v. State, 988 S.W.2d 823 (Tex.App.-Amarillo, 1999); Commonwealth v. Costa, 560 Pa. 95, 742 A.2d 1076
(1999); Commonwealth v. Prisk, 1999 Pa. Super 342, 744 A.2d 294,
296 (1999); Green v. State, 338 S.C. 428, 527 S.E.2d 98 (2000);
Rodriguez v. State, 761 So.2d 381 (Fla. App., 2d Distr, 2000).
19
Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 901, 904 (1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1023, 119 S. Ct. 1263, 143 L. Ed. 2d 359
(1999).
20
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905, 908 (1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1025, 119 S. Ct. 1266, 143 L. Ed. 2d 361
(1999); Baze v. Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d at 628 (2000).
21
Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 41 S.W.3d 436, 442 (2001).
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which are not discernable from the face of the record, such as
whether he had been made aware of the dangers inherent in opening
up his criminal history and whether defense counsel was aware of
the risks involved in her trial strategy.
The record clearly
shows that both Waterman and counsel were aware of the potential
prejudicial effects of his criminal history.
They obviously
discussed the strategy because defense counsel told the jury in
her opening statement that Waterman would testify.
Defense
counsel explained some of her reasons for adopting this strategy
in her closing argument.
In this particular situation, an
evidentiary hearing is not necessary and the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is refuted on the record.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Fayette Circuit Court.
COREY, SPECIAL JUDGE, CONCURS.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
RCr 12.02 and Section 110
of the Kentucky Constitution provide that an appeal from a
judgment imposing a sentence of death, life imprisonment, or
imprisonment for twenty years or more shall be taken directly to
the Supreme Court.
Here, Waterman was sentenced to 50 years’
imprisonment (15, 15, 20).
Hence, any appeal from that sentence
should have been addressed to our Supreme Court.
See also
Williams v. Venters, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 547 (1977), a mandamus
action seeking a transcript to be used in attacking a life
sentence.
Therein the Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals
could hear the denial of the mandamus because it did not affect
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the conviction.
The Court reasoned: “[a] judgment or order
denying a postconviction motion, however, is not a judgment
‘imposing a sentence.’”
Id. At 548.
I understand that to mean
if the conviction and sentence itself are being attacked directly
or collaterally - like in RCR 11.42 or CR 60.02 motions, where
the sentence is 20 years or more, the conviction shall be
appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Williams v. Venters, 550
S.W.2d 547, was a mandamus action seeking records to prepare for
an attack on the final sentence.
It was not an RCr 11.42 or CR
60.02 motion which seeks to attack the judgment imposing a
sentence.
I believe we do not have jurisdiction and the appeal
should be dismissed.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Russell J. Baldani
Baldani, Rowland & Richardson
Lexington, Kentucky
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
John E. Zak
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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