ANTHONY GRIFFITH v. MEADE COUNTY, KENTUCKY AND JOSEPH HAGER HUBERTA LYNN MILLER v. MEADE COUNTY, KENTUCKY AND JOSEPH HAGER
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RENDERED:
November 5, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-003064-MR
ANTHONY GRIFFITH
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM H. MONARCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-00019
v.
MEADE COUNTY, KENTUCKY
AND JOSEPH HAGER
AND
APPELLEES
NO. 1998-CA-003125-MR
HUBERTA LYNN MILLER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM H. MONARCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-00019
MEADE COUNTY, KENTUCKY
AND JOSEPH HAGER
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, McANULTY, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
These are two appeals from a summary judgment
entered in favor of Meade County and the Meade County Judge
Executive in an action against them for personal injuries
sustained as a result of a motorcycle accident at an intersection
in which a stop sign was missing from a county road.
We affirm
because the appellants’ claims were properly barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Early in the morning of October 4, 1994, appellant,
Anthony Griffith, was driving his motorcycle on Coleman Road in
Meade County, with appellant, Huberta Miller, as his passenger.
Upon entering the intersection of Coleman Road and Kentucky
Highway 1600, Griffith’s motorcycle collided with a vehicle
operated by Delma Duff.
It is undisputed that there was
ordinarily a stop sign on Coleman Road at the intersection in
question.
However, on the night of this accident, the stop sign
was missing.
The accident occurred when Griffith proceeded
through the intersection without stopping and collided with Duff.
There was some evidence that the stop sign had been missing from
this intersection for two to three weeks prior to the accident.
As a result of the accident, Griffith and Miller sustained
serious personal injuries.
On February 7, 1996, Griffith and Miller filed a
negligence action against Meade County and Meade County Judge
Executive Joseph Hager.
The complaint alleged that defendants
had a duty to install, maintain, and replace all stop signs on
county roads and that defendants breached that duty when they
failed to replace the stop sign which they knew, or by reasonable
due diligence should have known, had been missing for many
months.
On June 30, 1998, defendants moved for summary judgment
on grounds that the claims were barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
On November 10, 1998, the court granted
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summary judgment in favor of Meade County and Judge Executive
Hager.
From this judgment, Griffith and Miller now appeal.
Summary judgment is proper only where the trial court,
drawing all factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,
can conclude that there are no issues as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fischer v. Jeffries, Ky. App., 697 S.W.2d 159 (1985).
Summary
judgment should only be used to terminate litigation when, as a
matter of law, it appears it would be impossible for the
respondent to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in
his favor and against the movant.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel
Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
Griffith argues that appellees are not entitled to the
defense of sovereign immunity because they did not assert
sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense in their answer.
Griffith maintains that pursuant to CR 8.03 and CR 12.08,
sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pled or
it is waived.
Appellees concede that they did not raise the
issue of sovereign immunity until their motion for summary
judgment.
However, they argue that they were not required to
raise sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense according to
Knott County Board of Education v. Mullins, Ky. App., 553 S.W.2d
852 (1977).
In addressing the argument that sovereign immunity
must be pled as an affirmative defense, the Court in Mullins
stated:
Although some cases hint at a possible waiver
and refer to the fact that the defense was
raised (see, Board of Education of Leslie
County v. Lewis, Ky., 449 S.W.2d 765 (1974)),
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it appears well settled that immunity can
only be waived by an act of the legislature.
Smith v. Commonwealth, Department of
Highways, Ky., 495 S.W.2d 178 (1973); Foley
Construction Company v. Ward, Ky., 375 S.W.2d
392 (1964), and Commonwealth, Department of
Highways v. Davidson, Ky., 383 S.W.2d 346
(1964). See also, Smiley v. Hart County
Board of Education, Ky., 518 S.W.2d 785
(1974).
Mullins, 553 S.W.2d at 853.
From our reading of the above
language in Mullins, we agree with appellees that their failure
to raise the defense of sovereign immunity in their pleadings did
not result in a waiver of the defense.
Appellants next argue that County Judge Executive Hager
was not entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity because his
duty to see that the stop sign in question was replaced was a
ministerial duty.
From our review of the record, we need not
reach this issue because Judge Executive Hager was not sued in
his individual capacity.
It is well established that under Section 231 of the
Kentucky Constitution, the Commonwealth of Kentucky is immune
from civil suit except to the extent that such immunity is
specifically waived by the General Assembly.
Frankln County,
Kentucky v. Malone, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 195 (1997).
It has been
further established that a county, as a subdivision of the state,
enjoys the same sovereign immunity as the state.
Id.; Hempel v.
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, Ky., 641 S.W.2d 51
(1982), overruled on other grounds by Gas Service Co. v. City of
London, Ky., 687 S.W.2d 144 (1985).
Thus, any action against
county officials in their official capacity “is essentially an
action against the county which is barred by sovereign immunity.”
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Malone, 957 S.W.2d at 201.
However, the legislature cannot
extend sovereign immunity to the personal liability of the
state’s employees.
(1989).
Blue v. Pursell, Ky. App., 793 S.W.2d 823
A state employee can be individually liable for his
negligence in performing a ministerial function.
O’Bannon, Ky., 770 S.W.2d 220 (1989).
Gould v.
If a public official is
acting within the general scope of his authority in performing a
discretionary duty, he is shielded from individual liability
under the doctrine of official immunity.
Malone, 957 S.W.2d at
201.
In order to bring a claim against a public official in
his individual capacity, the complaint must state a separate
cause of action for personal liability against the particular
individual.
Calvert Investments, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson
County Metropolitan Sewer District, Ky., 805 S.W.2d 133 (1991).
While we acknowledge that the standard for determining whether a
claim has been sufficiently brought against a party in his
individual capacity was relaxed by our Supreme Court in McCollum
v. Garrett, Ky., 880 S.W.2d 530 (1994), from our reading of
McCollum, there still must be some indication in the complaint
that the plaintiff is alleging personal liability against the
official.
The caption in the complaint in the instant case
states the defendants as “Meade County, a Kentucky County and
Joseph Hager, County Judge Executive of Meade County” and gives
the same address for both parties.
The complaint does not state
that Hager is being sued individually, and under McCollum, we
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recognize that such is not necessary.
However, the complaint
does state:
That at all times complained of herein the
Defendant, Joseph Hager, was County Judge
Executive of Meade County and, therefore, is
the proper party in interest to name herein
to sue the county of Meade County. (Emphasis
added.)
In our view, the above language demonstrates that Hager was sued
only in order to sue the county.
Further, in the remainder of
the complaint, Meade County and Hager are always collectively
referred to as the “Defendant” or the “Defendants”.
Nowhere in
the complaint are there any allegations which expressly or
impliedly refer to Hager’s individual conduct.
In the demand for
judgment, plaintiffs seek “Judgment against the Defendants,
jointly and severally”.
Unlike McCollum, the allegations of
misconduct in the present case are directed at the County along
with Hager (the “Defendants”), and, clearly, plaintiffs were
seeking damages from the County.
Accordingly, we deem
appellants’ complaint to be against Hager only in his official
capacity, and, as stated previously, he is therefore immune from
suit.
Appellants next argue that, even if appellees were
entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity, said defense was
waived by Meade County’s membership in a self-insurance fund.
Appellants cite to Green River District Health Dept. v.
Wigginton, Ky., 764 S.W.2d 475 (1989), Kestler v. Transit
Authority of Northern Kentucky, Ky., 758 S.W.2d 38 (1988), and
Dunlap v. University of Kentucky Student Health Services Clinic,
Ky., 716 S.W.2d 219 (1986), which all held that to the extent
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that a governmental entity purchases insurance or establishes a
self-insurance fund pursuant to statutory authority, sovereign
immunity is waived.
However, those cases were overruled by
Withers v. University of Kentucky, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340 (1997),
wherein it was held that the University of Kentucky’s purchase of
insurance under the University of Kentucky Medical Center
Malpractice Insurance Act does not act as an express waiver of
sovereign immunity.
Appellants argue that since the accident at
issue occurred in 1994 and the action herein was filed on
February 7, 1996 when Dunlap and its line of cases cited above
were in effect, Withers, rendered February 27, 1997, cannot be
applied retroactively to bar their claim.
We do not agree.
From our review of the case law at issue, we see that
Withers turned on the Court’s interpretation of the 1986
Amendments to the Board of Claims Act, KRS 44.072-44.073, which
had been in effect for eight years at the time of appellants’
accident in the instant case:
We hold that the 1986 statutory changes
abrogated the rule in Dunlap and its line of
decisions which found waiver of immunity
based on the purchase of liability insurance
whether or not pursuant to statutory
authorization.
Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 346.
Neither Dunlap, Wiggington, nor
Kestler interpreted the 1986 Amendments to the Board of Claims
Act in their decisions because the causes of action in each of
those cases arose prior to the effective date of the 1986
Amendments (July 15, 1986), and under KRS 446.080(3), statutes
cannot be retroactively applied unless they expressly so state.
Thus, although Dunlap and its progeny were rendered after the
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1986 Amendments were in effect, those cases only applied to
causes of action that arose prior to the effective date of the
1986 Amendments.
Accordingly, Withers is not being retroactively
applied in the present case.
We reject Miller’s remaining argument that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity is archaic and should be reformed or
discarded by this Court.
We do not have the authority to reform
or discard a doctrine which has its basis in our state
Constitution.
We would also note that sovereign immunity in
Kentucky has previously withstood a constitutional challenge
before this Court.
See Rooks v. University of Louisville, Ky.
App., 574 S.W.2d 923 (1978), overruled in part by Guffey v. Cann,
Ky., 766 S.W.2d 55 (1989).
Accordingly, as we have determined that there are no
issues of fact to be resolved and that appellees were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, the judgment of the Meade Circuit
Court is affirmed.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
McANULTY, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, ANTHONY
GRIFFITH:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, MEADE
COUNTY, KENTUCKY AND JOSEPH
HAGER:
Ronald E. Hines
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
Darren A. Sipes
Brandenburg, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, HUBERTA
LYNN MILLER:
Reford H. Coleman
Matthew C. Hess
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
Michael R. Hance
Hope K. Fitzpatrick
Louisville, Kentucky
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