BEATRICE WILLIAMS v. BOBBY J. BUTTREY
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RENDERED: JUNE 8, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C o m m o n w ealth O f K en tu ck y
C o u rt O f A pp ea ls
NO.
NO.
1998-CA-001072-MR
AND
1998-CA-001156-MR
BEATRICE WILLIAMS
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS HOPPER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-00448
BOBBY J. BUTTREY
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART;
REVERSING IN PART; AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by
the Laurel Circuit Court pursuant to a jury verdict and from an
order overruling Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 59 posttrial motions.
The appellant/cross-appellee, Beatrice Williams
(Williams), argues that the trial court improperly denied her a
new trial on the issue of damages.
This is also a cross-appeal
by the appellee/cross-appellant, Bobby J. Buttrey (Buttrey),
alleging that the trial court erred when it failed to give a
comparative negligence instruction and a mitigation of damages
instruction.
Buttrey also contends that the trial court erred
when it directed a verdict to Williams on the issue of past
medical expenses.
We affirm in part and reverse and remand in
part.
On September 1, 1995, Williams was riding as a
passenger in a van.
While the van was stopped at a red-light,
Buttrey rear-ended the van with his pick-up truck.
caused minimal damage to the vehicles.
The accident
Williams suffered what
was initially thought to be a minor bruise to her right knee as a
result of her knee striking the dashboard.
However, over the
following days, the pain and swelling to the knee worsened and
the knee eventually had to be operated on.
Williams filed suit
against Buttrey on June 25, 1996.
Following a jury trial, the trial court directed a
verdict on the issue of Buttrey’s liability in causing the
accident and awarded Williams $8,931.72 for her past medical
expenses.
The remaining damage issues were submitted to the
jury, which returned a verdict awarding Williams $0.00 for future
medical expenses, $0.00 for loss of future earnings, and $0.00
for past and future pain and suffering.
trial on the issue of damages.
Williams moved for a new
Buttrey moved for a new trial on
the issues of liability and mitigation of damages in the event
the trial court granted Williams’s motion, and further moved that
the trial court set aside its directed verdict regarding past
medical expenses.
The trial court denied both motions.
This
appeal and cross-appeal followed.
Williams argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied her motion for a new trial on the issue
of damages.
A new trial may be granted for inadequate damages if
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the inadequate damages appear to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice or in disregard of the evidence
or the instructions of the court.
A trial court's order denying
a motion for a new trial on inadequate damages will not be
disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous.
812 S.W.2d 497, 501 (1991).
Cooper v. Fultz, Ky.,
On appeal, the trial judge's
determination as to whether to grant a new trial is considered
presumptively correct and will be reversed only if it is clearly
erroneous.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, Ky., 976
S.W.2d 409, 414 (1998).
First, Buttrey argues that Williams waived the damages
issue because she failed to request that the trial court instruct
the jury to return to the jury room and deliberate.
We disagree.
A jury’s decision to award $0.00 for pain and suffering
represents a completed verdict and is subject to challenge as
inadequate by a motion for a new trial.
Cooper v. Fultz at 499.
The issue of inadequate damages is preserved.
A line of cases holds that an award of $0.00 pain and
suffering damages is improper and is grounds for a new trial when
accompanied by an award of medical expenses.
311 Ky. 198, 201, 223 S.W.2d 734 (1949);
Ky., 291 S.W.2d 34, 35 (1956);
Wall v. Van Meter,
Vittitow v. Carpenter,
Friar v. Webb, Ky., 394 S.W.2d
583, 584 (1965); Prater v. Coleman, Ky. App., 955 S.W.2d 193, 194
(1997).
These cases reason that, “when a jury has found that a
plaintiff has suffered physical injury in the past, there is
always a certain amount of pain and suffering involved,” Prater
at 195, and that “[i]t will not do to say the jury believed it
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proper for appellee to incur the medical expenses for nonexistent injuries.”
Friar at 584.
However, during the pendency
of this case, on January 25, 2001, the Kentucky Supreme Court
rendered an opinion in Miller v. Swift, Ky.,
S.W.3d
(2001),1 which overruled this line of cases, stating that “[t]he
law in Kentucky . . . does not require a jury to award damages
for pain and suffering in every case in which it awards medical
expenses.”
Slip op. at 4 - 5.
Miller permits a jury verdict of past medical expenses
and zero past pain and suffering.
Here, however, Williams was
injured to the extent that she was required to undergo invasive
knee surgery.
We cannot reconcile the medical testimony with an
award of $0.00 for past pain and suffering.
necessarily involves pain and suffering.
In general, surgery
It is incongruent that
a defendant could be held responsible for causing the injuries
that required surgical procedures, and yet escape liability for
the pain and suffering caused by the surgery.
It was clearly erroneous for the trial court to deny
Williams’s motion for a new trial on the issue of damages for
past pain and suffering.
We therefore reverse the trial court’s
denial of that motion, and remand the case for a new trial on the
issue of damages for past pain and suffering.
The trial court’s decision not to grant a new trial on
the issues of future medical expenses, future loss of earnings,
and future pain and suffering, on the other hand, was not
1
While this case was never officially placed in
abeyance, this panel has, in fact, been awaiting the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Miller prior to deciding the case.
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erroneous.
In negligence cases, the jury's verdict resolves any
conflicts in the testimony and also any conflicts in the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the testimony in favor of
the prevailing party.
Horton v. Union Light, Heat and Power Co.,
Ky., 690 S.W.2d 382, 385 (1985).
The role of an appellate court
is limited to viewing the evidence from a standpoint most
favorable to the prevailing party. Id.
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Friesen included
testimony to the effect that while Williams will likely
experience problems in the future with her knee, those problems
will not necessarily be related to the accident, but, rather, may
be associated with Williams’s history of obesity.
Upon drawing
all inferences in favor of Buttrey, we cannot say that the
evidence was palpably and flagrantly against the evidence so as
to indicate that its decision not to award damages for future
medical expenses, future lost earnings, and future pain and
suffering was reached as a result of passion or prejudice, and,
accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court was clearly
erroneous in denying Williams a new trial on these issues.
In his cross-appeal,2 Buttrey first argues that he was
entitled to a comparative negligence instruction because Williams
took unnecessary chances with regard to her own safety because
she had the van seat moved forward to a position where her knees
almost touched the dashboard.
According to Williams, she had her
2
The original jury verdict assessed zero damages
against Buttrey and the cross-appeal as to the original jury
verdict is effectively moot. The discussion herein relating to
comparative negligence issues and mitigation of damages issues
are included in the event the issues arise again on remand.
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seat in this position because her infant child’s car-seat was
directly behind her seat, and having the passenger seat in a
forward position made it easier to access the child-seat and care
for her child.
Buttrey’s argument that Williams was contributorily
negligent for riding with her car seat in a forward position is
based entirely on speculation.
There was no competent expert
testimony expressing that riding with the seat forward caused or
contributed to the severity of the knee injury.
Absent expert
testimony to the contrary, it could as easily be speculated that
had the seat been positioned farther back, the injury may have
been more severe.3
In summary, the record does not establish what would
have happened had Williams had her seat set farther back, and it
would have been improper to submit a comparative negligence
instruction to the jury and allow them to speculate on what would
have happened.
We discern no contributory negligence associated
with Williams having her seat set forward for the purpose of
facilitating the care of her child.
It was not error for the
trial court to deny a comparative negligence instruction, and on
remand the trial court should not submit a comparative negligence
instruction.
Buttrey argues that he was entitled to a mitigation of
damages instruction because Williams failed to follow her
3
For example, if the seat were set back, the knee may
have traveled a greater distance prior to striking the dash,
greater momentum may have been generated, and the knee may have
struck the dash with greater force, thereby causing greater
damage to the knee.
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doctor’s advice.
In support of this argument, Buttrey cites the
medical testimony produced at trial to the effect that Williams’s
condition would probably have been much better had she lost
weight and exercised.
Williams weighed 320 pounds at the time of
the accident.
A mitigation of damages instruction recognizes that it
is the duty of an injured person to exercise ordinary care not to
aggravate his injuries and damages, Carney v. Scott, Ky., 325
S.W.2d 343, 345 (1959), and that an injured person is required to
use ordinary care and reasonable diligence to secure appropriate
treatment of an injury.
145 (1980).
Deutsch v. Shein, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 141,
The tortfeaser, in this case Buttrey, has the burden
of proving that some of the consequences of the injuries
inflicted by him might have been avoided through proper efforts
and the exercise of ordinary care by the injured person.
at 345.
Carney
Damages may be mitigated only in proportion to the
aggravation of injuries by the injured person's improper conduct.
Billroy's Comedians v. Sweeny, 238 Ky. 277, 37 S.W.2d 43 (1931);
Carney at 347.
Hence the burden was on Buttrey to establish that
Williams failed to mitigate damages and, if so, the proportion of
damages that may have been avoided by the mitigation.
The trial court’s denial of a mitigation of damages
instruction was appropriate in this case.
The only deficient
conduct cited in support of a failure to mitigate instruction was
related to Williams’s failure to lose weight and exercise.
failure to mitigate instruction is aimed at ensuring that a
The
defendant is not penalized because a plaintiff fails to seek
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proper medical care and treatment following an injury.
The
general medical testimony that Williams’s condition “would
probably have been much better had she lost weight and exercised”
does not justify a mitigation instruction.
Williams has a
history of obesity and the medical testimony that her condition
would be improved if she lost weight and exercised would be true
whether she had this particular accident or not. Buttrey has
failed to identify any specific conduct relating directly to
Williams’s failure to seek medical treatment following the
accident so as to justify a mitigation instruction.
Buttrey’s final argument is that the trial court erred
in directing a verdict in Williams’s favor regarding medical
expenses.
A directed verdict is appropriate when, drawing all
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, a reasonable jury
could only conclude that the moving party was entitled to a
verdict.
Buchholtz v. Dugan, Ky. App., 977 S.W.2d 24, 26 (1998).
The trial court is required to “consider the evidence in its
strongest light in favor of the party against whom the motion was
made and must give him the advantage of every fair and reasonable
intendment that the evidence can justify.”
Ky., 814 S.W.2d 921, 922 (1991).
Lovins v. Napier,
In our review, we must
“consider[] the evidence in the same light.”
Id.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion under the facts
of this case: Buttrey was negligent in the operation of the
vehicle he was driving and his negligence caused the collision in
question.
Buttrey admitted the accident was his fault.
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He
admitted that he was distracted and ran into the back of the
Williamses’ van.
Past medical expenses associated with the knee
injury were established as $8,931.72.
As a result we affirm the
trial court in directing the verdict in favor of Williams.
Thompson v. Piasta, Ky. App., 662 S.W.2d 223, 226 (1983).
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Laurel
Circuit Court is affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in
part for a new trial on the issue of damages for past pain and
suffering.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
J. Robert Stansbury
Stansbury, Zoellers & Hudson
London, Kentucky
Wayne F. Collier
Kinkead & Stilz
Lexington, Kentucky
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