TERRY BISCHOFF v. BROWN & KERR, INC.; CNA INSURANCE COMPANY; AND CNA RISK MANAGMENT
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RENDERED: December 30, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-003027-MR
TERRY BISCHOFF
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. WALLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00540
v.
BROWN & KERR, INC.; CNA INSURANCE COMPANY;
AND CNA RISK MANAGMENT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order of the Bullitt
Circuit Court, dismissing the appellant’s tort claims against his
employer, and his claim against his employer and its workers’
compensation insurance carrier for bad faith and unfair claims
settlement practices.
Since all of his arguments concerning the
constitutionality of the Workers’ Compensation Act have either
been rejected by the Supreme Court of Kentucky, or are not ripe
for review, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal on this ground.
We further find that any claims which the appellant may have
under the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (UCSPA) are also
precluded by the exclusive liability provision of the Workers’
Compensation Act.
Because the trial court disposed of this matter on a
motion for summary judgment, the underlying facts of this appeal
were not fully developed.
However, the allegations are
straightforward and can be briefly summarized here.
The
appellant, Terry Bischoff, was employed by Brown & Kerr, Inc. as
a roofer.
On April 8, 1998, he fell from a roof on a job site,
allegedly sustaining severe head and chest injuries.
There is no
dispute that these injuries were sustained within the course and
scope of his employment.
On July 27, 1998, Bischoff brought a civil action in
Bullitt Circuit Court against Brown & Kerr, alleging that his
injuries occurred as a result of its negligence.
He also brought
a claim for bad faith and unfair claims settlement practices
against Brown & Kerr and its workers’ compensation insurance
carrier, CNA Insurance Company/CNA Risk Management (CNA).
Bischoff argued that the Workers’ Compensation Act in its
entirety, as well as specific amendments to the Act made in 1996,
are unconstitutional.
Bischoff notified the Attorney General of
his intention to challenge the constitutionality of the statute.
The Attorney General filed a notice stating his intention not to
intervene in the action.
Brown & Kerr and CNA moved to dismiss the action
because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
matters assigned exclusively to the Workers’ Compensation Board.
KRS 342.690(1).
Following briefing of the issues by all parties,
the trial court agreed with Brown & Kerr and CNA, and dismissed
the action.
This appeal followed.
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Bischoff again argues that: (1) the Workers’
Compensation Act, KRS Chapter 342, is unconstitutional as a
violation of the jural rights doctrine; (2) the opt-out provision
in KRS 342.395 is unconstitutional because it presumes a waiver
of his constitutional rights by his silence; and (3) the method
of calculating income benefits for disability contained in the
1996 version of KRS 342.730 is arbitrary.
He also argues that
the trial court erred in dismissing his claim against Brown &
Kerr and CNA pursuant to the UCSPA.
KRS 304.12-230.
For the
following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing
these claims.
We begin by noting that this Court is required to
follow applicable precedents established in the opinions of the
Supreme Court and its predecessor court.
SCR 1.030(8)(a).
It
has long been established that the Workers’ Compensation Act is
constitutional even though it may limit the amount of money and
conditions under which a claimant may recover.
Workmen's
Compensation Board of Kentucky v. Abbott, 212 Ky. 123, 278 S.W.
533 (1925); Greene v. Caldwell, 170 Ky. 571, 186 S.W. 648 (1916).
In Mullins v. Manning Coal Corp., Ky. 938 S.W.2d 260 (1997), our
Supreme Court reiterated that the Workers’ Compensation Act does
not unconstitutionally restrict an injured party’s right to
recover compensation from the wrongdoer:
With regard to the appellant's argument
concerning § 14 of the Kentucky Constitution,
we are unpersuaded. The appellant attempts
to analogize this situation with that
presented in Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533,
49 S.W.2d 347 (1932). In Ludwig, our
highest court struck down as unconstitutional
Kentucky's "guest statute" enacted in 1930.
The Court held that § 14 of the Kentucky
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Constitution guaranteed an injured party's
right to attempt to recover compensation from
the wrongdoer who allegedly perpetrated the
harm. Id. The Workers' Compensation Act,
however, is not predicated upon redressing a
wrong which has caused an injury. In fact,
liability under the compensation act is not
in any way dependent on negligence, tortious
conduct, or comparative negligence. See
generally Tyler-Couch Const. Co. v. Elmore,
Ky., 264 S.W.2d 56 (1954). An employee's
right to occupational disease benefits is
purely statutory in nature and does not fall
under the ambit of § 14 of the Kentucky
Constitution. The General Assembly clearly
is free to limit application of workers'
compensation benefits as it has with KRS
342.316(3)(b). The appellant's theory of the
case would lead to the absurd result that the
General Assembly may not limit applicability
of the Act in any way.
Mullins, 938 S.W.2d at 263.
Bischoff places much emphasis on the recent Kentucky
Supreme Court opinion in Williams v. Wilson, Ky., 972 S.W.2d 260
(1998).
In Williams, our Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the punitive damages statutes, KRS 411.184 &
186.
Following an extensive discussion of the doctrine of jural
rights,
the Supreme Court found that the limitation on recovery
for punitive damages arising out of gross negligence violated §§
14, 54 and 241 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Bischoff contends
that the reasoning in Williams is equally applicable to the
Workers’ Compensation Act’s abolition of his right to bring a
tort action against his employer.
Although the Supreme Court’s opinion in Williams was
couched in expansive language, it was nonetheless limited to a
consideration of the constitutionality of KRS 411.184.
We find
nothing in the text of Williams which indicates that the Supreme
Court intended to overrule existing precedents regarding the
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constitutionality of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Moreover, by
electing to proceed under the workers' compensation system,
Bischoff has waived any rights which he could have asserted under
§ 14 and § 54 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Edwards v.
Louisville Ladder, Ky. App., 957 S.W.2d 290, 295 (1997).
Consequently, the jural rights doctrine has no applicability to
his claim for benefits.
Likewise, the validity of the opt-out procedure was
upheld in Wells v. Jefferson County, Ky., 255 S.W.2d 462 (1953).
The former Court of Appeals upheld the statute providing that an
employee is deemed to have accepted the act unless he or she
files with his or her employer a written notice of rejection.
The Court stated that this section adequately preserves the right
of an employee to make a voluntary election as to whether he will
come under the Act.
Thus, the former Court of Appeals concluded
that the unused opportunity of the employee to reject coverage
under the Act constitutes a waiver of his or her constitutional
right of suit against the employer for personal injuries or
wrongful death.
Id. at 463. See also, Mullins v. Manning Coal
Corporation, Ky., 938 S.W.2d 260 (1997).1
In addition, Bischoff argues that the 1996 version of
KRS 342.730 is arbitrary because of the manner in which the
statute determines disability.
Much of his argument centers
1
Please note: In Shamrock Coal Co, Inc. v. R. Cletus
Maricle, Judge, Ky., No. 1998-SC-0664-MR (Nov. 18, 1999), the
Supreme Court specifically reaffirmed the decision in Wells
upholding the constitutionality of the Workers’ Compensation Act
and the presumptive acceptance provision contained therein. Id.,
Slip Op. at p. 6.
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around the use of functional impairment rating established by the
American Medical Association’s “Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment” (AMA Guides), as a criterion for awarding
benefits. The AMA Guides set out objective criteria for
evaluation of medical evidence and for the evaluation of
functional impairment to the body as a whole. Cook v. Paducah
Recapping Service, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 684, 687 (1985).
However, the
AMA Guides caution against using the impairment percentages
therein to make direct financial awards or direct estimates of
disabilities.
Prior to 1996, the terms “functional impairment” and
“occupational disability” were clearly distinguished.
Garrett, Ky., 858 S.W.2d 181, 185 (1993).
Newberg v.
The term “disability,”
as used in the former version of KRS 342.0011(11), meant
occupational disability.
Under the former version of KRS
342.730, the finder of fact had considerable discretion to
translate the percentage of functional impairment into
occupational disability.
Cook, 694 S.W.2d at 687.
The 1996 version of KRS 342.0011(11) does not expressly
define “disability,” but speaks in terms of “temporary total
disability,” “permanent partial disability” and “permanent total
disability.”
Under the current definition, “permanent partial
disability” means “a condition of an employee who, due to an
injury, has a permanent disability rating but retains the ability
to work...”
KRS 342.0011(11)(b).
Likewise, “permanent total
disability” means “a condition of an employee who, due to an
injury, has a permanent disability rating and has a complete and
permanent inability to perform any type of work as a result of an
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injury ...”
KRS 342.0011(11)(c).
The “permanent disability
rating” is calculated by multiplying the functional impairment
rating by the factor set out in the current version of KRS
342.730(1)(b).
Bischoff contends that because the AMA Guides are
not intended to be used in such a direct and exclusive manner to
calculate occupational disability, then any statutory scheme
which correlates occupational disability benefits to the
impairment percentages contained in the AMA Guides must be
arbitrary.
Nonetheless, we conclude that Bischoff’s arguments that
the 1996 amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Act are
unconstitutional must fail because they are not ripe for review.
Bischoff asserts that since the Workers’ Compensation Act no
longer provides a fair or complete remedy to injured workers, he
no longer has a “remedy” under the Act as amended in 1996.
Thus,
he argues that he is entitled to bring this action in circuit
court to recover for his injuries.
However, before Bischoff
would be entitled to appellate review of these issues, he must
first have exhausted his remedies through the administrative
process.
Tharp v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 307 Ky.
322, 210 S.W.2d 954 (1948).
Furthermore, the constitutionality of the 1996
amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Act is not relevant to
the issue of whether the trial court erred in dismissing
Bischoff’s tort claim against his employer.
Even if a court were
to determine that all of the 1996 amendments were
unconstitutional, we would still be required to affirm the
summary judgment since Bischoff’s tort action would be governed
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by the statutes in effect at the time of the amendment.
Lumber Co.
v. Clark, Ky., 268 S.W.2d 954, 956 (1954).
Vestal
Because
the exclusive remedy provision of the Act, KRS 342.690(1), was in
effect prior to the 1996 amendments, a judicial voidance of the
1996 amendments would only affect the benefits to which Bischoff
is entitled under the Act.
Yet that issue is not presented to this Court.
The
only issue which is properly before us is whether Bischoff may
bring a civil action against his employer in circuit court.
The
fact that a remedy for a work-related injury may be unavailable
under the Act does not authorize bringing a civil action in
circuit court.
(1955).
Davis v. Solomon, Ky., 276 S.W.2d 674, 676
Therefore, because both the former and the current
versions of the Workers’ Compensation Act create exclusive
remedies for all matters falling within their purview, the trial
court has no subject matter jurisdiction over such a matter.
Rather, jurisdiction over matters falling within the purview of
the Workers’ Compensation Act lies solely with the Workers’
Compensation Board.
Consequently, the trial court did not err in
dismissing Bischoff’s tort action against Brown & Kerr.2
Finally, Bischoff argues that he is entitled to bring a
claim against Brown & Kerr and CNA for bad faith and unfair
claims settlement practices, pursuant to KRS 304.12-230.
Prior
to 1996, this Court held that the exclusive liability provision
of the Workers’ Compensation Act precluded a civil action against
an employer or insurance carrier under the Consumer Protection
2
Shamrock Coal Co. v. Maricle, Slip Op.
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at pp.
7-8.
Act, KRS 367.170, or under the UCSPA.
Insurance Co.
(1993).
v. Blank, Ky.
General Accident
App., 873 S.W.2d 580, 581-82
However, KRS 342.267, as enacted in 1996, subjects an
insurance carrier, self-insurance group or self-insured employer
to the provisions of the UCSPA.3
Nonetheless, KRS 342.267 and 803 KAR 25:240 each
specify that the authority to fine carriers for engaging in
unfair claims settlement practices belongs to the commissioner of
the Department of Workers’ Claims.
KRS 342.990 sets out
procedures by which the commissioner may assess civil penalties.
Consequently, we find that the extension of the applicability of
the UCSPA to workers’ compensation carriers does not carry with
it a separate right to bring a civil action.
Rather, we find
that KRS 342.267 vests exclusive jurisdiction over claims under
the UCSPA against workers’ compensation carriers with the
commissioner for the Department of Workers’ Claims.
Therefore,
the trial court correctly dismissed this claim as well.
Accordingly, the order of the Bullitt Circuit Court is
affirmed.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS WITH RESULT.
3
In addition, KRS 342.310 authorizes an arbitrator, an
administrative law judge, the Board or a court (in which an
enforcement action has been brought pursuant to KRS 342.305)
assess to determine that proceedings have been brought,
prosecuted or defended without reasonable ground. Upon such a
finding, the finder of fact may assess costs of the proceeding
against the party so offending, including, but not limited to:
court costs, travel expenses, deposition costs, physician
expenses for attendance fees at depositions, attorney fees, and
all other out-of-pocket expenses.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
BROWN & KERR, INC., ET AL.
John W. Bland, Jr.
Bland & Birdwhistell
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
Ronald L. Green
Stephen R. Armstrong
Boehl, Stopher & Graves
Lexington, Kentucky
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