CITY OF LOUISVILLE v. LARRY SLACK; HONORABLE FREEDA CLARK, INDIVIDUALLY; HONORABLE DONNA H. TERRY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: May 14, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002330-WC
CITY OF LOUISVILLE
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-96-80453
v.
LARRY SLACK; HONORABLE FREEDA CLARK,
INDIVIDUALLY; HONORABLE DONNA H. TERRY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, GUIDUGLI, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal by the City of Louisville
challenging the constitutionality of Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS) 342.320(2)(c), which requires an employer, or the
employer’s insurer, to pay up to $5,000 of the employee’s
attorney fees if the employer appeals a benefit determination of
an arbitrator or order of an administrative law judge and does
not prevail on the appeal.
We hold that KRS 342.320(2)(c) is
constitutional.
In May 1997, Larry Slack (Slack) filed a workers’
compensation claim for an injury that occurred in August 1996.
The matter was referred to an arbitrator pursuant to KRS 342.270.
In August 1997, the arbitrator issued her written benefit
determination decision.
The arbitrator found Slack to have a 40%
permanent partial impairment as a result of his injury and
awarded him permanent partial disability benefits in the amount
of $100.83 per week.
The City of Louisville appealed that decision and
requested a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge
(ALJ) pursuant to KRS 342.275.
On March 9, 1998, the ALJ issued
her opinion, which found Slack to be totally disabled and awarded
him $250.06 per week in temporary total disability income
benefits, an award more favorable to Slack than the arbitrator’s
award.
Thereafter, Slack moved for an award of attorney fees
pursuant to KRS 342.320(2)(c).
The ALJ subsequently granted
Slack a $4,000 fee to be assessed against the City of Louisville.
The City of Louisville filed for reconsideration of the award,
alleging that KRS 342.320(2)(c) is unconstitutional and that
imposition of the fee constituted an unjust taking of property.
Pursuant to KRS 418.075, the Office of the Attorney General was
notified of the challenge to the statute’s constitutionality.
The ALJ declined to rule on the constitutional issue,
correctly noting that the constitutionality of a statute is
reserved for the Court of Justice.
See Blue Diamond Coal Company
v. Cornett, Ky., 189 S.W.2d 963 (1945); and Kentucky Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board v. Jacobs, Ky., 269 S.W.2d 189 (1954).
The City of Louisville subsequently appealed the issue to the
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Workers’ Compensation Board.
For the same reasons cited by the
ALJ, the Board appropriately declined to pass on the
constitutionality of KRS 342.320(2)(c).
This appeal followed.
KRS 342.320(2)(c), which is a part of the revisions to
the Workers’ Compensation Statutes passed by the Legislature in
1996, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Upon an appeal by an employer or carrier from
a written determination of an arbitrator or
an award or order of an administrative law
judge, if the employer or carrier does not
prevail upon appeal, the administrative law
judge shall fix an attorney's fee to be paid
by the employer or carrier for the employee's
attorney upon consideration of the extent,
quality, and complexity of the services
rendered not to exceed five thousand dollars
($5,000) per level of appeal.
The City of Louisville argues that KRS 342.320(2)(c) is
unjust because it constitutes class legislation; is a denial of
due process; and is a violation of the Constitution of the United
States and of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
The City of Louisville relies primarily upon the case
Burns v. Shepherd, Ky., 264 S.W.2d 685 (1953).
Burns considered
the constitutionality of KRS 342.320(2), Acts of 1952, Chapter
182, Sec. 12, under which an employer was required to pay
one-half of the claimant's attorney fees in the case of an award
by the Workmen's Compensation Board growing out of injury or
death of an employee.
The Burns Court found the statute to be
unconstitutional, holding:
Unless based upon some unreasonable
delay or willful failure of the employer,
there could be no more constitutional
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justification for requiring the employer to
pay all or part of the employee's attorney
fee than to require payment of his grocery
bill. Unless some standards are provided by
which the requirement would apply only to
employers who have unreasonably or willfully
violated some obligation which they owe to an
employee, we do not think the statute can be
sustained as constitutional. It violates the
due process clause of the Federal
Constitution and Section 2 of the Kentucky
Constitution which declares that absolute and
arbitrary power exists nowhere in a republic.
Burns at 687-688.
The Burns opinion addressed prior Kentucky cases
dealing with statutes imposing attorney fees upon one party when
the opposing party was not granted a similar right if
successful.1
In regard to these cases, the Burns Court stated:
Throughout all of the cases is the
fundamental principle that the imposition of
the fees is justified solely on the ground
that the person responsible for their payment
has brought about the situation through which
the fees are incurred by the willful
violation of some statutory or contractual
obligation. In the statute under
consideration, no distinction is made between
the just and the unjust. It applies with
equal force to the employer who, without
reasonable basis for his position, is trying
to escape his statutory responsibility, and
the employer who is neither seeking to avoid
or delay payment of a valid claim asserted by
the employee.
Burns at 687.
1
See Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers'
Co-op. Ass'n, 208 Ky. 643, 271 S.W. 695 (1925) (upholding the
Bingham Co-operative Marketing Act, one provision of which
imposed attorney fees against the warehouse if it should become
liable for a violation of the Act); and W. W. Mac Co. v. Teague,
297 Ky. 475, 180 S.W.2d 387 (1944) (holding as constitutional a
provision of the Women and Minors' Act requiring payment of
attorney fees by the employer where he had failed to pay the
wages prescribed and an action was instituted against him by the
employee on that account).
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Burns has not been explicitly overruled by the Kentucky
Supreme Court and ostensibly supports the City of Louisville’s
position.
However, Owens v. Clemons, Ky., 408 S.W.2d 642 (1966),
substantially weakened Burns.
The Owens Court stated “[t]he
broad statement in [Burns] that the sole justification for the
imposition of fees is the willful violation of a statutory
obligation is inaccurate.”
Owens at 645.
The Court noted that
cases preceding Burns had upheld the assessment of attorney fees
to successful litigants against nonprevailing litigants.2
Id.
Owens upheld the constitutionality of KRS 337.360,
which permitted the awarding of attorney fees against a losing
employer in claims brought by employees under the minimum wage
laws.
Owens, noting the conflict with the Burns opinion, stated
“[s]ince . . . the public policy exemplified under both laws is
basically the same, we now have some question concerning the
soundness of the Burns decision.”
Owens at 646.
In view of the
foregoing, we do not believe Burns is controlling in the case at
bar.
See Supreme Court Rule 1.030(8)(a).
The City of Louisville identifies three bases whereby
KRS 342.320(2)(c) is unconstitutional:
(1) because it
constitutes class legislation; (2) because it is a denial of due
process; and (3) because it generally violates the Constitution
2
See Teague, 297 Ky. 475, 180 S.W.2d at 387 (fees can
be justified as a protective measure for a certain class of
workers); Chicago & N.W.Ry. Co. v. Nye-Schneider-Fowler Co., 260
U.S. 35, 43 S. Ct. 55, 67 L. Ed. 115 (1922) (basis for upholding
a statute allowing attorney fees to those asserting property
damage claims against railroad companies was that such a law
stimulated the seasonable consideration and prompt payment of
such claims).
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of the United States and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky.
We disagree.
KRS 342.320(2)(c) is not unconstitutional under Section
59 of the Kentucky Constitution as impermissible class
legislation.
Section 59 does not prohibit the legislature from
making reasonable classifications.
Kentucky Milk Marketing and
Anti-Monopoly Commission v. Borden Co., Ky. 456 S.W.2d 831, 835
(1969).
Where a classification is one made on a reasonable and
natural distinction, having a reasonable relationship to the
purposes of the Act, it does not run afoul of Section 59.
Id.
The fact that a statute discriminates in favor of a certain class
does not render it unconstitutional if the discrimination is
founded upon a reasonable distinction or if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived to sustain it.
Id.
KRS
342.320(2)(c) reasonably requires employers to help finance an
employee’s additional attorney fees when the employer appeals a
benefit determination decision and does not prevail on the
appeal.
It may reasonably be conceived that employers and their
insurers have greater financial resources than employees to
pursue workers’ compensation litigation.
Hence, “discrimination”
between the employer “class” and the employee “class” is founded
upon a reasonable distinction and is not impermissible class
legislation under Section 59.
Similarly, KRS 342.320 is not unconstitutional as a
violation of equal protection.
The standards for equal
protection classifications under the State Constitution are the
same as those under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
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Constitution and a single standard can be applied to both State
and Federal Constitutions.
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Commonwealth
of Kentucky, Revenue Cabinet, Ky., 689 S.W.2d 14, 18 (1985).
The
constitutionality of a statute that regulates economic matters
will be upheld if its classification is not arbitrary, or if it
is founded upon any substantial distinction suggesting necessity
or propriety of such legislation.
App., 920 S.W.2d 79 (1996).
Leeco, Inc. v. Baker, Ky.
In the area of economic legislation,
the legislature does not violate equal protection or due process
merely because the classifications made by its statutes are
imperfect.
Unless a classification requires some form of
heightened review because it jeopardizes the exercise of a
fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently
suspect characteristic, the equal protection clause of the
Federal Constitution requires only that the classification be
analyzed under the rational basis test.
Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 49 L. Ed. 2d
520 (1976); Commonwealth v. Howard, Ky., 969 S.W.2d 700, 702-703
(1998).
Under the rational basis test, a classification must be
upheld against an equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.
Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509
U.S. 312, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 125 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1993), citing
F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 113 S. Ct.
2096, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1993); Commonwealth v. Howard, 969
S.W.2d at 700.
In the workers' compensation context, the General
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Assembly may properly classify in its legislation, provided the
"objective is legitimate and the classification is rationally
related to that objective."
Mullins v. Manning Coal Corp., Ky.,
938 S.W.2d 260, 263 (1997), cert. denied, ______ U.S. ______, 117
S. Ct. 2511, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1014 (1997), quoting Chapman v.
Eastern Coal Corp., Ky., 519 S.W.2d 390, 393 (1975); see also
Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Holmes, Ky., 872 S.W.2d 446 (1994).
The discrepancy of financial resources available to an
employer and its insurance carrier in comparison to the financial
resources available to a partially or wholly disabled employee is
a rational basis sufficient to justify requiring employers to pay
attorney fees upon losing an appeal, while not requiring
employees to do likewise.
Hence, KRS 342.320(2)(c), under the
equal protection rational basis test, does not create
unconstitutional classifications by permitting employees to
recover attorney fees from nonprevailing employers, while not
permitting employers to recover from nonprevailing employees.
The City of Louisville’s contention that KRS
342.320(2)(c) violates due process constitutional protections is
likewise unpersuasive.
When economic and business rights are
involved, rather than fundamental rights, substantive due process
requires that the statute be rationally related to a legitimate
state objective.
Stephens v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
Ky., 894 S.W.2d 624, 627 (1995).
A court dealing with a
challenge to the constitutionality of an act of the General
Assembly must "necessarily begin with the strong presumption in
favor of constitutionality and should so hold if possible."
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Brooks v. Island Creek Coal Co., Ky. App., 678 S.W.2d 791, 792
(1984).
Due process or equal protection is violated "'only if
the resultant classifications or deprivations of liberty rest on
grounds wholly irrelevant to a reasonable state objective.'"
Edwards v. Louisville Ladder, Ky. App., 957 S.W.2d 290, 295-296
(1997).
Hence, again, legislation concerning economic matters is
tested for constitutional substantive due process violations
using the rational basis test.
For reasons similar to those set
forth in our discussion of the rational basis test under equal
protection, supra, the statute at issue is rationally related to
a legitimate state objective, and hence is not a violation of
substantive due process constitutional rights.
KRS 342.320(2)(c) is likewise not unconstitutional
under procedural due process.
The fundamental requirement of
procedural due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and manner.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976); Conrad v. LexingtonFayette Urban County Government, Ky., 659 S.W.2d 190, 197 (1983).
“It is an established rule that an enactment accords due process
of law, if it affords a method of procedure, with notice, and
operates on all alike.”
Parrish v. Claxon Truck Lines, Ky., 286
S.W.2d 508, 512 (1955), quoting Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis,
241 U.S. 440, 36 S. Ct. 637, 60 L. Ed. 1084 (1916).
Procedural
due process is always had when a party has sufficient notice and
opportunity to make his defense.
Somsen v. Sanitation Dist. No.
1 of Jefferson County, Ky., 197 S.W.2d 410, 411 (1946).
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The statute is silent as to notice and hearing
requirements; however, KRS 342.320(1) provides that “[a]ll fees
of attorneys . . . shall be subject to the approval of an
administrative law judge or arbitrator pursuant to the statutes
and administrative regulations.”
Hence, we will construe KRS
342.320(2)(c) to require notice and the opportunity to be heard
in accordance with procedural due process requirements.
See
Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. Jacobs, 269 S.W.2d
at 192.
In the case at bar, the City of Louisville was provided
with adequate notice and was afforded the opportunity to
challenge the ALJ’s award of attorney fees.
There is no evidence
that the City of Louisville sought a hearing and was denied same,
or was in any way denied the opportunity to challenge the
arbitrator’s award.
Finally, we note that the awarding of attorney fees is
permitted, or required, in a number of other situations.
KRS
403.340(4) requires attorney fees and costs to be assessed
against a party seeking modification of child custody if the
court finds that the modification action is vexatious and
constitutes harassment; KRS 403.220 permits a circuit court in a
domestic relations case, after consideration of the financial
resources of the parties, to order a party to pay a reasonable
amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or
defending an action; KRS 453.060(1) permits a successful party
represented by a licensed attorney, when no jury is impaneled, to
be awarded attorney fees; KRS 453.060(2) requires a guardian ad
litem or warning order attorney to be paid a reasonable fee for
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his services, to be paid by the plaintiff and taxed as costs; KRS
387.305 requires a reasonable fee to be paid to a guardian ad
litem by the plaintiff; KRS 453.260 permits the awarding of
attorney fees in lawsuits in which the Commonwealth is a party to
the action; KRS 271B.13-310, in an appraisal proceeding commenced
under KRS 271B.13-300, permits a court to assess the fees and
expenses of counsel for the respective parties.
Hence, the treatment of attorney fees under KRS
342.320(2)(c) is not particularly unique in requiring a party to
defer the legal expenses of his opposing party.
For the foregoing reasons, KRS 342.320(2)(c) is
adjudged constitutional under the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FURNISHES SEPARATE
OPINION.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
I respectfully dissent.
Initially, I would point out that Burns v. Shephard, Ky., 264
S.W.2d 688 (1953), has not been overruled and is still
controlling.
Supreme Court Rule 1.030(8)(a).
The majority held
that Owens v. Clemons, Ky., 408 S.W.2d 642 (1966), has
“substantially weakened” Burns and as such, they do not believe
Burns is controlling in the case at bar.
I do not agree.
SCR
1.030(8)(a) mandates the Court of Appeals to follow applicable
precedents established in the opinions of the Supreme Court and
its predecessor court.
As such, until Burns is explicitly
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overturned by the Kentucky Supreme Court, we, as an inferior
appellate court, are bound by its holding.
Further, I would state that KRS 342.320(2)(c) does
appear to violate the due process clause of the Federal
Constitution and Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution and thus
is unconstitutional.
I believe the mandatory language of the
statute requiring the employer to pay the employee’s attorney
fees is solely punitive in nature.
The statute mandates the
employer who appeals to pay a punitive fine if he is
unsuccessful, but does not require the same of an unsuccessful
employee who rightfully exercised his due process right.
aptly stated in Burns:
In the statute under consideration, no
distinction is made between the just and the
unjust. It applies with equal force to the
employer who, without reasonable basis for
his position, is trying to escape his
statutory responsibility, and the employer
who is neither seeking to avoid or delay
payment of a valid claim asserted by the
employee.
As illustrating how the statute may
penalize an innocent employer, there may be
many instances in which there would be a good
faith disagreement between the employer and
employee as to the extent of disability
resulting from an injury. The award of the
Board may agree with the employer in
determining the extent of disability; yet, if
there is any award whatever, the employer is
required to pay one-half of the attorney fee,
notwithstanding he may have been completely
successful in sustaining his position.
Unless based upon some unreasonable
delay or willful failure of the employer,
there could be no more constitutional
justification for requiring the employer to
pay all or part of the employee’s attorney
fee than to require payment of his grocery
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As
bill. Unless some standards are provided by
which the requirement would apply only to
employers who have unreasonably or willfully
violated some obligation which they owe to an
employee, we do not think the statute can be
sustained as constitutional.
Burns, supra, at 687-688.
Finally, I would point out that the majority’s reliance
upon the discrepancy of financial resources between employer and
employee as a rational basis to justify the constitutionality of
the statute is misplaced.
KRS 342.310 specifically addresses the
assessment of cost in an unreasonable proceeding.
Pursuant to
subsection (1) the arbitrator, ALJ, Workers’ Compensation Board,
or any court may assess the entire cost of the proceedings,
including attorney fees, if it is determined that any proceeding
therein has been “brought, prosecuted or defended without
reasonable ground(s).”
For the foregoing reasons, I believe the majority has
overstepped its authority and further believe that KRS 342.320(2)
is unconstitutional.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
Stuart E. Alexander, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
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