NEVADA D. GWYNN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: October 29, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002273-MR
NEVADA D. GWYNN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN MERSHON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-000720
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; HUDDLESTON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE.
Nevada D. Gwynn was arrested for non-support, a
Class A misdemeanor (KRS 530.050).
He was subsequently convicted
and sentenced to serve twelve months of incarceration in the
Jefferson County jail.
On September 2, 1997, Gwynn escaped from
the River City Correctional Complex jail.
Gwynn was arrested for escape.
On February 28,1 1998,
On March 18, 1998, Gwynn was
indicted for second-degree escape, a Class D felony (KRS
520.030).
Gwynn pleaded guilty to the escape charge, and on May
5, 1998, pursuant to the plea agreement, judgment was entered
sentencing him to eighteen months’ imprisonment.
1
February 23 according to Gwynn.
The judgment
stated that, “[t]he Defendant shall be entitled to credit for
time spent in custody prior to this sentencing.
KRS 532.120.
The amount of days is to be calculated by the Division of
Probation and Parole.”
The Division of Probation and Parole calculated that
Gwynn was entitled to one day of jail-time credit on his escape
conviction.
On July 27, 1998, Gwynn filed a motion alleging that
he was entitled to seventy-five days of jail-time credit.2
At
the trial court’s request, the Division of Probation and Parole
recalculated Gwynn’s jail-time credit and again concluded that
Gwynn was entitled to only one day of jail-time credit.
The
jail-time credit calculation sheet prepared by Probation and
Parole noted that, “[s]ubject receives no jail time credit for
the period from February 28, 1998 to 5/8/98 since he was
simultaneously serving a twelve month sentence for Non-Support
I[.]”
The trial court denied Gwynn’s motion for seventy-five
days of jail-time credit.
On August 26, 1998, Gwynn filed a motion for a
declaration of rights (KRS 418.040), again asserting that he was
entitled to seventy-five days of jail-time credit on his escape
charge.
The motion was “overruled” and this appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, Gwynn alleges that his
eighteen-month escape sentence was to run concurrently with his
2
Gwynn was apparently transferred from the Jefferson
County jail system to the Department of Corrections on May 9,
1998. Gwynn claims that he was arrested on the escape charge on
February 23. February 23 to May 9 is 75 days. Gwynn apparently
served out his non-support sentence on May 8, 1998. The one day
of credit time calculated by Probation and Parole was apparently
for the day of May 9, 1998.
-2-
twelve-month non-support sentence.
The judgment of sentence on
the escape charge is silent as to this issue.
In the usual case,
if the judgment is silent on whether sentences are to be run
consecutively or concurrently, the sentences are deemed to be run
concurrently.
KRS 532.110(2).
Moreover, in the usual case, a
definite sentence for a misdemeanor and an indeterminate sentence
for a felony must run concurrently.
KRS 532.110(1)(a).
However,
an escape sentence cannot be run concurrently with any other
sentence.
KRS 532.110(4).
Contrary to Gwynn’s claim, under our
sentencing statutes, his non-support sentence must be run
consecutively with his escape conviction.
Gwynn argues that he is entitled to seventy-five days
of jail-time credit pursuant to KRS 532.120 and Bailey v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 598 S.W.2d 472 (1980).
We disagree.
532.120(3) provides as follows:
Time spent in custody prior to the
commencement of a sentence as a result of the
charge that culminated in the sentence shall
be credited by the court imposing sentence
toward service of the maximum term of
imprisonment. If the sentence is to an
indeterminate term of imprisonment, the time
spent in custody prior to the commencement of
the sentence shall be considered for all
purposes as time served in prison. (emphasis
added)
KRS 532.120(5) provides as follows:
If a person serving a sentence of
imprisonment escapes from custody, the escape
shall interrupt the sentence. The
interruption shall continue until the person
is returned to the institution from which he
escaped or to an institution administered by
the Department of Corrections. Time spent in
actual custody prior to return under this
subsection shall be credited against the
sentence if custody rested solely on an
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KRS
arrest or surrender for the escape itself.
(emphasis added)
The incarceration time following Gwynn’s arrest was
credited against his non-support sentence and, in fact, Gwynn
apparently served enough time in Jefferson County following his
escape arrest to serve-out his non-support sentence.
Gwynn is
not entitled to credit under KRS 532.120(3) because the time
Gwynn spent in custody prior to the commencement of the escape
sentence was not “as a result” of the escape.
The time in
question, from approximately February 28, 1998, until
approximately May 8, 1998, was custody “as a result of” the nonsupport charge, as evidenced by the fact that the time served
during that period was credited against Gwynn’s non-support
sentence.
Similarly, Gwynn is not entitled to credit time under
KRS 532.120(5) because custody following his arrest did not rest
solely on an arrest for the escape itself.
Custody, rather,
rested upon the non-support conviction.
While Gwynn’s escape from custody did interrupt his
non-support sentence, that interruption ended upon his February
1998 arrest because he was returned to the “same institution”
from which he escaped.
532.120(5).
Gwynn argues that he escaped
from River City Correctional Complex and was returned to
Jefferson County Corrections Center.
However, Gwynn escaped from
the Jefferson County jail system and he was returned to the
Jefferson County jail system.
The interruption of sentence
-4-
triggered by his escape ended upon his arrest.
See Martin v.
Commonwealth, KY. App., 957 S.W.2d 262 (1997); KRS 532.120(5).
Gwynn’s reliance on Bailey v. Commonwealth, supra, is
misplaced because in that case the escapee, Bailey, was a state
prisoner who escaped from Blackburn Correctional Institute, a
prison administered by the Department of Corrections.
532.100; KRS 197.010(4).
KRS
Bailey was captured in Fayette County
and held in Fayette County Detention Center, a jail facility
administered by the Fayette County jail system.
See KRS 441.025.
Pursuant to KRS 532.120(5), Bailey’s sentence for his underlying
felony sentence was interrupted during his incarceration outside
a Department of Corrections administrated facility.
473.
Bailey at
Similarly, since his incarceration in Fayette County was
premised exclusively on his escape charge, Bailey was entitled to
credit against the escape sentence.
KRS 532.120(5).
Bailey did
not, however, receive credit against both sentences, which is
what Gwynn, in effect, seeks to do.
Since Gwynn received credit for the time awaiting
sentencing against the underlying misdemeanor sentence, he was
not also entitled to credit against his eighteen-month escape
sentence.
Martin 957 S.W.2d at 264.
In fact, since KRS
532.110(4) required that Gwynn’s sentence for escape run
consecutively with his underlying misdemeanor sentence, he could
not receive credit against both sentences.
Id.
Accordingly, the order denying Gwynn’s motion for a
declaration that he is entitled to seventy-five days of jail-time
credit is affirmed.
-5-
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Nevada D. Gwynn, Pro Se
Eddyville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Anitria M. Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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