NOVELLIA MOSLEY, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF BILLIE JO MITCHELL v. PAUL HUNT THOMPSON, SHERIFF OF FLOYD COUNTY
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RENDERED: August 20, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002113-MR
NOVELLIA MOSLEY, ADMINISTRATRIX OF
THE ESTATE OF BILLIE JO MITCHELL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLEY ASBURY, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00005
v.
PAUL HUNT THOMPSON, SHERIFF
OF FLOYD COUNTY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, BUCKINGHAM, AND KNOX, JUDGES.
KNOX, JUDGE:
On December 29, 1996, Andy Mitchell was arrested
for assaulting his estranged wife, Billie Jo.
Shortly
thereafter, on January 6, 1997, Billie Jo obtained a Domestic
Violence Order (DVO) against Andy.
It appears that Andy violated
the terms of the DVO more than once over the course of the year.
On October 28, 1997, while Billie Jo and a police officer were
attempting to retrieve Billie Jo’s belongings from the couple’s
house, Andy became violent.
Although he was arrested for
disorderly conduct, he was released on bond that same day.
The next day, October 29, 1997, Andy again violated the
terms of the DVO, in response to which the district court issued
a warrant for Andy’s arrest, forthwith.
The order recited the
court’s belief that Andy was armed and dangerous.
The warrant
was placed in the hands of appellee sheriff, Paul Hunt Thompson,
for service.
The warrant, however, was never served, and Andy
remained at-large over the next several days.
On November 2,
1997, Andy shot and killed Billie Jo.
In January 1998, appellant, after having been appointed
administratrix of Billie Jo’s estate, filed this wrongful death
action against appellee in his capacity as sheriff.
Appellant
alleged several counts of negligence on appellee’s part for his
failure to arrest Andy Mitchell prior to Billie Jo’s death.
In
response, appellee moved the circuit court to dismiss the action
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Specifically, appellee argued that appellant had sued him in his
official capacity only, rather than in both his official and
individual capacities, in which case, appellee maintained, he was
immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Alternatively, he argued in his motion to dismiss, even
had appellant sued him in his individual capacity, he did not owe
a duty to Billie Jo Mitchell of protecting her from harm and,
thus, could not be held liable for negligence.
Appellee further
argued that the service of arrest warrants constitutes a
discretionary function within the scope of his authority and
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that, as such, pursuant to case law, he could not be held liable
for the failure to arrest Andy Mitchell.
Finally, appellee
maintained, even if his failure to act were negligent, Andy’s
intentional and criminal conduct constituted an intervening and
superseding cause of Billie Jo’s death.
Thus, he argued, any
negligence on his part for failure to arrest Andy could not
possibly be the proximate cause of death, and he would not be
liable in any event.
Appellant filed a motion to amend her complaint to add
appellee in his individual capacity as a party to the lawsuit.
The Floyd Circuit Court heard both motions, appellee’s to dismiss
and appellant’s to amend, on the same day.
Shortly thereafter,
the court granted appellee’s motion to dismiss and entered
judgment in his favor, finding that: (1) appellee owed no duty to
Billie Jo to arrest Andy Mitchell; and, (2) appellee’s failure to
arrest Andy was not the proximate cause of the fatal injuries
suffered by Billie Jo.
The court denied appellant’s motion to
amend the complaint.1
On appeal, appellant argues that the act of serving an
arrest warrant is a ministerial function, not discretionary in
nature, and that, as such, sovereign immunity does not
necessarily protect appellee from exposure to liability for
negligence.
Further, appellant argues that appellee did, in
fact, owe Billie Jo the duty of protecting her, given that Billie
1
Appellant has not appealed that portion of the judgment
denying appellant’s motion to amend the complaint, and we do not
address that issue herein.
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Jo had been previously victimized by Andy and was an identifiable
individual clearly in danger.
In essence, appellant argues that Billie Jo’s death was
foreseeable, given the circumstances, and that, as such, appellee
did, in fact, owe Billie Jo the duty of protection.
This
argument, however, is one which is applicable only when a
government official, such as the sheriff in this case, has been
sued for negligence in his individual capacity.
See Corrections
Cabinet v. Vester, Ky., 956 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1997) (“If the
ultimate injuries were not foreseeable to the governmental
officials in their individual capacity, and if the victim of the
injury was not identifiable, there was no duty to prevent such an
injury.” (Quoting Fryman v. Harrison, Ky., 896 S.W.2d 908, 909
(1995) (emphasis added)).
Appellant did not sue appellee in his individual
capacity, but rather in his official capacity as sheriff.
In
fact, appellee, individually, was never made a party to this
lawsuit, the court’s having denied appellant’s motion to do so.
Yet, by way of its notice of appeal, appellant named appellee, in
his individual capacity, as a party to this appeal, and proceeded
to advance before this Court the argument that there is evidence
establishing individual liability on appellee’s part.
However,
appellant did not appeal the issue of whether the trial court
improperly denied the opportunity to add appellee to the lawsuit,
in his individual capacity.
Thus, the issue of appellee’s
liability in such capacity is not before us, and appellant’s
arguments, all of which are designed to persuade this Court that
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this case should proceed on the basis that the evidence
establishes individual liability, must fail.
It appears the circuit court did not address the issue
of sovereign immunity, when it should have done so prior to
addressing the substantive issues, e.g. duty and proximate cause,
which presume appellee’s status in the lawsuit as an individual.
However, we believe that although the court omitted this
important step, its conclusion that appellant failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted was correct, albeit for a
different reason, i.e. appellee, in his official capacity as
sheriff, is protected under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
See Franklin County, Kentucky v. Malone, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 195
(1997).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Floyd Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John David Preston
Phil A. Stalnaker
Pikeville, Kentucky
Marshall R. Hixson
Lexington, Kentucky
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