DEBBIE PFANNENSCHMIDT (NOW RICHARDSON) AND ALLEN K. GAILOR v. JOHN M. PFANNENSCHMIDT
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RENDERED:
April 27, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001410-MR
DEBBIE PFANNENSCHMIDT (NOW RICHARDSON)
AND ALLEN K. GAILOR
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE DENISE CLAYTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 88-CI-000706
v.
JOHN M. PFANNENSCHMIDT
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, KNOPF, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Debbie Richardson (formerly Pfannenschmidt)
appeals from December 7, 1998, and May 18, 1999, orders of the
Jefferson Family Court denying her motion for child-support
arrearages allegedly due from her former husband, John
Pfannenschmidt.
Debbie’s claim is based on a 1992 ruling of this
Court that John’s support obligation be recalculated to reflect
the support of two children rather than one.
The trial court
ruled that Debbie’s delay in asserting her right precluded the
retroactive application of this Court’s 1992 order.
Persuaded
that claims for child support generally are not barred by the
claimant’s delay, we reverse and remand.
In October 1990, a decree of dissolution ended the
Pfannenschmidts’ marriage of nearly eleven years.
had two children.
The couple had
The decree awarded custody of the children to
Debbie and ordered John to pay child support in the amount of
$826.00 per month.
In April 1991, Debbie and John filed
competing motions to modify John’s support obligation.
The trial
court granted John’s motion to reduce the obligation, but, by
awarding the amount of support stipulated in the guidelines1 for
one child ($418.00) instead of two, it entered a larger reduction
than it should have.
Debbie appealed, and in Pfannenschmidt v.
Pfannenschmidt,2 this Court affirmed the judgment in all other
respects, but remanded so that the erroneous award of child
support could be recalculated.
The mandate was filed in the circuit court on October
23, 1992.
Debbie promptly moved for an order giving effect to
the Court of Appeals’ judgment, but before the trial court could
act, she remanded the motion, her counsel explaining in a letter
to the court that the parties were “endeavoring to settle all
matters between them.”
“If the parties cannot fully agree to the
balance of claims made,” counsel’s letter continued, “they will
motion the court.”
Although Debbie denies it, John claims that
the parties did in fact agree that he would pay some but not all
of the increase that would have resulted from a recalculation.
In any event, Debbie did not seek implementation of
this Court’s order until September 1998, nearly six years later.
1
KRS 403.212.
2
No. 91-CA-001803-MR (rendered 10/2/92; final 10/23/92).
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At that time, she sought the difference (allegedly about
$2,000.00) between what John had actually paid from April 1991 to
September 1998 and what he would have owed during that period had
his obligation been recalculated as ordered.
In denying Debbie’s
motion, the court relied on the general rule that child-support
orders are not to be modified retroactively.
Although it is true
that modified support orders can be and usually are given effect
as of the date of the motion raising the issue, the court
believed that in this case counsel’s 1992 letter removing the
matter from the active docket and the substantial delay following
that letter had broken the connection with the April 1991
motions.
Debbie’s 1998 motion raised what was essentially a new
matter, according to the court, for which there could only be
prospective relief.
Apparently prospective relief was not
appropriate either, for the court noted that by an earlier order
it had abated John’s support obligation.
In effect, the trial
court ruled that this Court’s 1992 mandate has become moot.
Debbie maintains that the trial court erred by refusing to
correct John’s support obligation as of April 1991 and by failing
to measure his arrearages from that time until September 1998
accordingly.
We agree.
It is well established in Kentucky that the parties to
a child-support order may modify its provisions (prospectively)
by private agreement, without the intervention of a court, but
they do so at some risk.
A court will enforce such a private
agreement between parents if, but only if, it meets certain
requirements.
The agreement must exist, of course, and its
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existence and terms must be proven with reasonable certainty.
must be fair and equitable in the circumstances.
It
And there must
be a reasonable likelihood that it would have been approved by a
court if, at the time it was made, it had been the basis of a
proper motion to modify the existing order.3
If a court
determines that an alleged private agreement modifying a support
order either does not exist or is otherwise unenforceable, an
obligor under the order will be held to the order’s terms,4 and
this is so regardless of how long (short of the fifteen-year
statute of limitations) the obligee challenging the agreement has
acquiesced in the purported modification.
A custodian’s laches
has been held not to bar the assertion of what is primarily the
child’s right to support.5
John maintains, and the trial court found, that, in
November 1992, he and Debbie agreed to change his support
obligation from the $418.00 per month the trial court had
erroneously ordered to $519.00 or $520.00 per month.
There is no
dispute that this amount is less than his obligation would have
been had it been recalculated under the guidelines as this Court
had ordered.
There is also no dispute, apparently, that John
fulfilled this modified obligation.
Debbie denies, however, that
the parties truly agreed to this modification, and much of her
3
Price v. Price, Ky., 912 S.W.2d 44 (1995); Mauk v. Mauk, Ky.App., 873 S.W.2d 213
(1994); Whicker v. Whicker, Ky.App., 711 S.W.2d 857 (1986).
4
Price v. Price, supra, Whicker v. Whicker, supra.
5
Holmes v. Burke, Ky., 462 S.W.2d 915 (1971); Heisley v. Heisley, Ky. App., 676
S.W.2d 477 (1984).
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present argument to this Court concerns what she believes was the
trial court’s premature finding--without benefit of an
evidentiary hearing--that an agreement existed.
Although we
agree with Debbie that an evidentiary hearing would be necessary
if this issue were material, it turns out that it is not.
For
though the court found that an agreement existed, it also found
that the agreement cannot be enforced.
The agreement was unfair,
the court found, and unlikely to have been approved had there
been a proper motion to modify.
findings by cross-appeal.
John has not challenged these
Even if the agreement existed,
therefore, it does not provide the measure of John’s obligation
and does not shield John from Debbie’s claim.
The trial court’s
error, if any, in disallowing discovery and the introduction of
evidence on the issue of the agreement’s existence was therefore
harmless.
Under the authorities cited above, the fact that the
purported agreement is invalid means that John’s obligation is
what it would have been in the absence of the agreement.
what obligation was that?
But
Technically, an appellate court’s
mandate ordering the modification of a judgment is not selfexecuting.
[I]n a case where the mandate (based on the
opinion) directs some additional, corrective
action to be taken by the lower court there
is no final determination of the rights of
the parties [unless] and until the proper
judgments, order, etc., are prepared, signed
and filed of record in the lower court. If
anything remains to be done following the
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directive of the mandate, the litigation is
incomplete.6
In the absence of a new judgment giving effect to this Court’s
mandate, therefore, the mandate itself does not alter John’s
obligation from the incorrectly determined $418.00 per month.
John maintains, moreover, and the trial held, that Debbie’s delay
in moving for a new judgment bars her from now having John’s
obligation corrected retroactively.
We disagree.
Against the trial court’s conclusion, Debbie argues
that, because a child-support modification order is typically
deemed effective as of the date of the motion giving rise to it,
the corrected modification of John’s obligation, once entered,
can and should be given effect as of the April 1991 motions to
modify support.
We agree.
Technically, perhaps, the obligation
that preceded John and Debbie’s agreement and that revived once
that agreement was declared invalid is the erroneous one for
$418.00 per month.
Nevertheless, the obligation that in fact
prompted the agreement, and the one that should be revived by the
agreement’s failure, is the obligation implicit in the mandate
from this Court.
That mandate is still effective, and we agree
with Debbie that, despite her delay, it relates back to April
1991.
In so ruling, we are mindful that a party is free to
settle or abandon a claim at any time in the litigation, even
after appeal.7
Debbie has been found not to have settled hers,
6
Begley v. Vogler, Ky., 612 S.W.2d 339, 341 (1981) (emphasis in the original).
7
Jones v. Conner, Ky. App., 915 S.W.2d 756 (1996).
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however, and we are not persuaded that she abandoned it.
We do
not condone Debbie’s lengthy delay in seeking to have this
Court’s order implemented, but, as noted above, courts have been
extremely reluctant to find that a custodial parent has abandoned
his or her child’s right to support.
It is also true, as illustrated by Duvall v. Duvall,8
that a party’s failure to advance the litigation in a timely
manner can, in some instances, foreclose a right gained on
appeal.
Yet unlike Duvall, in which the respondent died not long
after the appellate court rendered its judgment, and the
petitioner failed to revive the action against the respondent’s
estate within the strict time limitations of the revivor
statutes,9 this case does not involve the clear breach of a rule.
Debbie’s dilatoriness does not seem to have violated any specific
time limit.
There are, of course, general time limits as well.
CR
41.02 and CR 77.02 provide generally for the dismissal of
unprosecuted claims.
Like the doctrine of laches, however, these
rules should be applied narrowly to claims for child support.
Furthermore, neither of these rules has been properly raised.
In
these circumstances, we do not believe that either of these
general rules justifies the trial court’s decision.
In short, a
remand is necessary.
Finally, Debbie also contends that the trial court
erred by denying her motion for attorney fees.
8
Ky., 550 S.W.2d 506 (1977).
9
KRS 395.275 and KRS 395.276.
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The trial court
enjoys broad discretion in ruling on such motions, and we cannot
say that its denial of fees in this case was an abuse of that
discretion.
Because this matter is to be remanded for additional
proceedings, however, Debbie is free to renew and the trial court
to reconsider a motion for fees.
In sum, we are persuaded that the trial court erred by
denying Debbie’s motion for child-support arrearages.
Debbie’s
delay in asserting it did not, as the trial court believed,
dismiss her right to have John’s erroneously determined childsupport obligation corrected.
The corrected obligation, not the
erroneous one, is what should replace the parties’ invalid
agreement.
For this reason, we reverse the December 7, 1998,
order of the Jefferson Family Court and remand for new
proceedings that give effect to this Court’s mandate of October
1992.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MILLER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Allen K. Gailor
Gailor Law Office
Louisville, Kentucky
R. Dale Warren
Louisville, Kentucky
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