AND KENNETH BROCKMAN APPEALS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 4, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
NO.
NO.
1998-CA-002828-MR
1998-CA-002829-MR
AND
1999-CA-000579-MR
KENNETH BROCKMAN
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH F. BAMBERGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-00011
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
McANULTY, MILLER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: Appellant Kenneth Brockman appeals from the
judgment of the Boone Circuit Court overruling his RCr 11.42, CR
60.02 and 60.03 motions.
We affirm.
In 1995, Appellant was convicted of robbery in the
first degree in Boone Circuit Court and sentenced to 17 years’
imprisonment.
Shortly thereafter, defense counsel filed a Motion
for a New Trial, alleging improper contact between a prosecution
witness and one of the trial jurors.
This motion was overruled
by the Boone Circuit Court and affirmed by this court in 1997.
In 1998, Appellant filed a Motion to Vacate Sentence
Pursuant to RCr 11.42 claiming ineffective assistance of counsel,
another Motion for New Trial, and a Motion to Adjudicate, Declare
and Remedy Violation of Federal Law by Prosecution Pursuant to Cr
60.03.
All three motions were overruled by the Boone Circuit
Court.
Then, in 1999, Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus and a Motion to Vacate Judgment of Conviction
Pursuant to Cr 60.02, alleging his indictment and conviction were
obtained through perjured testimony.
Court overruled Appellant’s motion.
Again, the Boone Circuit
This appeal followed.
Appellant now asks this court to review his ineffective
assistance of counsel, Cr 60.02 and Cr 60.03 claims.
We will
examine each of the Appellant’s contentions individually,
beginning with Appellant’s allegations that his defense counsel
was ineffective.
The test for proving ineffective assistance of counsel
is set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
This two-prong test requires
Appellant to show defense counsel’s performance was deficient,
and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, accord Gall v. Commonwealth, 702
S.W.2d 37 (1985).
An attorney’s performance is evaluated, “by
the degree of its departure from the quality of conduct
customarily provided by the legal profession.”
Beasley v. United
States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974), Henderson v. Commonwealth,
636 S.W.2d 648 (1982).
In addition, courts should, ”indulge a
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strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.”
Commonwealth v.
Pelfrey, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 460, 463 (1999), citing Strickland,
supra.
In support of his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Appellant makes three allegations: 1) counsel should
have reported possible juror bias to the court during trial and
demanded a hearing to determine whether members of the jury were
biased, 2) counsel should have stated an objection or requested a
jury admonition when the prosecution introduced a co-defendant’s
guilty plea in its case in chief, and 3) counsel should have
supported Appellant’s Motion for a New Trial with affidavits to
substantiate the claims of juror bias made therein.
We will begin by evaluating the claims regarding juror
bias.
Appellant submits two incidents as proof that counsel was
ineffective for failing to report possible juror bias or demand a
hearing.
First, Appellant alleges a juror and a prosecution
witness were seen talking outside of the courtroom during the
trial.
Appellant infers from this conversation that these
participants had an existing relationship and thus the juror must
have been untruthful about the nature of their relationship
during voir dire.
Second, Appellant alleges a juror was
threatened by a trial witness, the son of Appellant’s codefendant.
First we will address whether counsel was ineffective
for failing to report the out-of-court conversation between the
juror and the witness and to demand a hearing to determine if any
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jury bias resulted from it.
We believe that Appellant cannot
prove any actual juror bias based on the conversation, and thus
he suffered no prejudice from counsel’s failure to report it or
demand a hearing.
Appellant submits several affidavits to the court
claiming the victim of the crime with which Appellant is charged,
who was also a witness for the prosecution, engaged in a
conversation with one of the jurors from the trial during a
recess.
Appellant then cites KRS 29A.310(2), which states in
pertinent part, “No officer, party, or witness to an action
pending, or his attorney or attorneys shall, without leave of the
court, converse with the jury or any member thereof upon any
subject after they have been sworn.”
KRS 29A.310(2).
While a
strict construction of this rule would seem to speak directly to
Appellant’s complaint, case law in Kentucky has consistently
veered from such a narrow interpretation.
In 1998, the Kentucky Supreme Court held it was
harmless error for a witness and a juror to talk in violation of
KRS 29A.310(2) if the offending conversations were innocent and
did not relate to the merits of the trial.
Talbott v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 968 S.W.2d 76, 86 (1998), citing Jones v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 662 S.W.2d 483, 484 (1983), C.V. Hill &
Co. v. Hadden’s Grocery, 299 Ky. 419, 185 S.W.2d 681 (1945),
Canter v. Commonwealth, 176 Ky. 360, 195 S.W. 825 (1917).
It is
the responsibility of the party claiming bias to show the
statements made were indeed about the subject matter of the case.
Polk v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 574 S.W.2d 335, 337 (1978),
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citing Watson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 884 (1968).
Thus,
to violate KRS 29A.310(2), the complaining party must show not
only that a conversation took place, but that the conversation
was about the merits of the trial.
Here, Appellant has shown no more than the fact that a
conversation took place.
According to affidavits supplied by the
Appellant, none of the witnesses to the conversation heard what
was said between the juror and the witness.
One witness does
state that the trial judge admonished jurors not to speak to
anyone about the case, and there is a presumption that jurors act
in accordance with admonishments handed down by the court.
Tamme
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13, 26 (1998).
Since Appellant has not proven the substance of the
conversation, we cannot find that it violated KRS 29A.310(2).
Because there was no violation, we believe defense counsel was
not deficient in failing to report the conversation to the court
or demand a hearing.
Accordingly, we find counsel’s actions were
not prejudicial to the Appellant, and thus, the Strickland test
is not satisfied.
Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel must fail on this issue.
Appellant also asserts that since these two trial
participants were seen conversing, it necessarily follows that
the juror and witness had some type of existing relationship the
juror purposely hid during voir dire.
Appellant contends that
counsel was notified about this possible relationship, but that
he did not bring it to the attention of the trial court.
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Appellee claims the issue of the juror-witness
relationship is inappropriate for appellate review because it was
never raised at trial and is not a basis for the post-conviction
relief sought by Appellant.
Appellee’s argument.
However, we must disagree with
The question before this court is not
whether such a close relationship existed, but whether
Appellant’s counsel was deficient in not reporting the potential
relationship to the trial court once he became aware of it.
The
crux of the claim is ineffective assistance of counsel, not juror
bias.
As such, we find this issue is appropriate for appellate
review and for post-conviction relief.
Applying the Strickland test to this issue, we find
counsel was indeed deficient in failing to investigate or report
the potential for juror bias to the trial court.
As this court
has recognized, all defendants are entitled to the right of due
process of law which includes the right to an unbiased decision
by an impartial jury.
Key v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 840 S.W.2d
827, 830 (1992), citing Grooms v. Commonwealth, Ky., 756 S.W.2d
131, 134 (1988).
If an unqualified juror participates in the
verdict, the defendant’s right of due process has been violated.
Key, supra, at 830, citing Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 801
S.W.2d 665, 669 (1990).
If the defendant suspected that bias was
possible and reported that fact to his attorney, it was counsel’s
duty to at least report the information to the trial judge so he
could determine whether enough proof existed to hold an
evidentiary hearing.
Not doing so was deficient on the part of
defense counsel.
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That being said, we cannot agree, however, that
prejudice resulted from counsel’s inaction.
We would find it
presumptuous to immediately assume a close relationship exists
between two people based on a hallway chat, as Appellant has done
here.
Appellant offers no evidence in the record to show the
existence of any relationship outside of the one conversation
witnessed during trial.
Appellant essentially accuses the juror
of purposely hiding a relationship from the court during voir
dire, but he does not offer any proof to support that accusation.
Without such proof, there is no guarantee that the outcome of a
possible hearing would result in Appellant’s favor.
Therefore,
Appellant’s claim must fail.
Next, we must consider whether counsel was ineffective
for failing to request a hearing to discuss alleged threatening
behavior by a witness towards a juror, and that behavior’s affect
on the jury.
This claim stems from a question asked of the court
by a juror during trial, inquiring what time the witness (also
the son of a co-defendant) arrived home on a particular evening.
Appellant believes the juror’s question related to a
particular evening during the course of the trial.
He asserts
that the juror was followed home by someone driving the same type
of car as was owned by the co-defendant, flashing their
headlights and honking their car horn.
He claims the driver was
the witness, and that the question was asked to determine if he
could have been responsible for that behavior.
Appellee says the
question was actually asked in regards to the evening the co-
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defendant and the witness were detained and questioned by police
about the charged crime.
The video record does not resolve this issue.
Appellant’s counsel asks the judge if the question is in relation
to the evening the witness was detained, but counsel’s question
is never affirmatively answered.
However, Appellant has never
produced any evidence to show that this behavior ever occurred.
Appellant never even asserts that he relayed his fear to counsel
that jurors were being intimidated.
Without such proof or even
such notification, counsel cannot be expected to extrapolate an
inference of juror bias from an ambiguous question posed by a
juror.
Therefore, a hearing to determine jury bias was certainly
unnecessary, and the Appellant could not have been prejudiced by
the lack thereof.
Thus, his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel must fail.
Next, Appellant claims defense counsel was ineffective
because counsel did not object when a co-indictee’s guilty plea
was admitted at trial, both in the opening statement for the
prosecution and as part of the co-indictee’s testimony during the
Commonwealth’s case-in-chief.
In the alternative, Appellant also
alleges ineffective assistance because defense counsel did not
request from the court a jury admonishment regarding the
testimony.
Again, we apply the Strickland test; was counsel’s
performance deficient, and if so, did his deficient performance
prejudice the Appellant’s defense. We conclude that counsel’s
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performance was effective and his actions did not prejudice the
defense.
The Appellant relies on U.S. v. DeLoach to support his
contention that the introduction of the guilty plea was improper,
and so his counsel should have objected to it or obtained a jury
U.S. v. DeLoach, 34 F.3d 1001 (11th Cir. 1994).
admonishment.
Indeed, the court in DeLoach held that a co-defendant’s guilty
plea should only be brought out at trial, “provided that 1) the
evidence serves a legitimate purpose and 2) the jury is properly
instructed about the limited use they may make of it.”
supra at 1003.
DeLoach,
But the court goes on to say, “To blunt the
impact of ‘expected attacks on the witnesses’ credibility,’ the
Government may disclose guilty pleas of Government witnesses.”
DeLoach, supra at 1004, citing U.S. v. Countryman, 758 F.2d 574,
577 (11th Cir. 1985), U.S. v. Melton, 739 F.2d 576, 578-79 (11th
Cir. 1984) and U.S. v. Veltre, 591 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 1979).
The Commonwealth claims that very motive in introducing the coindictee’s testimony in the case at bar.
Anticipating an attack
by the defense on the co-indictee’s testimony, the Commonwealth
elected to divulge the existence of the plea agreement first, in
an attempt to “soften the blow.”
It is clear that Kentucky law does not allow a coindictee’s guilty plea to be entered as substantive evidence of
the guilt of his fellow indictees.
Commonwealth v. Gaines, Ky.,
13 S.W.3d 923, 924 (2000), citing Tipton v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
640 S.W.2d 818 (1982) and Parido v. Commonwealth, Ky., 547 S.W.2d
125 (1977).
But Kentucky courts have also recognized an
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exception to that rule for the purposes of trial strategy.
Thus,
if counsel allows the introduction of a co-indictee’s guilty plea
as a matter of strategy, the introduction will be allowed.
Tamme
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13, 32-33 (1998), citing Brock
v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 627 S.W.2d 42, 44 (1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 1009, 73 L.Ed.2d 1305, 102 S.Ct. 2302 (1982).
The Commonwealth alleges that it was a matter of trial
strategy for defense counsel to allow the guilty plea information
to come before the jury.
In fact, later in the trial, defense
counsel also made references to the co-indictee’s conviction
before the jury, apparently in an attempt to portray him as
someone who willingly put his family in jeopardy to commit a
crime.
Although we do not have the benefit of defense
counsel’s thoughts about his strategy before us, we know that
Kentucky law presumes the actions of an attorney at trial are
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Pelfrey, supra, at 463.
Therefore, we believe defense counsel’s
failure to object or to request an admonition was likely a part
of his trial strategy, thus defense counsel was not deficient in
his actions.
Moreover, we believe that based on Kentucky case
law, the information about the co-indictee’s guilty plea was
properly admitted, thus no prejudice resulted in defense
counsel’s failure to object or request an admonition.
As such,
we cannot find for the Appellant as to this issue.
Appellant also alleges that defense counsel was
ineffective because he did not submit affidavits to the court in
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support of Appellant’s motion for new trial.
Applying the
Strickland test, we disagree.
Again, while defense counsel may have been deficient in
not submitting supporting affidavits with Appellant’s motion, we
believe Appellant suffered no prejudice from counsel’s inaction.
Appellant’s motion for new trial related back to the prosecution
witness’ alleged threatening behavior directed towards one of the
jurors.
This court overruled that motion in 1997, saying
Appellant’s claims were completely unsubstantiated and
unsupported by evidence.
Appellant claims affidavits would have
been easily procured to support his motion, and says such
affidavits have been submitted to this court with this brief.
However, the affidavits now submitted to this court by Appellant
are in regards to the alleged courthouse conversation between a
juror and a different witness, and not about the alleged
threatening behavior.
Thus, the only proof presented in the
record is the question regarding what time the witness arrived
home on the night the alleged behavior occurred.
The inference
Appellant draws from that question, as we discussed above, is not
supported by evidence.
As such, Appellant still has not shown us
any proof that the alleged threatening behavior ever existed in
the first place.
Without such proof, we cannot conclude that
Appellant suffered any prejudice from counsel’s failure to attach
affidavits to the motion for new trial.
Thus, Appellant’s claim
must fail.
Next, Appellant claims he is entitled to relief
pursuant to CR 60.02 because his conviction was based on perjured
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testimony from his co-indictee.
Appellant also alleges this
testimony was “purchased” with deals made by the prosecution with
the co-indictee.
To obtain relief under Cr 60.02, the movant must
demonstrate why he or she is entitled to this special,
extraordinary relief.
Barnett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 979 S.W.2d
98, 101 (1998), citing Gross v. Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d
853, 856 (1983).
Relief should not be granted pursuant to this
provision unless new evidence, if presented originally, would
have, with reasonable certainty, changed the result.
Brown v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 932 S.W.2d 359, 362 (1996).
To support the claim that his co-indictee’s testimony
was perjured, Appellant provides affidavits from the co-indictee
and his fellow inmate at the Roederer Correctional Complex, both
apparently recanting the co-indictee’s trial testimony.
The
affidavit signed by the co-indictee was purportedly witnessed by
a corrections officer from Roederer, however, no one has been
able to identify an officer there with the same name as is found
on the affidavit.
There is also a second affidavit from the co-
indictee claiming his first recantation was untrue and written
under duress, which Appellant asserts was written only after the
co-indictee had contact with the Commonwealth’s Attorney and the
lead detective on the case.
Affidavits in which witnesses recant their testimony
are regarded with distrust in Kentucky, and typically are given
little weight.
Hensley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 488 S.W.2d 338, 339
(1972), citing Thacker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 453 S.W.2d 566
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(1970).
Mere recantation of testimony alone will not require the
granting of a new trial.
There must also be extraordinary and
unusual circumstances in existence to garner that relief.
Recanting statements will only give rise to a new trial when the
court is satisfied of their truth, and the trial judge is in the
best position to determine the truth of such statements.
An
appellate court will not take lightly a trial judge’s
determination on recanted testimony.
Thacker, supra, at 568.
The trial judge in this case overruled Appellant’s Cr
60.02 motion, saying Appellant’s arguments were unsubstantiated
and that no evidence supported such allegations.
persuaded to overturn the trial court’s decision.
We are not
Moreover, the
first recanting affidavit from the co-indictee is claimed to be
forged because no such person with the name of the witness on the
affidavit apparently exists at Roederer.
Finally, Appellant’s
co-indictee now also claims he signed that affidavit only because
he didn’t want other inmates to know he had originally testified
against Appellant in court.
Based on this information, the truth
of these affidavits is obviously suspect and as such, this
evidence, if introduced originally, would not have changed the
result of the case.
Thus, the recantations made therein cannot
be used to prove Appellant’s conviction rests on perjured
testimony, and we find Cr 60.02 relief to be inappropriate.
Appellant also alleges his co-indictee’s testimony was
“purchased” by the Commonwealth through deals made outside the
purview of the court.
He cites U.S. v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343
(10th Cir. 1998), which explored whether leniency granted to a
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witness by a U.S. Attorney violated the federal so-called “antigratuity” statute, which in pertinent part makes it illegal to
give anything of value to a witness in return for his or her
truthful testimony.
We agree with the Appellee that Appellant’s
reliance on this case is incorrect.
Singleton is based wholly on
the responsibilities of U.S. Attorneys under federal law,
therefore, it does not apply here.
We see nothing that separates
the agreement made between the Commonwealth and Appellant’s coindictee from any other plea agreement allowable by law, and as
such we do not believe the agreement serves as grounds for relief
under Cr 60.02.
Because this evidence would not have changed the
case’s result even if introduced originally, we find no merit in
this claim.
Appellant next alleges misconduct in his motion for Cr
60.02 relief on behalf of the Commonwealth’s Attorney who
prosecuted Appellant at trial.
Almost 52 minutes of Appellant’s
trial are missing from the video record.
Appellee attributes the
gaps in the record to mechanical error, but Appellant claims the
prosecutor erased those portions of the record.
He bases this
assumption wholly on a single comment overheard on the video
record and made outside the course of the trial by a detective.
The record does not even establish in what context the comment is
made, because remarks from all others besides the detective are
inaudible.
Appellant provides no other substantive evidence
anywhere in the record to support this claim of misconduct.
we find it must fail and it merits no further discussion.
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Thus
Finally, Appellant claims his conviction was obtained
in violation of federal law, pursuant to CR 60.03.
The federal
law cited by Appellant is 18 U.S.C. §201(c)(2), or the
aforementioned “anti-gratuity” law.
However, this law pertains
only to federal government, and even in light of that limitation,
many federal courts have agreed that this section does not apply
to federal prosecutors creating a plea agreement within the scope
of their authority.
Mass. 1999).
U.S. v. Medina, 41 F.Supp.2d 38, 41 (D.
Because this law does not apply to state courts, we
find Appellant’s claim has no merit.
Based on the foregoing, we find Appellant’s counsel was
effective at trial, and that Appellant’s claims under Cr 60.02
and Cr 60.03 are without merit.
Accordingly, we affirm the
decision of the Boone Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth Brockman, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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