JOSEPH A. STURM v. CORNING CLINICAL LABORATORIES; CORNING LIFE SCIENCES; HONORABLE ROBERT L. WHITTAKER, DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND; HONORABLE JOHN B. COLEMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: AUGUST 20, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000031-WC
JOSEPH A. STURM
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. 95-38048
v.
CORNING CLINICAL LABORATORIES;
CORNING LIFE SCIENCES;
HONORABLE ROBERT L. WHITTAKER,
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND;
HONORABLE JOHN B. COLEMAN,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, MCANULTY, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Joseph Sturm appeals from a decision of the
Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) rendered December 4, 1998.
We affirm.
On July 6, 1995, Sturm received a work-related back
injury when the vehicle he was driving was rear-ended by a
vehicle driven by third party, Daniel Stone.
The accident
occurred while Sturm was performing his duties as a courier for
Corning Clinical Laboratories (Corning).
Consequently, he was
off work for a short period of time and was paid temporary total
disability (TTD) benefits from July 14, 1995, through August 17,
1995, by Corning’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier,
Lumbermens Mutual.
On October 3, 1996, Sturm and his wife negotiated a
settlement (the settlement) with Daniel Stone and his insurance
carrier, Jefferson Insurance Group (Jefferson Insurance).
In
exchange for $38,000.00, the Sturms executed a release which
reads in relevant part as follows:
. . . I, Joseph and [T]awajo Sturm . . . for
and in consideration of . . . ($38,000.00) .
. . discharge Daniel Stone and Jefferson
Insurance Group of and from any and all
claims, actions, causes of actions, demands,
rights, damages, costs, property damage, loss
of wages, expenses, hospital medical and
nursing expenses, accrued or unaccrued claims
for loss of consortium, loss of support or
affection, loss of society and companionship
on account of or in any way growing out of,
any and all known and unknown personal
injuries and damages resulting from an
automobile accident which occurred on or
about 7/6/95, at or near I-65 south bound,
KY.
Sturm noted on the release that the $38,000.00 was to be paid to
him and, in addition, certain medical bills would be paid by
Jefferson Insurance.
Sturm was not represented by legal counsel
in negotiating this settlement.
Thereafter, Jefferson Insurance
paid Lumbermens Mutual $6,208.75 for reimbursement of medical
expenses and TTD benefits paid to Sturm.
-2-
On August 14, 1997, Sturm filed a claim for workers’
compensation benefits pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) Chapter
342.
On January 12, 1998, Arbitrator Walter Bedford, Jr., issued
a benefit review determination dismissing Sturm’s claim and
noting that Sturm had failed to comply with a request for
information necessary to determine the applicability of KRS
342.700.
Sturm requested a de novo review before an
administrative law judge (ALJ).
In an opinion and award dated July 20, 1998, the ALJ
found Sturm to be 12% occupationally disabled.
He also found
that Corning and the Special Fund were entitled to a “full dollar
for dollar credit for all income and future medical expenses
against the $38,000.00 settlement that the plaintiff negotiated
on his own with the third party tortfeasor’s insurance carrier.”
Sturm appealed to the Board, which, in turn, affirmed the ALJ’s
decision.
This appeal followed.
In contravention of Ky. R. Civ. Proc. 76.12(4)(c)(iv),
Sturm has failed to properly set forth his arguments in his
brief.
Nevertheless, we glean the following complaints: 1) that
Corning’s right of subrogation under KRS 342.700 could be pursued
only through a separate civil action and 2) that the ALJ’s
apportionment of the $38,000.00 settlement was erroneous.
Sturm first contends that pursuant to KRS 342.700,
Corning and the Special Fund were compelled to file a civil
action to pursue their rights to subrogation.
In essence, he
maintains that it was error for the ALJ to adjudicate Corning's
-3-
and the Special Fund's subrogation rights and to grant a “set
off” or “credit.”
KRS 342.700(1) reads as follows:
Whenever an injury for which compensation is
payable under this chapter has been sustained
under circumstances creating in some other
person than the employer a legal liability to
pay damages, the injured employee may either
claim compensation or proceed at law by civil
action against the other person to recover
damages, or proceed both against the employer
for compensation and the other person to
recover damages, but he shall not collect
from both. If the injured employee elects to
proceed at law by civil action against the
other person to recover damages, he shall
give due and timely notice to the employer
and the special fund of the filing of the
action. If compensation is awarded under
this chapter, the employer, his insurance
carrier, the special fund, and the uninsured
employer’s fund , or any of them, having paid
the compensation or having become liable
therefor, may recover in his or its own name
or that of the injured employee from the
other person in whom legal liability for
damages exists, not to exceed the indemnity
paid and payable to the injured employee,less
the employee’s legal fees and expense. The
notice of civil action shall conform in all
respects to the requirements of KRS
411.188(2). (Emphasis added.)
We believe the plain language of this statute merely
allows an employer, its compensation carrier, or the Special Fund
to seek indemnity from a third-party tortfeasor through a civil
action.
Such would be necessary in cases where the claimant has
not secured a judgment, whether by jury verdict or settlement,
against the third-party tortfeasor.
In any event, our supreme
court embraced such “statutory subrogation” in Mastin v. Liberal
Markets, Ky., 674 S.W.2d 7 (1984).
We, therefore, find no error
in allowing the setoff of the workers’ compensation award absent
the filing of a civil action by the employer or Special Fund.
-4-
Sturm next charges that the ALJ erred in apportioning
the full $38,000.00 settlement to those items also covered by
workers’ compensation benefits.
Sturm contends the settlement
was intended to cover only those items not covered by workers’
compensation benefits.
In his decision, however, the ALJ noted
that the settlement neglected to delineate what portion of the
$38,000.00 settlement corresponded to the different types of
damages.
He further determined that Sturm failed to prove that
the settlement was for items not covered by workers’ compensation
benefits.
Consequently, to ensure Sturm did not receive a double
recovery, the ALJ granted Corning and the Special Fund a credit
up to $38,000.00 for all income benefits and future medical
expenses for which they were liable.
KRS 342.700 expresses a clear public policy against
double recovery.
Sturm fails to direct us to any evidence in the
record indicating what portion of the $38,000.00 settlement was
not duplicated by workers’ compensation benefits.
It has long
been held that an appellate court will not search a record for
evidence where no reference to the record is furnished.
v. Watts, Ky. App., 686 S.W.2d 833 (1985).
Ventors
Furthermore, the
settlement on its face is silent as to apportionment.
We believe
Sturm had the burden of proving apportionment of the settlement
and that he failed to meet said burden.
In sum, we cannot say
the ALJ erred by apportioning the full $38,000.00 to damages
which duplicate workers’ compensation benefits.
Noble, Ky., 361 S.W.2d 285 (1962).
-5-
See Stacy v.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE CORNING:
Lawrence E. Osterhage
Louisville, KY
William P. Swain
Mary Ann Kiwala
Louisville, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE FUND:
Joel D. Zakem
Louisville, KY
-6-
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