COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. DEBBIE CARDWELL
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RENDERED: December 23, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: January 14, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000028-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BUTLER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00018
v.
DEBBIE CARDWELL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON, and GUIDUGLI, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE: The Commonwealth appeals from the order of the
Butler Circuit Court granting Debbie Cardwell’s motion to sever
and to try separately two counts of manslaughter contained in an
indictment against her.
Having carefully reviewed the record on
appeal, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
In March 1998, Debbie Cardwell (Cardwell) was indicted
by the Butler County Grand Jury for two counts of manslaughter in
the first degree.
She was charged with causing the deaths of her
infant daughter, Tori Cardwell, and of her infant son, Adam Ray
Cardwell.
The indictment against Cardwell was the result of an
investigation (conducted by the Cabinet for Human Resources and
the Kentucky State Police) initiated at the time of the birth of
her fifth child.
history:
The investigation was based upon her family
Cardwell had given birth to four other children, three
of whom had died as infants.
One surviving child (the first
born) is mentally retarded due to an incident as an infant; the
second surviving child (the fifth born) is the child whose birth
launched the investigation by the Cabinet for Human Resources.
Cardwell’s first child, a daughter born in 1983,
suffered an oxygen deprivation episode around the age of five
months and is mentally retarded as a result.
Three years later,
in 1986, she bore her second child, a daughter, who died at seven
weeks of age; the cause of death was listed as Sudden Infant
Death Syndrome (SIDS) without an autopsy having been performed.
In 1988, Cardwell gave birth to her third child, Adam Ray
Cardwell, who died on January 26, 1989, at seven weeks of age.
An autopsy was performed, and SIDS was cited as the cause of
death.
Cardwell’s fourth child, Tori Caldwell, was born in 1996.
That infant died at the age of five months, and the cause of her
death was undetermined.
Based upon these facts, the Cabinet for
Human Resources and the Kentucky State Police launched an
investigation of Cardwell after the birth of her fifth child in
June 1997.
Subsequently, Cardwell was indicted on two counts of
manslaughter in the first degree for the deaths of Tori Cardwell,
her fourth child, and Adam Ray Cardwell, her third child; she was
not charged concerning the death of her second child.
Additionally, CHR initiated an action to remove the fifth child
from Cardwell’s home, and at the time of the filing of the
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Commonwealth’s brief in this appeal, the infant had been removed
from her care.
On October 8, 1998, Cardwell filed a motion for
separate trials of the counts contained in the indictment against
her.
She argued that the two charges constituted two separate
and unconnected offenses and that to try both counts at the same
time would prejudice her, leading to an unjust result.
The court
entered an order on December 21, 1998, granting Cardwell’s motion
and ordering that the two counts in the indictment be severed and
that separate trials be conducted as to each count. This appeal
followed.
The Commonwealth argues on appeal that the court erred
in granting Cardwell’s motion for separate trials on the two
counts contained in the indictment and that severance is
unreasonable and unfairly prejudicial to its case against her.
The Commonwealth contends that the two charges are sufficiently
related in nature and circumstances to justify a joint trial.
RCr 9.16 provides, in pertinent part:
If it appears that a defendant or the
Commonwealth is or will be prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses or of defendants in an
indictment, information, complaint or uniform
citation or by joinder for trial, the court
shall order separate trials of counts, grant
separate trials of defendants or provide
whatever other relief justice requires.
In considering a motion pursuant to RCr 9.16, the trial court is
vested with the discretion to determine whether the defendant or
the Commonwealth will be prejudiced by joinder.
relative term.
“Prejudice is a
In the context of a criminal proceeding it can
mean only that which is unnecessarily or unreasonably hurtful.”
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Romans v. Commonwealth, Ky., 547 S.W.2d 128, 131 (1977).
The
extent to which evidence of one offense would be admissible in a
trial of the other offense is a critical factor in determining
whether joinder is prejudicial.
858 S.W.2d 185, 187 (1993).
Rearick v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
The trial court has broad discretion
in regard to joinder, and its decision in such matters will not
be overturned absent a showing of prejudice and clear abuse of
discretion.
Violett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 907 S.W.2d 773 (1995).
In the case before us, the only issue on appeal is
whether the Commonwealth is unnecessarily or unfairly prejudiced
by severing the two counts against Cardwell.
In arguing that
severance is prejudicial, the Commonwealth contends that the
counts must be tried together in order to present the jury with a
full and accurate picture of the alleged crimes.
It maintains
that as to both counts of manslaughter against Cardwell, it will
be necessary to portray to the jury her complete psychological
profile, including the following elements:
her suffering from
low self-concept, paranoia, and feelings of inadequacy and
insecurity; the statistical improbability of one family’s
experiencing three infant deaths from SIDS; and the similar
circumstances and pattern surrounding the children’s deaths.
The
severing of the two counts does not preclude the Commonwealth
from introducing such evidence at each of the trials on the two
counts.
The fact that it may be more efficient, more convenient,
or more judicially economical to try the two counts jointly does
not constitute unreasonable or unfair prejudice to the
Commonwealth within the meaning of RCr 9.16.
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The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving the
elements of manslaughter as to each of the counts against
Cardwell.
It must accomplish this task through the introduction
of competent and admissible evidence, and there is nothing in the
record to indicate that the Commonwealth’s ability to do so will
be prejudiced by severance.
The Commonwealth has failed to
demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in
ordering that the two counts of manslaughter against Cardwell be
severed and tried separately.
We affirm the judgment of the Butler Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
George G. Seelig
Morgantown, KY
Robert B. Wade
Morgantown, KY
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