R.C.D. TRUCKING v. REEVIS CARROLL; ROBERT WHITTAKER, DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND; HON. DONALD G. SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: July 23, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002497-WC
R.C.D. TRUCKING
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-92-O48686
v.
REEVIS CARROLL;
ROBERT WHITTAKER,
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND;
HON. DONALD G. SMITH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, JOHNSON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
RCD Trucking (RCD) appeals from an opinion and award
rendered May 26, 1998, in which the ALJ granted a reopening petition
brought by Reevis Carroll.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Carroll worked as a truck driver and a rock picker for RCD
from 1981 until February 7, 1992, during which time he had multiple
exposure to coal dust.
Prior to that time, he worked for almost
twelve (12) years in a concrete factory, a foundry, and an
underground coal mine, where he was exposed to cement, iron, and coal
dust.
On December 10, 1992, Carroll filed a claim for total
disability due to the occupational disease of coal workers’
pneumoconiosis.
His claim against RCD was settled at the prehearing
conference level for a fifty percent (50%) occupational disability.
The Special Fund did not participate in that settlement.
During the pendency of this claim, three (3) physicians
diagnosed Carroll as having category 1 pneumoconiosis.
Two (2) of
the doctors attributed his disease to exposure to a combination of
coal, rock, and sand dust, while the third physician gave no opinion
as to causation.
Three (3) other doctors found no occupational
disease or pneumoconiosis.
The relevant medical evidence was
summarized as follows:
Physician
X-Ray
FVC
FEV1
Anderson
1/0
82%
77%
Myers
1/1
80%
78%
Lane
1/1
---
---
Dahhan
0/0
88%
76%
Dineen
0/0
100%
85%
Vuskovich
0/0
84%
81%
On September 20, 1993, the ALJ entered an Opinion and
Award in favor of Carroll.
In so doing, the ALJ, on his own motion,
amended Carroll’s application to a claim for mixed dust exposure and
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decided Carroll’s claim pursuant to KRS 342.316.
The Special Fund
appealed, and the Board reversed this determination.
The Board found
that the 1987 restructuring of the Workers’ Compensation Act required
the claim to be prosecuted pursuant to KRS 342.732.
Both this Court
and the Supreme Court affirmed the Board, holding as follows:
The General Assembly developed a statutory
system in the Workers’ Compensation Act of 1987
in which the industry that creates the bulk of
the burden bears the brunt of the liability.
See Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Holmes, Ky.,
872 S.W.2d 446 (1994); Also see KRS 342.1201.
The General Assembly also imposed an additional
Special Fund Assessment against employers
engaged in the severance and processing of
coal. KRS 342.1201(6) and KRS 342.122(1)(b).
KRS 342.732 created a statutory
presumption regarding the establishment of
occupational disability where coal is a
medically significant exposure. Cf. Newberg
v. Reynolds, Ky., 831 S.W.2d 170 (1992). The
passage of this statute, in conjunction with
the overall system of the legislature in
revamping the entire Workers’ Compensation Act
in 1987 indicated an intent on the part of the
legislature that where coal is a medically
significant cause after the effective date of
KRS 342.732, then the occupational disability
is to be decided pursuant to that statute and
not the more general KRS 342.316 on
occupational disease.
Here the finding by the ALJ that Carroll
suffers from mixed dust pneumoconiosis is an
implicit finding that his exposure to coal dust
was a significant cause of this disease. Such
a conclusion is supported by the medical
opinions of Drs. Meyers and Anderson. The
finding of a Category I pneumoconiosis is
unchallenged on appeal and is supported by
substantial evidence. The pulmonary function
studies do not entitle Carroll to an award
greater than retraining incentive benefits.
-3-
The facts of this case clearly bring his claim
within the purview of KRS 342.732.
In Kentucky Harlan, supra, there was
medical evidence that the employee sustained a
mixed-type pneumoconiosis relating to exposure
to sand, coal and iron dust and also medical
proof that he suffered pure coal workers’
pneumoconiosis. Kentucky Harlan stated that in
cases where workers have mixed exposure to both
coal dust and other dust, KRS 342.732 would
apply if the inhalation of coal dust was a
substantial medical cause of any respiratory
impairment.
Accordingly, it is our opinion that the
legislature intended to make KRS 342.732,
rather than KRS 342.316, the sole remedy in
cases where not only was coal dust the last
exposure after the effective date of KRS
342.732, but it was also a medically
significant cause of the disease. The coal
dust exposure still must be a substantial cause
of pneumoconiosis in order to come within the
range of KRS 342.732.
Carroll v. Whittaker, Ky., No.
95-SC-276-WC (Not-To-Be-Published
Opinion rendered June 20, 1996).
On June 4, 1994, Carroll filed a motion to reopen his
claim, alleging a progression of his pneumoconiosis.
The claim was
assigned to an arbitrator, who denied the motion, finding
insufficient evidence to support reopening.
Carroll then sought a de
novo review of his motion to reopen before an ALJ.
In
support of
reopening, Carroll submitted a report and supplement from Dr. Harold
Bushey.
In response, RCD submitted medical reports from Dr. Matt
Vuskovich and Dr. A. Dahhan.
The ALJ summarized the medical evidence
in Carroll’s claim on reopening as including:
Physician
X-Ray
FVC
-4-
FEV1
Causation
Bushey
2/1,
3.08
q, T-5 zones liters
2.75 liters
Vuskovich
0/0
62%
59%
Dahhan
Negative
---
---
Smoking and
heart
disease
The ALJ noted the prior finding, that Carroll’s decreased
breathing was due to his exposure to occupational dust, had never
been reversed.
Consequently, the ALJ concluded this finding was res
judicata with regard to causation.
Based upon this evidence, the ALJ
found that Carroll’s pneumoconiosis had progressed from the
previously diagnosed Category 1/1 to Category 2/1.
The ALJ also
concluded that the 1996 amendments to KRS 342.125 were not
retroactive.
Finally, the ALJ found that RCD was entitled to credit
for previous payments of retraining incentive benefits.
affirmed the ALJ.
The Board
RCD now appeals to this Court.
The first issue in this case is whether the ALJ erred in
failing to apply the 1996 amendment to KRS 342.125(5)(a).
RCD argues
that the time limitations were applicable to Carroll’s claim even
though his last exposure to coal dust occurred in 1992.
The Board
disagreed, stating that, although the General Assembly designated
other portions of KRS 342.125 as remedial, it did not so designate
Section 125(5)(a).
The Board also concluded that the additional
requirements of KRS 342.125(5)(a) are substantive in nature and are
not to be retroactively applied.
-5-
We agree with the Board’s analysis finding that KRS
342.125(5)(a) should not be retroactively applied.
KRS 446.080(3)
provides that “no statute shall be construed to be retroactive,
unless expressly so declared.”
The law in effect on the date of
injury generally determines the rights of the injured worker and the
obligations of the defendant regarding income benefits for that
injury.
Maggard v. International Harvester, Inc., Ky., 508 S.W.2d
777 (1974).
However, legislation has been applied to causes of
action arising before its effective date in certain instances where
the courts have determined that the provision was remedial or
procedural in nature and that retroactive application of the
provision was consistent with the legislative intent.
v. Fields, Ky., 941 S.W.2d 473 (1997).
Benson’s Inc.
The Kentucky Supreme Court
explained this distinction in Peabody Coal Co.
v. Gossett, Ky., 819
S.W.2d 33 (1991):
A retrospective law, in a legal sense, is one
which takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under existing laws, or which creates
a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or
attaches a new disability, in respect to
transactions or considerations already past.
Therefore, despite the existence of some
contrary authority, remedial statutes, or
statutes relating to remedies or modes of
procedure, which do not create new or take away
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance
of the remedy or confirmation of such rights,
do not normally come within the legal
conception of a retrospective law, or the
general rule against the retrospective
operation of statutes. In this connection it
has been said that a remedial statute must be
so construed as to make it effect the evident
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purpose for which it was enacted, so that if
the reason of the statute extends to past
transactions, as well as to those in the
future, then it will be so applied although the
statute does not in terms so direct, unless to
do so would impair some vested right or violate
some constitutional guaranty.
Id. at 36; quoting, 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 354 (1974).
Section 125(5)(a) was enacted by the legislature in 1996
as part of the sweeping changes in the workers’ compensation laws.
The legislature set out certain statutes which it wished to be
applied retroactively, and KRS 342.125(5) was not so listed.
In
contrast, the legislature specifically set out that KRS 342.125(8)
was to be applied retroactively.
In addition, the 1996 amendment to KRS 342.125(5)(a)
requires a reopening claimant to show a progression of pneumoconiosis
on x-ray and development of respiratory impairment due to that
pneumoconiosis, and, in addition, it also requires two (2) additional
years of employment in Kentucky where the employee was continuously
exposed to the hazards of the disease.
The showing of additional
exposure after the entry of the original award is a new substantive
requirement for a claimant on reopening.
Given the substantive
import of the statute, we find that it is not remedial in nature, nor
is it consistent with the beneficent purpose underlying the Workers’
Compensation legislation in effect at the time of the injury.
Therefore, the ALJ and the Board correctly held that KRS
342.125(5)(a) cannot be accorded retroactive application.
-7-
Most of RCD’s remaining grounds of error involve the ALJ’s
reliance on Dr. Bushey’s report as a basis for granting Carroll’s
motion to reopen.
RCD first argues that Dr. Bushey’s ILO
Classification report was not submitted in a timely manner, and that
the ALJ abused his discretion in allowing the supplemental report to
be filed late.
KRS 342.316(2)(a) requires that the physician’s
report be accompanied by the latest ILO Classification report.
Moreover, the parties agree that the ILO Classification report was
not filed within the proof deadline.
Thus, RCD asserts that since
the ILO Classification report was not timely submitted, Dr. Bushey’s
entire report should not have been admitted and could not form the
basis of an award on reopening.
The Board disagreed, finding that the ALJ did not abuse
his discretion by allowing a late filing of the ILO Classification
report since the medical report and the x-ray interpretation from Dr.
Bushey were timely submitted.
We are concerned that the record does
not show compliance with the regulation for allowing extensions of
proof time.
803 KAR 25:010 § 16.
Nonetheless, we agree with the
Board that under the circumstances of this case, the ALJ’s decision
to allow the untimely filing of the ILO Classification report was not
an abuse of discretion.
RCD further argues that the Board erred in relying on Dr.
Bushey’s report and in finding that Carroll had met the statutory
requirements for reopening.
In our consideration of these matters,
-8-
we are mindful of the standard for appellate review of decisions by
the ALJ and the Board.
The ALJ, as finder of fact, has the authority
to determine the quality, character, and substance of the evidence
presented.
(1985).
Paramount Foods v. Burkhardt, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 418, 419
When the decision of the fact-finder favors the party with
the burden of proof, that decision will ordinarily be upheld on
appeal if there was some evidence of substance to support the
finding, meaning evidence which would permit a fact-finder to
reasonably find as it did.
641, 643 (1986).
Special Fund v. Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d
The purpose of the Board's review of a decision by
an ALJ is to decide whether the evidence is sufficient to support a
particular finding made by the ALJ, or whether such evidence as there
was before the ALJ should be viewed as uncontradicted and compelling
a different result.
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827
S.W.2d 685, 687 (1992).
The function of further review of the Board
in the Court of Appeals is to correct the Board only where the Court
perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued controlling
statutes or precedents, or committed an error in assessing the
evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.
Id. at 688.
RCD raises several evidentiary issues regarding the
sufficiency of Dr. Bushey’s report.
RCD argues that Dr. Bushey’s
report was improperly admitted because it did not comply with KRS
342.316(3)(b)1 and the quality control criteria set forth in the AMA
Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.
-9-
Along similar
lines, RCD also contends that Dr. Bushey’s report was improperly
admitted because the testing protocol contained in KRS 342.316(3) b)1
& 2 had not been established.
In support of these contentions, RCD
refers us to Fields v. Carbon River Coal Company, Ky.
App., 920
S.W.2d 880 (1996); and Miller v. Arch of Kentucky, Inc., 918 S.W.2d
748 (1996).
Unlike the circumstances in Fields and Miller, RCD does
not clearly set out how Dr. Bushey’s report fails to satisfy the AMA
Guidelines and the testing protocols.
Rather, RCD merely asserts
that Carroll failed to establish that Dr. Bushey followed the AMA
Guidelines and the testing protocols.
However, the Board found that
“the ALJ properly had before him x-ray evidence meeting the standards
of KRS 342.316."
In Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, supra, our Supreme
Court noted that the Board’s function is “to decide whether the
evidence is sufficient to support a particular finding made by the
ALJ, or whether such evidence as there was before the ALJ should be
viewed as uncontradicted and compelling a different result.
are judgment calls.
These
No purpose is served by second-guessing such
judgment calls, let alone third-guessing them.”
Id. at 687.
While
this Court is not obliged to defer to the Board in matters of law,
the ALJs and the Board are considerably more qualified than we to
determine the quality of medical evidence.
Consequently, we believe
that RCD bears the burden of clearly establishing that Dr. Bushey’s
-10-
report did not comply with the AMA Guidelines.
Based upon the
record, we cannot find the Board’s rulings on these evidentiary
matters were an abuse of discretion.
RCD argues that Dr. Bushey’s report was insufficient to
establish a progression of pneumoconiosis because he had never
previously examined Carroll, nor had he interpreted any of the x-rays
which had been made in Carroll’s prior claim.
RCD also argues that
there was insufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion to
show both a progression of pneumoconiosis and the progression of
respiratory impairment.
The finder of fact has authority to believe
part of the evidence and to disbelieve other parts even if it comes
from the same witness.
560 S.W.2d 15, 16 (1977)
Caudill v. Maloney's Discount Stores, Ky.,
Thus, the fact that Dr. Bushey had never
previously examined Carroll or reviewed the x-rays from the prior
claim is not determinative, so long as the evidence as a whole
supports the ALJ’s conclusion.
Likewise, Dr. Bushey’s failure to
properly state the FVC and FEV1 values as percentages of the
predicted values is not fatal to Carroll’s claim because the values
given in Dr. Vuskovich’s report clearly show a decline in the FVC and
FEV1 values from the time of the prior adjudication.
Although the
evidence regarding the progression of Carroll’s previously diagnosed
pneumoconiosis and the progression of his respiratory impairment was
conflicting, we are persuaded that the ALJ’s conclusion on these
issues was supported by evidence of substance.
-11-
We further agree with the ALJ and the Board that Carroll
proved that his decreased breathing capacity at the time of reopening
was caused by his occupational exposure to coal dust.
However, we
take issue with some of their reasoning on this point.
The ALJ and a
majority of the Board found the prior finding that Carroll suffered
from work-related pneumoconiosis was conclusive as to causation in
this proceeding.
Concerning the prior finding that causation for
Carroll’s pneumoconiosis had been established, we agree that this
determination is res judicata in the present proceeding.
However,
res judicata does not apply if the issue is claimant's physical
condition or degree of disability at two (2) different times.
Woodbridge INOAC, Inc. v. Downs, Ky. App., 864 S.W.2d 306, 307
(1993).
In Campbell v. Universal Mines, Ky., 963 S.W.2d 623
(1998), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the plain language of
KRS 342.125(2)(a) requires a prima facie showing of both a
progression of the disease and either the development or the
progression of a respiratory impairment in order for a worker to
prevail on a motion to reopen a RIB award.
A worker is not required
to show both category 2 pneumoconiosis and compensable respiratory
impairment in order to reopen, but only a progression of the disease
and a development or progression of impairment, so long as either the
disease or the impairment has progressed to the point of
compensability.
Id. at 625.
-12-
However, Campbell v. Universal Mines only refers to the
proof necessary for a claimant to establish a prima facie case for
reopening.
Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case, the
burden of going forward shifts to the party opposing the reopening.
If the prima facie case is not rebutted, then the finder of fact may
presume that the claimant’s previously diagnosed pneumoconiosis has
progressed to a compensable level as a result of his or her workrelated exposure.
However, the claimant retains the ultimate burden
of proving that a significant change in occupational disability has
occurred, and that the disability is a result of the disease which
was the subject of the original award.
Nonetheless, it is beyond doubt that pneumoconiosis is a
progressive disease which may worsen, but does not improve.
v. Mountain Top, Inc., Ky., 968 S.W.2d 91, 96 (1998).
Begley
In the present
case, Dr. Vuskovich, who testified on behalf of RCD, attributed the
progression of the breathing impairment to Carroll’s smoking habit
and to cardiovascular disease.
However, the ALJ chose not to believe
Dr. Vuskovich’s opinion as to causation.
While Dr. Bushey did not
give an opinion regarding the cause of the progression of Carroll’s
pneumoconiosis, the ALJ was entitled to infer that Carroll’s
pneumoconiosis has progressed as a result of his work-related
exposure.
Although the evidence was conflicting, we find sufficient
evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion.
-13-
Accordingly, the opinion and order of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
REEVIS CARROLL:
David H. Neeley
Neeley & Reynolds Law Offices
P.S.C.
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
Donald Wayne Taylor, Jr.
Stumbo, Barber & Moak, P.S.C.
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
SPECIAL FUND OF KENTUCKY:
David W. Barr
Louisville, Kentucky
-14-
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