OMAR THOMAS COLEY v. ANITA EDGING
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 12, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002082-MR
OMAR THOMAS COLEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEFF HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1997-CI-00096
v.
ANITA EDGING
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, HUDDLESTON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order and judgment of
the McCracken Circuit Court, enforcing the provisions of an
Indiana dissolution decree and entering a judgment against the
appellant for a child support arrearage.
We conclude that the
trial court correctly determined that an alleged oral agreement
to modify child support could not be enforced.
Hence, we affirm.
The appellant, Omar Thomas Coley, and the appellee,
Anita Edging, were married in 1984.
On March 12, 1996, their
marriage was dissolved by a decree of the Vanderburgh Superior
Court in the State of Indiana.
The Indiana decree adopted a
written settlement agreement which, among other things, required
Coley to pay the sum of $300.00 per week in child support for the
parties’ two (2) children.
Shortly thereafter, Coley became unemployed and fell
behind in his child support payments.
In 1997, Edging, now a
resident of Kentucky, brought an action in McCracken Circuit
Court to enforce the Indiana decree.
Coley, who is also a
resident of Kentucky, did not respond to the complaint.
On April
30, 1997, the trial court entered an order granting full faith
and credit to the Indiana decree.
Subsequently, Edging filed a motion to obtain a
judgment for the child support arrearage and to enforce several
other provisions of the decree.
In response, Coley alleged that
in June 1996 he and Edging entered into an oral agreement wherein
his child support obligation would be modified depending on his
income from his new employment.
The matter was referred to the
domestic relations commissioner, who conducted a hearing and
issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended
order.
The commissioner found that Coley had established the
existence of an enforceable oral agreement to modify child
support.
However, the trial court sustained Edging’s objections
to the commissioner’s report.1
The court found that the original
1
In the instant case and widely throughout this
jurisdiction, the term "exception" or some form thereof is used
to denote the procedure by which one obtains trial court review
of the report of a domestic relations commissioner pursuant to CR
53.06. The rule in question does not use the term "exception,"
but rather speaks of "objections." The terms “exception” and
“objection” are synonymous. Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.,
1991) p. 559.
In the interest of consistency with the rule, we
will use the term "objection" herein.
-2-
child support amount as set out in the Indiana decree had not
been modified by a subsequent oral agreement.
The trial court
calculated Coley’s child support arrearage accordingly.2
Coley
now appeals from this portion of the judgment.
As a preliminary matter, Edging argues that the trial
court’s order of April 30, 1997, enforcing the Indiana decree
voids any prior oral agreements.
We disagree.
After the trial
court entered its April 30 order, the Indiana decree became
enforceable in Kentucky to the same extent that any Kentucky
decree would be.
However, the trial court’s order did not reduce
the child support arrearage to a judgment against Coley.
Consequently, we do not believe that the trial court’s order
granting enforcement of the Indiana decree precluded Coley from
raising the alleged oral agreement as a defense to the arrearage.
The substance of this appeal concerns whether Coley
proved the existence of an oral agreement to modify his child
support obligation with reasonable certainty.
The commissioner
found that the alleged oral agreement to modify child support
made by the parties on June 5, 1996, contained the following
terms:
No support obligation was due to Edging while Coley
remained unemployed.
Once Coley became employed the parties were
to use his income at the time of employment to determine the
amount of child support and arrearage that would be due after
2
The commissioner recommended that Coley’s child support
obligations be modified to a base support amount of $870.00 per
month, of which he is obligated to pay $431.00 per month
retroactive to the date of the oral agreement. Although the
trial court set aside the portion of the recommended order
retroactively modifying his child support obligation, it appears
that the trial court adopted that portion of the commissioner’s
recommended order which reduced Coley’s prospective payments.
-3-
June 5, 1996.
The commissioner found Coley’s evidence
establishing this agreement to be compelling.
He also found
Edging’s testimony to the contrary to be less than credible.
Coley first argues that the trial court erred in
setting aside the commissioner’s recommended findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
We disagree.
A trial court is not bound by
the domestic relations commissioner’s factual findings.
The
trial court has wide discretion to adopt, modify or reject the
commissioner's recommendations.
CR 53.06(2).
The court is free
to disregard those findings and to review the matter de novo.3
Eiland v. Ferrell, Ky., 937 S.W.2d 713, 716 (1997).
See also
Basham v. Wilkins, Ky. App., 851 S.W.2d 491 (1993) and Haley v.
Haley, Ky. App., 573 S.W.2d 354 (1978).
The role of this Court
is to review the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law, not those made by the commissioner.
A trial court’s
findings of fact shall not be set aside unless they are clearly
erroneous.
CR 52.01.
In the present case, the trial court did not state any
specific disagreement with the commissioner’s factual findings.
Rather, the trial court held that Coley had not carried his
burden of proving that an enforceable oral agreement existed.
An
oral agreement modifying child support payments must be proven
3
Having said this, we note that the commissioner is
frequently in the best position to judge the demeanor and
credibility of witnesses. When the trial court chooses to make
new factual findings based solely on the evidentiary transcript,
it loses the benefit of the commissioner’s observations. Thus,
the trial court should carefully consider all of the
commissioner’s observations and findings before making new
factual findings.
-4-
with reasonable certainty and must be reasonable in its terms.
Whicker v. Whicker, Ky. App., 711 S.W.2d 857, 859 (1986).
In
addition, the agreement will be enforced only if a modification
of child support might reasonably have been granted had such
modification been sought at the time the agreement was made.
Furthermore, such private agreements are enforceable only
prospectively, and will not apply to support payments which had
already become vested at the time the agreement was made. Id.
Regardless of the credibility of the witnesses, we
agree with the trial court that the alleged oral agreement to
modify child support was not proven with reasonable certainty.
The alleged agreement did not prospectively modify child support.
Rather, Edging merely agreed to suspend her efforts to collect
child support until Coley obtained employment.
The parties then
agreed to recalculate the amount of child support, including the
arrearage, at some future date.
It is well-established that an agreement which leaves
essential terms to be decided at a future date is not an
enforceable contract.
(1964).
Walker v. Keith, Ky., 382 S.W.2d 198
Furthermore, this lack of definiteness as to its terms
would have prevented the trial court from enforcing the agreement
had a motion been made at the time the agreement was made.
We recognize that this holding may place Coley in a
difficult position, facing a large and unexpected child support
arrearage.
However, parties who decline to obtain a modification
of a child support obligation from the courts run the risk of
having their private agreements declared invalid by a court when
they attempt to have the agreements judicially enforced.
-5-
Whicker
v. Whicker, 711 S.W.2d at 859.
Although the courts will enforce
such oral agreements when possible, we find as a matter of law
the trial court correctly determined that the alleged oral
agreement could not be enforced.
Accordingly, the judgment of the McCracken Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Leslie Judson Shekell
Paducah, Kentucky
Cynthia E. Sanderson
Paducah, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.