SETTLEMENT FUNDING, LLC; AND ULYSSIS R. HARBIN, ANNUITANT AND "PROTECTED PARTY" v. COMMONWEALTH GENERAL ASSIGNMENT CORPORATION; AND COMMONWEALTH LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, N/K/A MONUMENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, "PROTECTED PARTIES"
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RENDERED: AUGUST 20, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000740-MR
SETTLEMENT FUNDING, LLC; AND
ULYSSIS R. HARBIN, ANNUITANT
AND “PROTECTED PARTY”
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-006813
COMMONWEALTH GENERAL ASSIGNMENT
CORPORATION; AND COMMONWEALTH LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, N/K/A MONUMENTAL
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, “PROTECTED
PARTIES”
APPELLEES
* * * * * * * * * *
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
The “Protected Parties”, SAFECO Life
Insurance Company and SAFECO Assigned Benefits Service Company
(hereinafter the SAFECOs) filed a motion to dismiss the appeal to
which appellants responded; appellants filed a motion to allow
amended notice of appeal and/or to substitute parties; the
SAFECOs filed a motion for leave to file reply to response,
treated as motion for enlargement of time in which to respond to
appellants’ motion; appellants responded to that motion and, in
the alternative, filed a motion to file a reply to the SAFECOs’
response to their motion.
The Court, being sufficiently advised,
ORDERS the motion for enlargement of time and the alternate
motion to file a reply be GRANTED.
The tendered response and the
tendered reply are ORDERED FILED and were considered by the
panel.
The motion to allow amended notice of appeal and/or to
substitute parties is DENIED.
The motion to dismiss appeal is
GRANTED.
Appellant, Ulyssis R. Harbin, suffered personal injury
and settled all his claims arising from any tortious conduct.
He
wished to assign his payments to appellant, Settlement Funding,
LLC (hereinafter SF) in exchange for a lump sum.
SF filed a
notice of intention to transfer pursuant to KRS 454.430.
The
SAFECOs, (the annuity issuer and the structured settlement
obligor) opposed the assignment based on a clause of the
settlement agreement.
The Jefferson Circuit Court held that the
transfer would contravene applicable contract law and denied the
application for transfer.
SF and Harbin filed a notice of appeal
from that decision on March 30, 1999.
The body of the notice of
appeal designates as appellees, “protected parties” Commonwealth
General Assignment Corporation and Commonwealth Life Insurance
Company, n/k/a Monumental Life Insurance Company.1
In their
motion to dismiss appeal, the SAFECOs contend the named appellees
have no connection to the action below or to this appeal, and
that the SAFECOs have been omitted as appellees but are
indispensable to this appeal that will affect their rights as
1
The caption of the notice of appeal merely reads: In Re: Ulyssis R. Harbin, Annuitant
and Settlement Funding, LLC, Petitioner.
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“protected parties”.
They contend the notice of appeal does not
comply with CR 73.03, which requires that the notice specify by
name all appellants and all appellees.
Since they have not been
identified as appellees in the notice of appeal, they are not
before the Court on appeal and, therefore, “there simply is no
appeal for this Court to adjudicate, and the appeal must be
dismissed.”
In response, appellants contend the notice of appeal
did not violate CR 73.03 because its purpose is to give notice to
the opposing party that an appeal of right is being pursued
against it.
Appellants rely on Blackburn v. Blackburn, Ky., 810
S.W.2d 55 (1991), which appellants contend “implicitly overruled
or modified the old rule that parties to an appeal must be
specifically named as either appellants or appellees.”
According
to them, notice is the key and CR 73.03 provides the mechanism
for inclusion of parties to an appeal.
They argue that they
satisfied the Rule by timely serving a copy of the notice of
appeal upon counsel of record for the two only parties below that
opposed the transfer, i.e., the SAFECOs, which, in addition, were
the only two parties that were not otherwise named in the notice
of appeal.
Thus, appellants conclude that, as happened in
Blackburn, the designation of the Commonwealth Companies in their
notice of appeal instead of that of the SAFECOs was a
typographical error.
Appellants further argue that, even if their notice of
appeal did violate CR 73.03, the violation would only be a
procedural one, controlled by CR 73.02(2), which extends the
-3-
doctrine of substantial compliance to violations of “other rules
relating to appeals”, one of those rules being CR 73.03(1).
They
contend that, under the current version of CR 73.02(2), the only
defect which is automatically fatal to an appeal is an untimely
notice of appeal.
Appellants’ notice of appeal was timely filed.
Although appellants note that the Kentucky Supreme Court held in
City of Devondale v. Stallings, Ky., 795 S.W.2d 954 (1990), that
the omission of a party from a notice of appeal is a
jurisdictional defect and that only the parties designated in the
notice of appeal are subject to the appellate court’s
jurisdiction, they add that this principle was changed by more
recent case law, relying on Johnson v. Smith, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 944
(1994), which established that the filing of a notice of appeal
“is not a matter of jurisdiction, but only of procedure.”
Johnson at 949.
Appellants recognize that Johnson specifically
denies application of the doctrine of substantial compliance to
the failure to name indispensable parties, but contend that the
matter is resolved if the parties were named below.
interpretation of the aforequoted language
Any other
would be illogical
since CR 73.02(2) does not include the automatic dismissal of an
appeal for a violation of CR 73.03.
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the parties’
arguments and cited authorities and is of the opinion that this
appeal must be dismissed.
It is clear that appellants’ notice of appeal violates
CR 73.03(1) and that this violation is fatal to the appeal.
SAFECOs do not appear anywhere in the notice of appeal, which
The
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distinguishes this case from Blackburn, and prohibits this Court
from treating the omission of the SAFECOs as a clerical mistake.
While the Court agrees with appellants that Blackburn emphasizes
that fair notice to the opposing party is the key, the Court
disagrees that notice was satisfied by mere service of the notice
of appeal upon the SAFECOs’ counsel of record.
Notice on counsel
who happens to represent a party is not notice to that party that
it is an intended appellee where that party was entirely omitted
from the notice of appeal.
This Court does not construe the import of Blackburn in
the expansive fashion espoused by appellants.
We believe
Blackburn created only a narrow exception applicable to the
unique facts of a situation where the requirement of notice to
opposing parties was satisfied, in spite of poor drafting of the
notice of appeal, by the actual designation of all parties to the
action somewhere in the document.2
Here, the specific
designation of the Commonwealth Companies, “protected parties” –
which have nothing to do with the case – as appellees cannot
operate as a substitute for the actual designation of the
SAFECOs, even though the SAFECOs are the only two “protected
parties” which could possibly be appellees herein.
2
In addition, the Blackburn parties’ conduct allowed the conclusion that the notice of
appeal had met its objective of fair notice. All filings made in the appeal included the names of
all the parties, and no party ever questioned having been properly designated as a party. This is
not the case here, as demonstrated by the motion to dismiss appeal. Appellants contend that the
filing of that motion is “overwhelming proof that [the SAFECOs] did, in fact, get notice.” We
disagree. The “protected parties” having knowledge of the appeal(be it through service of the
notice of appeal on their counsel, or through some other source of information) is not the
equivalent of their having legal notice of it as intended by CR 73.03, and, thus, the filing of the
motion to dismiss does not qualify as the conduct which saved the appeal in Blackburn.
-5-
The SAFECOs were omitted as parties to this appeal that
would affect their rights as “protected parties”, thus making
them indispensable as appellees.
In addition, it has been held
that the failure to specify in a notice of appeal any party the
absence of which prevents the appellate court from affording
complete relief among the named parties is fatal to an appeal.
See, e.g., Braden v. Republic-Vanguard Life Insurance Co., Ky.,
657 S.W.2d 241 (1983).
Since the Commonwealth Companies have no
connection to this case, there are, in fact, no appellees herein,
thus, “there simply is no appeal for this Court to adjudicate. .
. .”
We also disagree with appellants that, even if their
notice of appeal violates CR 73.03, the violation is only
procedural and is eligible for the remedial provisions of CR
73.02(2).
Johnson, supra, clearly maintains the principle of
strict compliance as it pertains to the failure to name
indispensable parties.
While CR 73.03(1) is one of those “other
rules relating to appeals” when the defect in the notice of
appeal relates to the failure to properly designate the final
judgment3, it is not one of those “other rules” when the defect
relates to the failure to name indispensable parties.
As the
SAFECOs correctly point out, the “[f]ailure to name indispensable
parties is a defect that makes the notice of appeal untimely. . .
.”
City of Devondale v. Stallings, Ky., 795 S.W.2d 954 (1990);
Johnson at 949.
Appellants’ notice of appeal neither timely nor
properly invoked this Court’s jurisdiction with regard to the
3
Ready v. Jamison, Ky., 705 S.W.2d 479 (1986).
-6-
SAFECOs.
The time has expired for an amendment to add or
substitute them as appellees.
Therefore, the strict
compliance/automatic dismissal provision of CR 73.02(2) shall
apply to this appeal.
It is ORDERED that Appeal No. 1999-CA-000740-MR be
DISMISSED.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: August 20, 1999
/s/ David C. Buckingham
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Franklin S. Yudkin
Louisville, Kentucky
Samuel G. Bridge, Jr.
Stephen R. Price
Louisville, Kentucky
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