ISLAND CREEK COAL COMPANY v. CHARLES O. GAMMON; DONNA H. TERRY, Administrative Law Judge; SPECIAL FUND; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: October 1, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1999-CA-000004-WC
ISLAND CREEK COAL COMPANY
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-91-42482
CHARLES O. GAMMON;
DONNA H. TERRY,
Administrative Law Judge;
SPECIAL FUND; and
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, HUDDLESTON and KNOPF, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge:
Island Creek Coal Company appeals from a
decision of the Workers' Compensation Board which affirmed an
administrative law judge's order that denied the coal company’s
motion to reopen a benefit award.
Charles Gammon sustained an injury to his back while
working for Island Creek and sought workers' compensation benefits.
Island Creek and Gammon settled Gammon's claim by agreeing that he
had a 25 percent occupational disability.
Island Creek subsequently moved to reopen the claim. The
motion disputed the medical charges of Dr. Barbara Kunkle, Gammon's
treating chiropractor.
Island Creek initiated a “utilization
review” regarding Gammon's chiropractic visits to Dr. Kunkle.
utilization
review,
performed
by
Encompass
Health
Systems, involved the opinions of two "doctors."
The
Management
Each concluded
that Gammon had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI), and
additional medical treatment by Dr. Kunkle would not be necessary.
Arbitrator
Walter
Bedford
gave
Gammon
20
days
to
establish a prima facie case of work relatedness for the contested
expenses.
Gammon filed a report from Dr. Kunkle which stated that
the chiropractor was continuing to treat Gammon for an injury to
his
low
back.
According
to
Dr.
Kunkle,
the
injury
caused
stretching and tearing of the soft tissue in his back, leading to
scarring, weakness and pain.
The report went on to say that Gammon
was still in the recovery stage and needed to continue treatment,
and
that
continued
treatment
prevented
Gammon
from
becoming
permanently disabled.
After the arbitrator denied Island Creek's motion to
reopen,
Island
Creek
requested
administrative law judge.
a
de
novo
review
before
an
The ALJ issued an opinion and order
again denying Island Creek's motion to reopen. The ALJ stated that
the
utilization
review
decision
contained
only
conclusive
statements regarding the reasonableness of Dr. Kunkle's treatment,
with no “medical reasons” for denial of continued care.
-2-
Island
Creek then appealed to the Workers' Compensation Board, which
affirmed the decision of the ALJ.
In order for a claim to be reopened pursuant to Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 342.125, the movant must set forth sufficient
facts to establish a prima facie case for reopening before the
opposing party must respond.1
In order to reopen the award, Island
Creek was required to show that a change in Gammon's physical
condition since the settlement has produced a decrease in Gammon's
occupational disability.2
Island Creek argues on appeal that the findings of the
utilization review reach the required level of proof needed to
establish a prima facie case to reopen the award of medical
expenses.
However, as the Workers' Compensation Board made clear,
even if the utilization review was the only evidence considered, it
does
not
establish
a
prima
facie
case
treatment by Dr. Kunkle is unnecessary.
that
the
chiropractic
The utilization review
notice of denial letter stated that Dr. Jensen recommended care
until February 20, 1998, and that further care past that date would
not
be
necessary.
No
medical
analysis
nor
reason
for
this
recommendation was given. Furthermore, the letter does not explain
who Dr. Jensen is or what his qualifications are.
review was performed at Gammon's request.
A second level
Dr. Skribsted, an
Encompass chiropractic advisor, opined that additional care for
Gammon was not “medically necessary, corrective or curative for the
1
Stambaugh v. Cedar Creek Mining Co., Ky., 488 S.W.2d 681
(1972).
2
Newberg v. Davis, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 164, 166 (1992).
-3-
1/31/91 injury and would be of palliative benefit only.” Again, no
reasons were given for Dr. Skribsted's opinion.
Without further evidence to explain why continued care by
Dr. Kunkle is unnecessary, the conclusive allegations by Drs.
Jensen and Skribsted are not enough to create a prima facie case to
reopen the award.
Island Creek argues that sufficient weight was
not given to the utilization report.
Even if the ALJ had relied
solely on the utilization report, a prima facie case was not
presented by Island Creek.
As the ALJ pointed out, Dr. Skribsted's opinion actually
advances Gammon's argument that treatment by Dr. Kunkle is still
warranted.
To characterize treatment as only “palliative” is not
to say that it is not compensable.
This Court has made it clear
that the phrase “cure and relief,” as used in KRS 342.020(1), was
not intended to mean that only curable work related injuries would
be compensable.3
Instead, the phrase “cure and relief” is to be
interpreted “cure and/or relief”.
stated
that
further
care
would
Id. at 951.
only
be
Dr. Skribsted
“palliative.”
Such
“palliative” care could well fall under the relief for which
provision is made in KRS 342.020, therefore making it compensable.
Hence, Island Creek has not established the required prima facie
case.
The order denying Island Creek's motion to reopen is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
3
National Pizza Company v. Curry, Ky. App., 802 S.W.2d
949, 951 (1991).
-4-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael O. McKown
ZIERCHER & HOCKER, P.C.
Clayton, Missouri
Thomas M. Rhoads
RHOADS & RHOADS, P.S.C.
Madisonville, Kentucky
-5-
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