AMERICAN CONTINENTAL INSURANCE CO. v. N.K.C. HOSPITALS, INC.
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RENDERED: December 10, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002318-MR
AMERICAN CONTINENTAL INSURANCE CO.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-001795
v.
N.K.C. HOSPITALS, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
American Continental Insurance Company (ACIC)
appeals from an amended opinion and order entered by the
Jefferson Circuit Court on August 20, 1998 which awarded judgment
in favor of NKC Hospitals, Inc. (NKC).1
We affirm.
THE GORDON CLAIM
On January 15, 1988 a fire occurred on NKC’s premises.
Bryan Gordon (Gordon), an employee of a painting contractor hired
to do work on the premises, was severely injured as a result of
1
Although NKC is now Alliant Health Systems, Inc., we will refer to it as NKC for
purposes of this appeal.
the fire.
John Smither (Smither), NKC’s Director of Risk
Management, was notified of the fire on the day it occurred.
A field incident report dated January 15, 1988 listed
the cause of the fire as ignition of gasoline by a cigarette
lighter.
An investigator’s field report of the same date listed
the cause of the fire as being ignition of gasoline vapors by
either a cigarette lighter or a spark from the blower or motor of
a wall mounted heating unit in the room in which the fire
occurred.
This report indicated that the heater did not cause
the fire because the heater’s power switch was in the “off”
position and no one questioned during the investigation admitted
to turning the heater off.
On January 13, 1989 Gordon filed suit against NKC to
recover damages for the injuries he sustained as a result of the
fire.
In both his deposition and in conjunction with his
settlement of a workers’ compensation claim, Gordon stated that
the fire was caused by a co-worker who used a cigarette lighter
to ignite gasoline poured from a clean-up bucket.
Following a
jury trial which resulted in a verdict in Gordon’s favor,
judgment was entered against NKC on December 2, 1991 in the
amount of $2,983,806.60 plus interest and costs.
Although this court later reversed the judgment, the
Kentucky Supreme Court ordered it reinstated.
Hospitals, Inc., Ky., 887 S.W.2d 360 (1994).
Gordon v. NKC
Subsequent to
reinstatement of the judgment, NKC paid Gordon $4,200,892.32 on
December 7, 1994, said amount representing the original judgment
plus accrued interest and costs.
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NKC’S RELATIONSHIP WITH ACIC
At the time of the fire, NKC was insured under a
“claims made” policy issued by The Travelers Insurance Company.
The renewal date for the Travelers’ policy was February 1, 1988.
For reasons not apparent from the record, it appears that NKC had
decided to procure coverage elsewhere.
On January 20, 1988, five days after the occurrence of
the fire, NKC submitted an application for Hospital Professional
Liability and Comprehensive General Liability insurance and a
separate application for Hospital Umbrella Liability Insurance to
ACIC.
Although NKC was seeking coverage under the terms of the
umbrella policy only, ACIC required NKC to fill out applications
for both the primary and excess policies.
Although the application for primary coverage asked for
“an itemized descriptive breakdown of all Hospital and
Comprehensive General Liability losses for the past five years
plus this year to date” it is not clear from the record whether
NKC complied as there was no attachment to the numerous copies of
the application in the record.
Under question no. 11 for the
excess policy, NKC was asked to state its loss record during the
last five years in regard to vehicles, aircraft, water craft and
professional general liability.
aircraft and water craft.
NKC answered “none” next to
Neither application asked NKC to
disclose any information regarding pending claims, incidents or
occurrences which may eventually result in a claim.
NKC did not
advise ACIC of the occurrence of the fire in either application.
-3-
Both applications were sign by Smither on January 18,
1988 in his capacity as Director of Risk Management.
Immediately
above his signature on the primary application was the following
language:
The applicant represents that the
above statements and facts are true
and that no material facts have
been suppressed or misstated.
Above the signature line on the excess application, the following
language appeared:
We know of no other relevant facts
which might affect underwriter’s
judgment when considering this
application.
On February 12, 1988 Angela Nevels (Nevels), who
appears to be an ACIC employee, wrote to NKC’s insurance broker,
stating:
One of the conditions of coverage
with [ACIC] was the exclusion of
all known claims and circumstances.
To verify, we need a list of all
claims reported to NKC’s carriers
prior to expiration (known claims
and circumstances upon knowledge of
binding with [ACIC]).
It appears that NKC complied with this request, but once again
the occurrence of the fire and Gordon’s injuries were not
reported.
ACIC issued a claims-made Hospital Umbrella Liability
Insurance Policy to NKC under Policy No. 88L0088.
Although the
policy period was listed as February 1, 1988 to February 2, 1989
the policy provided a retroactive date for coverage of January 1,
1986.
The total policy premium was listed as $902,462.90.
Under
the terms of the policy, NKC was self- insured up to $2,000,000
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per “occurrence” with a yearly aggregate of $5,000,000.
The
policy further provided that ACIC agreed to
pay on behalf of [NKC] for ultimate
net loss in excess of the
underlying limit or retained limit
which [NKC] shall become legally
obligated to pay . . . for damages
because of . . . bodily injury . .
. caused by or arising out of an
occurrence[.]
The policy also set forth when a claim would be
considered to be first made.
Under the relevant language, a
claim would be considered made at the earlier of the following:
(a) When [NKC] receives notice that
a claim has been made, or
(b) When [NKC] first gives written
notice to [ACIC] of a specific
OCCURRENCE involving a particular
person or situation and stating
that it might reasonably be
expected to result in a claim.
[emphasis in original]
Under the “Exclusions” portion of the policy, the
following language appeared:
[This policy does not apply to]
liability of [NKC] for damages
resulting from an injury, harm, or
loss if, prior to the inception of
this policy period, any claim has
been made against [NKC] by anyone
for such damages or if [NKC] could
have reasonably foreseen that such
injury, harm, or loss might result
in a claim for such damages.
Attached to the policy was a list of 30 claims with dates of
occurrence ranging from February 12, 1986 to November 20, 1987
which were designated as being specifically excluded from
coverage.
The Gordon claim does not appear on this list.
-5-
Finally, the policy provided that “whenever it appears
that an occurrence is likely to involve this policy, written
notice thereof shall be given to [ACIC] or any of its authorized
agents as soon as practicable.”
The policy was ultimately renewed over the next several
years as follows:
YEAR
PREMIUM
1988
1989
1990
1991
$ 847,383
_________
$1,050,006
$1,457,313
ACIC’s coverage of NKC was continuous until the policy expired on
April 1, 1991.
ACIC’S DENIAL OF LIABILITY FOR THE GORDON CLAIM
It appears that during each policy renewal period, NKC
submitted a list of yearly liability claims to ACIC.
liability claims list included the Gordon claim.
The 1989
Under the
“Indemnity” column of the list, “0" was entered for both
“Reserve” and “Paid.”
A handwritten notation reading “industrial
accident” was written on the report in regard to the Gordon
listing.
In an internal memo dated June 13, 1990, Lori Barreca
(Barreca), an ACIC claims consultant, indicated that she had
reviewed the current loss run as part of an annual audit.
In another internal memo dated January 13, 1992,
Barreca directly addressed the Gordon claim.
It appears that
several weeks prior to the memo, Smither called her and reported
the jury verdict.
The memo stated:
While I cannot put a specific date
on day [sic] I had “knowledge” of
the event, I do recall discussing
-6-
it with John. I recall it was the
opinion of both John and me that
the case was not one in which the
hospital would be liable. It
appeared to be a case of contractor
liability. Therefore, the case was
not reported to us.
. . .
In June 1990 my audit report states
I did review the loss run.
Although I do not specifically
recall discussing the Gordon case I
must have seen it and asked about
it. At audits I routinely review
each entry on the internal loss
run. I did identify two other
cases from the loss run which
needed to be reported. [emphasis in
original]
In a follow-up memo of the same date, Barreca stated:
I have discovered the handwritten
notes taken at the time of the
5/22/90 account visit. On the
[NKC] internal loss run I have made
a notation next to the Gordon case
indicating this was an “industrial
accident” and it involved 3 subcontractors and a fire.
. . .
Therefore on 5/22/90 I was aware of
the case as it was discussed at
that time. It was thought to be an
“industrial” case and therefore not
one involving hospital liability.
On December 23, 1991, Smither wrote to Jeff Troyer, who
replaced Barreca as claims consultant, regarding the Gordon claim
and jury verdict.
In the letter, Smither indicated that the
claim had not been formally reported but was listed on the loss
runs.
Smither further stated that while he had set a legal
reserve of $20,000, there was no reserve established for
liability.
Smither further stated that the claim had never been
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formally reported because it did not meet ACIC’s reporting
requirements.
Troyer responded by letter dated January 9, 1992.
Although Troyer acknowledged receipt of written notice, he
further indicated that “your verbal and written notice . . . was
given to me outside your active policy period.”
Under the terms
of the letter, ACIC reserved its rights in regard to any
potential coverage of the Gordon claim.
On March 16, 1992 ACIC filed a declaratory judgment
action with the trial court regarding its liability for the
Gordon claim.
In an initial opinion and order entered by the
trial court on February 19, 1998 following a bench trial, the
trial court held that ACIC was indeed liable to pay the excess
amount of the Gordon claim over $2,000,000 plus interest at the
rate of 12% from December 2, 1991, the date judgment was entered
on the Gordon claim.
The trial court further held ACIC liable
for payment of NKC’s costs and legal expenses incurred from the
date of the jury verdict in the Gordon claim.
In regard to ACIC’s argument that NKC intentionally
failed to report the Gordon claim on its January 18, 1988
applications, the trial court found that ACIC failed to bring
forth any evidence regarding whether the omission was
intentional.
Although the trial court stated that “common sense
would dictate an injury of this proportion should have been
included” on the application, the trial court held that ACIC had
failed to show that a material misrepresentation occurred because
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it failed to show that the omission was intentional, material and
fraudulent.
The trial court also found that ACIC had been given
proper notice of the Gordon claim.
The trial court noted that
under the terms of the policy, notice was to be given “whenever
it appeals that an occurrence is likely to involve this policy,”
and further held:
Given the fact that all parties
overlooked this claim, NKC was
under no duty to give formal
written notice until after they
realized that the case was in
excess of the two million dollar .
. . coverage.
The trial court reasoned that because NKC could not anticipate
that the claim would exceed $2,000,000 until after the jury
returned its verdict, its notice of December 31, 1991 was
adequate under the language of the policy.
The trial court
further found that ACIC did, in fact, have notice of the claim
prior to NKC’s written notice by virtue of the loss run reports
and Barreca’s memos, stating:
The fact that [ACIC] chose either
to do nothing about this claim or,
more importantly, agreed with NKC
as to the merits of Mr. Gordon’s
claim leads to the exposure they
now claim was NKC’s fault.
As to ACIC’s argument that NKC breached the agreement
because it failed to report the claim after the policy expired,
the trial court found that there never was a gap in coverage
because ACIC “continued to cover NKC through 1991.”
The trial
court further found that NKC did not breach its duty to cooperate
under the terms of the policy.
-9-
Following motions by both NKC and ACIC for further
clarification of the court’s order,
the trial court entered an
amended opinion and order on August 20, 1998.
Under the amended
opinion, the trial court omitted its earlier statement that
common sense dictated that the Gordon claim should have been
reported on the application.
The major change in the amended
opinion was that the trial court specifically undertook to
calculate the damages payable to NKC under the terms of the
policy.
The trial court held that under the definition of
“ultimate net loss” as set forth in the policy, the sum that NKC
actually paid to Gordon in December 1994 was the proper measure
of damages.
Furthermore, the trial court held that because NKC
was entitled to payment from ACIC of “all expenses incurred,” it
was proper to award litigation costs.
The trial court further
held that the 12% interest which accrued from the date of the
judgment was also properly included as “ultimate net loss.”
The
trial court ultimately entered judgment in favor of NKC as
follows: (1) $2,200,892.32 representing ACIC’s share of the
amount paid by NKC under the judgment in the Gordon claim; (2)
legal fees in the amount of $107,266.07 incurred by NKC
in
defending the Gordon claim; and (3) pre-judgment interest at the
rate of 8& from December 7, 1994 to the date of entry of this
judgment and post-judgment interest of 12% compounded annually
until paid.
This appeal followed.
ACIC contends that NKC’s failure to either identify the
Gordon claim or the fact that a fire resulting in injuries
occurred on its application for insurance constituted a material
-10-
misrepresentation which would allow it to deny coverage of the
claim.
In support of its argument, ACIC relies on the language
contained in the application for excess coverage above Smither’s
signature regarding NKC’s knowledge of relevant facts which might
affect underwriter’s judgment in deciding whether to accept the
risk.
ACIC also points to the correspondence from Nevels to
NKC’s insurance agent.
Finally, ACIC relies on KRS 304.14-110,
which provides:
All statements and descriptions in
any application for an insurance
policy or annuity contract, by or
on behalf of the insured or
annuitant, shall be deemed to be
representations and not warranties.
Misrepresentations, omissions, and
incorrect statements shall not
prevent a recovery under the policy
or contract unless either:
(1) Fraudulent; or
(2) Material either to the
acceptance of the risk, or to the
hazard assumed by the insurer; or
(3) The insurer in good faith would
either not have issued the policy
or contract, or would not have
issued it at the same premium rate,
or would not have issued a policy
or contract in as large an amount,
or would not have provided coverage
with respect to the hazard
resulting in the loss, if the true
facts had been made known to the
insurer as required either by the
application for the policy or
contract or otherwise. This
subsection shall not apply to
applications taken for workers’
compensation insurance coverage.
Having reviewed the insurance applications and the relevant case
law, we agree with the trial court that NKC did not make a
representation which would allow ACIC to deny coverage for the
Gordon claim.
-11-
Our review of the applications for coverage submitted
by NKC shows that ACIC failed to
ask NKC to disclose claims or
incidents which had the potential to ripen into claims at a later
date.
While NKC was asked to disclose its actual loss record for
the last five years in the application for excess coverage it was
not asked to divulge any information pertaining to claims,
incidents or pending matters at the time it submitted the
application.
We believe that the failure on ACIC’s part to
request this information precludes application of KRS 304.14-110
and forecloses ACIC’s
ability to deny coverage for the Gordon
claim.
In Niagra Fire Ins. Co. v. Layne, Ky., 172 S.W. 1090
(1915), the insurer issued a fire insurance policy on a building
and merchandise stored therein.
Although the policy stated that
it would become void should the merchandise become subject to a
chattel mortgage, the application did not ask any questions
pertaining to whether the property was encumbered.
When the
building and its contents were destroyed by fire, the court was
asked to decide:
the effect of the failure of an
applicant for insurance to
communicate to the insurer the fact
of an incumbrance on the property
to be insured, where no inquiry is
made concerning the subject, and
where the policy has a forfeiture
clause similar to the one sued on.
Layne, 172 S.W. at 1091.
In holding that the failure of the
insured to disclose the encumbrance was not a misrepresentation,
the court stated:
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[W]here no inquiry is made and
answered concerning incumbrances on
the property sought to be insured,
and no voluntary statement is made
concerning the existence or
nonexistence of incumbrances, there
is no representation or statement
in the application for the
insurance which will render
applicable section 639, Kentucky
Statutes.2
Where one applying for insurance
does make answer to inquiries, or
makes statements voluntarily, this
court has consistently held that
section 639 controls, and that, if
the fact be material and the answer
untrue, the policy is avoided,
whether the applicant knew the
statement to be untrue or not, and
regardless of any fraud or intent
to mislead or deceive the insurer.
[citations omitted]
But where no inquiry is made and
answered concerning incumbrances,
and no voluntary statement in
regard thereto is made by the
applicant for insurance, an
avoidance of the policy will not be
declared unless the insured has
fraudulently failed to disclose the
fact of an incumbrance material to
the risk assumed by the company.
Layne, 172 S.W. at 1091-1092.
The court further stated:
[T]he rule in this state is that,
if no inquiry is made and answered
concerning incumbrances and no
voluntary statement is made by
insured in regard thereto, the
failure to disclose the existence
of incumbrances on the property
sought to be insured will not be
grounds for avoidance of the
policy, unless: (1) The insured
fraudulently failed to make such
disclosure; and (2) unless the
2
This appears to be a forerunner of KRS 304.14-110. [footnote added]
-13-
incumbrance was material to the
risk assumed by the company.
Id. at 1092-1093.
The same result was reached by this Court in First
Federated Life Insurance Company v. Citizens Bank & Trust
Company, Ky. App., 593 S.W.2d 97 (1980).
In that case, the
insured, who had previously been diagnosed with leukemia,
purchased a truck on an installment contract.
Although it is not
clear from the facts, it appears that the insurer issued a credit
life insurance policy to the insured with the bank as beneficiary
to cover the outstanding balance on the truck.
Neither the
dealership, the bank, or the insurer knew of the insured’s
condition, nor did the policy require evidence of the
insurability of the insured, a medical exam of the insured, or
any representation as to the insured’s health.
When the insured
ultimately died with the balance of the installment contract due
and owing, the insurer refused payment under the policy, arguing
that “[k]nowledge of the insured of his terminal illness at the
time of the procurement of the subject policies of credit life
insurance precludes recovery under said policies.”
Federated, 593 S.W.2d at 98-99.
First
In holding that the insurer had
a duty to pay the proceeds in accordance with the terms of the
policy, the Court held:
[T]he issuance of insurance is
predicated upon a borrower’s
request and payment of a premium.
There is no evidence of
prerequisite oral or written
representations in regard to
application for the insurance so as
to raise a defense or bar recovery
under K.R.S. 304.14-110. Insofar
-14-
as appellant required no statement
of health condition, examination or
application, it should therefore
bear the greater of the risks of
the debtor, being of unsound health
at the time of issuance of the
credit life policy. The policy of
insurance issued in this case was
absent a requirement for furnishing
satisfactory evidence of
insurability, and there is no
policy provision affecting the
validity of the policy in the event
the insured was of unsound health
at the time the policy was issued.
Id. at 99.
In Roess v. St. Paul and Marine Insurance Company, 383
F.Supp. 1231 (M.D. Fla. 1974), a statute identical to KRS 304.14110 was construed to reach the same result.
In ruling that an
insured’s failure to disclose the pendency of a taxpayers’ suit
to the insurer did not void the policy, the Court explained:
[T]he statute simply does not apply
to concealment or other species of
fraud not related to questions
asked or representations made
either on an application form or
during the course of other special
negotiations preceding issuance of
the policy. In the circumstances
of this case, therefore, since the
subject of pending litigation was
not broached in the application
form nor otherwise discussed in any
separate negotiations, one must
look beyond the statute to the
common law in order to determine
the rights and obligations of the
parties.
The modern rule seems to be that
the insurer has a duty to make
inquiry concerning matters deemed
by it to be material to the risk,
and the insured is entitled to a
presumption that information not
requested is deemed immaterial.
Thus, where no inquiry is made
-15-
about matters alleged to have been
concealed, the insurer may avoid
the policy only by proving that the
concealment was in fact material
and, further, that the withholding
of such information was intentional
and fraudulent. [citations omitted]
In summary, therefore, the nondisclosure by Roess of the pendency
of the taxpayers’ suit at the time
the policy was issued was not a
‘concealment’ within the meaning of
Florida Statute [Sec.] 627.409
since no inquiry was made of him
concerning that subject matter. On
the other hand, if the insurer
could allege and prove that the
pendency of the suit was material
to the risk from an underwriting
standpoint (overcoming the adverse
presumption arising from the lack
of inquiry); and could further
prove that the nondisclosure of
such fact was an intentional and
fraudulent concealment by Roess, it
would then be entitled to relief
under the traditional common law
rule. [citation omitted]
Roess, 383 F.Supp. at 1236-1237.
Based on the foregoing, because KRS 304.14-110 does not
apply, ACIC must show that NKC’s failure to divulge information
concerning the fire on its application was both fraudulent and
material to the risk.
We agree with the trial court that ACIC
has failed in its burden of proof as to these two requirements.
First, ACIC makes no argument in its brief on appeal
that NKC acted fraudulently in failing to disclose the occurrence
of the fire.
Instead, ACIC has chosen to base its arguments on
the allegation that NKC’s failure to disclose was an intentional
misrepresentation as opposed to a fraudulent one.
-16-
Secondly, ACIC has failed to show that the fact that
the fire occurred would have been material to the risk insured
against.
The facts of this case clearly show that both NKC and
ACIC, as soon as it was informed of the claim as established by
Barreca’s testimony, believed that the Gordon claim would result
in no liability to NKC, and that even if it did no one
anticipated that it would exceed NKC’s self-insured reserve of
$2,000,000.
It is also clear from ACIC’s actions once it had
knowledge of the Gordon claim that it did not believe it to be
material to the risk insured against because it kept renewing
NKC’s policy for several years after the fire.
In light of the
fact that ACIC kept renewing NKC’s policy and received
substantial premiums for doing so despite the fact that it had
full knowledge of the Gordon claim, it cannot not be heard to
claim that the occurrence of the fire was a fact which was
material to the risk insured against.
We are also unpersuaded that the correspondence from
Nevels placed a duty on NKC to disclose the occurrence of the
fire.
First, Nevels only requested that NKC disclose all
previously reported claims.
Under the terms of the policy, the
Gordon claim did not become a claim until suit was filed, which
did not occur until January 13, 1989.
We also believe that the
fire was not an “occurrence” which should have been disclosed in
answer to Nevels’ request.
All parties involved chose to treat
the Gordon claim as a matter which would not result in liability
to NKC, so it does not appear to have been an occurrence which
had the potential to ripen into a claim.
-17-
Finally, we are unpersuaded by ACIC’s argument that the
language appearing above Smither’s signature on the excess policy
application3 required disclosure of the fire.
As we have
demonstrated, ACIC’s own actions once it had knowledge of the
fire show that this did not become a relevant fact until it was
called upon to do what it agreed to do under the terms of the
policy.
We do not believe that the trial court erred in finding
that NKC’s failure to disclose the fact of the fire was not
material, intentional, or fraudulent.
ACIC next argues that there was no coverage for the
Gordon claim based on the express language of the policy.
support of its argument, ACIC relies on the following
In
language
which provided that coverage under the policy did not extend:
[t]o liability of the insured for
damages resulting from an injury,
harm, or loss if, prior to the
inception of this policy period,
any claim has been made against the
insured by anyone for such damages
or if the insured could have
reasonably foreseen that such
injury, harm, or loss might result
in a claim for such damages.
Based on the foregoing, ACIC maintains that because NKC could
have reasonably foreseen that a claim might be made as a result
of the fire there is no coverage.
We disagree.
Once again, we
find that all parties to this lawsuit reasonably believed that no
liability to NKC would result from the fire.
As NKC illustrates
in its brief on appeal, “[b]oth John Smither and ACIC’s claim
manager, Lori Barreca, concluded, even after suit was filed, that
3
“We know of no other relevant facts which might affect underwriter’s judgment when
considering this application.”
-18-
the Gordon incident did not implicate [NKC] and presented no
potential liability on the part of [NKC]. [ACIC’s] expert
confirmed that it was reasonable for Mr. Smither to believe this
incident would not result in a claim for damages against [NKC].”
Finally, ACIC contends that the trial court did not
correctly calculate the damages.
ACIC’s argument is two-fold:
(1) should NKC’s self insured reserve of $2,000,000 have been
deducted after accruing interest, or should interest accrue only
on the amount over and above ACIC’s self-insured obligation; and
(2) should interest accrue at 8% as opposed to 12%.
In regard to the first argument, ACIC maintains that
interest should have accrued only on $983,806.60, that figure
representing the balance of the original judgment in the Gordon
claim once NKC’s self-insured obligation of $2,000,000 is
subtracted out.
ACIC maintains that the effect of the trial
court’s accrual of interest on $2,983,806.60 is to require it to
pay interest on the entire judgment as opposed to the portion of
the judgment that NKC argues ACIC is liable to pay.
We disagree.
Under the terms of the policy, ACIC agreed to
pay on behalf of [NKC] for ultimate
net loss in excess of the
underlying limit or retained limit
which [NKC] shall become legally
obligated to pay . . . for damages
because of . . . bodily injury . .
. caused by or arising out of an
occurrence[.]
“Ultimate net loss” was defined in the policy as:
(a) all sums which [NKC] shall
become legally obligated to pay as
damages arising from an occurrence
to which this policy applies; and
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(b) all expenses incurred by [NKC]
in the investigation, negotiation,
settlement and defense of any such
claims or suit seeking such damages
excluding only the salaries of
[NKC’s] regular employees.
We agree with the trial court’s finding that based on
the definition of “ultimate net loss” contained in the policy,
the sum which NKC was “legally obligated to pay as damages” was
the sum it actually paid in December 1994.
Having considered the parties’ arguments on appeal, the
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
William D. Grubbs
Louisville, KY
Harry L. Mathison
Henderson, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Elizabeth Ullmer Mendel
William D. Grubbs
Louisville, KY
-20-
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