BARTON BRANDS, LTD.(AS INSURED BY LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY) V. PHYLLIS M. HALL; BARTON BRANDS, LTD., BARTON BRANDS, LTD., DIRECTOR OF THE SPECIAL FUND; HON. SHEILA LOWTHER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD BARTON BRANDS, LTD. PHYLLIS M. HALL; BARTON BRANDS, LTD. BARTON BRANDS, LTD.
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RENDERED: August 20, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002681-WC
BARTON BRANDS, LTD.(AS INSURED BY
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY)
v.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. 94-15521
PHYLLIS M. HALL;
BARTON BRANDS, LTD.,
(AS INSURED BY LUMBERMENS/KEMPER);
BARTON BRANDS, LTD.,
(AS INSURED BY ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY);
DIRECTOR OF THE SPECIAL FUND;
HON. SHEILA LOWTHER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
AND:
APPELLEES
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 1998-CA-002783-WC
BARTON BRANDS, LTD.
(AS INSURED BY LUMBERMENS/KEMPER)
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. 94-15521
PHYLLIS M. HALL;
BARTON BRANDS, LTD.
(AS INSURED BY LIBERTY MUTUAL);
BARTON BRANDS, LTD.
(AS INSURED BY ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY);
HON. ROBERT L. WHITTAKER,
CROSS-APPELLANT
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND;
HON. SHEILA C. LOWTHER; and
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
AND:
CROSS-APPELLEES
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 1998-CA-002805-WC
HON. ROBERT L. WHITTAKER,
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND
CROSS-APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. 94-15521
v.
PHYLLIS M. HALL;
BARTON BRANDS, LTD.
(AS INSURED BY LIBERTY MUTUAL);
BARTON BRANDS, LTD.
(AS INSURED BY ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY);
BARTON BRANDS, LTD.
(AS INSURED BY LUMBERMENS/KEMPER);
HON. SHEILA C. LOWTHER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING ON DIRECT APPEAL NO. 1998-CA-002681-WC;
AFFIRMING ON CROSS-APPEAL NO. 1998-CA-002805-WC;
AND REVERSING AND REMANDING WITH DIRECTIONS
ON CROSS-APPEAL NO. 1998-CA-002783-WC
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: JOHNSON, McANULTY, and MILLER, Judges.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Barton Brands, Ltd., as insured by Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company (Barton/Liberty), asks this court to review an
Opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board (board) rendered
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September 25, 1998.
Barton Brands, as insured by
Lumbermens/Kemper (Barton/Lumbermens), and the Special Fund bring
these cross-appeals.
We affirm on Direct Appeal No. 1998-CA-
002681-WC; affirm on Cross-Appeal No. 1998-CA-002805-WC; and,
reverse and remand with directions on Cross-Appeal No. 1998-CA002783-WC.
Phyllis M. Hall began employment with Barton Brands,
Ltd. (Barton), in 1967.
All of her duties at Barton were in the
bottling house and involved repetitive use of her arms.
In the
late 1980's, Hall began to experience pain in both thumbs.
Initially, she was treated with injections and given braces for
her thumbs and wrists.
In 1988, she underwent surgery on her
left hand and missed approximately six months of work.
She then
returned to work in the bottling house.
In 1991, an accident report was filed indicating that
Hall was experiencing discomfort in her hand.
Then, in 1993,
Hall again sought medical treatment for her hands.
In March
1994, she filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits.
Rev. Stat. (KRS) Chapter 342.
Ky.
She continued to work until she
underwent surgery on her right hand in August 1994.
She has not
returned to work since that time.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company provided workers’
compensation coverage for Barton through October 18, 1993; Royal
Insurance Company (Royal) provided coverage from October 15,
1993, through March 14, 1994; and Lumbermen’s/Kemper provided
coverage from March 1994 to the present.
The administrative law
judge (ALJ) determined, among other things, that Hall was
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permanently and totally disabled, that the date of injury (or
manifestation thereof) was May 1993, that Hall’s claim was not
barred by the statute of limitations, and that the Special Fund
was liable for 12% of Hall’s income benefits.
the Special Fund appealed to the board.
Barton/Liberty and
The board, in turn,
determined that the following findings were based on substantial
evidence:
1) Hall was totally disabled, 2) Hall’s disability
manifested itself in May 1993, and 3) the Special Fund was
partially liable.
In addition, however, the board determined
that the ALJ did not decide the issue of limitations based upon a
correct understanding of the evidence.
Therefore, it remanded
Hall’s claim to the ALJ for “reconsideration of her findings
regarding the date on which the disabling reality of Hall’s
condition became manifest and the application of the statute of
limitations in light of Dr. Kutz’ testimony.”
This appeal
followed.
On direct appeal, Barton/Liberty asserts that the ALJ
erred in its determination that Hall’s disability became manifest
in May 1993.
It argues that the correct date of manifestation
should have been in August 1994, as Hall continued working until
then.
We believe the ALJ’s determination that Hall’s disability
manifested itself in May 1993 is based on substantial evidence.
See Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky. App., 673 S.W.2d 735
(1984).
Although Hall underwent surgery on one thumb in 1988,
she worked continuously from February 1989 until 1994.
With the
exception of one visit to the doctor in 1992, further medical
treatment was unnecessary until May 1993, when Hall's condition
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was sufficient to affect her work.
She resumed treatment with
Dr. Kutz at that point and told him that she had to leave work
because of the pain in her hands.
Soon thereafter she began to
demonstrate signs of nerve compression.
Contrary to Barton/
Liberty’s allegation, we find no authority requiring the
disability manifestation date to coincide with employment
cessation date.
Hence, we find no error in the ALJ’s
determination that Hall’s disability manifested in May 1993.
In the alternative, Barton/Liberty urges us to adopt a
“last exposure rule” wherein “the insurance carrier covering the
risk at the time of the most recent injury or exposure” would be
liable for benefits.
We reject this argument outright, as it is
well settled that in cumulative trauma cases, the “date of
injury,” for purposes of liability, is the date the disability
manifests itself.
S.W.2d 611 (1994).
Coslow v. General Electric Company, Ky., 877
We are bound to follow such precedent as
established by our supreme court.
SCR 1.030(8).
Barton/Liberty next contends that the ALJ’s finding of
total occupational disability was not based on substantial
evidence.
Specifically, it contends that Hall’s inability to
work resulted from her prior active hypertension.
The board
specifically found that:
[t]he functional capacity evaluation relied
upon by Dr. Kutz indicated that Hall could
lift no more that ten pounds maximum or five
pounds frequently and should avoid repetitive
work with her arms, overhead work, and the
use of vibratory tools. Dr. DuBou felt that
Hall could return to light work but only if
it was non-repetitive in nature. Sharon
Lane, the vocational evaluator, stated that
taking into account Hall’s low academic
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ability and her age, she would be totally
occupationally disabled. Hall herself
testified that she could not continue to
perform the sort of work that she had done in
the past for Barton. She also denied there
was any light duty at Barton that she could
perform. This is substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ’s finding of total
occupational disability. Although we concede
that another fact finder may have given more
weight to the testimony of the lay witnesses
regarding the existence of light duty work at
Barton’s plant and found Hall capable of
doing some work, there is ample evidence
supporting the conclusion reached by this
ALJ.
We agree with the board and believe the ALJ’s
determination of total occupational disability was supported by
substantial evidence.
On cross-appeal, Barton/Lumbermens complains that the
board erred in remanding Hall’s claim for a reconsideration of
the manifestation date of Hall’s disability and how it affects
the limitations issue.
In regard to limitations, the ALJ noted
that Hall’s 1988 medical problems were separate and distinct from
her 1993/1994 medical problems.
The board held that the ALJ
misconstrued the evidence in that Dr. Kutz had diagnosed Hall
with degenerative arthritis in both hands in 1988 and 1993.
The
board, therefore, remanded the cause for a reconsideration of the
disability manifestation date and its effect on the limitations
issue based on a correct understanding of the evidence.1
Having
reviewed the record, we believe that although the ALJ may have
1
We are baffled by the board holding, on one hand, that the
disability manifestation date set by the administrative law judge
(ALJ) was based on substantial evidence, yet, on the other hand,
remanding the cause to the ALJ for further consideration of that
date and its application to the statute of limitations.
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misstated Dr. Kutz’s testimony, such error was immaterial as she
had already referred to ample independent evidence supporting the
May 1993 disability manifestation date.
The board specifically
held that the assignment of such date was based on substantial
evidence.
We agree.
We, therefore, adopt the following excerpt
from Hon. Dwight Lovan’s dissent:
While the parties are entitled to an accurate
understanding of the evidence in accord with
Cook v. Paducah Recapping Service, Ky. 694
S.W.2d 684 (1985), if such a misunderstanding
will not materially alter what the ALJ has
decided, reversal . . . is unnecessary and
inappropriate.
We believe the board erred in reversing Hall’s claim and in
remanding it for the ALJ’s reconsideration.
On cross-appeal, the Special Fund argues that the ALJ’s
determination of the Fund's liability is not based on substantial
evidence.
We disagree.
functionally disabled.
Dr. DuBou reported that Hall was 16%
He stated further that 2% of such
disability resulted from the arousal of preexisting arthritis.
The apportionment of 12% liability to the Special Fund is
proportional to Dr. DuBou’s findings.
Hence, we believe there
was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s apportionment.
Having considered the appeal and cross-appeals herein,
we find no error other than the board's remand to the ALJ for
reconsideration of the evidence relating to the manifestation
date of injury and its impact on the statute of limitations.
We,
therefore, vacate that portion of the board's opinion and remand
same with directions to enter an order affirming the ALJ’s
decision.
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For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed on Direct Appeal No. 1998-CA002681-WC; affirmed on Cross-Appeal No. 1998-CA-002805-WC; and
reversed and remanded with directions on Cross-Appeal No. 1998CA-002783-WC.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR BARTON/LIBERTY:
BRIEF FOR PHYLISS HALL:
Laurie Goetz Kemp
Louisville, KY
Ben T. Haydon Jr.
Bardstown, KY
BRIEF FOR
BARTON/LUMBERMENS/KEMPER:
ATTORNEY FOR BARTON/ROYAL:
Emily L. Hoffman
Louisville, KY
William P. Swain
Mary Ann Kiwala
Louisville, KY
BRIEF FOR SPECIAL FUND:
Benjamin Johnson
Louisville, KY
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