HETTIE LEE JACOBS v. FRUIT OF THE LOOM; HON. ROBERT L. WHITTAKER, DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND; HON DONNA H. TERRY, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: December 17, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000581-WC
HETTIE LEE JACOBS
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. 96-91630
v.
FRUIT OF THE LOOM;
HON. ROBERT L. WHITTAKER,
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND;
HON DONNA H. TERRY, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE; AND WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF, MILLER AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an opinion and order by the
Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) affirming an opinion and
award made by the Chief Administrative Law Judge (CALJ).
We find
that the Workers’ Compensation Act as a whole, and the presumed
acceptance provision of KRS 342.395 in particular, do not offend
the constitutional doctrine of jural rights.
We further find
that the 1994 version of KRS 342.730(1)(b), which limits recovery
of income benefits to an employee who has returned to work after
an injury at equal or higher wages, is not arbitrary.
Hence, we affirm.
The underlying facts of this appeal are not in dispute.
The appellant, Hettie Lee Jacobs, was employed by the appellee,
Fruit of the Loom, as a sewing machine operator at its
Campbellsville facility.
On February 12, 1996, Jacobs fell off a
platform and injured her lower back.
She ultimately underwent
low back surgery for a herniated disc at L3-L4 and a free disk
fragment at L4-L5.
Jacobs subsequently returned to work at Fruit of the
Loom on modified duty as a ticket stamper.
During this time,
Jacobs earned a greater weekly wage than she had earned prior to
her injury.
However, nearly a year after Jacobs accepted this
position, Fruit of the Loom closed the Campbellsville plant.
Jacobs states that she has been unable to find a suitable job
since that time.
Since Jacobs’ claim arose prior to the effective date
of the current version of KRS Chapter 342, the ALJ applied the
standards set out in the pre-1996 Act are applicable.
Based on
the medical evidence, the arbitrator found that Jacobs has a 15%
permanent functional impairment to the body as a whole.
agreed with the arbitrator’s assessment of the evidence.
The CALJ
Both
the arbitrator and the CALJ believed that Jacob’s occupational
disability was considerably higher.
However, since she returned
to work at the same or greater wage than she received prior to
her injury, the CALJ was limited to an occupational disability
rating of twice her functional impairment rating, or 30%.
342.730(1)(b).
The Board affirmed.
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KRS
Jacobs now appeals to this Court, arguing that: (1) the
Workers Compensation Act, KRS Chapter 342, is unconstitutional as
a violation of the jural rights doctrine; (2) the opt-out
provision in KRS 342.395 is unconstitutional because it presumes
a waiver of her constitutional rights by her silence; and (3) the
cap on income benefits contained in the 1994 version of KRS
342.730(1)(b) is arbitrary.
These issues were presented to the
ALJ and to the Board, although neither body had jurisdiction to
consider the merits of the constitutional questions.
Blue
Diamond Coal Co. v. Cornett, 300 Ky. 647, 189 S.W.2d 963 (1945).
Jacobs also notified the Attorney General of her intention to
challenge the constitutionality of the statute.
The Attorney
General filed a notice stating his intention not to intervene in
the action.
We begin by noting that this Court is required to
follow applicable precedents established in the opinions of the
Supreme Court and its predecessor court.
SCR 1.030(8)(a).
It
has long been established that the Workers Compensation Act is
constitutional even though it may limit the amount of money and
conditions under which a claimant may recover. Workmen's
Compensation Board of Kentucky v. Abbott, 212 Ky. 123, 278 S.W.
533 (1925); Greene v. Caldwell, 170 Ky. 571, 186 S.W. 648 (1916).
In Mullins v. Manning Coal Corp., Ky. 938 S.W.2d 260 (1997), our
Supreme Court reiterated that the Workers’ Compensation Act does
not unconstitutionally restrict an injured party’s right to
recover compensation from the wrongdoer:
With regard to the appellant's argument
concerning § 14 of the Kentucky Constitution,
we are unpersuaded. The appellant attempts
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to analogize this situation with that
presented in Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533,
49 S.W.2d 347 (1932). In Ludwig, our
highest court struck down as unconstitutional
Kentucky's "guest statute" enacted in 1930.
The Court held that § 14 of the Kentucky
Constitution guaranteed an injured party's
right to attempt to recover compensation from
the wrongdoer who allegedly perpetrated the
harm. Id. The Workers' Compensation Act,
however, is not predicated upon redressing a
wrong which has caused an injury. In fact,
liability under the compensation act is not
in any way dependent on negligence, tortious
conduct, or comparative negligence. See
generally Tyler-Couch Const. Co. v. Elmore,
Ky., 264 S.W.2d 56 (1954). An employee's
right to occupational disease benefits is
purely statutory in nature and does not fall
under the ambit of § 14 of the Kentucky
Constitution. The General Assembly clearly
is free to limit application of workers'
compensation benefits as it has with KRS
342.316(3)(b). The appellant's theory of the
case would lead to the absurd result that the
General Assembly may not limit applicability
of the Act in any way.
Mullins, 938 S.W.2d at 263.
Jacobs places much emphasis on the recent Kentucky
Supreme Court opinion in Williams v. Wilson, Ky., 972 S.W.2d 260
(1998).
In Williams, our Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the punitive damages statutes, KRS 411.184 &
186.
Following an extensive discussion of the doctrine of jural
rights, the Supreme Court found that the statutes’ limitation on
recovery for punitive damages arising out of gross negligence
violated §§ 14, 54 and 241 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Jacobs
contends that the reasoning in Williams is equally applicable to
the Workers’ Compensation Act’s abolition of her right to bring a
tort action against her employer.
Although the Supreme Court’s opinion in Williams was
couched in expansive language, it was nonetheless limited to a
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consideration of the constitutionality of KRS 411.184.
We find
nothing in the text of Williams which indicates that the Supreme
court intended to overrule existing precedents regarding the
constitutionality of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Moreover, by
electing to proceed under the workers' compensation system,
Jacobs has waived any rights that she could have asserted under
§§ 14 and 54 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Edwards v. Louisville
Ladder, Ky. App., 957 S.W.2d 290, 295 (1997).
Consequently, the
jural rights doctrine has no applicability to her claim for
benefits.
Likewise, the validity of the opt-out procedure was
upheld in Wells v. Jefferson County, Ky., 255 S.W.2d 462 (1953).
The former Court of Appeals upheld the statute providing that an
employee is deemed to have accepted the act unless he or she
files with his or her employer a written notice of rejection.
The Court stated that this section adequately preserves the right
of an employee to make a voluntary election as to whether he will
come under the Act.
Thus, the former Court of Appeals concluded
that the opportunity of the employee to reject coverage under the
Act constitutes a waiver of his or her constitutional right of
suit against the employer for personal injuries or wrongful
death.
Id. at 463. See also, Mullins v. Manning Coal
Corporation, supra.1
1
Please note: In Shamrock Coal Co, Inc. v. R. Cletus
Maricle, Judge, Ky., No. 1998-SC-0664-MR (Nov. 18, 1999), the
Supreme Court specifically reaffirmed the decision in Wells
upholding the constitutionality of the Workers’ Compensation Act
and the presumptive acceptance provision contained therein. Id.,
Slip Op. at p. 6.
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Jacobs further argues that the 1994 version of KRS
342.730(1)(b) is unconstitutional because it limits occupational
disability benefits to a multiple of her functional impairment
rating established by the American Medical Association’s “Guides
to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment” (AMA Guides).
As
explained by the CALJ in her opinion and award:
Under KRS 342.730(1)(b), as effective
from April 4, 1994 to December 11, 1996, an
employee who returns to work at that same or
greater wage is limited to occupational
disability benefits no greater than twice her
permanent impairment rating under the AMA
Guides. It is undisputed that Jacobs
returned to work at the same or greater
wages, albeit at a different and easier job.
The only alternative to mandatory application
of KRS 342.730(1)(b) is a finding of total
disability and, based upon the medical and
lay testimony of record, it simply cannot be
found that Jacobs was permanently and totally
disabled as the result of the February 12,
1996 injury. Indeed, she continued working
(except for periods of recuperation) for
nearly two years post-injury, until the plant
closed for economic reasons. Thus, while the
undersigned Administrative Law Judge believes
that Jacobs has an occupational disability
greater than 30 percent (twice the 15 percent
permanent functional impairment rating) that
is the maximum which may be awarded absent a
finding of total disability. Since a total
disability award cannot be rendered for the
reasons set forth hereinabove, the
Administrative Law Judge is constrained to
limit Jacobs’ occupational disability award
to 30 percent.
Opinion and Award, November 30, 1998, pp.
3-4
Jacobs points out that the AMA Guides caution against
using the impairment percentages therein to make direct financial
awards or direct estimates of disabilities.
She correctly notes
that the standards set out in the AMA Guides for determining
functional impairment are not intended to translate directly into
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a finding of occupational disability.
However, KRS 342.730(1)(b)
caps her benefits at a multiple of her functional impairment
rating, regardless of her actual occupational disability.
Consequently, she contends that the method of determining
occupational disability set out in KRS 342.730(1)(b) is
arbitrary.
As noted above, Jacobs has waived any rights she could
have asserted under §§ 14 and 54 of the Kentucky Constitution by
failing to reject coverage under the workers’ compensation
system.
Nonetheless, Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution
further prescribes, “[a]bsolute and arbitrary power over the
lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a
republic, not even in the largest majority.”
City of Louisville
v. Kuhn, 284 Ky. 684, 145 S.W.2d 851, 853 (1940).
“The right of
the legislature to declare what is a proper public policy, so as
to authorize its being dealt with under the police power, seems
to be limited only by the consideration that its action in the
matter may not be arbitrary, but must be rested upon some
tangible and reasonably clear public purpose to be served, and
which has a reasonably substantial tendency to further the
interest of the public welfare.”
Workman’s Compensation Board of
Kentucky v. Abbott, 278 S.W. at 536.
Section 2 is a curb on the legislature as well as any
other public body or public officer in the assertion or attempted
assertion of political power.
Board of Education of Ashland, Ky.
v. Jayne, Ky., 812 S.W.2d 129, 133 (1991).
Whatever is
essentially unjust and unequal or exceeds the reasonable and
legitimate interests of the people is arbitrary. Kentucky Milk
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Marketing and Antimonopoly Commission v. Kroger Co., Ky., 691
S.W.2d 893, 899 (1985). The question of reasonableness is one of
degree and must be based on the facts of a particular case.
Id.
However, it is not our place to pass on the wisdom of
the laws, only their application and constitutionality.
Henderson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 454, 458 (1974).
Therefore, any analysis of whether a statute violates Section 2
must be limited.
Moreover, statutes involving the regulation of
economic matters or matters of social welfare are typically
reviewed under the lowest level of equal protection scrutiny, the
“rational relation” test. Legislative distinctions between
persons, under traditional equal protection analysis, must bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate state end.
Eastern Coal Corp., Ky., 519 S.W.2d 390 (1975).
Chapman v.
Under this test,
statutorily created classifications will be held invalid when
they are not rationally related to the legislation’s stated
purpose, and when there is no other conceivable ground to justify
them.
McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners., 394 U.S.
802, 808-809, 22 L.Ed.2d 739, 745,
89 S.Ct. 1404 (1969);
Kentucky Association of Chiropractors, Inc. v. Jefferson County
Medical Society, Ky., 549 S.W.2d 817 (1977).
Essentially, Jacobs contends that because the AMA
Guides are not intended to be used exclusively to calculate
occupational disability, then any statutory scheme which
correlates occupational disability benefits to the impairment
percentages contained in the AMA Guides must be arbitrary.
the following reasons, we disagree.
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For
The AMA Guides set out objective criteria for
evaluation of medical evidence and for the evaluation of
functional impairment to the body as a whole. Cook v. Paducah
Recapping Service, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 684, 687 (1985). However, the
terms “functional impairment” and “occupational disability” are
not synonymous. Newberg v. Garrett, Ky., 858 S.W.2d 181, 185
(1993).
Rather, the term “disability” as used in the 1994
version of KRS 342.0011(11), means occupational disability.2
Prior to 1996, the finder of fact had considerable discretion to
translate the percentage of functional impairment into
occupational disability.
Cook, 694 S.W.2d at 687.
The legislative purpose of the 1994 amendment to KRS
342.730(1)(b) was to limit the amount of compensation which was
paid to those workers with no present loss of income.
Where a
worker can demonstrate that her occupational disability is
greater than her functional impairment rating, but she has
suffered no present wage loss, the maximum award is limited to
two times the worker's functional impairment. Whittaker v.
Johnson, Ky., 987 S.W.2d 320, 324 (1999).
The statute preserves
the distinction between functional impairment and occupational
disability, but also seeks to prevent large awards of income
benefits to claimants who have no present loss of income.
2
The 1996 version of KRS 342.0011(11) does not expressly
define “disability,” but speaks in terms of “temporary total
disability,” “permanent partial disability” and “permanent total
disability.” The current definition of “permanent partial
disability” means “a condition of an employee who, due to an
injury, has a permanent disability rating but retains the ability
to work...” KRS 342.0011(11)(b). The “permanent disability
rating” is calculated by multiplying the functional impairment
rating by the factor set out in the current version of KRS
342.730(1)(b).
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Although the result may work a hardship in Jacob’s case, we
conclude that the General Assembly’s purpose in enacting this
statutory scheme is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.3 Therefore, the 1994 version of KRS 342.730(1)(b) is
constitutional.
Accordingly, the opinion and order of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
HETTIE LEE JACOBS
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
FRUIT OF THE LOOM
John W. Bland, Jr.
Bland & Birdwhistell
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
Jeff V. Layson, III
Harned, Bachert & Denton
Bowling Green, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE;
SPECIAL FUND OF KENTUCKY
Joel D. Zakem
Labor Cabinet
Louisville, Kentucky
3
See also Texas Workers Compensation Commission v. Garcia,
893 S.W.2d 504 (Tex., 1995), which considered the
constitutionality of a provision in the Texas Workers
Compensation Act which set a threshold requirement that a
claimant suffer at least a 15 percent functional impairment
before an employee is eligible for supplemental income benefits.
The claimants argued that the statute’s use of the functional
impairment rating to measure the threshold for receiving benefits
was arbitrary because functional impairment does not translate
directly into occupational disability. They further argued that
use of the AMA Guides to measure functional impairment violated
their due process rights because the impairment rating produced
by the Guides is not relevant to disability, is unreliable, and
is an inadequate measure of the concept of injury. The Supreme
Court of Texas disagreed, finding that the use of the functional
impairment rating to set a threshold for recovery of benefits,
and the statutes’s use of the AMA Guides to measure functional
impairment did not violate the equal protection or due process
clauses of the Texas Constitution. Id. at 524-26.
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