BOBBY R. ROBINSON v. ISLAND CREEK COAL COMPANY; SPECIAL FUND; RONALD W. MAY, Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 23, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1999-CA-001013-WC
BOBBY R. ROBINSON
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NOS. WC-98-00149, WC-98-00277
and WC-98-00279
v.
ISLAND CREEK COAL COMPANY;
SPECIAL FUND; RONALD W. MAY,
Administrative Law Judge; and
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, JOHNSON and SCHRODER, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge:
The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed an
administrative
judge’s
law
order
dismissing
Bobby
Robinson’s
disability benefit claims against Island Creek Coal Company and the
Special
Fund.
Robinson
alleged
impairment
resulting
repetitive trauma, hearing loss and pneumoconiosis.
from
The ALJ
determined that Kentucky Revised Statute 342.316(3)(a)1 barred, as
1
KRS 342.316(3)(a), now KRS 342.316(4)(a), states:
(continued...)
untimely, the hearing loss2 and pneumoconiosis claims.3
The ALJ
further decided that Robinson’s employment was not principally
localized in Kentucky and, thus, dismissed his repetitive trauma
claim4 as Kentucky does not provide Robinson with extraterritorial
workers’ compensation coverage. The appropriateness of the Board’s
decision affirming this dismissal is the single issue presented for
our
consideration
inasmuch
as
Robinson
has
not
appealed
the
dismissal of his hearing loss and pneumoconiosis claims.
In Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly5 the Supreme Court
delineated the applicable standard of review this Court must apply
to decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Board:
1
(...continued)
The right to compensation under this chapter resulting
from an occupational disease shall be forever barred unless a
claim is filed with the commissioner within three (3) years
after the last injurious exposure to the occupational hazard
or after the employee first experiences a distinct
manifestation of an occupational disease in the form of
symptoms reasonably sufficient to appraise him that he has
contracted the disease, whichever shall last occur; and if
death results from the occupational disease within that
period, unless a claim therefor be filed with the commissioner
within three (3) years after the death; but that notice of
claim shall be deemed waived in case of disability or death
where the employer, or his insurance carrier, voluntarily
makes payment therefor, or if the incurrence of the disease or
the death of the employee and its cause was known to the
employer.
However, the right to compensation for any
occupational disease shall be forever barred, unless a claim
is filed with the commissioner within five (5) years form the
last injurious exposure to the occupational hazard, except
that, in cases of radiation disease or asbestos-related
disease, a claim must be filed within twenty (20) years from
the last injurious exposure to the occupational hazard.
2
No. WC-98-00277.
3
No. WC-98-00279.
4
No. WC-98-00149.
5
Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685 (1992).
-2-
The function of further review of the WCB in the Court of
Appeals is to correct the Board only where the . . .
Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued
controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error
in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross
injustice.6
Robinson was employed by Island Creek for approximately
23 years.
He worked for some 17 to 18 years in Kentucky until
transferring to West Virginia and then, in 1992, to Virginia.
Robinson left Island Creek’s employment in August 1996.
Robinson
remained domiciled in Kentucky during his entire employment with
Island Creek.
Robinson alleges that he suffered work-related
repetitive trauma to his back, shoulders, knees and ankles, and he
argues these injuries occurred while his employment was principally
localized in Kentucky.
KRS
342.670
provides
the
framework
for
determining
whether an employee who is injured outside of Kentucky is entitled
to Kentucky workers’ compensation benefits. KRS 342.670 (1) states
in part:
If an employee, while working outside the territorial
limits of this state, suffers an injury on account of
which he, or in the event of his death, his dependents,
would have been entitled to the benefits provided by this
chapter had that injury occurred within this state, that
employee, or in the event of his death resulting from
6
Id. at 687.
-3-
that injury, his dependents, shall be entitled to the
benefits provided by this chapter [Workers’ Compensation
Act], if at the time of the injury:
(a) His employment
is principally localized in this state . . . .
According to KRS 342.670(5)(d):
A person’s employment is principally localized in this or
another state when:
1.
His employer has a place of
business in this or the other state and he regularly
works at or from that place of business, or
subparagraph
1.
foregoing
is
not
applicable,
2.
he
If
is
domiciled and spends a substantial part of his working
time in the service of his employer in this or the other
state . . . .
In Amax Coal Co. v. Smith,7 this Court applied KRS
342.670 to facts analogous to this case and noted that “[f]or
Kentucky’s extraterritorial coverage law to apply to an injury, the
injury must occur outside of Kentucky to a Kentucky resident who
principally works in Kentucky at the time of the ‘injury’”.
We
observed that “[a claimant’s] employment is principally localized
where he spends a substantial part of his working time in the
service of his employer in this state.”8
Robinson argues that because he spent a substantial
majority of his time working for Island Creek in Kentucky, his
employment was principally localized in Kentucky.
7
Ky. App., 748 S.W.2d 158 (1988).
8
Id. at 160 (emphasis original).
-4-
This Court
rejected this argument in Amax, finding such “reasoning to be
faulty.”9
We noted that “the language of the statutes is expressed
in the present tense.”10
Because the language is in the present
tense, we stated that “[w]e are concerned with where he [the
claimant] was at the time of the injury.”11
We also observed that
while the exposure to coal dust may have caused the claimant’s
pneumoconiosis and “he sustained many ‘injuries’ while breathing
Kentucky coal dust, and coal dust in other states,” his last
“injurious exposures” occurred in Indiana.12
Like the claimant in
Amax, Robinson spent “his last working years”13 outside of Kentucky
and, thus, his last injurious exposures to repetitive trauma
occurred
outside
controlling
workers’
and,
of
thus,
compensation
principally
this
localized
state.
benefits
in
this
decision
in
Amax
is
not
entitled
to
Kentucky
as
Robinson
Our
his
state.
employment
We
decline
was
is
not
Robinson’s
invitation to overrule Amax.
Robinson believes that his claim for repetitive trauma is
distinguishable from a pneumoconiosis claim in that the former
“takes place over a long period of time and cannot be said to have
occurred on a specific day.”
Even if we postulate, as Robinson
inferentially suggests, that pneumoconiosis does not occur over a
long period of time, nothing in the record suggests he suffered his
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
-5-
last
injurious
exposures
to
repetitive
trauma
in
Kentucky.
Additionally, if Robinson’s last injurious exposures occurred in
Kentucky, then KRS 342.670 is not applicable because the statute
applies to injuries that occur outside the state.
We
affirm
the
Board’s
decision
upholding
the
ALJ’s
dismissal of Robinson’s workers’ compensation repetitive trauma
claim as the Board has not overlooked or misconstrued KRS 342.670
and Amax, nor committed an error in assessing the evidence.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
ISLAND CREEK COAL COMPANY:
Robert J. Greene
KELSEY E. FRIEND LAW FIRM
Pikeville, Kentucky
Natalie D. Brown
JACKSON & KELLY, PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
SPECIAL FUND:
David W. Barr
LABOR CABINET
Louisville, Kentucky
-6-
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