HAROLD LAWSON v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: October 1, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000205-MR
HAROLD LAWSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEONARD L. KOPOWSKI, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00537
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, HUDDLESTON AND KNOX, JUDGES.
KNOX, JUDGE:
Harold Lawson (Lawson) appeals an order of the
Campbell Circuit Court granting appellee, State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), summary judgment on a
claim for uninsured motorist benefits brought by Lawson.
Having
reviewed the record and applicable law, we reverse.
This matter arises from an automobile accident
involving several vehicles.
The record discloses that on October
10, 1996, in the state of Ohio, a blue pick-up truck struck the
vehicle driven by Matthew Hackworth.
The collision caused Mr.
Hackworth to lose control of his vehicle and collide with the
vehicle Lawson was driving.
A chain reaction was set into motion
wherein two (2) additional vehicles were involved in the
accident.
The driver of the blue pick-up never paused and left
the scene of the accident without his or her identity ever being
discovered.
Lawson, a Kentucky resident who had procured his
contract of automobile insurance in Kentucky through his insurer,
State Farm, made a claim for uninsured motorist benefits under
his policy in the Campbell Circuit Court.
State Farm denied
coverage due to a lack of any physical contact between Lawson’s
vehicle and the alleged “phantom” driver’s truck.
Thereafter,
State Farm filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, requesting
that the court determine the rights and obligations afforded to
Lawson, respecting uninsured motorist coverage, under the
policy.1
In December 1998, the court granted summary judgment in
favor of State Farm.
The appeal ensued.
Summary judgment is germane where there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
The circuit court is precluded from
rendering summary judgment where a material fact exists requiring
a trial.
The function of summary judgment is to dispose of
litigation where it is impossible for the non-moving party to
produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor.
James Graham Brown Found., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
1
Originally, Lawson filed a lawsuit in Hamilton County,
Ohio, against Matthew Hackworth. An arbitration panel of the
Court of Common Pleas determined that Hackworth was not liable
under the circumstances. Without proceeding further in Hamilton
County, Lawson, through his attorney, submitted an uninsured
motorist claim to State Farm.
-2-
Co., Ky., 814 S.W.2d 273, 276 (1991).
However, summary judgment
is to be cautiously applied and not to be used as a substitute
for trial, or to sever litigants from their right to trial should
they present viable issues, for the sake of efficiency and
expediency.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv.
807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991).
Ctr., Inc., Ky.,
Yet, where the issue presented to
the court is a question of law, such issue should be determined
by the court.
Cornette v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 899 S.W.2d
502, 505 (1995).
In the present case, the dispositive issue is whether,
as a matter of law, Lawson is contractually entitled to recover
uninsured motorist benefits from State Farm, under the terms of
the policy and legal precedent of this jurisdiction.
We believe
coverage is called for.
The circuit court observed that the language contained
in Lawson’s policy of insurance was the same as that discussed at
length in the case of Masler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
Ky., 894 S.W.2d 633 (1995), wherein a divided Supreme Court chose
“not to expand the actual, direct, physical contact requirement
to indirect physical contact[,]” with regard to “hit-and-run”
vehicles provided for under the terms of uninsured motor vehicles
coverage.
Id. at 635.
However, we believe the circumstances
underlying the Masler decision are readily distinguishable from
those before us.
It is our opinion that the holding of State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, Ky., 553 S.W.2d 691
(1977)(per curiam), can be reconciled with Masler so as to
-3-
demonstrate that coverage, under conditions such as those sub
judice, is available.
As a primary matter, we discern the language variation
in Lawson’s uninsured motorist policy and that contained in the
policy at issue in Mitchell to be a distinction without a
difference.
The uninsured motorist provisions of the policy
discussed in Mitchell contained a definition of hit-and-run
vehicle as follows:
[]Hit-and-run automobile means a land motor
vehicle which causes bodily injury to an
insured arising out of physical contact of
such vehicle with the insured or with an
automobile which the insured is occupying at
the time of the accident, provided: (1) there
cannot be ascertained the identity of either
the operator or owner of such []hit-and-run
automobile[.]
Mitchell, 553 S.W.2d at 692.
The insurance policy, as relating to uninsured motorist
coverage, in Masler provided, in pertinent part, the identical
language as that contained in Lawson’s.
Lawson’s policy
contained the following provision:
We will pay damages for bodily injury an
insured is legally entitled to collect from
the owner or driver of an uninsured motor
vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused by
an accident arising out of the operation,
maintenance or use of an uninsured motor
vehicle.
Uninsured Motor Vehicle — means:
2. a “hit-and-run” land motor vehicle whose
owner or driver remains unknown and which
strikes:
a. the insured or
-4-
b. the vehicle the
insured is occupying and
causes bodily injury to
the insured.
See also Masler, 894 S.W.2d at 635.
Plainly, both policies required: (1) bodily injury to
the insured; (2) arising from physical contact/striking of the
unknown vehicle with the insured’s own vehicle or the vehicle
which the insured is occupying at the time of the accident; and,
(3) the land motor vehicle’s owner and/or operator’s identity
remain unknown.
The trial court viewed the Masler decision more
persuasive in that the policy discussed therein contained the
verb “strike” as opposed to “contact.”
distinction.
We see no such
Rather, we believe the two verbs to be entirely
interchangeable.
For example, “contact” has been defined as “[a]
coming together or touching as of objects or surfaces.”
American Heritage Dictionary 406 (3d ed. 1996).
The
“Strike” has
been defined as “[t]o cause to come into violent or forceful
contact[,]” or “[t]o damage or destroy, as by forceful
contact[.]” Id. at 1779.
Since the verb “strike” merely implies
a form of “contact,” we observe no meaningful difference with
respect to the application and scope of the provision of
uninsured motorist insurance addressed in Mitchell versus that
discussed in Masler. Therefore, contrary to the trial court’s
opinion, we do not necessarily view Masler as controlling in this
matter.
As a secondary matter, we note the underlying policy
reasons behind the physical contact/striking requirement.
-5-
Insurance companies inject such a requirement as a means of
protecting an insurer from fraudulent claims arising in instances
where the insured’s injuries are the result of his own
negligence.
Jett v. Doe, Ky., 551 S.W.2d 221, 222 (1977).
“Without such a requirement, insureds could damage their own car
and recover, claiming fault with some third party.”
Belcher v.
Travelers Indem. Co., Ky., 740 S.W.2d 952, 953 (1987).
Such is a
means by which the insurer shields itself from the fraudulent
phantom driver scenario.
Masler addressed a fact pattern wherein the plaintiff
sought uninsured motorist benefits following an automobile
accident.
Apparently, plaintiff was driving his automobile
northbound when an unidentified truck, equipped with duel tandem
wheels, approached traveling southbound.
As the truck passed, a
rock entered the windshield of plaintiff’s vehicle, striking
plaintiff and causing him injury.
The truck neither slowed nor
stopped, the identity of its driver never being ascertained.
At
no time was there ever any physical contact between the actual
truck, itself, and the vehicle of the plaintiff.
The Masler Court denied coverage in that it gleaned the
absence of any direct physical contact or “striking” between the
phantom vehicle and plaintiff foreclosed coverage.
The Court
observed:
The accepted and recognized
rationale for the “striking” requirement of a
policy when the identity of a hit and run
motorist is unknown is to foreclose
fraudulent and collusive claims.
. . . .
-6-
In any event, it is clear, whether
we agree or not, that the State Farm policy
clearly and unambiguously provides that a hit
and run vehicle must strike the insured or
the vehicle occupied by the insured in order
for uninsured motorist coverage to arise.
Masler, 894 S.W.2d at 635. (Citing, inter alia, State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, Ky., 553 S.W.2d 691 (1977)).
We concede Mitchell incorporates a “physical contact”
requirement for the receipt of uninsured motorist benefits in a
hit-and-run scenario.
However, it is our opinion this holding
envisioned a fact pattern such as that before us and opined
benefits to be available.
Specifically, the court stated:
The majority rule in this respect
holds that where an unknown hit-and-run
motorist strikes a third vehicle, which in
turn strikes the insured vehicle, there is
“actual physical contact” within the meaning
of the contractual requirements contained in
an uninsured motorist policy.
Mitchell, 553 S.W.2d at 692.
(Citations omitted)(emphasis
added).
The Mitchell case involved a motorist, Timothy Moran,
who alleged that having been forced off the road by a utility
truck, he swerved across the grass median of Highway I-65 and
struck an automobile driven by Lucy Mitchell.
Moran admitted
there was no physical contact between his vehicle and the truck,
nor were there any witnesses to the event either prior- or postcollision.
As such, the Court concluded:
This court is of the opinion,
nevertheless, that where there has been no
actual physical contact between the hit-andrun vehicle itself and either the insured
vehicle or the intermediate vehicle, the
“physical contact” requirement of the hitand-run clause of the uninsured motorist
-7-
policy under consideration in this case has
not been met.
Mitchell, 553 S.W.2d at 692. (Emphasis added).
We believe, as did a dissenting opinion in Masler, this
language reflects the Court’s recognition “that there is a
possibility of coverage where the unknown hit-and-run vehicle
strikes another vehicle, which in turn strikes the insured
vehicle.”
Masler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Ky., 894
S.W.2d 633, 638 (1995) (4-3 decision) (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
Further, Masler is distinguishable from the case sub judice in
that the intermediary object of forceful contact was a flying
rock as oppose to a vehicle involved in the collision.2
Here, the first vehicle (the unidentified blue truck),
supplied the propulsive force that made the intermediary vehicle
(Hackworth) an agency of harm to the third vehicle (Lawson).
The
underlying policy reasons behind the insurance contract requiring
physical contact with an unidentified car are simply not
applicable.
The record reflects the actual existence and errant
action of the hit-and-run driver was never brought into question.
Similarly, as State Farm points out in its brief, a non-binding
arbitration panel in Hamilton County, Ohio, found Hackworth not
2
We note that the oft-cited case of Jett v. Doe, Ky., 551
S.W.2d 221 (1977), as well as Mitchell involved the denial of
coverage due to the absence of any actual contact with the
unidentified vehicle. In both these cases the driver swerved
away from the errant vehicle, which reflexive action resulted in
loss of control and, ultimately, collision with another vehicle.
Although we align with the reasoning set forth by Justice
Leibson’s dissent in Belcher v. Travelers Indem. Co., Ky., 740
S.W.2d 952, 954 (1987), as equally as we do Justices Leibson’s
and Stumbo’s dissenting opinions in Mitchell, such broad issues
are not before this Court and, as such, we limit our discussion
herein to the facts at bar.
-8-
liable for the accident.
We believe Justice Leibson succinctly
stated the rationale for providing uninsured motorist benefits
under circumstances such as those contained in the facts of this
case, to wit:
Since uninsured motorist coverage
was first enacted in 1970, the legislature
has further demonstrated a policy of
providing accident victims statutory coverage
by the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA),
which adds no-fault and underinsured motorist
coverage. This should give us pause to
reevaluate our thinking in Jett v. Doe, Ky.,
551 S.W.2d 221 (1977), which was never really
sound in the first place.
The underlying reasoning upholding
the physical contact requirement expressed in
Jett was that an insurance company had a
right to protect against fraud or collusion.
The reason is simply meaningless in cases
where there is independent corroboration to
prove that an unknown motorist caused the
accident.
Belcher, 740 S.W.2d at 954. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
In sum, we believe that as a matter of law the Court’s
opinion in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, Ky., 553
S.W.2d 691 (1977), controls in this matter and Lawson should be
permitted to pursue his cause of action against State Farm for
uninsured motorist benefits.
Further, in light of the decision
of the Hamilton County, Ohio, arbitration panel, it appears there
is some physical evidence or other form of corroborating
testimony that will support Lawson’s theory of the case.
Should
State Farm choose to challenge Lawson’s theory, a question of
fact will be raised for a jury to determine.
In concert with the forgoing opinion, the order of the
Campbell Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of
-9-
State Farm is reversed and the matter remanded for further
proceedings.
DYCHE AND HUDDLESTON, JUDGES, CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert N. Trainor
Covington, Kentucky
Susanne M. Cetrulo
Edgewood, Kentucky
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.