GEORGES BIRENBAUM, M.D. v. ROYCE E. DAWSON, M.D.; OLNEY M. PATRICK, M.D.; JOHN S. LLEWELLYN, M.D.; DANNY M. CLARK, M.D.; FRANK M. GAINES, JR., M.D.; CORNELLA SERPELL; CHARLES L. CONLEY, D.O.; WALTER R. BREWER, M.D., BOARD OF MEDICAL LICENSURE; AND THE KENTUCKY BOARD OF MEDICAL LICENSURE
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RENDERED:
November 5, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002747-MR
GEORGES BIRENBAUM, M.D.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-002206
ROYCE E. DAWSON, M.D.;
OLNEY M. PATRICK, M.D.;
JOHN S. LLEWELLYN, M.D.;
DANNY M. CLARK, M.D.;
FRANK M. GAINES, JR., M.D.;
CORNELLA SERPELL;
CHARLES L. CONLEY, D.O.;
WALTER R. BREWER, M.D.,
AS MEMBERS OF THE KENTUCKY
BOARD OF MEDICAL LICENSURE;
AND THE KENTUCKY BOARD OF
MEDICAL LICENSURE
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: GUIDUGLI, KNOPF AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Georges Birenbaum, M.D. (Birenbaum), brings
this appeal from a “Memorandum and Order” of the Jefferson
Circuit Court entered September 24, 1998.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The underlying facts of this case were set forth in
Dawson v. Birenbaum, Ky., 968 S.W.2d 663 (1998), and we hereby
adopt the following portion of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s
opinion in that case as our own:
This case arose as a result of actions taken
by the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure
(Board) against appellee Georges Birenbaum,
M.D. The Board is charged with the duty to
“regulate, control and otherwise discipline
the licensees who practice medicine and
osteopathy within the Commonwealth of
Kentucky.” KRS 311.355. The procedural
framework the Board must follow for
investigating and disciplining licensed
medical doctors is established in KRS
311.591. Under the statute, the president of
the board divides the members of the board
into two panels. The inquiry panel is
charged with investigating the grievances
which are filed with the Board. Under
section three (3) of the [sic] KRS 311.591,
when an inquiry panel investigation is
concluded, it is authorized to take only one
of three actions: (1) it may find that the
grievance is without merit and that further
action by the board is not necessary; (2) it
may find the physician’s misconduct
insufficient to warrant a complaint, and thus
may issue an admonishment; or (3) it may
issue a complaint against a physician. If a
complaint is issued by the inquiry panel,
then the hearing panel takes over, and
ultimately hears the case against the
licensee.
Appellee is an ophthalmologist licensed by
the board, practicing in Fayette County. In
November 1990 two grievances were filed
against appellee with the board, and in
March, 1991 another grievance was filed
against him. Pursuant to KRS 311.591, the
grievances were assigned to an inquiry panel,
and that panel investigated the grievances.
The minutes of the August 15, 1991, meeting
of the inquiry panel reveal the action taken:
. . . ACTION: Upon discussion, a
motion was made by Dr. Gaines that
it appeared no violation of the
Medical Practice Act occurred in
this case and the investigation
should be closed. Dr. Gaines
further recommended that ten
additional patient records should
be obtained for further review by a
Board consultant. Seconded by Ms.
Serpell, the motion carried.
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In addition, appellee was notified that his
license was placed on “monitor status” at
that meeting by a letter dated January 9,
1992, from Lee Weese a “probation officer”
with the Board. That letter stated:
The Kentucky Board of Medical
Licensure Inquiry Panel A, at its
meeting on August 15, 1991,
reviewed an investigation regarding
the care and treatment you provided
to an individual patient.
After long and thoughtful review,
it was the consensus of the Panel
that your license to practice
medicine in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky be placed in a monitor
status.
Thus, contrary to KRS 311.591(3) the inquiry
panel did not issue a complaint against
appellee, admonish appellee for any
misconduct, or decide that no further action
was necessary. Rather, the inquiry panel
placed appellee’s medical license on “monitor
status” and subpoenaed additional patient
records from his office for review. Prior to
such action, appellee was not afforded a
hearing before the Board regarding the status
of his license, and he was not given notice
of the Board’s action placing his license on
“monitor status” until January 1992, well
after the Board had taken the August 1991
action. On February 20, 1992, the inquiry
panel again discussed the status of
appellee’s license, and denied appellee’s
request to be removed from “monitor
status.”[footnote omitted]
Appellee challenged the board’s action by
seeking a declaration of rights and
injunctive relief in the Jefferson Circuit
Court. In his complaint, appellee alleged
that the board’s actions violated statutory
procedures set out in KRS 311.530 to 311.620,
specifically KRS 311.591 and KRS 311.605. He
also asserted claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
[Sec.] 1983 for vindication of his rights
under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; and he
asserted that he should be awarded attorney’s
fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. [Sec.] 1988.
-3-
The circuit court granted summary judgment
for appellee on his state statutory claims.
The circuit court did not address appellee’s
federal constitutional claims, but focused on
the propriety of the Board’s actions in light
of controlling state statutes. The court
held that the Board, in placing appellee’s
medical license on “monitor status,” deviated
from the statutory procedure set out in KRS
311.591. The Court concluded that “there is
no authorization in the statute for a
‘monitor’ status and that the Board must
either [follow the procedure of] KRS
311.591(3), or, cease and desist its periodic
review of Plaintiff’s files.” The court was
also highly critical of the Board’s actions
taken at the August 1991 meeting:
. . . Assuming the additional
inquiry commenced in August, 1991,
how long must the Plaintiff expect
to be kept under the cloud of
investigation? Is this truly an
active ongoing investigation by the
Board of some existing misconduct
as defined by KRS 311.595, or is it
some kind of quasi disciplinary
action called “monitor status?”
The Court from the undisputed
facts, can only infer that this is
some sort of quasi disciplinary
action taken without compliance
with the literal intent of the
statute.
Appellee moved for attorney fees pursuant to
42 U.S.C. [Sec.] 1988. The circuit court
denied attorney’s fees based on KRS 311.603,
a statute which confers immunity on the board
for actions taken within the scope of its
authority. The circuit court also noted that
the statutory provisions regulating the
board’s powers and functions did not provide
for attorney’s fees. Additionally, the court
pointed out that its previous order was based
solely on Kentucky’s statutory law, and that
no determination regarding appellee’s
constitutional claim had been made.
The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit
court’s denial of fees, and remanded for a
determination of the amount of fees. The
Court of Appeals also held that the board was
not immune to an award of attorney fees under
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[Sec.] 1988, because under the Supremacy
Clause, [Sec.] 1988 pre-empted the state’s
statutory grant of immunity to the board.
Dawson, 968 S.W.2d at 664-665.
Following this Court’s reversal of the trial court’s
denial of attorney’s fees, the Board appealed to the Kentucky
Supreme Court, which rendered the above-cited opinion.
The only
issue presented before the Court on appeal was “whether a party
who has alleged both federal constitutional claims and state
statutory claims in state court, and prevailed on the state
claims with the federal claims having been left unresolved, may
recover attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. [Sec.] 1988[.]” Dawson, 968 S.W.2d
at 664.
In holding that prevailing parties such as Birenbaum are
potentially entitled to recover attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 1988, the Court adopted the following standard to be used in
determining when such an award is appropriate:
Under the prevailing test, [Sec.] 1988 fees
may be awarded to a party who prevails on a
state law claim pleaded in conjunction with a
“substantial” federal constitutional claim if
the constitutional and the state law claims
arise out of a “common nucleus of operative
fact.
Id. at 666, citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218, 227-228 (1966).
The Court then addressed whether Birenbaum’s federal
constitutional claim was substantial.
In holding that Birenbaum
had set forth a substantial federal claim, the Court stated:
Under the prevailing standard, appellee’s
federal claim cannot be held insubstantial as
a matter of law. As the Court of Appeals
noted, the term “substantial” was defined in
terms of what is “insubstantial” in Hagans v.
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Lavine, [415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed
2d 577 (1974)]. The Court in Hagans quoted
from Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518, 93
S.Ct. 854, 858-59, 35 L.Ed.2d 36 (1973), a
case which summarized the ways
“insubstantiality” had been characterized by
the Court in previous cases.
Insubstantiality” had been equated with
concepts such as “essentially fictitious,”
“wholly insubstantial,” “obviously
frivolous,” and “obviously without merit.”
(citations omitted) “Insubstantiality” had
been further defined as such: “[a] claim is
insubstantial only if ‘its unsoundness so
clearly results form [sic] the previous
decisions of this court as to foreclose the
subject and leave no room for the inference
that the questions sought to be raised can be
the subject of controversy.’” (citations
omitted)
Previous U.S. Supreme Court decisions do not
“foreclose the subject” of whether the
board’s departure from the statutory
procedures governing investigating and
disciplining licensed medical doctors was a
due process violation. . . .There is at least
an “inference” that the board violated
appellee’s due process rights. Appellee’s
claim is neither “obviously frivolous” nor
“wholly insubstantial.”
Dawson, 968 S.W.2d at 667-668.
In addressing the Board’s
concerns that its ruling would invite abuse by artful pleaders,
the Court further noted:
While it is true that the potential for abuse
may exist, we believe that strict adherence
to the requirements outlined in this opinion
will prevent a party from obtaining an
unjustified award of attorney’s fees if the
underlying constitutional claim is
insubstantial and without probable success on
the merits. Moreover, the foregoing should
be considered along with the doctrine that a
prevailing party should ordinarily be awarded
[Sec.] 1988 attorney’s fees unless there are
special circumstances making such an award
unjust. [citations omitted]
Id. at 668.
The Court affirmed this Court’s reversal of the
trial court’s order, and remanded the matter to the trial court
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“to hold a hearing for determination of whether appellee should
recover attorneys’ fees and if so, in what sum, and for further
proceedings consistent herewith.”
Id. at 668-669.
THE CURRENT APPEAL
Following remand, the trial court conducted a hearing,
framing the issue as “whether the Plaintiff’s claim under 42
U.S.C. Section 1988 was substantial, and, as a result, [whether
Birenbaum is] entitled to attorneys fees.”
In holding that
Birenbaum was not entitled to attorney’s fees, the trial court
found that the Board’s subpoena of medical records did not amount
to a substantial violation of his civil rights, reasoning:
Had the [Board] sought to hold [Birenbaum] in
contempt or suspend his license or ability to
make his living without literal compliance
with the statute, the Court would agree that
the actions of the Defendant were
substantial.
. . .
Upon reflection, the “monitor” status would
appear to be something less than a private
letter of misconduct and not a disciplinary
status of probation.
To paraphrase Justice Liebson in Meyer v.
Chapman Printing Co., Inc., Ky., 840 S.W.2d
814 (1992), this case has been one where the
tail is waging [sic] the dog. The vast
majority of the effort expended has been due
to the efforts of Plaintiff’s counsel to
recover its fees.
The original issue was simple and was simply
resolved. There is no substantial violation
of the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights
justifying attorney fees in this case, and
the motion, therefore, is denied.
This appeal followed.
Once again Birenbaum contends that the trial court
erred in refusing to compensate him for his attorneys fees and,
-7-
based on the Dawson opinion, we agree.
We believe that the
Supreme Court in Dawson clearly found that Birenbaum’s cause of
action constituted a substantial federal constitutional claim
which rendered him potentially eligible for a fee award.
Further, we interpret Dawson to hold that once a prevailing party
is held to be entitled to an award of attorney’s fees, an award
is to be made unless the presence of “special circumstances”
warrant a different outcome.
Here, the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees on
the ground that Birenbaum’s federal constitutional claim was
insubstantial flies squarely in the face of the finding of the
Supreme Court that it was, in fact, substantial.
Because the
issue of substantiality was fully resolved by the Supreme Court
in Dawson, we must remand the matter to the circuit court for
consideration as to whether any special circumstances exist upon
which a denial of a fee award can be predicated.
If no special
circumstances are found to exist, then the trial court must enter
an appropriate award of reasonable attorney’s fees in favor of
Birenbaum.
We also agree with Birenbaum that any award of
attorney’s fees should include not only compensation for
attorney’s fees incurred in the initial action, but also
attorney’s fees spent in the appeals which have followed entry of
the trial court’s subsequent orders denying attorney fees.
As
Birenbaum illustrates in his appellate brief, such awards are
allowed in federal court.
When Congress passed [42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988,]
its basic purpose was to encourage the
private prosecution of civil rights suits
-8-
through the transfer of the costs of
litigation to those who infringe upon basic
civil rights. If a successful party in a
civil rights suit is awarded attorney’s fees
under the Act and he cannot secure attorney’s
fees for legal services needed to defend the
award on appeal, the underlying Congressional
purpose for the Act would be frustrated. We
conclude that implementation of Congressional
policy requires the awarding of attorney’s
fees for time spent pursuing attorney’s fees
in the cases presently under review. This
award should also include amounts for legal
time spent defending and prosecuting the
instant appeals[.]
Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.3d 49, 53-54 (6th Cir. 1979).
This reasoning has been followed by numerous other federal
circuit and district courts.
Finally, Birenbaum has asked us to calculate and award
attorney’s fees as opposed to remanding this matter back to the
trial court for such a determination.
Although the idea of doing
so in the name of judicial economy is appealing given the obvious
reluctance of the trial court to make such an award, we note that
our jurisdiction is limited to appellate jurisdiction only
pursuant to Section 111(2) of the Kentucky Constitution.
For us
to render such a decision, we would not only have to decide the
amount of award, but also the issue of whether special
circumstances exist so as to deny awarding attorney’s fees
altogether.
We are not empowered to make such factual findings.
Having considered the parties’ arguments on appeal, the
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered September 23, 1998,
is vacated and this matter is once again remanded for further
consideration.
On remand, the trial court is instructed to
consider only whether special circumstances exist which would
justify denial of an award of attorney’s fees.
-9-
If no such
special circumstances are found, the trial court is hereby
instructed to enter an award of reasonable attorney’s fees in
favor of Birenbaum.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Kent Masterson Brown
Christopher J. Shaughnessy
Danville, KY
C. Lloyd Vest II
Louisville, KY
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