GARY STILL AND DAVID ALLEN v. LEGGETT & PLATT, INC.; SPECIAL FUND; THOMAS A. NANNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: July 23, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-003038-WC
GARY STILL AND DAVID ALLEN
v.
APPELLANTS
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-96-78367
LEGGETT & PLATT, INC.;
SPECIAL FUND;
THOMAS A. NANNEY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, MILLER, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE: Gary Still and David B. Allen (appellants) ask us
to review an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board (board)
rendered November 6, 1998.
Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 342.290.
We
affirm.
Still suffered two work-related back injuries while in
the employ of Leggett & Platt, Inc.
They occurred October 20,
1995, and December 9, 1996, respectively.
Still sought workers’
compensation benefits.
KRS Chapter 342.
On April 17, 1997,
appellants entered into a contract whereby Allen was to represent
Still in his pursuit of benefits.
On November 26, 1997, the
arbitrator determined Still to be 10% occupationally disabled.
This decision resulted in a total award of $15,096.00 to be paid
over 425 weeks.
Thereafter, Still requested a de novo review
before an administrative law judge (ALJ).
On May 15, 1998, the
ALJ concluded Still was 25% occupationally disabled.
The result
was a total award of $34,000.00 to be paid over 425 weeks.
On
July 17, 1998, Allen filed a motion for $6,350.00 in attorney
fees.
Based on the formula set forth in KRS 342.320, the ALJ
approved a $5,780.80 fee.
Appellants appealed this fee to the
board, which, affirmed the ALJ’s decision.
This appeal followed.
Appellants’ complaints center upon KRS 342.320, which
reads in relevant part as follows:
(2) Attorney’s fees for services under this
chapter on behalf of an employee shall be
subject to the following maximum limits:
(a) Twenty-percent (20%) of the award not to
exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000) for
services performed up to and including the
date of a written determination by the
arbitrator. This fee shall be paid by the
employee from the proceeds of the award or
settlement.
(b) Upon an appeal by an employee from a
written determination of an arbitrator or an
award or order of an administrative law
judge, a fee to be fixed by the
administrative law judge upon consideration
of the extent, quality, and complexity of
services not to exceed twenty percent (20%)
of the first twenty-five thousand dollars
($25,000) of any increased income benefits
awarded, ten percent (10%) of the next
fifteen thousand ($15,000) of increased
income benefits, and five percent (5%) of the
-2-
remainder of the additional income benefits
awarded and not to exceed in all ten thousand
dollars ($10,000). This fee shall be paid by
the employee from the proceeds of the award
or settlement and shall be in addition to the
fee, if any, awarded under paragraph (a) of
this subsection.
. . .
(d) Attorney-client employment contracts
entered into and signed prior to December 12,
1996, shall not be subject to the conditions
of paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this
subsection, and the law existing at the date
of the injury or last exposure to the hazards
of an occupational disease shall apply.
We shall address appellants’ arguments in what we
believe to be the logical order.
First, they contend that KRS
342.320 is unconstitutional as it closes the courts to injured
workers by placing a cap on attorney fees.
The effect of the
cap, they maintain, is to deter competent attorneys from
accepting these cases.
We disagree.
The legislature has long
placed a cap on attorney fees in workers’ compensation cases and
Kentucky courts have approved.
See Vanderpool v. Goose Creek
Mining Co., 293 Ky. 719, 170 S.W.2d 32 (1943).
Appellants next argues that the 1996 amendment to KRS
342.320 (the amendment) constitutes a substantive change in the
law and should not be applied retroactively.
They assert that
the law existing at the date of injury controls.
Still’s
injuries occurred prior to December 12, 1996, the amendment’s
effective date.
Thus, appellants maintain, the amendment should
not have been applied in setting Allen’s fee.
KRS 342.0015 specifically declares the amendment to be
remedial.
Appellants fail to convince us that this designation
-3-
is erroneous.
The amendment, therefore, does not fall under the
general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.
See Peabody Coal Company v. Gossett, Ky., 819 S.W.2d 33 (1991).
Pursuant to KRS 342.320(d), the amendment applies to all
attorney-client employment contracts entered into and signed
subsequent to December 12, 1996, regardless of the date of
injury.
Appellants’ attorney-client employment contract was
entered into and signed on April 17, 1997.
As such, we believe
the amendment was properly applied in setting Allen’s fee.
Last, appellants claim that the ALJ miscalculated
Allen's fee under KRS 342.320.
We disagree.
KRS 342.320
specifically states that “[a]ttorney’s fees for services under
this chapter . . . shall be subject to the following maximum
limits . . . .”
The statute then sets forth the maximum fee an
attorney shall receive for his services at the arbitrator level
and at the appeal level, respectively.
In the case sub judice,
the ALJ awarded Allen the statutory maximum of $2,000.00 for his
services at the arbitrator level and the statutory maximum of
$3,780.00--%20 of the increased benefit1--for his appellate
services.
It is our opinion that the ALJ correctly applied KRS
342.320 in calculating Allen’s fee.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
1
David B. Allen
$34,000.00 less $15,096.00 = $18,904.00
-4-
Lexington, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/LEGGETT:
F. Allon Bailey
Lexington, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/SPECIAL
FUND:
Benjamin C. Johnson
Louisville, KY
-5-
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