DON BIEK v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, a/k/a UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 23, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002823-MR
DON BIEK
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA R. ISAAC, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-03103
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY,
a/k/a UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, MILLER, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order dismissing Don
Biek’s action to compel the University of Kentucky Committee on
the Status of Women to comply with the Kentucky Open Records Act
on grounds that he lacked standing to bring the action.
Because
Biek has never filed a complaint with or requested a ruling from
the University of Kentucky regarding compliance with the Open
Records Act, and is in essence seeking to appeal a ruling sought
by an individual not a party to this action, we agree that Biek
did not have standing to bring the action herein.
affirm.
Hence, we
On June 27, 1998, John Sammons sent a letter to the
University of Kentucky Senate Committee on the Status of Women
(the “Committee”) alleging the Committee’s practice of declining
to include topics that the Committee agreed to discuss during
their meetings in the Committee’s minutes constituted a violation
of the Open Records Act.
By letter dated June 30, 1998, the
Committee took the position that it was not required to include
topics designated for discussion in their minutes because it was
not “action taken” pursuant to KRS 61.835.
On July 9, 1998,
Sammons sought review of the Committee’s decision by the Attorney
General pursuant to KRS 61.846.
On July 27, 1998, the Attorney
General rendered its decision, 98-OMD-119, in favor of the
University of Kentucky.
Sammons did not appeal the Attorney
General’s decision pursuant to KRS 61.846(4).
On August 26, 1998, appellant, Don Biek, filed an
action in the Fayette Circuit Court pursuant to KRS 61.848
alleging that the University of Kentucky Committee on the Status
of Women was in violation of the Open Records Act for failing to
include topics designated for discussion in its minutes.
Although Biek had never filed an Open Records complaint with the
University of Kentucky, nor was he a party to any of the
proceedings initiated by Sammons before the University of
Kentucky or the Attorney General, Biek specifically alleged in
his complaint that the Attorney General’s opinion in 98-OMD-119
was erroneous and requested that it be overturned.
The
University moved to dismiss the action on grounds that Biek
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lacked standing to bring the action.
motion on October 14, 1998.
The court granted the
This appeal followed.
Biek argues that he had standing to bring the action
under KRS 61.848(1) which provides as follows:
The Circuit Court of the county where the
public agency has its principle place of
business or where the alleged violation
occurred shall have jurisdiction to enforce
the provisions of KRS 61.805 to 61.850, as
they pertain to that public agency, by
injunction or other appropriate order on
application of any person.
Biek maintains that because the above provision states that “any
person” can invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court to
enforce the Open Records Act, he need not be the one who filed
the Open Records complaint at issue in order to bring the action
herein.
We do not agree.
Biek has overlooked the language in
KRS 61.848(2) which provides:
A person alleging a violation of the
provisions of KRS 61.805 to KRS 61.850 shall
not have to exhaust his remedies under KRS
61.846 before filing suit in a Circuit Court.
However, he shall file suit within sixty (60)
days from his receipt of the written denial
referred to in subsections (1) and (2) of KRS
61.846 or, if the public agency refuses to
provide a written denial, within sixty (60)
days from the date the written complaint was
submitted to the presiding officer of the
public agency. (Emphasis added.)
It is clear from the above language that the person bringing the
action to enforce the Open Records Act must have first submitted
a complaint before the agency pursuant to KRS 61.846(1) which was
denied.
While the person need not exhaust his administrative
remedies through the Attorney General pursuant to KRS 61.846(2)
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and (3), he must at least have submitted a written complaint with
the agency.
Biek cites Beckham v. Board of Education of Jefferson
County, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 575 (1994) as authority for his position
that he is not required to be the one to file the Open Records
complaint in order to bring an action alleging an Open Records
violation.
In Beckham, the Courier-Journal requested certain
employee records from the Jefferson County Board of Education,
and those employees objected to release of the records on privacy
grounds.
The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the employees had
standing to bring an action under KRS 61.848 to prevent
disclosure of the records pursuant to KRS 61.878(1)(a), even
though they were not the ones who requested the records.
The
Court’s holding turned on the fact that the employees were
seeking to prevent disclosure of the records on personal privacy
grounds and that there were limited remedies in the Open Records
Act for those who sought to contest disclosure.
The Court
stated:
We have recognized the personal privacy
exclusion [in KRS 61.878(1)(a)] as an
independent right of persons who were not
even parties to the litigation and permitted
their right to be asserted by the agency.
Beckham, 873 S.W.2d at 578.
The Court specifically noted that
there were extensive remedy provisions in the Act for those
seeking access to records.
Id.
In our view, Biek’s reliance on Beckham in the case at
hand is misplaced.
Biek is not seeking to prevent disclosure of
records, rather he is seeking to gain access to records.
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Nor
does the instant case involve any of the exclusions to the Open
Records Act in KRS 61.878.
Thus, under the remedy provisions in
KRS 61.848, he must first file a complaint with the University
alleging the Open Records violation.
Clearly, in the instant
case, Sammons is the real party in interest and Biek is simply
attempting to stand in the shoes of Sammons and appeal his
unfavorable decision.
This he cannot do.
For the reasons stated above, the order of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William C. Jacobs
Lexington, Kentucky
Stephen L. Barker
Robyn E. Miller
Lexington, Kentucky
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