THE LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY; AUSTIN J. SIMMS; MARGARET BURCH; JIM DESPAIN; v. SANDRA C. BROOKS AND WILLIAM C. JACOBS, HER ATTORNEY
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RENDERED: June 22, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
ORDERED PUBLISHED: September 7, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
MODIFIED: December 7, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1999-CA-001578-MR (DIRECT)
NO. 1999-CA-001655-MR (CROSS)
THE LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN
COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY;
AUSTIN J. SIMMS;
MARGARET BURCH; JIM DESPAIN;
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS G. PAISLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-02843
v.
SANDRA C. BROOKS AND
WILLIAM C. JACOBS, HER ATTORNEY
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
REVERSING DIRECT APPEAL NO. 1999-CA-001578-MR
AFFIRMING IN PART - REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 1999-CA-001655-MR
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, KNOPF AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
This appeal and cross-appeal stem from various
orders and judgments entered by the Fayette Circuit Court in
regard to Sandra C. Brooks’ (Brooks) claims of racial
discrimination and retaliation under Kentucky’s Civil Rights Act
(KRS Chapter 344, et seq.) against the Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Housing Authority (the Housing Authority).
In regard to
the direct appeal of the Housing Authority, we reverse the trial
court’s denial of the Housing Authority’s motion for directed
verdict and award of attorney fees, court costs, and out-ofpocket expenses to Brooks.
In regard to Brooks’ cross-appeal, we
affirm all of the orders of the trial court from which Brooks
appeals with the exception of the order pertaining to the award
of attorney fees, which is reversed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
In July 1992, Brooks, an African-American female, filed
a complaint against the Housing Authority, Austin Simms, the
Housing Authority’s Executive Director, and Margaret Burch and
Jim DeSpain, two of the Housing Authority’s managerial employees
(the individual defendants).
In the complaint, Brooks alleged
that the Housing Authority and the individual defendants
discriminated against her on the basis of race in regard to
several hiring and promotion decisions, retaliated against her
when she filed a sworn charge of discrimination with the
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights Commission, and
engaged in a pattern of behavior which led to her constructive
discharge.
The Housing Authority filed a motion for summary
judgment on Brooks’ claims for discrimination and constructive
discharge.
In support of its argument, the Housing Authority
claimed that Brooks made misrepresentations concerning her
educational background and work experience which came to light
during the discovery process.
Based on these misrepresentations,
1
We will further develop facts regarding Brooks’ claims for
discrimination and retaliation where appropriate in relation to
the arguments raised on appeal.
-2-
the Housing Authority argued that the after-acquired evidence
doctrine precluded Brooks’ claims.2
In support of its argument,
the Housing Authority attached an affidavit from Simms stating:
If I had known that Brooks had submitted
false information in her 1987 application, or
known of any of her other application
falsifications, the Housing Authority would
not have hired or promoted Brooks to any of
the positions she sought.
Brooks filed a motion for partial summary judgment on
her claim that she was initially discriminated against when she
applied for a position as an assistant housing manager and was
hired as a work order clerk.
Brooks argued that she had
established a case of discrimination in regard to this incident
and that the Housing Authority had failed to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to hire her
as assistant housing manager.
In an order entered August 10, 1995, the trial court
addressed both parties’ summary judgment motions.
In denying the
Housing Authority’s motion, the trial court agreed that Brooks
misrepresented her educational background and work experience,
but held:
The public policy behind anti-discriminatory
legislation such as that enacted in Kentucky
is two-fold involving both deterrence and
compensation for injuries suffered as a
result of discrimination. In discussing the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
[citation omitted], the Supreme Court stated:
2
Under that doctrine, an employer’s discovery of employee
wrongdoing during litigation of an employer’s claim for
discrimination which is of such a nature that the employer would
have discharged the employee had it known of the misconduct at
the time it occurred acts as a bar to an employee’s charges of
discrimination.
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“[i]t would not accord with this scheme if
after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing that
would have resulted in termination operates,
in every instance, to bar all relief for an
earlier violation of the Act.” McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 130 L.Ed. 2d
852, 861 (1995). [Footnote omitted.] The
purpose of such legislation in exposing and
deterring discrimination is met even if the
Plaintiff comes to the Court with unclean
hands. Yet, the public policy of encouraging
applicants to be truthful should be afforded
weight as well. The Court finds that it is
not in the position of having to choose
between the two. The goals of both can be
furthered, not by using the after-acquired
evidence as a bar to the discrimination
charge in the present case, but by
considering it in limiting and fashioning an
appropriate remedy in this case should the
Plaintiff prevail on the merits.
The proper boundaries of remedial
relief in the general class of
cases where, after termination, it
is discovered that the employee has
engaged in wrongdoing must be
addressed by the judicial system in
the ordinary course of further
decisions, for the factual
permutations and the equitable
considerations they raise will vary
from case to case. We do not
conclude that either, and as a
general rule in cases of this type,
neither reinstatement nor front pay
is an appropriate remedy. It would
be both inequitable and pointless
to order the reinstatement of
someone the employer would have
terminated, and will terminate, in
any event and upon lawful grounds.
McKennon, 130 L.Ed.2d at 863.
Therefore, this Court concludes that should
the Plaintiff prevail on the merits of her
discrimination case, the remedies of front
pay and reinstatement are foreclosed to her.
In denying Brooks’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court
stated:
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The Plaintiff is a member of a protected
class. She is an African American. She was
at least minimally qualified for the manager
position even though she did not possess the
preferred degree. It is a reasonable
assumption that had she not been qualified,
she would not have been the first choice of
the supervisor for that position. She did
not receive the manager position. As the
above-referenced memorandum of [Simms]
indicates, the position not only remained
open, but was readvertised. The position
eventually was filed [sic] by a caucasian
woman possessing the preferred bachelor’s
degree. Clearly the Plaintiff has
established a prima facie case of
discrimination.
The burden then shifts to the Defendants [to
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for its decision]. [citation omitted]
It is this burden that the Plaintiff argues
that the Defendants have failed to meet. It
is important to remember the posture of this
case as it stands before the Court now. It
is the Court’s role at this stage to
determine if the Plaintiff is entitle [sic]
to summary judgment on this claim. The Court
is not sitting as trier of fact.
When the Court determines the appropriateness
of summary judgment, it must view the record
in the light most favorable to the opposing
party resolving all doubts in favor of the
opposing party. Ky. R. Civ. Pro. 56 permits
summary judgment only where there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitle [sic] to judgment as a
matter of law. Kentucky case law has held
that summary judgment may only be granted
where the opposing party could not prevail
under any circumstances. Steelvest, Inc. v.
Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.
2d 476 (1991). Yet the opposing party cannot
sit idly by and survive a summary judgment
motion. Therefore, the narrow issue before
the Court on the Plaintiff’s motion is
whether the Defendants have sufficiently
articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for
the hiring decision in question.
Reason is defined by Webster’s as “the motive
or basis of action, decision, feeling or
belief. [sic] Webster’s New Riverside
-5-
Dictionary (2d ed. 1984). The Director has
testified that he cannot recall the reason
for the decision. Often the genuine
inability to recall is more truthful than the
self-serving response. However, the
genuineness of the response is for the trier
of fact to determine. Likewise, the cause of
the employment action is for the trier of
fact to determine. The Defendant has set
forth a sufficiently neutral statement to
survive summary judgment.
On September 2, 1997, the trial court entered an order clarifying
its ruling on the after-acquired evidence doctrine, stating:
The Court will clarify that its ruling on
August 10, 1995 was and still is that the
Plaintiff does not have the remedies of
reinstatement or front pay available to her
due to her misrepresentations. Front pay is
that award which could be given from the time
of judgment for a specified time forward.
Furthermore, under [McKennon], the
Plaintiff’s right to back pay will be limited
to the time period beginning with her leaving
the employment of the Defendants and ending
with the time when the Defendants discovered
Plaintiff’s misrepresentations in gaining
employment.
In June 1996, the individual defendants sought
dismissal of the complaint against them on the ground that KRS
Chapter 344 does not allow individuals to be held liable for
civil rights violations.
In a separate motion, the Housing
Authority and the individual defendants asked that Brooks’ claims
for punitive damages be stricken on the ground that KRS Chapter
344 does not allow for the recovery of punitive damages.
On
October 4, 1996, the trial court entered an order dismissing the
individual defendants and striking Brooks’ claim for punitive
damages, stating:
The act is clear. In all but limited
circumstances, liability extends solely to
employers. KRS Sec. 344.030(2) defines an
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employer as one with eight or more employees
and agents of the employer. The argument
that individuals can be proceeded against as
agents of the employer has been specifically
addressed and rejected by Lowry v. Clark, 843
F.Supp. 228 (E.D. Ky. 1994). Despite the
Plaintiff’s protestations to the contrary,
the Court finds Lowry to be a well reasoned
opinion.
. . . .
Also pending at this time is the Defendants’
Motion to Strike the Plaintiff’s punitive
damages claim. A discrimination claim is a
creature of statute. The remedies available
upon successful prosecution of such a claim
are controlled by statute. Gryzb v. Evans,
Ky., 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (1995). The plain
language of KRS § 344.450 does not include
punitive damages as an available remedy.
Brooks’ claims were finally tried before a jury in
September 1997.
The jury was not instructed in regard to Brooks’
claim of constructive discharge.
On September 26, 1997, the jury
rendered a verdict in favor of the Housing Authority on Brooks’
claim of discrimination and a verdict in favor of Brooks on her
claims of retaliation.
The jury awarded Brooks $40,000 for
“embarrassment, humiliation and mental distress . . . [Brooks]
suffered as a direct result of [the Housing Authority’s]
conduct[.]”
On October 17, 1997, an interlocutory judgment in
accordance with the jury’s findings and award was entered in
which the court awarded Brooks attorney fees “in such amount as
the Court shall determine upon application by [Brooks],” and
dismissed Brooks’ claims of discrimination.
On July 30, 1999,
the trial court entered a final judgment awarding a Brooks a
total of $56,810.37 for attorney fees, court costs, and out-ofpocket expenses.
-7-
As we have noted, both the Housing Authority and Brooks
have appealed from the various orders and judgments of the trial
court.
We will address the issues raised by Brooks on her cross-
appeal first followed by the issues raised by the Housing
Authority on its direct appeal, with the exception that issues
raised by both parties with regard to the award of attorney fees
will be addressed last.
BROOKS’ CROSS-APPEAL
I.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO
GRANT BROOKS’ MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT AND/OR NEW TRIAL AS TO THE
HOUSING AUTHORITY’S LIABILITY FOR
DISCRIMINATION?
Brooks contends that she was entitled to either a
directed verdict in her favor or a new trial on the issue of the
Housing Authority’s liability for discrimination based on the
fact that it did not initially hire her as assistant housing
manager in 1987 and failed to promote her to that position in
1990 and 1991.
When a motion for directed verdict is made, “the
trial court must consider the evidence in its strongest light in
favor of the party against whom the motion was made and must give
him the advantage of every fair and reasonable intendment that
the evidence can justify.”
921, 922 (1991).
Lovins v. Napier, Ky., 814 S.W.2d
The trial court cannot grant a motion for
directed verdict “unless there is a complete absence of proof on
a material issue in the action, or if no disputed issue of fact
exists upon which reasonable men could differ.”
Kennedy, Ky.App., 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1985).
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Taylor v.
“On appeal, the
appellate court considers the evidence in the same light.”
Lovins, 814 S.W.2d at 922.
In order to maintain a claim for racial discrimination,
a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that:
1) she is a member of a protected class, 2)
she is qualified for and applied for an
available position, 3) she did not receive
the job, and 4) the position remained open
and the employer sought other applicants.
Kentucky Center for the Arts v. Handley, Ky. App., 827 S.W.2d
697, 699 (1991).
This burden of proof mirrors the federal
standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnellDouglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36
L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
The fourth element of the prima facie case
can be established by showing that a member of an unprotected
class was ultimately hired to fill the position.
S.W.2d at 699, fn 1.
Handley, 827
Once the plaintiff has established a prima
facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant, who must
then “articulate a “legitimate nondiscriminatory” reason for its
action.”
Id. at 699, citing Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 428, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207
(1981).
Once the defendant has established a nondiscriminatory
reason for its decision, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
“to demonstrate that the stated reason is merely a pretext to
cover the actual discrimination.”
Handley, 827 S.W.2d at 699.
If the plaintiff’s establishment of a prima facie case is
unrefuted, judgment is to be entered in favor of the plaintiff.
Id. at 700.
-9-
Turning to the facts presented at trial in light of the
standard of review set forth in Lovins and Taylor, we note the
following.
In July 1987, the Housing Authority advertised an
opening for an assistant housing manager position in a Lexington
newspaper.
Brooks applied for the job and was interviewed.
During the interview process, Brooks was told that the Housing
Authority also had an opening for a work order clerk.
Brooks was
told that if she accepted the work order clerk position she would
be in line for a better position within the Housing Authority in
the future.
Although Brooks gave the Housing Authority
permission to consider her for the work order clerk position, she
emphasized her preference for the assistant housing manager
position.
On August 26, 1997, Simms prepared the following memo
regarding the work order clerk position which was distributed to
various Housing Authority employees, including DeSpain, Burch,
and Shirley Cook (Cook):
Because of the apparent delay in filling the
position of Assistant Manager and Work Order
Clerk, I have taken the liberty to do the
following:
Since Earl’s and Jackie’s number one
preference was the same person for both
positions, I have given Earl the authority to
hire the subject individual, Sandra Brooks.
Further, by this memo, I direct Sandra
Baldridge to readvertise the position of
Assistant Manager and to ask all of you named
above to serve on the committee. I would
further request from Sandy that the committee
be furnished with evaluation sheets and that
they be used as we interview each applicant.
You are to evaluate those who submit
applications and the top three are to be
-10-
submitted to my office for a final
determination.
Hopefully, this will delineate (sic) any
further delay.
At trial, Simms testified that it was his decision to hire Brooks
as a work order clerk.
He further testified, and Brooks agreed,
that the Housing Authority could not have hired her for both
positions.
The Housing Authority offered the work order clerk
position to Brooks and she accepted it.
At the time she accepted
the offer, Brooks was unaware that she had been the top candidate
for both the work order clerk and assistant housing manager
position.
When Brooks learned that she had been the top
candidate for the assistant housing manager position, she asked
who had been hired to fill the spot.
Upon learning that the
position was going to be re-advertised, Brooks sought to re-apply
but was told that Housing Authority policy prohibited her from
applying for another position within the Housing Authority during
her one-year probationary period.
hired as assistant housing manager.
A white female was ultimately
At the end of her
probationary period, Brooks was promoted to an accounting
position.
A new assistant housing manager position was created in
1990 and Brooks applied for that position.
As part of the
selection process, the Housing Authority used a panel of three
employees to conduct initial candidate interviews.
Brooks was
interviewed by the panel and designated as one of the top three
candidates.
Brooks next underwent a second interview with Cook,
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who was the designated supervisor for the position.
Cook
testified that after interviewing the top three candidates,
including Brooks, she was not satisfied with any of them and
sought to re-advertise the position.
At trial, Cook testified
that she did not want to hire Brooks for the position because (1)
she had concerns that Brooks did not always provided needed
assistance; (2) she was concerned that Brooks was abrupt and
abrasive with people and this could be problematic when dealing
with frustrated leaseholders; and (3) she needed someone who
could work well with the staff.
When she told Simms how she
felt, he told her it would be nice if Brooks got the position
because it would be good for other employees to see people being
promoted from within.
Simms asked Cook to take Brooks to lunch
and talk with her further to see if she could change her mind.
At Simms’ request, Cook took Brooks to lunch.
Cook
testified that the lunch was good from a conversation standpoint,
but that she was still not convinced that Brooks was the right
person for the job.
Brooks testified that at the end of lunch Cook told her
that she had the job as assistant manager.
Brooks stated that
Cook told her that Simms, who was out of town, would have to
finalize the paperwork before she could be promoted.
version of this event is much different.
Cook’s
Cook testified that
Brooks asked when she would hear something about the position or
when a decision would be made.
She told Brooks that Simms was
out of town and nothing would be done until he returned.
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Cook
denied telling Brooks that she had the job or that she offered
the job to Brooks because only Simms could hire someone.
According to Brooks, Simms returned to the office but
never contacted her about the promotion.
When she called Cook
and asked why she had not heard anything, Cook appeared to be
surprised that Simms had not contacted her.
Brooks testified
that Cook came to her desk later the same day and asked her to
come to the break room.
While on their way to the break room,
Burch stopped them and asked Cook to come to her office.
and Cook were later joined by Simms.
Burch
Brooks stated that after
meeting with Burch and Simms for approximately an hour and a
half, an upset-looking Cook told her that she was not going to be
promoted and that the position was going to be re-advertised.
Again, Cook’s version of the event is much different.
She
testified that she did meet with Burch and Simms on one occasion
when she was at the central office, and at some point during this
meeting she told Simms that she still wanted to re-advertise the
position.
According to Cook, she wanted to re-advertise the
opening because she wanted someone with a current strong
housing/property management background.
When she met with
Brooks, Cook stated that she did not tell Brooks about her
concerns about her job performance or abrasiveness.
Cook denied
being upset or near tears during this meeting.
Upon re-advertisement of the assistant housing manager
position, Brooks once again applied.
Brooks testified that she
was called into a meeting with DeSpain and Suzanne Feng, her
supervisor, and offered a lateral transfer to a new position
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which did not contain a pay raise.
Brooks refused the position
because had she accepted she would have been back on a
probationary period which would have made her ineligible to apply
for the assistant housing manager position.
Brooks completed another interview with the threeemployee panel, but was not selected as one of the top three
candidates for the assistant housing manager position.
Again, a
white female was ultimately hired to fill the position.
Cook
testified that the person hired to fill the assistant housing
manager position had three years of property management
experience before applying which Brooks did not have, and four
years of management experience immediately prior to that.
Cook
stated that while Brooks had some management and housing
experience, none of it was recent and she did not believe that
Brooks had the experience necessary for the job.
Brooks contends that the trial court should have
entered a directed verdict in her favor on her claims of
discrimination because the Housing Authority failed to rebut her
prima facie case by offering a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason as to why it did not initially hire her to fill the
assistant housing manager position and twice failed to promote
her to that position.
Based on the above-referenced facts, we
disagree.
In regard to why Brooks was not initially hired to fill
the assistant housing manager position, Simms testified that
having decided to hire her to fill the work order clerk position
he could not also hire her to fill the assistant housing manager
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position.
We believe that this explanation suffices to satisfy
the Housing Authority’s burden of establishing a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason as to why Brooks was not hired as
assistant housing manager in 1989.
[T]he burden of refuting the prima facie case
need not be met by persuasion; the employer
need only articulate with clarity and
reasonable specificity, a reason unrelated to
a discriminatory motive, and is not required
to persuade the trier of fact that the action
was lawful.
Handley, 827 S.W.2d at 700.
As explained by the United States
Supreme Court in Burdine:
The nature of the burden that shifts to the
defendant should be understood in light of
the plaintiff’s ultimate and intermediate
burdens. The ultimate burden of persuading
the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff remains at all times with the
plaintiff. [citations omitted] The McDonnell
Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary
burdens serves to bring the litigants and the
court expeditiously and fairly to this
ultimate question.
The burden of establishing a prima facie case
of disparate treatment is not onerous. The
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that she applied for an
available position for which she was
qualified, but was rejected under
circumstances which give rise to an inference
of unlawful discrimination. [footnote
omitted] The prima facie case serves an
important function in the litigation: it
eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory
reasons for the plaintiff’s rejections.
[citations omitted]. As the Court explained
in Furnco Construction Corp, v, Walters, 436
U.S. 567, 577 (1978), the prima facie case
“raises an inference of discrimination only
because we presume these acts, if otherwise
explained, are more likely than not based on
the consideration of impermissible factors.”
Establishment of the prima facie case in
effect creates a presumption that the
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employer unlawfully discriminated against the
employee. If the trier of fact believes the
plaintiff’s evidence, and if the employer is
silent in the face of the presumption, the
court must enter judgment for the plaintiff
because no issue of fact remains in the case.
[footnote omitted]
The burden that shifts to the defendant,
therefore, is to rebut the presumption of
discrimination by producing evidence that the
plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was
preferred, for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need
not persuade the court that it was actually
motivated by the proffered reason. [citation
omitted] It is sufficient if the defendant’s
evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to
whether it discriminated against the
plaintiff. [footnote omitted] To accomplish
this, the defendant must clearly set forth,
through the introduction of admissible
evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff’s
rejection. [footnote omitted] The
explanation provided must be legally
sufficient to justify a judgment for the
defendant. If the defendant carries this
burden of production, the presumption raised
by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the
factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of
specificity. Placing this burden of
production on the defendant thus serves
simultaneously to meet the plaintiff’s prima
facie case by presenting a legitimate reason
for the action and to frame the factual issue
with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff
will have a full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate pretext. The sufficiency of the
defendant’s evidence should be evaluated by
the extent to which it fulfills these
functions.
The plaintiff retains the burden of
persuasion. She now must have the
opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered
reason was not the true reason for the
employment decision. This burden now merges
with the ultimate burden of persuading the
court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination. She may succeed
in this either directly by persuading the
court that a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated the employer or indirectly
-16-
by showing that the employer’s proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-1095, 67
L.Ed.2d 207, 215-217 (1981).
The United States Supreme Court has
also recognized that “the determination that a defendant has met
its burden of production . . . can involve no credibility
assessment.”
St. Mary’s Honor Center v, Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
509, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2748, 125 L.Ed.2d 407, 417 (1993).
Based on
the foregoing authority, we believe that the reason offered by
Simms as to why Brooks was not hired to fill the assistant
housing manager position in 1987 meets the above-referenced
criteria.
Simms’ explanation gives a nondiscriminatory reason as
to why Brooks was not originally hired as assistant housing
manager.
This is all that Handley requires.
To accept Brooks’
argument that Simms’ explanation was insufficient would be
vocative of the third Handley prong which requires Brooks to show
that the reason offered for the hiring decision is pretextual in
nature.
Brooks’ contention that the Housing Authority failed to
offer a nondiscriminatory reason for failing to promote her to
assistant housing manager in 1990 and 1991 is without merit.
we noted in the recitation of facts relevant to this argument,
As
Cook articulate numerous reasons as to why she did not want to
promote Brooks, and these explanations satisfy the Housing
Authority’s burden of proof under Handley.
II.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ITS
APPLICATION OF THE AFTER-ACQUIRED
EVIDENCE DOCTRINE?
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While preparing for trial, the Housing Authority
discovered several discrepancies in the résumé
Brooks used when
she initially applied with the Housing Authority in 1987 and on
her subsequent applications for the assistant housing manager
position in 1990 and 1991.
Although the Housing Authority cited
numerous examples of Brooks’ misrepresentations in its July 1993
motion for summary judgment, we will use the ones the Housing
Authority relies on in its brief on appeal as illustrations of
the type of discrepancies which appear.
On her 1987 résumé, Brooks indicated that she had a 3.0
GPA at the University of Kentucky.
In her 1990 application,
Brooks indicated that her GPA was 2.8.
When questioned at her
deposition regarding this discrepancy, Brooks stated that the 2.8
GPA was correct, and that she had rounded it up to 3.0 on her
1987 résumé.
On her 1990 application for the assistant housing
manager position, Brooks indicated that she had completed 3.5
years at the University of Kentucky as a business major with a
2.8 GPA.
Under the column headed “Degree/Diploma,” Brooks typed
“Bachelor.”
On her résumé under the title “Educational History,”
Brooks typed “University of Kentucky, Bachelor’s Degree, Business
Administration 1983, completed 132 credit hours.”
The Housing
Authority questioned Brooks regarding whether she had a
Bachelor’s degree in her requests for admission filed in Brooks’
federal court action.3
Brooks admitted that she did not have the
3
Brooks originally filed her claims in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. This claim was later
(continued...)
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Bachelor’s degree, but referred to her 1987 application and
résumé “which reflect [that] Plaintiff had 132 hours of the 150
hours needed for a Bachelor’s degree.”
On her 1991 application for the assistant housing
manager position, Brooks indicated that she had completed four
years at the University of Kentucky as a business major.
the column headed “Degree/Diploma,” Brooks typed “BS.”
Under
When
questioned about this discrepancy during her deposition, Brooks
maintained that her résumé and application only showed that she
had “four years towards a B.S.” as opposed to a Bachelor’s
degree.
Based on these misrepresentations and others, the
Housing Authority moved for summary judgment on Brooks’
discrimination claims on the ground that the aforementioned
after-acquired evidence doctrine precluded Brooks’ claims for
discrimination.
Simms testified both by affidavit in support of
the motion for summary judgment and in court during trial that
had he known of the misrepresentations at the time Brooks
initially applied he would not have hired her, and that if he
would have discovered the misrepresentations during the course of
her employment he would have discharged her.
As we have noted,
the trial court denied the Housing Authority’s motion for summary
judgment, but did rule that Brooks’ misrepresentations precluded
her from seeking front pay and reinstatement in line with
3
(...continued)
voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.
-19-
McKennon.
Because of this ruling, Brooks’ claim for damages for
constructive discharge was not submitted to the jury.
Brooks contends that under McKennon, the Housing
Authority bore the burden of proving that she made the
misrepresentations of which it complained and that the trial
court relieved the Housing Authority from meeting its burden by
the following language contained in a footnote to its order of
August 10, 1995:
The Court refuses to embroil itself in the
semantics of determining exactly what
misrepresentations were made, the extent of
such misrepresentations, and the defendant’s
prior knowledge of the misrepresentations.
It suffices to say, misrepresentations were
made.
We disagree.
In McKennon, the United States Supreme Court described
the employer’s burden of proof under the after-acquired evidence
doctrine as follows:
Where an employer seeks to rely upon afteracquired evidence of wrongdoing, it must
first establish that the wrongdoing was of
such severity that the employee in fact would
have been terminated on those grounds alone
if the employer had known of it at the time
of the discharge.
McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362-363, 115 S.Ct. at 886-887, 130 L.Ed.2d
at 864.
The Housing Authority presented evidence of
misrepresentations and that it would have terminated Brooks had
it learned of the misrepresentations during the course of her
employment.
The fact that the trial court agreed that
misrepresentations were made was not improper, given the evidence
contained in the résumé and applications, Brooks’ response to the
-20-
requests for admissions, and Brooks’ deposition testimony.
Therefore, the trial court’s application of the after-acquired
evidence doctrine was not erroneous.
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO
USE BROOKS’ TENDERED JURY INSTRUCTION IN
REGARD TO HER DISCRIMINATION CLAIM?
Brooks maintains that in cases where the plaintiff
seeks to prove discrimination by circumstantial evidence, the
plaintiff is entitled to a jury instruction “in accordance with
the 3-stage format of . . . Handley.”
Specifically, Brooks
argues that the jury should have been instructed to find in her
favor if it was satisfied that the Housing Authority did not give
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its employment
decisions and if she has shown that she was a member of a
protected class, that she was qualified to fill the position,
that she did not receive the position, and that the position
remained open and was ultimately filled by a member of an
unprotected class.
We disagree.
As the Housing Authority points out in its brief on
appeal, the provisions in Handley on which Brooks relies are
burden-shifting presumptions.
“In Kentucky, jury instructions do
not include evidentiary presumptions.”
Meyers v. Chapman
Printing Co., Inc., Ky., 840 S.W.2d 814, 824 (1992).
Such presumptions alter the burden of going
forward with the evidence, and this may
result in a directed verdict in the absence
of countervailing evidence, but the jury
instructions should be framed only to state
what the jury must believe from the evidence
in order to return a verdict in favor of the
party who bears the burden of proof.
Meyers, 840 S.W.2d at 824.
-21-
IV.
WAS IT ERRONEOUS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
DISMISS BROOKS’ CLAIMS OF RETALIATION
AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS?
Brooks alleges that:
Because KRS 344.280 proscribes retaliatory
conduct by a “person,” and because “person”
is defined by KRS 344.010 as, inter alia,
“one (1) or more individuals,” and because
Simms, Burch, and DeSpain are “individuals”
and therefore “persons” within the meaning of
KRS 344.280, the trial court should not have
dismissed Brooks’ retaliation claim against
them.
We find that this argument is not properly preserved for our
review because it was not presented to the trial court.
When the individual defendants moved for summary
judgment on Brooks’ claims against them, they argued that KRS
Chapter 344 does not allow individuals to be held liable for
civil rights violations.
In responding to the argument of the
individual defendants, Brooks only referred to Kentucky’s general
discrimination provisions and raised no argument pertaining to
KRS 344.280.
Because an argument not raised before the trial
court cannot be considered on appeal, we will not address this
argument.
Lawrence v. Risen, Ky.App., 598 S.W.2d 474, 476
(1980).
V.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO
SUBMIT BROOKS’ CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE
DAMAGES TO THE JURY?
Brooks argues that the trial court improperly refused
to submit her claim for punitive damages to the jury.
Because we
have held that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the
Housing Authority’s motion for directed verdict on Brooks’
retaliation claim, we need not address this argument.
-22-
Having considered all of the arguments raised by Brooks
in her cross-appeal with the exception of her arguments
pertaining to attorney fees, the decisions of the trial court
from which Brooks complains are affirmed.
THE HOUSING AUTHORITY’S DIRECT APPEAL
Aside from an argument pertaining to attorney fees
which we will address at the end of this opinion, the only
argument the Housing Authority raises on direct appeal is that
the trial court erred in refusing to grant a directed verdict in
its favor in regard to Brooks’ claim of retaliation.
We will
first address Brooks’ contention that this issue was not properly
preserved for our review.
Brooks maintains that when the Housing Authority moved
for a directed verdict at the close of her case, it did not
assert that Brooks failed to show that its reason for treating
Brooks as it did following her filing of the sworn claim of
discrimination with the Commission was pretextual in nature.
Based on this fact, Brooks contends that the Housing Authority’s
mere renewal of its motion for directed verdict “in general” at
the close of all evidence was not sufficient to preserve this
alleged error for our review.
If this is truly what happened,
then we may have been persuaded to agree with Brooks.
However, a
review of the Housing Authority’s motions on the videotape of the
trial shows that there is more to this story which Brooks fails
to take into consideration.
When the Housing Authority made its motion for directed
verdict at the conclusion of Brooks’ case in chief, the trial
-23-
court indicated that it would take the motion under advisement.
At the close of all evidence, counsel for the parties retired to
the judge’s chambers to discuss the jury instructions.
At the
outset, the trial court asked if there were any motions to be
made at the conclusion of the evidence.
Counsel for the Housing
Authority then reminded the trial court that it had not yet ruled
on its initial motion for directed verdict.
In response to this
observation, the trial court indicated that one of the issues to
be decided was whether the actions Brooks alleged to have
occurred after her filing of the sworn charge with the Commission
were sufficient to rise to the level of retaliation.
The trial
court stated that in its opinion, the actions Brooks complained
of were sufficient under Handley to support a claim for
retaliation and overruled the motion for directed verdict.
After
making this ruling, the trial court asked counsel for the Housing
Authority if it wished to renew its motion for directed verdict
in general.
When counsel for the Housing Authority responded in
the affirmative, the trial court denied its motion.
We agree with the Housing Authority that based on the
foregoing, its renewal “in general” of its motion for directed
verdict preserved this issue for our review.
The trial court
clearly stated that it believed Brooks showed evidence of conduct
on the Housing Authority’s behalf which would warrant submission
of Brooks’ claims for retaliation to the jury.
Faced with this
finding on behalf of the trial court before counsel for the
Housing Authority had an opportunity to make its second motion
for directed verdict, we believe that the Housing Authority’s
-24-
renewal of its motion in general was sufficient to preserve this
issue for our review.
The Housing Authority claims that the trial court erred
in failing to grant its motion for directed verdict because: (1)
Brooks presented no evidence of any act constituting adverse
employment action on behalf of the Housing Authority or severe or
pervasive harassment on behalf of a supervisor; (2) that Brooks
failed to establish a causal connection between Brooks’ protected
activity and any alleged adverse employment action on behalf of
the Housing Authority; and (3) even if Brooks established a prima
facie case of retaliation, she did not prove that the Housing
Authority’s articulation of a non-retaliatory reason for its
action was pretextual in nature.
We will begin our discussion of the Housing Authority’s
argument by analyzing the evidence in light of the standards we
have previously discussed under Lovins and Napier.
As we
previously indicated, Brooks filed her sworn charge of
discrimination with the Commission on July 2, 1991.
Brooks
alleged that shortly after filing her sworn complaint, she was
periodically sent to work in the maintenance area of the Housing
Authority’s warehouse in July, August, September, and October of
1991.
In late October 1991, Brooks wrote a note to Feng
advising her that an investigator from the Commission would be
coming to interview her and asking Feng to be truthful when she
spoke with the investigator.
On November 8, 1991, approximately
one week after Brooks informed Feng of the pending investigation,
-25-
Brooks was called to a meeting in the board room by DeSpain.
Feng and Alan Sisk from personnel were also in attendance.
Both
parties dispute what occurred at this meeting, however, in light
of the standard of review for directed verdict, we will accept
Brooks’ statement of what occurred.
According to Brooks, the meeting was very adversarial
in nature.
When Brooks asked if everything was “OK,” DeSpain
stated that he was in charge of the meeting and that if she said
anything he did not like he would write her up for
insubordination and fire her.
DeSpain proceeded to tell Brooks that on November 7,
1991, he observed her reading a newspaper at the receptionist’s
desk for 25-30 minutes immediately prior to her lunch break.
According to DeSpain, after Brooks finished reading the paper she
proceeded to take her entire lunch break.
DeSpain also told
Brooks that on the same day he observed her talking with a man
outside the building for an extended period of time during work
hours.
DeSpain then accused Brooks of making an accounting error
on a HUD report which could have cost the Housing Authority
thousands of dollars.
When Brooks told DeSpain that in reality
she had found the error on a form which he had principally
prepared and brought the error to his attention, DeSpain became
angry and “slapped” his hand back and forth at her.
Although
DeSpain did not physically touch Brooks, she testified that his
hand was so close that she could feel the hairs on the back of
his fingers.
At that point, Brooks began to cry and asked to
leave the room.
-26-
When Brooks returned to the meeting, Simms was present.
When Simms asked Brooks what had occurred, she told him that
DeSpain was making false accusations.
After discussing DeSpain’s
concerns, Simms allegedly told Brooks that she should get
permission from her supervisor to leave her desk for any reason.
When Brooks asked Simms if other employees were required to
obtain permission to leave their desks, Simms told her not to
worry about anyone else.
Although Simms denied telling Brooks to
obtain permission to leave her desk, there was no dispute that
following the meeting Brooks did not leave her desk for any
reason without asking Feng’s permission to do so.
As a result of
the meeting of November 8, 1991, Brooks filed a sworn charge of
retaliation with the Commission on November 14, 1991.
Brooks testified that one day when she was preparing to
leave her desk to go on break, she saw the Sheriff come into the
Housing Authority to serve Simms with her federal complaint.
Before Brooks’ break was over, Feng came into the break room and
told her that her break was over.
Brooks accompanied Feng to her
office, where Feng told her that Sisk had just shortened her
break time from fifteen minutes to ten.
Under KRS 344.280, it is an unlawful practice:
To retaliate or discriminate in any manner
against a person because he has opposed a
practice declared unlawful by this chapter,
or because he has made a charge, filed a
complaint, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in any
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this chapter.
KRS 344.280(1).
In addressing the burden of proof necessary to
establish a claim for retaliation, Handley states:
-27-
The McDonnell-Douglas scheme [for
discrimination] is, in a modified version,
applicable to retaliation claims. The
plaintiff, in making out a prima facie case,
must show that 1) she engaged in a protected
activity, 2) she was disadvantaged by an act
of her employer, and 3) there was a causal
connection between the activity engaged in
and the employer’s act. Again, if the
employer articulates a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the decision, the
employee must show that “but for” the
protected activity, the adverse action would
not have occurred.
Handley, 827 S.W.2d at 701, citing DeAnda v. St. Joseph Hospital,
671 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1982).
The Housing Authority contends
that Brooks did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation
because Brooks failed to “present evidence of any act
constituting adverse employment action or pervasive retaliatory
harassment by a supervisor on the part of the Housing Authority.”
Brooks argues that the fact that (1) she was required to do
intermittent work at the warehouse immediately after the filing
of her sworn charge with the Commission; (2) she was required to
obtain permission to leave her desk for any reason from her
supervisor; and (3) her breaks were shortened from fifteen
minutes to ten minutes were sufficient to prove that she was
“disadvantaged by an act of her employer” as required by Handley.
Aside from stating that a plaintiff must show that she
was “disadvantaged by an act of her employer” in order to set
forth a prima facie case of retaliation, Handley is silent as to
what constitutes a disadvantageous act.
Because of the
similarities between KRS Chapter 344 and Title VII of the federal
civil rights act, it is permissible to seek guidance from federal
-28-
case law in rendering decisions on claims brought under KRS
Chapter 344.
Handley, 827 S.W.2d at 699.
The Sixth Circuit has recently ruled that a Title VII
plaintiff must show that the defendant “took adverse employment
action against the plaintiff or that the plaintiff was subject to
severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment by a supervisor” in
order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
Morris v.
Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000).
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that “Title VII was designed to
address ultimate employment decisions, not to address every
decision made by employers that arguably might have some
tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions.”
Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-782 (5th Cir. 1995.)
Dollis v.
In so ruling, the
Fifth Circuit noted that ultimate employment decisions are those
concerned with hiring and discharging, promoting, compensating,
and granting leave.
Dollis, 77 F.3d at 782.
See also Matteen v.
Eastman Kodak Company, 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997); and Messer
v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130 (5th Cir. 1997).
The Eighth Circuit
reached a similar decision, stating that “while the action
complained of may have . . . a tangential effect on [a
plaintiff’s] employment, [it must] rise to the level of an
ultimate employment decision intended to be actionable under
Title VII.”
Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th
Cir. 1997).
While we realize that other federal circuit and
district courts have adopted a lesser standard in evaluating
whether an employer’s allegedly retaliatory conduct constitutes
-29-
adverse employment action, we believe that we should apply the
“ultimate employment decision” standard in determining whether a
plaintiff has been “disadvantaged by an act of her employer.”
As
support for our decision, we adopt the reasoning set forth by the
Third Circuit in Robinson v. City of Pittsburg, 120 F.3d 1286
(3rd Cir. 1997).
Retaliatory conduct other than discharge
or refusal to rehire is . . . proscribed by
Title VII only if it alter the employee’s
“compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment,” deprives him or
her of “employment opportunities,” or
“adversely affects his [or her] status as an
employee.” It follows that “not everything
that makes an employee unhappy” qualifies as
retaliation, for “[o]therwise, minor and even
trivial employment actions that ‘an
irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee’ did
not like would form the basis of a
discrimination suit.” Smart v. Ball State
University, 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir.
(1996), (quoting Williams v. Bristol-MyersSquibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir.
1996)).
Courts have operationalized the
principle that retaliatory conduct must be
serious and tangible enough to alter an
employee’s compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment into the
doctrinal requirement that the alleged
retaliation constitute “adverse employment
action.” [citations omitted] Accordingly,
just as we concluded that a quid pro quo
plaintiff must show a “quo” that is serious
enough to alter his or her “compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges” of
employment, we hold that the “adverse
employment action” element of a retaliation
plaintiff’s prima facie case incorporates the
same requirement that the retaliatory conduct
rise to the level of a violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 200e-2(a)(1) or (2). [footnote omitted].
Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300-1301.
-30-
Applying the foregoing standard to the case at hand,
even if we accept Brooks’ allegations as to what occurred after
she filed her sworn charge with the Commission, she has failed to
prove that she was disadvantaged by the Housing Authority.
At
best, Brooks has shown that she was required to occasionally work
in the warehouse, that she was required to get permission from
her supervisor to leave her desk for any reason, that she was
subjected to one meeting where DeSpain “slapped” at her without
making physical contact and falsely accused her of making
accounting errors and being away from her desk for long periods
of time for reasons unrelated to her job, and that her breaks
were shortened from fifteen minutes to ten.
Brooks made no
allegation that she was terminated, demoted, subjected to a
decease in compensation or benefits, denied leave, or subjected
to any other adverse employment action as a result of the filing
of her sworn charge with the Commission.
Because the activities
of which Brooks complains do not rise to the level of adverse
employment action as detailed above, Brooks has failed to make a
prima facie showing of retaliation and the trial court erred in
refusing to direct a verdict in favor of the Housing Authority.
-31-
ATTORNEY FEES
As we have previously noted, the trial court awarded
Brooks a total of $56,810.37 in attorney fees, court costs, and
out-of-pocket expenses as a result of her success in regard to
her claim for retaliation.
On appeal, both parties raise several
arguments in regard to the amount of attorney fees awarded.
Because we have found that the trial court erred in failing to
grant a directed verdict in favor of the Housing Authority in
regard to Brooks’ claims of retaliation, it necessarily follows
that she is not entitled to an award of attorney fees.
All orders challenged by Brooks in her cross-appeal are
affirmed with the exception of the trial court’s award of
attorney fees.
In regard to the Housing Authority’s direct
appeal, the trial court’s denial of the Housing Authority’s
motion for directed verdict is reversed, as is the trial court’s
award of attorney fees, and this matter is remanded to the trial
court with instructions to enter a directed verdict in favor of
the Housing Authority.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANTS:
Philip C. Eschels
Louisville, KY
William Jacobs
Lexington, KY
Winifred L. Bryant
Lexington, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES:
Philip C. Eschels
Louisville, KY
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